



THE POLITICAL AWAKENING
OF THE EAST

GEORGE MATTHEW DUTCHER



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The Political Awakening of the East

STUDIES OF POLITICAL PROGRESS IN EGYPT, INDIA,
CHINA, JAPAN, AND THE PHILIPPINES

By

GEORGE MATTHEW DUTCHER

Hedding Professor of History, Wesleyan University



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INTRODUCTION

GEORGE SLOCUM BENNETT, a graduate of Wesleyan University in the class of 1864, showed his lifelong interest in the training of youth for the privileges and duties of citizenship by long periods of service as a member of the board of education of his home city, and as member of the boards of trustees of Wyoming Seminary and Wesleyan University.

It was fitting, therefore, that, when the gifts made by himself and family to Wesleyan University were combined to form a fund whose income should be used "in defraying the expenses of providing for visiting lecturers, preachers, and other speakers supplemental to the college faculty," it should have been decided that the primary purpose should be to provide each year a course of lectures, by a distinguished speaker, "for the promotion of a better understanding of national problems and of a more perfect realization of the responsibilities of citizenship," and to provide for the publication of such lectures so that they might reach a larger public than the audience to which they should, in the first instance, be addressed.

In arranging for the fifth course of lectures on this foundation, the committee made a radical departure from their usual procedure in selecting as the lecturer a member of the faculty of Wesleyan University, George Matthew Dutcher, Hedding Professor of History. During the academic year 1921-22 Professor Dutcher was granted leave of absence by the trustees of the University in order that he might make a first-hand study of political and social conditions in various eastern countries. In the course of his travels, which extended over a period of fifteen months, Professor Dutcher made the circuit of the globe, lecturing at a large number of foreign schools, colleges, and universities, where he enjoyed exceptional opportunities for the study of educational problems, and for making the acquaint-

tance of persons of distinction in all walks of life in many different countries. During the period of his absence important political changes were taking place in the various countries of the East, which were bound to have far-reaching effects. In particular, the question of the relations between the East and the West had begun to assume a greater importance, perhaps, than at any other time in history, and Professor Dutcher became especially interested in studying the growth and influence of western political ideas in eastern lands.

The committee on the Bennett Lectures were glad to make available to a Wesleyan audience the result of these timely investigations, undertaken by a scholar whose training and experience admirably fitted him for his task, and they now take pleasure in presenting the lectures in printed form.

STEPHEN HENRY OLIN,
DAVID GEORGE DOWNEY,
ALBERT WHEELER JOHNSTON,
FRANK EDGAR FARLEY,
HENRY MERRITT WRISTON.

PREFACE

THE invitation from President Shanklin to give this series of lectures reached me in Egypt after I had spent a considerable portion of my year of sabbatical leave, 1921-22, in visiting Japan, China, the Philippines, India, and other parts of the East. On the voyage from India to Egypt I had been reviewing the crowded experiences and varied observations of recent months in an endeavor to find some plan of formulating them in writing for my own satisfaction. It then became clear to me that, without quite realizing it, I had been making an intensive study of a great revolutionary, or transition, movement—perhaps the greatest in history—the penetration of modern ideas and methods among the peoples of the East.

So it happened that the plan for a series of studies on the progress of modern ideas in eastern lands was already worked out in my mind when the invitation with which the board of trustees and faculty of Wesleyan University so generously honored me arrived to offer a most unexpected occasion for presenting my subject.

The scope of the series of lectures precludes the treatment of the topic in all its amplitude. In addressing an audience composed primarily of students of history and government it was obvious that I should select for emphasis the factors involved in the acceptance by eastern peoples of western aims and methods in government rather than those of economic character or those of intellectual and ethical import. Even so, I have endeavored to indicate with some clearness the significant influence wielded by these other factors upon political developments in eastern lands. Though the countries dealt with in the successive lectures are those in which I spent most time, they represent many different types of conditions and problems, and they exemplify practically every important issue involved in any part of the East. As

the lectures were delivered on February 12-23, 1923, the account of each country has been brought up to the date of publication by the addition of a few paragraphs under the heading "Recent Events."

I cannot refrain from taking this occasion to express my sense of personal loss—a loss felt by all friends of Wesleyan—in the untimely death of Reuben Nelson Bennett, who shared in the establishment of this lectureship in memory of his father. It was my privilege to be associated with him in the arrangements for the original and several succeeding series of these lectures, and so I may feel that I understand the purposes which he had in mind. My thoughts have often turned to him as I have endeavored to prepare these lectures in harmony with his noble ideals.

I wish to express my gratitude for various forms of assistance in the preparation of these lectures, to several of my colleagues, but especially for the unstinted kindnesses of the two who are members of the committee in charge of this lectureship. I am also indebted for helpful suggestions to several friends who have read all or part of the proofs. These friends include natives of the countries studied and persons familiar with them through long residence or special study of their affairs.

It is not customary in this series of publications to include a dedicatory page, so I must avail myself of this place for the purpose. The journey which furnished the basis for these lectures was an equal partnership with one who was then, as ever, a "good sport" on the dark days as well as the bright ones—MY WIFE, to whom I inscribe this volume, every page of which recalls experiences which we shared under eastern skies.

At the same time we would both acknowledge our debt of gratitude to the many good friends scattered through all these eastern lands from whose intimate knowledge of the peoples among whom they live and work our own minds have been enriched. To their hospitality and kindnesses were due much of the comfort and pleasure of our journey. Nor would we forget the numerous nameless toilers of many races whose faithful performance of their humble tasks

assured our welfare and lightened our burdens by sea and by land.

It is my hope that these lectures may contribute in some measure to the development in our western nations of a more enlightened sympathy for the peoples of the eastern lands and may help to advance the day when all the great human brotherhood shall share the privileges now enjoyed by the most favored.

G. M. D.

Wesleyan University,
November, 1924.

WESLEYAN UNIVERSITY

GEORGE SLOCUM BENNETT FOUNDATION

LECTURES

For the Promotion of a Better Understanding of National Problems and of a More Perfect Realization of the Responsibilities of Citizenship.

First Series—1918-1919. STEPS IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY. By Andrew Cunningham McLaughlin.

Second Series—1919-1920. THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA. By George M. Wrong.

Third Series—1920-1921. THE VALIDITY OF AMERICAN IDEALS. By Shailer Mathews.

Fourth Series—1921-1922. THE IDEALS OF FRANCE. By Charles Cestre.

Fifth Series—1922-1923. THE POLITICAL AWAKENING OF THE EAST. By George Matthew Dutcher.



CHAPTER I

EGYPT

EGYPT, so far as we now know, is entitled to the double and paradoxical honor of being both the oldest and the youngest of the world's nations. Five thousand years ago, more or less, it began with Menes; eleven months since it made a new beginning with King Fuad. What influences conspired to produce the venerable Menes the world has quite forgotten these many centuries, but as for this Fuad, him I saw and the western influences which were operating in his eastern land I observed. Between the incorporeal Menes and the corpulent Fuad, as Egypt has swung along through the centuries, twice it has passed through periods when western influences have considerably affected its course, and now for a century and a quarter these western ideas have been even more potently determining its progress.

It was in the year 168 B. C. that the Roman envoy Popilius Lænas drew his famous circle in the sand near Alexandria, forced the conquering Syrian king to retreat, and asserted the political authority of Rome, the rising power of the West, which was to dominate Egypt for well nigh eight centuries. Then came the Mohammedan, whose sway has now endured beyond a dozen centuries despite the era of western crusading pressure from Godfrey and Baldwin, from Richard the Lion-Hearted and Saint-Louis, and despite the more recent French and English interventions inaugurated by the youthful Bonaparte in 1798.

To Egypt, the first home of art and learning, came Alexander the Great and the Greeks with the flower of antiquity's art and philosophy. To Egypt, where the arts of peace and the supremacy of law were first established, came Cæsar and his Romans to embrace it, last of Mediterranean lands, within the all-inclusive *pax Romana* and to extend over it the sway of law in its most perfect ancient charac-

ter. To Egypt, the world's oldest nation of traders, of feudal lords, and of masters of linguistic refinement, came Venetian ships bearing the crusading Frankish counts and knights to reopen long-fettered routes for the rich trade of the East on which Venice was to batten, and to introduce Frankish speech and influences which have never entirely vanished from the land of the Nile or been completely forgotten on the banks of the Seine.

To Mohammedan Egypt, in 1517, came the Turkish sultan, Selim, to reduce it to subjection to Mohammedan Constantinople as Christian Egypt had once been tributary to Christian Constantinople, and to filch from the decrepit heir of the Abbasides Islam's pontifical title of Caliph. There followed for the devoted country three cruel, dreary centuries. The Turk and his Mamelukes were extortioners and oppressors whose benighted sway can not fairly be accounted typical of Mohammedanism. At the end of the eighteenth century relief came suddenly and from an unexpected quarter, when there appeared in Egypt Bonaparte, the child of the French Revolution, posing as a new Alexander and a new Cæsar, accompanied not merely with fleet and army but also by an academy of scientists and men of letters, to bring the land of the Pharaohs within the circle of western imperialism, liberalism, and enlightenment.

While "from the summits of yonder pyramids forty centuries" looked down, the young conqueror transformed the land as by enchantment and gave to its people for the first time in generations the breath of new life. The lucky find of the Rosetta stone by one of Bonaparte's officers enabled Champollion a score of years later to begin the interpretation of the nation's long-forgotten history from its mysterious monuments. Thus a French general brought to life and activity once more the peoples of the land in which the world's civilization was born, and a French scholar began the unraveling of the story of its ancient achievements and grandeur. Civilization had started a backfire; the West had begun to react upon the East; the progress of modern western ideas in eastern lands was under way.

In 1769, in the same year as Bonaparte, there was born

in the native land of Alexander the Great, Mehemet Ali, the second of the creators of modern Egypt. At the age of thirty he arrived in Egypt as an officer in the Turkish army sent to expel the French. After participating in the events which led to the capitulation of the French to the English and to the English evacuation of Egypt, he intrigued and fought his way up until in 1805 he was recognized by the sultan as pasha of Egypt. It is no part of our problem to deal with his exploits and schemes outside Egypt, either as the agent or as the enemy of the sultan, which made him a conspicuous and sometimes troublesome international figure till his death in 1849.

It is, however, significant to record Mehemet Ali's achievements inside Egypt. In 1811 he completed the destruction of the Mamelukes begun by Bonaparte, thus extinguishing the military organization which had dominated the country for centuries. His resumption, or confiscation, of extensive lands was accompanied by the first alterations in many a century in the tenure of the *fellaheen*, the tillers of the soil. He established various forms of manufacturing, built roads and canals, encouraged commerce, introduced improvements in agriculture, established hospitals, and, besides promoting education within the country, sent brilliant youths to western Europe to pursue their studies, especially in medicine. Europeans were permitted and encouraged to settle in Egypt. His admiration for the French found expression not merely in his political policies but also in his borrowing of ideas and methods and in the utilization of the services of numerous Frenchmen for the promotion of his enterprises for the improvement of the nation to which he had given a quasi-independent status after centuries of subjection.

Valuable as was Mehemet Ali's work for Egypt, it must be recognized that he was not laboring to promote the welfare of the Egyptian people but to create for himself and his family an empire. He was not an Egyptian striving to redeem and uplift his people, but an alien, thrown by chance upon Egyptian soil, where fortune and his own talents gave him the opportunity to seize the government and found a

dynasty with which the history of the country has ever since been linked. To this shrewd adventurer modern ideas were not an end in themselves, they were but means to the accomplishment of his aims and to the establishment of a power which could maintain itself in the international competition of the new age, whose tendencies he was keen enough to discern.

Whatever may have been the reasons which lured ancient conquerors to Egypt, it was not Egypt itself which had attracted the Venetians in the time of the Crusades or Bonaparte at the close of the eighteenth century. To the Venetians Egypt was merely an *entrepôt* on a great trade route; to the French it was a post of vantage, a half-way station, on the route of empire as well as trade which led from Europe to India and the East. To safeguard their trade and empire in India the English drove Bonaparte out of Egypt. Throughout the first three quarters of the nineteenth century England proved strangely negligent of its interests in the Egyptian portal to India, while France steadily extended its influence there and was customarily the best European friend of Mehemet Ali and his descendants. Only at critical moments did England rouse itself to active measures, and then, by good fortune, with success. French influence culminated in the construction of the Suez canal by Lesseps, but English interests soon countered with Disraeli's famous *coup* of purchasing the Khedive Ismail's shares in the canal company in 1875.

Ismail, like his predecessors Mehemet Ali and Said, had welcomed numerous foreigners to Egypt, not a few of whom fattened themselves on the khedive's favor. Ismail delighted to play before their eyes the enlightened patron of western ways while behind the curtain he was acting the oriental despot in outrageous exactions upon his subjects. Lord Cromer dubbed him "the great high-priest of Sham." When his credit was exhausted, he was compelled by certain European powers, in 1876, to permit the creation of a commission of the public debt, the *caisse*, to safeguard his creditors, and later to accept European members in his ministry to regulate his policies, especially in financial matters. This humilia-

tion he sought to evade by plotting the call of a national parliament, but such audacity was punished by his dethronement and supersession by his son Tewfik. Ismail's vanity and craft had led him to patronize Europeans, to parody western ways, and at the last to acquaint the Egyptians with the two great modern shibboleths of nationalism and democracy. For good or ill his tawdry rule inaugurated a new epoch in Egyptian history.

Though Mehemet Ali had reserved the higher stations in the army for Turks, Ismail had permitted native Egyptians to work their way up in the service. One of these successful officers, Arabi Pasha, became the leader of a native group who caught at the new ideas, especially nationalism, and succeeded in arousing those who felt the insult of rule by European ministers and of foreign financial control. Other factors, no doubt, entered into the case, but suffice it to mention that in June, 1882, a considerable number of Europeans were murdered in Alexandria by a Mohammedan mob.

A month later a British fleet bombarded the forts of Alexandria, which it was believed Arabi, then minister of war, was strengthening in spite of a warning from the admiral. The previous day the French fleet had deliberately sailed away, and the sultan was temporizing. England thus was left to intervene single-handed to protect European interests in Egypt. Since that date, with unwillingness and hesitation and in face of the unfriendly attitude of the other powers, it has controlled the fortunes of the country. In September, 1882, a British force captured Arabi and put his followers to flight; so, by the action of one of the most democratic nations, vanished the first dream of Egyptian nationalism and democracy.

The British had awakened one morning to find themselves in control of Egypt. They explained that, finding themselves in Egypt, they could not possibly find their way out at once without being guilty of deserting their post, but that they intended to withdraw as speedily as circumstances might permit. The British government occupied Egypt as a sort of trustee for the despotic khedive and also for European bondholders, and yet the British people claim their govern-

ment is the most democratic in the world. Strange conflicts of interests and of ideas at London and in Cairo, uncertainty and wavering instead of clean-cut and consistent policies, became inevitable. Unkind fate did not omit the handicap of international jealousies. This was a problem in real life; someone must undertake its solution. Imagine yourself stationed at Cairo then as England's agent, and ask yourself how many months you could have held the post. England's first choice was Sir Evelyn Baring; he served twenty-five years and retired as Lord Cromer. The tangles he unraveled were many; the achievements he wrought were notable.

With all his difficulties, Sir Evelyn Baring had certain advantages. The khedive, Tewfik, was a loyal supporter if not an intelligent co-worker. As he quaintly put it, "Tewfik should be remembered as the khedive who allowed Egypt to be reformed in spite of the Egyptians." Then, too, Baring had the advantage of an illuminating apprenticeship in India, where he had administered the finances of that empire and had learned how to govern eastern peoples. From India, moreover, he was able to draft experienced officials to aid him in directing every important undertaking.

Toward the close of his administration the Anglo-French convention of 1904, at last, relieved him of his most jealous international critic and gave him instead his first international supporter. Still all did not go well. In 1892, Tewfik died and his successor, Abbas Hilmi, who had been educated at Vienna, added to his oriental heritage of despotic ideas the European conceptions of divine-right monarchy and displayed a tendency to become a satellite of the infamous sultan, Abdul Hamid. Cromer's masterful management irked him and he never ceased to tug at the leash.

It was no easy task that awaited Cromer's successor, one of his own pupils and lieutenants, Sir Eldon Gorst, who had scarcely entered upon his duties when the Young Turk revolution at Constantinople in 1908 suddenly altered conditions in the Ottoman Empire, of which Egypt was more than technically a part. The triumph of this aggressive group of nationalists and constitutionalists could not be

without its repercussion in Egypt. Many young Egyptians of the better classes had been getting their education in Europe, or at any rate along modern lines, and not a few of them were ready to grasp the lesson of the Turkish revolution. The khedive, Abbas, also read some of the signs of the times and, as the Young Turks became more nationalist and less constitutionalist, gradually came to align himself with them and, like them, to fall under the German influences which were rife at Constantinople, where he was a frequent visitor.

In 1911 Sir Eldon Gorst's broken health compelled him to give place to Lord Kitchener, who combined both Indian and Egyptian experience, but as an army man, not as a diplomatist or a civilian like his predecessors. His justly won prestige in Egypt served him in good stead, but forces were at work both in Egypt and in the larger world which would soon compel more radical action than had yet been anticipated. Experience with the municipal, provincial, and legislative councils devised by Lord Dufferin in 1882 was bound to lead to an increased native participation in government. This tendency was confirmed not merely by the Turkish revolution but by the corresponding developments elsewhere, notably in the Indian councils act of 1909. An even more striking case was the formation in 1910 of the Union of South Africa, including two states which had been at war with Great Britain within a decade.

The Turkish disasters in the Italian and Balkan wars of 1911-1913 created a deeply unfavorable impression throughout the Mohammedan world, which included Egypt. Finally the behavior of Abbas was rapidly making his continued occupation of the khedivate incompatible with British administration. In 1913 Kitchener accorded Egypt an organic law comparable to the Indian councils act of 1909; and early in 1914 he was apparently contemplating the termination of the irritating career of Abbas. It should be observed that Abbas knew, as his grandfather Ismail had not known, how to play on the nationalist spirit while adhering unflinchingly to his despotic notions.

Then came the World War and with it sudden and far-

reaching changes for Egypt. When Turkey entered the war as the ally of Germany, Great Britain declared, on December 18, 1914, the termination of the Turkish suzerainty over Egypt and the establishment of a British protectorate. On the following day there was announced the dethronement of Abbas, who had been for some months in Constantinople, and the accession in his stead of his uncle Hussein with the ill-chosen title of sultan. These transactions were accomplished by British fiat without any effort to give them the semblance of actions of the Egyptian nation, the chief party in interest.

Great Britain not only flagrantly disregarded Egyptian sentiment, but also threw away the opportunity to develop among the Egyptians a spirit of voluntary loyalty and service which would have made them feel their membership in the British Commonwealth of Nations to which they might naturally assume they were now a party. While Egypt was expressly excluded from the privilege accorded, without question, to the dominions, the colonies, and even India, of volunteering to share the burdens of the war, various burdens of war were actually imposed upon the country, notably by the creation of the Egyptian labor corps and of the camel and donkey transport corps.

In other ways the World War had its effects upon Egypt. The service of the *fellaheen* in the corps just mentioned could not fail to have an educating influence, nor could the presence in Egypt of the great British forces recruited from all parts of the empire. This utilization of Egypt as a great base camp and other war-time conditions, such as those affecting the cotton market, necessarily involved the pouring into Egypt of an unwonted amount of wealth, with its consequent effects. More potent still was the example, glaring in Egyptian eyes, of the more liberal policy pursued with reference to India which culminated in the Montagu-Chelmsford reforms.

These measures stood out in flagrant contrast with the halting performances with reference to Egypt since the proclamation of the protectorate. During the war there were repeated changes in the office of British high commis-

sioner and also in the chief command of the armed forces in Egypt, and the selections did not invariably prove wise. It must be recorded as highly creditable to the Egyptian people that, despite these circumstances, they remained quiet and gave the British authorities practically no cause for anxiety throughout the war. The death, in 1917, of the highly respected Sultan Hussein was a serious loss for which the selection of his brother Fuad as his successor was slight compensation.

These ineptitudes of British policy in dealing with Egypt did not cease with the war. Two days after the armistice, November 13, 1918, Saad Pasha Zaghlul, a former cabinet minister and the elected vice-president of the legislative council, which had not been summoned to meet throughout the war, called with some friends on the British high commissioner, Sir Reginald Wingate, and speaking as the representative of the Egyptian people demanded the abolition of the protectorate and the recognition of the complete independence of Egypt. The British statement issued at the time of proclamation of the protectorate afforded reasonable pretext for such a demand, and the delay in raising the question until after the armistice showed that the quiescence of the Egyptian people during the war had been a deliberate policy not to embarrass England. With the close of hostilities would come the peace negotiations and the readjustment of all questions of territorial status which had developed during the war. The case of Egypt was obviously one of these questions, and one in which the people of Egypt naturally felt they had a vital interest, especially in view of the public pronouncements on nationalism and democracy by the British premiers, Asquith and Lloyd George, and by the American president, Woodrow Wilson.

After receiving a noncommittal reply, the delegation later returned with the request to be allowed to proceed to England to discuss the questions with the British ministry and lay their case before the British people. In view of the rejection of this not unreasonable appeal and in view of other disquieting developments, the Egyptian prime minister, Rushdi Pasha, and his leading colleague, Adli Pasha, who

had both been in office throughout the war and were tried friends of the British interests, asked permission to visit London to discuss the situation with the ministry there. The reply that the British ministers were too busy with the peace conference to discuss Egyptian affairs was not unnaturally followed by the resignation of the whole Egyptian ministry on March 1, 1919.

Up to this date the nationalist agitation had been conducted zealously, but in a perfectly lawful and orderly manner. A week later Zaghlul Pasha and three other nationalist leaders of nearly equal eminence and influence were arrested and promptly deported to Malta by the British general in command. It was only after this abrupt measure that the nationalist movement involved any disorder. Even then the earlier demonstrations were peaceful if not orderly, but they soon gave cover for disorderly elements to raid shops and street cars. To repress these disturbances the helpless police appealed to the military, who fired into the mob. Bloodshed was a most unfortunate argument to give the agitators, and worse trouble followed not merely in Cairo but in many important provincial towns.

Just as the troubles were starting, General Allenby, the commander-in-chief in Egypt and Syria, had been summoned to Paris to give advice in connection with the peace negotiations. He had been in Paris only two days when the British ministers, perplexed by the bad news which poured in from Egypt, instead of burdening themselves with responsibility for the matter, decided to pack him off posthaste to Egypt as special high commissioner with general orders "to take all such measures as he considers necessary and expedient to restore law and order." Three days later "the strong man" was at his post in Cairo. Allenby was a soldier without administrative or political experience. His slight knowledge of Egypt had been gained in the two or three years since his appointment to the command of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force, which had been operating most of the time in Palestine and Syria.

General Allenby met the situation with sound common sense and with energy. His first task was to restore the

normal functioning of government, which required the securing of a new ministry. Interviews with leading Egyptians, singly and in groups, soon indicated a solution. On April 7, 1919, after consultation with the home authorities and with the sultan, he announced the release of Zaghlul and his companions and the grant to them and to other Egyptians of freedom of travel. This meant that Zaghlul would be free to go to Paris, as he did. The next day Rushdi Pasha and his cabinet, with only minor changes of personnel, were back in office. That their tenure was brief was due to a new turn in the nationalist agitation, especially in Cairo, which among other things took the form of a strike of government employees.

The announcement was made in May that a commission headed by Lord Milner would proceed to Egypt to investigate and report constructive measures, but not till December 7, 1919, did Lord Milner and his colleagues reach Cairo. Meanwhile Zaghlul at Paris had assumed the leadership of the nationalist movement. Internationally he met only rebuffs. The formal recognition of the British protectorate by the American government, on April 22, could not have rendered more timely aid to the British interest had President Wilson deliberately planned to discomfit Zaghlul. Two months later article 147 of the treaty of Versailles gave general international recognition to the British protectorate. On the one hand Zaghlul and his agents carried their campaigning even to Washington, while on the other they organized an Egyptian boycott of the Milner commission.

The nationalist boycott of the commission held good throughout the latter's three-month stay in Egypt and prevented consultations with the leaders of the movement, which might have been helpful. Still the commission accomplished much, even in learning at first hand the views of the Egyptians; the very circumstances of the boycott revealed much of conditions which they needed to understand; the workings of the British administration were for the first time thoroughly investigated; the views of the British and other foreign communities were gathered; various sections of the

country were visited. In spite of all this it was obvious that without frank and open discussion with the nationalist leaders the work of the commission would fail of its chief purpose. Even Zaghlul and his friends were beginning to realize that they were throwing away opportunities so valuable that they would sooner or later have to reckon with the results of their failure to utilize an obvious means of presenting their case and perhaps achieving their real if not their avowed ends.

When the Milner commission left Egypt early in March, 1920, its members had already reached the conclusion "that no settlement could be satisfactory which was simply imposed by Great Britain upon Egypt, but that it would be wiser to seek a solution by means of a bilateral agreement—a treaty—between the two countries." About a month later the commission resumed its work in England, and finally, through the mediation of Adli Pasha, Zaghlul and several of his colleagues left Paris on June 7 and joined the commission in the discussion of the problems at issue. On the basis of these conferences Lord Milner prepared a memorandum dated August 18, 1920, outlining the bases for a proposed treaty of alliance between Great Britain and Egypt. This memorandum was published, and four of Zaghlul's colleagues were sent to Egypt to sound out public opinion upon the proposals.

The results were generally favorable, and at the end of October Zaghlul and his colleagues returned to London for further conference with the commission. On November 9, Lord Milner brought the conferences to a close in a brief address appealing to all "to cultivate and strengthen by every means the spirit of friendship and mutual confidence which our conversations here have helped to engender." Zaghlul replied in similar terms, but with great insistence, that he was still unable to give the Egyptian people definite assurance "that Great Britain had finally repudiated the protectorate."

The commission shortly afterward completed its report, which was published in a white book in February, 1921. In Egypt a change of ministry brought to the premiership

Adli Pasha, who had been so largely responsible for the successful conferences between the commission and the Zaghlul delegation. Adli, with a new delegation, returned to London and in July began negotiations for the proposed treaty which after four months ended in a rupture. The negotiations had been conducted in absolute secrecy and were presumably making favorable progress. The reason for the rupture was the British insistence upon free military use of the Egyptian soil to guarantee British imperial communications. Adli naturally denounced the proposals as "an occupation pure and simple which destroys all idea of independence, even to the extent of suppressing internal sovereignty."

Shortly after the breakdown of negotiations Lord Allenby urged upon Lord Curzon a definite program for the withdrawal of the protectorate. Meanwhile disorders broke out anew and it was deemed necessary once more to deport Zaghlul Pasha, this time to the Seychelles Islands. Apparently the dilatory maneuvers of Lord Curzon drew from Lord Allenby an ultimatum of resignation, which led to a request from Lord Curzon that the high commissioner return at once to confer with the government in London. Throughout this period Lord Allenby had not only been acting in closest harmony with his British colleagues in Egypt but he had also been in close touch with Adli Pasha, Sarwat Pasha, and other representative Egyptians, and had undoubtedly arrived at an understanding.

The success of Lord Allenby's visit to London was revealed on February 28, 1922, when the prime minister, Lloyd George, announced in the house of commons the government proposals with regard to Egypt. These proposals included the termination of the protectorate, the recognition of Egypt as a sovereign state, the withdrawal of martial law on the passage of an act of indemnity by the Egyptian government, and, pending negotiations on other important issues, the maintenance of the existing status. Thus, instead of securing a settlement through a bilateral agreement between the two countries as recommended by the Milner commission, the British cabinet, after squander-

ing fifteen precious months, was compelled to adopt the obviously less advantageous policy of a unilateral pronouncement of concessions on the main issues before negotiating the adjustment of conditions.

On March 16, as I landed in Suez, flags were flying and cannon salutes were heard, which I soon learned were in honor of the independence of Egypt, officially proclaimed on that day. During the ensuing days in Cairo it was my fortune to witness further demonstrations connected with the event and to see Lord Allenby and Fuad, who inaugurated the new order by exchanging the obnoxious title of sultan¹ for the unobjectionable one of king. The demonstrations, however, were not marked by enthusiastic approbation; indeed, the most enthusiastic exhibitions were of an unfriendly sort. The students not merely went on strike to express their disapproval but paraded the streets shouting their declaration of principles: "Down with false independence; down with the new king; down with Sarwat Pasha; we want Saad Pasha [Zaghlul]." That their sentiments might be clear even to the visitor in the city who was ignorant of Arabic, a leader would give a phrase in English or French, which would then be vociferated by the whole group. The great university mosque of El Azhar was closed, not without bloodshed, in order to avert further disorder.

Nearly a year has passed since those apparently momentous days, and yet, strangely, little news has leaked out of Egypt. Martial law continues, murderous attacks on British officials and soldiers persist, plans for the preparation of a constitution are announced, but yet no constitution has appeared.² Meanwhile the successes of the Angora Turks and the dubious policies of the British government in dealing with them have had a most disturbing influence throughout the Near East and have naturally affected Mohammedan opinion in Egypt.

¹Since 1517, the Ottoman ruler had been the caliph or ecclesiastical head of Islam and the title of sultan had come to be reserved for him alone.

²See below, page 44.

The persistence of British control in Egypt through four decades is a phenomenon which requires some explanation. It has been, on the whole, beneficial not merely to the British themselves, but also to both the Egyptian people and to all other nations with any interest in the country. British interests have been clearly superior to those of any other outside nation. The passage of the control of the country to any other power would have produced a situation less acceptable internationally. The interests of no nation in Egypt have suffered from any injustice that would have given basis for complaint that British occupation was inimical to international welfare. It might be said that British rule continued in Egypt in default of anything better to substitute for it, were it not that such a statement gives a false implication that British rule was devoid of merit.

Thus far I have undertaken to outline the history of the three greatest developments of the past century affecting Egypt: the establishment and rule of the semi-independent dynasty of Mehemet Ali, which was of Mohammedan but European origin; the British occupation and administration; and the rise and growth of the nationalist movement, which drew its inspiration mainly from western sources and was, therefore, to a degree difficult to determine, bound up with ideas of representative government and democracy. Egypt has reached the point where it is to enter upon the experiment of self-government following western models. It becomes necessary, therefore, to inquire whether the conditions of the country and its people and the developments toward modern ideas in other matters are such as to afford prospect of success.

Egypt is the gift of the Nile; the almost unique source of the nation's wealth is agriculture. The country is nearly devoid of mineral products. Handicrafts have never prospered greatly in the land, and even to-day the development of manufactures is quite negligible. Other peoples have always traded in and through Egypt but the Egyptian himself has never been a trader or even a shopkeeper. The real Egyptians, the *fellaheen*, are tillers of the soil as their forebears have been since the dawn of history.

The estimated area of the kingdom is 350,000 square miles, but of this only 12,023 square miles (Massachusetts and Connecticut together have 12,859 square miles) are cultivable and constitute the inhabited area. Of this small amount only two thirds are actually under cultivation. This area is situated in the delta and, to a somewhat less extent, in a narrow ribbon along either bank of the river above Cairo. As some indication of the improvement of conditions it should be noted that the estimate made by the French under Bonaparte was 6,921 square miles of tillable land of which 5,500 were tilled.

The productivity of the land is absolutely dependent upon the inundations of the Nile or upon irrigation with Nile water, for which purpose works have been constructed and maintained ever since the beginning of history. During the Turkish period these works fell into neglect, but Mehemet Ali began their restoration and extension so as to provide perennial irrigation. His successors did not continue his wise policy, so that it was left for the British to carry his work to a conclusion and to add to it the colossal undertaking at Assuan. This great dam has provided safeguards against the two opposite disasters of inadequate or excessive rise of the river; it has largely increased the cultivable area, extended perennial irrigation, and enlarged the possibilities for raising two and even three crops annually. This achievement alone, were there not others, would be a sufficient monument to the British occupation. One of the important results of perennial irrigation has been the successful development of cotton-growing, to which more than 1,500,000 acres are regularly devoted, thus furnishing the country's most profitable marketable product.

This vast benefit conferred by British effort has wrought remarkable improvement in the economic status of the *fellah-keen*, but far greater benefits have been bestowed upon them at the hands of the British reformers. For the first time since Joseph acquired their lands from them for Pharaoh (Genesis 47. 20), they have been assured personal and property rights. Changes which date back to the reign of Mehemet Ali have been breaking down what may be roughly

described as the mixture of feudal holding and state ownership of land established by Joseph, so that many *fellaheen* now own their land.

At present there are over 1,700,000 native owners with holdings of less than five acres each, constituting over 90 per cent of the landholders and controlling over 27 per cent of the cultivated area. On the other hand the evils of large estates in the hands of wealthy owners have not disappeared, for over 40 per cent of the tillable land is in holdings of over fifty acres each in the hands of 13,500 persons, less than one per cent of the total number of owners. Under the so-called five-feddan, that is five-acre, act of Lord Kitchener, only the portion of a holding in excess of five acres can be levied on to satisfy debts. This measure is an absolute safeguard against the exploitation of the *fellaheen* by money lenders and others.

Further safeguards were thrown about the *fellaheen* by the establishment in 1902 of the agricultural bank, which loans to them at moderate rates. As an encouragement to the development of thrift among them, postal savings banks were established in 1900, which have proved successful, but the rural savings-bank service inaugurated in 1912 has not yet shown such satisfactory results.

With the absolute reliance upon irrigation, the assurance of a fair supply of water to each landowner, however humble, is vital. Prior to British occupation the abuses in favor of the rich and of those who could use official or financial pressure were notorious; now the small holder gets his share of water equally with the richest. In similar manner the British have safeguarded the *fellaheen* by providing for the weighing of cotton and the sale of seed by the government. The ancient quasi-feudal practice of calling out forced labor to clean the irrigation canals, to safeguard the Nile embankments in time of floods, and to toil on other public works, a practice to which the French term *corvée* has been applied, not only operated to the detriment of the normal agricultural activities of the *fellaheen* but was also enforced with rank injustice and favoritism. Under the British occupation such forced labor has been replaced with paid labor.

Similar to the *corvée* was conscription for military service, enforced by press-gangs with all manner of corruption and abuse. The army is still recruited by conscription, but under British supervision it is carried out with absolute equity, and the fixed term of service, the regular pay, and various other improved conditions in the army have removed the horror fostered by the ancient practices. The use of torture and of flogging, the *courbash*, was the regular procedure for enforcing the collection of taxes and for the administration of justice. It was due to Lord Dufferin that these methods were officially abolished in 1883 and soon eliminated in actual practice. Equitable assessment and honest collection of taxes brought further relief to the oppressed *fellaheen*.

Lord Cromer summed up these reforms as the three C's, that is the abolition of *corvée*, *courbash*, and corruption. Their significance cannot be overrated and, while not parallel in detail, the relief secured may be compared in general to that obtained by the French peasantry through the Revolutionary and Napoleonic periods. For these benefits the *fellaheen* are certainly indebted to the British. It may be argued that the Egyptians themselves would have worked out the reforms, but it would be difficult to find any confirmation for such an assumption.

Modern ideas have entered Egypt through the British administration and achieved these far-reaching changes which have swept away abuses hoary with antiquity, and have for the first time given the *fellaheen* rights and decent treatment as human beings. Though the *fellaheen* may still be fabulously ignorant, modern ideas have tremendously affected them, and quite in spite of themselves they must henceforth live and move upon the basis of those ideas. The British have taught by practice the value of a rule of law instead of caprice.

The *fellaheen*³ are estimated to form nine tenths of the population of Egypt, which was shown by the census of

³This word, the plural of *fellah*, strictly means plowmen, that is, peasants; but it is freely used, as here, to designate the whole group of the indigenous population, that is, likewise, all the working classes.

1917 to be 12,750,918, an average of 1,061 per square mile of cultivable area. These people are not of negro race but are of the same stock which has formed the basic element of the country's population throughout historic times. The Arab conquest in the seventh century and the Turkish in the sixteenth brought in considerable numbers from those two stocks and from the other peoples of the empires which they represented. Since very ancient times groups of Syrians and Greeks have been resident in the country as traders, and since the Middle Ages, if not since Roman times, Italians have been similarly represented. More recently French and English communities have developed.

Though forming a small minority of the population, these non-Egyptian racial elements are of dominant importance, for they constitute not merely the ruling or political class but also the propertied and cultured class. Until the reign of Mehemet Ali these non-Egyptian elements had a monopoly of power, wealth, and culture to the absolute exclusion of the real Egyptians, the *fellaheen*; and in spite of the more beneficent influence of British control, it still remains virtually true that the non-Egyptian elements continue to enjoy almost exclusive authority in all matters political, economic, intellectual, and religious.

Only these classes in Egypt have been able to afford the privileges of higher education, whether Mohammedan or European. This fact has confirmed their control of the intellectual and religious life of the nation. The native press is mainly in their hands, and it voices their interests rather than those of the *fellaheen*. The present ruling dynasty, as has been seen, is Turkish,⁴ not Egyptian. The ministers, even throughout the past forty years, have been drawn almost without exception from the Turkish and other non-Egyptian peoples of the country. The major proportion of nationalist leaders belong to the same classes. Self-government for Egypt cannot mean, for the present or for a long time to come, anything other than the rule of this non-Egyptian minority element which for centuries has had

⁴Strictly, Albanian.

nothing in common with the *fellaheen* except the utilization of their toil. Self-government for Egypt will not mean democracy, or rule by a majority of the whole people; it will mean the right of this long-privileged minority to rule all the people, with what aim and result may be surmised. Only the continuance of some genuine guidance of affairs by the British can prevent such an outcome.

The commercial and financial affairs of the country, however, are not in the hands of the *fellaheen*, or to any considerable degree in those of the non-Egyptian Mohammedan elements just discussed; they are controlled by foreign communities. Of these the most numerous are, no doubt, the Syrians, Armenians, Jews, and Greeks, who form the major part of the shopkeeping class, but some of whom are engaged in larger enterprises. What may be called the big business of the country, both commercial and financial, is to a large extent in the control of western Europeans, Italians, French, and British, who live and do business in Egypt under a special regime of law known as the capitulations.

The Egyptian people, whether of Egyptian or non-Egyptian stock, never have controlled and do not now control more than a small fraction of the nation's business affairs, and there is no indication of either their willingness or their ability to shoulder the management of these matters. It is a serious question how a people incompetent and unready to handle its private business affairs can be expected to manage successfully its public business. The foreign control of the nation's business is in itself a most serious obstacle to national self-government, unless provision is made to denationalize these foreign elements, to merge them into the national citizenship of Egypt, and to assure them sufficient voice in affairs to afford some guarantee of national financial stability. Yet any such proposition would in its very nature be undemocratic, as it would give the all-important power of the purse to a minute fraction of the population.

The capitulations, under whose protection these foreigners dwell and trade in Egypt, are concessions granted by the government through treaty or otherwise, assuring the nationals concerned the protection of their own law, and freedom from

the operation of the local law and from such burdens as the payment of most forms of taxes.⁵ At present Great Britain and thirteen other nations enjoy such privileges for their subjects.

Hitherto the beneficiary nations have resisted strenuously every effort to abolish the capitulations or to modify their application except in very minor matters. Until the capitulations are abrogated or radically modified in scope and application there can be no self-government in Egypt in a full and proper sense, for they constitute serious limitations on the national sovereignty. Great Britain has repeatedly undertaken with little, if any, success to secure such action. With the proclamation of independence Great Britain is pledged to endeavor to obtain the desired concessions from the powers concerned. In this there is, however, a double difficulty. If the powers are to abandon the capitulations, they must have adequate guarantees for the full protection of the law in both the administration of justice and in the freedom of trade which can at present be guaranteed only by Great Britain. Such an arrangement would amount to the abandonment by the thirteen powers of favored treatment to the good offices of the one power whose position in Egypt is already that of the most favored. A concession of such sort would hardly be made without the exaction of some *quid pro quo* at British expense. Nevertheless, England's position with reference both to Egypt and to the powers concerned might conceivably be adjusted to the satisfaction of all on a basis similar to that of the United States to Cuba as provided in the Platt Amendment. It would be less invidious to other powers to have England's status in Egypt defined by a constitutional measure rather than by means of an Anglo-Egyptian diplomatic alliance.

As long as the capitulations exist there can be no thoroughgoing judicial and legal reform in the country; equitable adjustment of the burden of taxation will remain impossible,

⁵The origin of the capitulations may be traced to medieval trading arrangements. The more important existing concessions were granted by the Ottoman sultan with reference to Egypt as a province of the Turkish Empire.

and numerous other difficulties will persist. Taxation necessary for the establishment and maintenance of a suitable educational system which would be the most efficient agency in the spread of western ideas in the country is blocked by the capitulations; as are also such apparently simple reforms as the suppression of gambling and disorderly houses and of quack practitioners of medicine, dentistry, and pharmacy.

The capitulations include within their scope guaranties to the nationals of the several countries of freedom in the practice of their religion and permission for the conduct of missionary activities. Christianity in Egypt seems as incongruous as Protestantism in Rome. Egypt is a Mohammedan country and has been since the tenth year after the Prophet's death. Over 91 per cent of the people are Mohammedan. The famous university of El Azhar at Cairo, which dates from 972, is the intellectual and theological center of Islam in the country and stands preëminent in the Mohammedan world, with its 400 professors and 10,000 students⁶ drawn from every Moslem nation. Cairo is not only the intellectual center of Mohammedanism but also the literary headquarters of Arabic, the universal language of the Islamic world. Extraordinary significance, therefore, attaches to the Egyptian press in its output of both books and periodicals.

The steady extension of Christian political domination over Moslem lands during the past century, which has been accentuated in recent years by the partitioning of the Ottoman Empire by Italy and the Balkan states and more recently by the abortive treaty of Sèvres, has left only scattered patches of the former widespread empire of Islam free from Christian control. These alarming changes naturally aroused the religious zeal of pious Moslems and gave life to a Pan-Islamic movement.

In Egypt, therefore, the development of an unfriendly attitude toward British control was inevitable even though the British had taken every precaution to avoid unnecessary

⁶These are the figures usually given, but they are probably considerably too large. El Azhar, moreover, is an ecclesiastical institution rather than a university in the western sense.

offense and had given no overt cause for complaint. The Mohammedan leaders have, indeed, refrained from activities which would bring matters of faith into political controversy. None the less the nationalist movement has enjoyed consistent and generally hearty support from Mohammedan sources, especially from the professors and students of El Azhar. In fact, the students of El Azhar have been in the forefront of most nationalist demonstrations and strikes. This Mohammedan-nationalist alliance is but one of the many paradoxes in the Egyptian situation.

Without war or revolution certain reforms which seem desirable in western eyes can be effected only as the result of changes developing within Mohammedanism itself. It rests with the leaders of Islam to determine whether they will alter the aims and methods and scope of education and so direct the modern movement among their peoples, or whether they will adhere rigidly to the past and resist innovations with every power at their disposal. If one can read aright what are apparently some of the signs of the times, the tendency toward readjustment rather than resistance is the stronger. The nationalist movement is instinct with modern or western ideas which have hitherto remained alien to the Moslem world. The Mohammedan-nationalist alliance, in the case of nationalist success, cannot fail to result in profound effects of the various liberalizing ideas identified with nationalism upon the religious institutions and life of Mohammedanism.

Of the eight per cent of the people of Egypt who are Christians, about three quarters are Copts. These people have adhered to the Christian faith throughout all the vicissitudes of Mohammedan rule in Egypt for over twelve centuries. Trying experiences have benefited neither these people nor their faith. Adherents of the western churches have recently been exercising a helpful influence among them, and evidences of a progressive spirit are to be found. The percentage of literacy among the Copts is three times greater than among their Mohammedan neighbors, for out of every thousand Mohammedans only fifty-three are able to read and write, whereas one hundred and seventy-one

out of every thousand Copts possess that ability. As might have been anticipated on general principles, the Copts, the oldest group in the population, have been sympathetic to the nationalist movement. On the other hand, the leadership of the movement by the non-Egyptian elements and the Mohammedan support would suggest an opposite attitude as natural. Absence of such opposition is perhaps due, in part, to fear of incurring the disfavor of those powerful elements.

There are nearly fifty thousand Protestants in Egypt and more than double that number of Roman Catholics. Moslem lands have been proverbially barren fields for Christian missions. Until recent years the efforts which have been put forth have been among the Copts rather than among the Mohammedan sections of the community. Aggressive missionary enterprise by the British has for obvious reasons been inexpedient. The American Protestant missions are chiefly conducted by the United Presbyterians, who have founded a college at Assiut. More recently an American University has been started in Cairo. Both institutions are already doing promising educational work. It is probable, however, that the largest influence of these enterprises will not be in effecting conversions to Christianity but in their helpful reactions upon Mohammedanism.

The most serious charge which has been brought against the British control in Egypt has been that, in the face of its pronounced policy of preparing the people for self-government, it has made but slight advances in the extension of educational facilities. For elementary education there have long existed in Egypt rather inefficient schools called *maktabs* in which some vernacular instruction in reading, writing, and arithmetic is given along with religious teaching. Since 1897 efforts have been made for governmental inspection and supervision of these schools, and small grants have been made to those which meet certain very moderate standards. In 1913 the responsibility in these matters was transferred to the provincial councils. The attendance at these government-aided elementary schools is not much over two hundred thousand.

In the matter of higher education the situation is somewhat better. The beginnings of instruction of modern type as contrasted with the time-honored theological and canonistic learning of El Azhar were made under Mehemet Ali for the purpose of training civil servants. Owing to the financial difficulties the British did not at first find it possible to encourage considerable undertakings, but since 1897 the number of schools of the higher grades under government control has increased from 14 to 45, the number of male pupils from 1,447 to 8,231, and the number of female pupils from 20 to 971.⁷ A scheme has been elaborated for a complete system of government elementary schools with a capital cost of approximately \$60,000,000 and an annual maintenance charge of about \$10,000,000, and also for a state university at Cairo, but as yet little progress has been made, and under favorable circumstances a generation would be necessary to carry the plan into execution. A fundamental difficulty will be the provision of a proper corps of trained teachers, which will require the establishment of a system of training schools. The problem of developing taxation to supply the needed funds is a matter of serious concern.

Egyptians of the better classes are able readily to acquire higher education in European institutions, as has been the practice since the time of Mehemet Ali. The most remarkable developments are the growth in the demand for education and the change in attitude with regard to the education of women. In the latter case the ancient hostile prejudice has been giving place to a recognition of its value. With this change has come the establishment of schools for girls and a rapid growth in attendance upon them. The result is shown clearly in the statistics of literacy. In 1917 there were 120 literate males per thousand as compared with 85 in 1907; the number of literate females increased from 3 per thousand in 1907 to 18 per thousand in 1917. With the extension of education there is disappearing the habit of

⁷Largely due to the fifteen years' work of the late Mr. Sidney Wells, who was appointed director general of technical, industrial, and commercial education in 1907.

regarding the acquisition of a certain amount of higher education as merely a qualification for a post in public employ. This change cannot fail to improve the tone of both education and the public service.

The growth of journalism has been an important though scarcely a laudable adjunct to the development of the nationalist movement. It is not long since the field of native journalism was regarded as the refuge of those more or less educated persons who failed to obtain civil service appointment. The tone of this native journalism has been quite too vehement and irresponsible, denunciation, vilification, and scurrility being the main contents of their arsenals. The foreign-language press in Egypt has, unfortunately, set no high standard for the native press. The inferiority of these papers to the English papers in India affords an astounding contrast. Except for commercial intelligence, their level rarely rises to that of a small-town sheet in the United States.

As regards language, in contrast with India, Egypt offers little difficulty, since practically the whole population, except the Europeans, speak Arabic. French is the most important European language, and, strangely enough, has never been displaced by English for official purposes. This curiously characteristic British attitude of *laissez faire* has undoubtedly been a mistaken policy in this case.

A second charge frequently made against the British administration of Egypt is the failure to carry through a complete and consistent policy of sanitation. Quarantine is under the control of an international sanitary commission. In Cairo and some of the other larger towns the development of suitable water and sewage systems has recently been undertaken. Vaccination against smallpox has been widely enforced. Measures against cholera and plague have been carried out with a high degree of success. Some of the most unsanitary conditions have been abolished. Great advances have been made in medical service and in the establishment of hospitals and insane asylums. Much yet remains to be done, especially in the smaller towns, where conditions continue extremely unsatisfactory. The rate of

infant mortality continues unduly high. The plague of flies has not abated in Egypt. It would be an oversight not to mention the marked diminution of ophthalmic troubles, in the achievement of which the work inaugurated through the beneficence of Sir Ernest Cassel has been of the highest importance.

In the matter of legislation the British have also been open to criticism for failure to establish a complete and consistent system. Two almost insuperable obstacles have been in the way—the existence of the capitulations and the dominance of Koranic law. Still another difficulty has been the influence of the French codes which have molded the Egyptian conceptions of western law since the days of Mehemet Ali, an influence which has been strengthened by the practice under the capitulations. Notwithstanding all these difficulties, the British have done no small amount toward the systematization and improvement of law in Egypt. The English genius, indeed, does not operate to produce codes of law but to legislate for special cases.

Whatever criticisms may be justly passed upon the British in questions of education, sanitation, and legislation, their achievement in the development of an Egyptian judicial system cannot fail to evoke praise. Prior to 1883, the country was for all practical purposes without any proper method of administering justice. In that year a system of tribunals was inaugurated, and the use of the *courbash* and of torture was abolished. Lack of sufficient competent judges and the unreadiness of the people to cooperate, especially as witnesses, made progress slow, but the advance has been steady and sure. The courts command unquestioned respect for their impartial administration, and to-day the sense of security of person and property under the reign of law is such as Egypt has not known for centuries, if ever. The existence of the consular courts and of the mixed tribunals to deal with cases affecting foreigners stands seriously in the way of the establishment of a complete and uniform system of justice.

The unwillingness of the natives to testify, together with other causes, handicaps the courts in the detection and pun-

ishment of crime. It will obviously require some time to educate the public conscience to a proper standard for co-operation in the enforcement of justice according to modern ideas and methods. Nowhere is the watchful eye and the supporting arm of British authority or guidance more essential for the welfare of Egypt than in the administration of justice, and nowhere else would the weakening of western influences be more seriously felt. This is one of the most difficult tasks in the education of the East to western ways, and there are few places where their value for the East is so free from doubt. Probably there is no more accurate measure of the progress of modern ideas in eastern lands than that of the degree of attainment of the standard set forth in *Magna Carta*: "To no one will we sell, to no one will we deny or delay right or justice."

As in the courts of law so in the other fields of administration the establishment of the principle and practice of the honest and efficient performance of public duty, free from bribe or unfair influence, has been a remarkably successful illustration of British teaching by example. The idea is novel to the East but it is not unappreciated. The eastern idea of office as an opportunity for personal advancement and profit gives place with difficulty to the western conception of office as a responsibility for the performance of public duty.

Since it was the question of finance which led to the intervention in Egypt by western powers, it may well be asked what the achievement in that field of administration has been. Government expenditures have increased from £8,757,597 in 1882 to £15,728,785 in 1913, and the budget estimate for the year 1922-23 amounted to £31,440,000. In other words, the cost of government, which had nearly doubled in thirty years, has fully doubled again in the last decade. The debt in 1883 totaled £96,439,860 and in 1921 had been reduced to £92,971,740, or, allowing for the treasury surplus, to about £80,000,000. This achievement has been wrought at the very time when elsewhere public debts have been tremendously increased, quite apart from the burdens imposed by the World War. The annual charge for the debt has also been

lowered by the reduction of the interest rates, which now vary from three to four per cent. The Egyptian pound, which is worth a few cents more than the pound sterling, has maintained its relative standing with reference to the English pound in international exchange in recent years. These favorable results have been accomplished coincidentally with the equalization and alleviation of the burden upon the taxpayer and the introduction of fair and just methods of collection.

The increased prosperity of the country is clearly revealed by a few statistics. The census of 1882 showed a population of 6,831,131, and that of 1917 of 12,750,918. The average annual increase, which had been 1.25 per cent during the period between the censuses of 1846 and 1882, suddenly jumped under British control to 2.76 per cent in the next fifteen years, and ever since then has remained at a higher rate than previous to the British occupation. In 1882 the exports were £11,108,262 and the imports £5,696,739. The annual average for the four years 1918 to 1921 was £E60,000,000 exports and £E64,000,000 imports. A partial answer to the possible question whether England is bleeding Egypt is shown by the British percentage of Egyptian trade. In 1882 Great Britain furnished 52 per cent of the imports, in 1921 only 30 per cent; in 1882 Great Britain took 65 per cent of the exports but in 1921 only 46 per cent. In 1882 less than 1 per cent of Egyptian trade was with the United States; in 1921 the United States took 18 per cent of the exports and furnished 15 per cent of the imports.

Like every other country Egypt was profoundly affected by the World War. Whatever else may be said of the wisdom of British policy with reference to the country during the war, it must be recognized that Egypt emerged from the war without any increased burden of debt and with but trivial losses of life. Moreover, the war conditions brought unprecedented economic prosperity to the country, though not without hardship on certain classes and those the least able to bear the burden. This situation was, however, not peculiar to Egypt and may be dismissed as a gen-

eral effect of the war and not one particularly chargeable to the conditions or situation of the country.

Likewise the effects did not cease with the armistice, but prices rose even higher; labor difficulties found expression in strikes that were economic rather than political; and more or less agitation of a bolshevic sort developed. All these factors naturally had a direct bearing on the nationalist agitation which has already been discussed. The increased cost of living remains as an abiding result, and the necessary adjustments thereto have not yet been worked out fully. In this respect Egypt suffers an unusual difficulty owing to the existence of a class of large landholders with considerable numbers of *fellaheen* living and working upon their estates.

Before concluding this consideration of England's work in Egypt it is pertinent to note the foundation upon which it rests. Prior to the outbreak of war in 1914, the British army of occupation numbered 6,067 of all branches and ranks; since the war the number has been steadily reduced until, at present, it is reported as below even the prewar standard. Though England is holding Egypt under martial law, it can hardly be described as grinding the country under the heel of military despotism. The old Egyptian army was disbanded immediately after Tel-el-Kebir in 1882, and a new army created under British officers, which now numbers about 17,000. Military service under conscription is required, but only about four per cent of those liable are actually called to the colors. The creation of this new army through training the *fellaheen* was proved to be a genuine achievement by the experience of the Sudan campaigns.⁸ The story is familiar through Mr. Kipling's "Pharaoh and the Sergeant" and other poems.

The development of this native army is of distinct importance as furnishing the only perfectly clear and definite evidence bearing on the question whether the *fellaheen* are ready for self-government. From almost every other point of view the evidence seems to be cumulative on the negative

⁸Mehemet Ali had earlier demonstrated the capacity of the *fellaheen* as soldiers.

side. In the army, however, the *fellaheen* have been taken out of their oriental environment, trained in western ways, and given the only opportunity they have ever had to show what they can do when given a chance. The verdict, above any doubt, is that the *fellaheen* have made good. Of course the *fellaheen* cannot be suddenly stood on their feet and told that they are citizens and expected to acquit themselves like Thomas Jefferson or William E. Gladstone. They have been the servants of the nations since the curse of Canaan, but they are not to be dismissed as "niggers" any more than Kipling's Gunga Din. They have, at least, the right to be given a fair chance. This discussion of Egyptian conditions under British control has shown that in its economic and administrative activities the British rule has been excellent and beneficial. It has proceeded conservatively but it has achieved remarkable progress. Few will dispute that the results have been far better than they would have been under Turkish or native control. Much has been said in praise of these aspects of British administration and but little criticism has been expressed other than of a merely captious sort.

On the other hand the British have been severely criticized for their failure to promote education, to train the people in habits of self-government, and to develop in them a realization of the obligations of citizenship and a sense of responsibility in matters of public concern. Many Egyptians, however, have been associated with a few Englishmen in the regeneration of the country and have consequently learned the forms and something of the spirit of western administration. Though the British have governed Egypt since 1882, the Egyptians with whom they have had to deal had grown up under the evil rule of Ismail. The few of them who had obtained a modern education had received it under French or other continental influences. Fortunately, British rule has been so prolonged that the generation upon whom will rest the responsibilities for establishing independent government is one which has been trained under its enlightening and progressive influence.

Egyptians are, conceivably, prepared to give their nation excellent administration under the direction of an enlight-

ened and benevolent despot; but are they prepared to govern the country through a popularly elected legislature with a responsible ministry after the manner of England and other nations of the West? The only answer is that they are facing that obligation with slight preparatory experience. The modern forms can readily be copied, but will it prove so easy to instil into them that spirit which gives them vitality in western lands? British rule has wrought laudable changes in Egypt, but the vital question is whether modern ideas have changed the Egyptians. The Sphinx awaits the answer to the riddle.

RECENT EVENTS

The prolonged delay in framing a constitution produced a condition of nervous tension.⁹ English soldiers and officials were murdered, while on the other hand unduly active nationalists were arrested. Finally a severe crisis in the relations between Egypt and Great Britain was precipitated when it was proposed to extend the application of the new constitution to the Sudan. A compromise was ultimately reached by which the question of the Sudan was postponed for future negotiation, and the British government, on March 30, 1923, ordered the release of Zaghlul Pasha, who had been confined at Gibraltar, whither he had been transferred from the Seychelles.

The new constitution was completed on April 19, 1923, and received the royal signature. It established a parliamentary monarchy and provided for universal suffrage, compulsory free education for both sexes in public schools, complete religious toleration, Mohammedanism as the official religion, and Arabic as the official language. It reserved larger powers for the king and cabinet than is customary in similar European constitutions. In accordance with the understanding when independence was proclaimed, the completion of the constitution was soon followed by the termination of martial law, which had been maintained under British authority ever since 1914, and by the consequent release of the Zaghlulist sympathizers. The independence

⁹See above, page 26.

which had been formally proclaimed in March, 1922, was thus practically attained in July, 1923. There still awaited settlement, however, certain questions which had been reserved for future consideration by Mr. Lloyd George when he announced, on February 28, 1922, the British decision to recognize the independence of Egypt. These postponed questions related to the sovereignty and administration of the Sudan, the public debt and other financial obligations of an international character, the capitulations, and the guaranties and protection for British communications through the Suez canal.

Though Zaghlul Pasha had denounced the new constitution, he and his followers took an active part in the elections to the first parliament. When the final results were announced in January, 1924, they showed an overwhelming majority of Zaghlulists elected. It was estimated that 58 per cent of the qualified electors voted. The existing ministry at once resigned and, after prolonged negotiations, a new cabinet, including Zaghlul Pasha as prime minister and two ex-premiers, took office on January 28, 1924. Zaghlul notified the king that his acceptance of office did not imply his indorsement of preceding governmental acts against which he had protested. He further declared that he would pursue firmly his policy of independence for Egypt, including the Sudan, though he would accept an agreement with Great Britain on other matters not inconsistent therewith. The opening of the first session of parliament on March 15, 1924, was marked by a cordial exchange of telegrams between the British and Egyptian prime ministers and by other conciliatory gestures.

When parliament was prorogued without having gratified the nationalists by a summary and satisfactory settlement of the deferred questions, Zaghlul was greeted with bitter denunciations. At the reassembling of parliament in May, 1924, Premier Zaghlul renewed his declaration that he did not accept the British program of February 28, 1922, and that he would insist on complete independence for Egypt and full Egyptian control of the Sudan. The MacDonald ministry replied with an announcement in the British par-

liament that it would not abandon the Sudan. As a consequence, Zaghlul tendered his resignation, which King Fuad declined to accept. A fortnight later an attempt on the life of Zaghlul was made in Cairo by an irresponsible extremist. Fortunately the premier escaped serious injury and was able to embark for England on July 24 to negotiate with the British government over the several questions still at issue. All these matters are difficult and complicated, but there can be little doubt that the chief bar to an amicable adjustment is the problem of the Sudan.

Historically, the reconquest of the Sudan, completed in 1898, was a joint Anglo-Egyptian enterprise, and the country has since been under a joint administration. Geographically, Egypt requires control of the Sudan to protect the flow of the Nile waters for irrigation. A hostile government in the Sudan could divert the waters of the Nile to such an extent as to ruin Egypt. Consequently, Egypt must insist on control of the Sudan or on irrefragable guaranties of the uninterrupted and undiminished enjoyment of the Nile waters. On the other hand, England's interests in the Sudan are linked with the control of the Red Sea route to India, the establishment of the Cape-to-Cairo route, and the security of its possessions in eastern and central Africa. Racially, the Sudanese are entirely distinct from the Egyptians, and would resent domination by Egypt alone. Their absorption or exclusive control by the Egyptians would be as serious a violation of the principle of nationality as would have been a British refusal of independence to Egypt.

An agreement with France was signed in London on December 28, 1923, fixing the boundary for about a thousand miles between the Sudan and adjacent French possessions. It is reported that satisfactory progress is being made on the construction of a great barrage on the Blue Nile at Makwar, about 170 miles above Khartum. Construction has also been begun on a railway from Port Sudan and Suakin to Kassala, near the Abyssinian frontier. Both these projects contemplate the development of cotton-growing in the Sudan, and are regarded by the Egyptians as British enterprises inimical to their interests. In the summer of

1924 some clashes occurred in the Sudan between Egyptian troops stationed there and the British authorities.

The negotiations with Great Britain have been further complicated by Egypt's declaration of its position on certain items involved in the financial readjustment necessitated by independence. Notice has been given that Egypt will henceforth decline to make the annual payment of \$750,000 toward the maintenance of British troops in the country. For many years a portion of the Turkish national debt has been secured on the annual Egyptian tribute of somewhat over \$3,300,000. Egypt holds that the ratification of the treaty of Lausanne legally establishes its independence from Turkey, and has announced that it will discontinue the payment of the tribute from the date of ratification. This action destroys the security for the Turkish bonds, which are largely held in France and Germany as well as in England, and produces a serious international complication. The Zaghlul administration has taken another significant step in the appointment of an Egyptian engineer and former minister of public works as general manager of the state railways, a position heretofore filled by a European. More reassuring to the outside financial interests has been the refusal of the government to divert any part of the accumulated reserve fund to balance the budget for 1924.

Among the measures connected with the establishment of independence has been the appointment of diplomatic and consular representatives, especially at Rome, Paris, London, and Washington, and the corresponding accrediting of foreign representatives at Cairo. Independence has given added importance to Egypt's relations to Mohammedan questions. A dispute with King Hussein of the Hedjaz over matters connected with the pilgrimages to Mecca arose in 1923 but has been satisfactorily adjusted. Since the Turkish government at Angora deprived the former Ottoman sultan of the title of caliph, Egypt has maintained a noncommittal attitude on the question of succession to the caliphate. Though there have been rumors that King Fuad might assume the title, it seems unlikely that he will find it wise to take such action.

The report of the government finances for the year ending March 31, 1923, showed a surplus of about \$37,500,000 and that the reserve fund had been increased to \$60,000,000. The British may well feel, at the conclusion of over forty years of management of the Egyptian finances, that their record of achievement is a satisfactory one. Recent statistics show that the total trade of Egypt increased from \$296,000,000 in 1913 to \$416,000,000 in 1922, and that the share of the United States rose from \$12,000,000 to \$47,000,000. The use of the Suez canal in 1922 surpassed all records. The number of ships passing through the canal was 4,345, aggregating 20,743,245 tons.

Though Great Britain may wisely develop, as far as possible, other routes of communication with India, there can be no concealment of the vital significance of continued security in its use of the Suez route. In the present international situation and under existing imperial and commercial conditions it is inconceivable that the British can afford to make any concessions which would weaken them at this point. Other items may be compromised or yielded but on this one Great Britain must stand firm. Fortunately this problem seems capable of solution with less wounding of Egyptian susceptibilities than in the case of any of the other questions at stake. Few would contend that Egypt alone could be a satisfactory guardian of the canal. It is impossible to conceive of any other nation replacing Great Britain in control of the canal with equal satisfaction to all its users. The day may come when international control will be established at both Suez and Panama, but that day does not seem to be at hand. Meanwhile Suez is more vital to Britain than Panama to the United States.

The negotiations at London were broken off by the departure of Zaghlul Pasha on October 7, 1924, and by the publication on the same day of a despatch from the British premier, Mr. Ramsay MacDonald, to the British high commissioner in Egypt. The despatch recited that, in addition to concession on the subjects already at issue, the Egyptian premier had explicitly demanded the withdrawal of all British forces; of British financial and judicial advisers; of

all other control of administration, including foreign affairs; of claims to protect foreigners and minorities in Egypt; and of the claim to share in the defence of the Suez canal. Mr. MacDonald pointed out that Egyptian insistence on the last demand constituted a bar to further negotiations. The failure of Zaghlul Pasha to meet the British Labor premier in a more conciliatory manner and to secure from him the very best bargain he could is difficult to explain. An opportunity for so favorable a settlement may not soon recur.

A report in September, 1924, of the failure of negotiations to fix the boundary between Egypt and the Italian colony of Cyrenaica has called attention to certain developments which have hitherto received little consideration. France practically withdrew from Egypt in 1882, and formally renounced its interests in favor of Great Britain in 1904. Now that the latter power is pledged to withdraw, there arises the question of the possibility of the intervention of some other power. The census of 1907 showed 34,926 Italians resident in Egypt. It is estimated that the number has now doubled and exceeds that of any other European nationality. In 1911 Italy established itself in Tripolitania and Cyrenaica, so that, with its older colony of Eritrea, it is the nearest neighbor both to west and south and may claim to have a special interest in Egypt. In recent years there has been a considerable propaganda in Italy in favor of Italian domination of the Mediterranean and even of a revival of the glories of ancient Rome. There has, moreover, been definitely anti-British animus in this propaganda. In view of these facts it appears possible, if not probable, that the decline of British power in Egypt may be offset by a corresponding growth of Italian influence. The British have for some time had occasion for annoyance from Italian activities in Egypt and for feeling that certain matters might have been adjusted satisfactorily but for Italian meddling.

In dealing with the delicate situations which have arisen since the proclamation of independence, King Fuad has displayed tact and discretion which have strengthened his position and won him general esteem. The change in status

of Zaghlul Pasha from irresponsible nationalist leader to responsible premier has naturally lessened his popularity. The more extreme nationalists have resented the sobering effect of office upon their leader, while the premier has shown peculiar sensitiveness to unfriendly utterances in the press. Even cautious observers have expressed doubt whether the man who successfully led the struggle for independence will prove equal to the task of administering the government. One of the most notable developments in recent years, especially since independence, has been the remarkable growth of the power of the vernacular press in molding public opinion. The number and circulation of newspapers and periodicals has greatly increased. Their contents, it must be remembered, reach a far larger public than the number of actual readers.

The return of Zaghlul Pasha to Egypt was soon followed by the defeat of the Labor party in the British elections and the return to power of a Conservative ministry. In the face of this situation and of unfavorable movements of opinion in Egypt Zaghlul a second time proffered his resignation to King Fuad, who again refused to accept it. Amid the continued excitement in Cairo Sir Lee Stack, the governor-general of the Sudan and sirdar, or commander-in-chief, of the Egyptian army, was wounded by assassins on November 19, 1924, and died two days later. This unfortunate event is not unlikely to have a sinister effect on Anglo-Egyptian relations.

SUGGESTIONS FOR READING

A fairly readable account of the recent history of Egypt will be found in *A History of Events in Egypt from 1798 to 1914* (London, William Blackwood and Son, 1915), by Arthur E. P. B. Weigall. *The Story of the Khedivate* (New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1902), by Edward Dicey, gives a more independent view and affords first-hand information for the last quarter of the nineteenth century.

There are three standard books dealing with the British occupation of Egypt, each of which is primarily valuable with reference to the date of its original publication. They are Viscount Milner's *England in Egypt* (London, Edward Arnold, 1892; thirteenth edition, slightly revised, 1920); Earl of Cromer's *Modern Egypt*

(2 vols., New York, The Macmillan Company, 1908; frequently reprinted); and Sir Valentine Chirol's *The Egyptian Problem* (London, Macmillan and Company, 1920; later reprinted). All three books are based on prolonged and intimate acquaintance with the country. A more popular and superficial account of journalistic type is *Egypt in Transition* (New York, The Macmillan Company, 1914), by Sidney Low, which must be read, like the other books, with reference to its date of publication and not with reference to the present. The report of the Milner commission is printed in full in *The Nation* (New York) for April 6, 13, 20, 1921.

CHAPTER II

INDIA

EGYPT is a simple problem ; India is a complex one. Egypt is a limited inhabited area with a small population generally homogeneous in race, language, religion, and historical development. India is a vast continental area inhabited by one fifth of mankind, diverse in race and language, variegated in religion and historical experience.

India, like Egypt, is a land with an ancient history, with a people recently awakened to national consciousness and to the realization of the significance of western ideas. Like Egypt, too, India seeks freedom from the rule of the British, to whom it is chiefly indebted for initiation into western ways. In common with the valley of the Nile, the valleys of the Indus and the Ganges rank among the great source reservoirs of the world's civilization. Furthermore, India, as well as Egypt, had experienced centuries of alien rule before the coming of the British.

From the monuments and other remains, scholars have been able to unravel the history of Egypt with comparative accuracy and definiteness for more than three millenniums prior to the Christian era. The memorials of ancient India are no less extensive and interesting but the historical investigator is able to glean from them few definite facts for the establishment of even the outline of the country's early annals. The curtain rises in the sixth century before Christ and reveals a settled society which postulates centuries of development. In that century occurred two epochal events: the great religious revolution inaugurated in the Ganges valley by Buddha and the appearance of the Persian armies on the northwest frontier, establishing the first clearly historical contact between India and the West.

Two centuries later Alexander the Great, who had already brought Egypt and other lands under his sway, appeared

with his all-conquering Macedonian phalanx in the valley of the Indus. For at least two hundred years Greek influences continued to stream, or at least to trickle, into India; Greek visitors to India recorded their observations; regular commercial intercourse between India and the West was established. This cultural and commercial contact between India and the West, though perhaps never extensive, continued unbroken until the rise of Mohammedanism at the beginning of the seventh century of our era. Buddhism reached its climax in India in the third century before Christ under the empire of Asoka, the most extended and enlightened rule ever developed in India prior to the seventeenth century.

The decline of Buddhism and the revival of Hinduism had already progressed far when the first Mohammedan contacts with India were established at the beginning of the eighth century. It was not until the beginning of the eleventh century that any part of India was brought under Mohammedan sway, and not till two hundred years later was a distinctively Mohammedan Indian state established in the land with its capital at Delhi. The founder of this state, a Mohammedan and oriental contemporary and compeer of Richard the Lion-Hearted, has left as his splendid memorial the highest minaret in the world, the Kutab Minar, which still overlooks the plain of Delhi and preserves his name. By this time Mohammedan faith and rule had been spread across northern India from the mouths of the Indus to the delta of the Ganges. This Mohammedan empire was not preserved intact, for there were soon almost as many Moslem kingdoms in India as there had been Hindu states for centuries out of mind.

It was, therefore, a welter of petty states¹ ruled by Moslem shahs and Hindu rajas that made up the India of 1498. In that memorable year there landed on the southwestern coast of India a Portuguese expedition under the command of Vasco da Gama, whose coming was to bring India into far closer relations with Europe than had ever before subsisted. The extension of Mohammedan power in India had

¹ Several of these states were comparable in size to the larger countries of western Europe.

been accompanied by a renewal of trade intercourse with the West. It was about 1293 that India was visited by Marco Polo on his way from the court of Kublai Khan back to Venice. His description is the first account of India by a Christian from western Europe. In the two centuries between Marco Polo and Vasco da Gama various Europeans, both traders and Catholic friars, had visited India and recorded their observations and experiences. The West was getting acquainted with India and placing a steadily increasing value on its trade. Vasco da Gama opened an all-sea route, which at that date was both quicker and cheaper than any other between western Europe and southern Asia.

The consequent monopoly of the rapidly expanding trade with the East was enjoyed by Portugal until the close of the sixteenth century, when the folly of Philip II, who had added Portugal to his Spanish dominions, provoked the Dutch and English into successful competition for that rich prize. In general, the Dutch directed their activities to Malaysia and the English to India. English relations with India became the monopoly of the English East India Company chartered by Queen Elizabeth in 1600, which retained its privileges in whole until 1773, and in part till 1858. In the seventeenth century three centers were established—Madras, 1639; Bombay, 1664; Calcutta, 1689—from which English power in India was to develop in the eighteenth century. The English came to trade; they remained to rule.

Synchronously with the growth of European interests in India, there had grown up a vast Mohammedan empire, which for a time seemed likely to succeed in subduing the whole peninsula to its sway. This empire of the Great Mughals, founded at Delhi by Babar in 1526, reached its zenith under Akbar, 1556–1605, the contemporary of Queen Elizabeth, and under Aurangzib, 1658–1707, the contemporary of Louis XIV. Under these monarchs more of India was embraced within a single empire than at any time prior to British rule, except under Asoka two thousand years earlier. It was the break-up of the Mughal empire after the death of Aurangzib, and the ensuing struggle between Mohammedan and Hindu that opened the way for the estab-

lishment of a new alien rule in India. In the eighteenth century four powers—two Asiatic, the Persians under Nadir Shah and the Afghans under Ahmad Shah, and two European, the French led by Dupleix and the English led by Clive—struggled for the mastery of India. By 1763 three had failed; the English alone survived, and their territorial possessions in India amounted to less than a thousand square miles.

The English had merely won a clear field; it remained to be determined whether they could establish political control over the numerous heterogeneous and conflicting states. Beginning with Bengal in 1765, the British have added province to province and kingdom to kingdom, until, for the first time in history, a single power holds dominion over the whole land from Cape Comorin to the Himalayas, and all the borderlands as well are brought under its control. The British have converted India from a geographical expression into an empire, from a congeries of peoples into a nation. Historians have been wont to speak of the unification of Italy and the unification of Germany as the two greatest and most characteristic political achievements of the nineteenth century, but have taken no thought of the more remarkable achievement of the unification of India.

The annexation of Bengal made the English East India Company not merely a wealthy and powerful trading corporation but the ruler of an area and a population exceeding those of the British Islands. The first legislative effort to deal with this curious situation was Lord North's regulating act of 1773. This measure provided for the exercise of jurisdiction jointly by the English government and by the Company. The dual control, as this arrangement was called, subsisted, with some modifications, until 1858. The English government was represented in India by a governor-general and council; Indian interests were represented in the English government by a special minister, the president of the board of control. The Company was deprived of its trade monopoly in 1813 and of all its trade privileges in 1833.

It was not until after the Mutiny that the anomalous continuance of the Company as a ruling power was terminated

on November 1, 1858, when the British Crown assumed full control of the government of India. The president of the board of control became secretary of state for India, and the governor-general became viceroy. The essential element in the change was the establishment of the complete and direct supremacy of parliament over India, with the consequent definite location of responsibility. An informed judgment on Indian affairs, if not a representation of the interests of India, was assured to the government in London by the substitution for the old board of control, of a council of India to advise and assist the secretary for India. On this council a majority had to have seen service in India, and in practice nearly every appointee complied with that requirement.

In India the viceroy, like the governor-general previously, was to be advised and assisted by a council of four in executive and administrative matters. Under an act of 1853 this number was enlarged to twelve by the addition of other nominated members for purposes of legislation. In provincial administration, likewise, the existing status was continued with slight modifications. The governors of Madras and Bombay were to be appointed by the Crown and assisted by councils; the other governors were appointed by the viceroy and acted without councils. The government was entirely in the hands of the British and no native was admitted to one of the higher offices or to the councils. Natives were employed only in the subordinate ranks of the administration.

Hitherto there had been little consideration of British aims with reference to India and there was no formally avowed policy. The English position in India had been that of an exploiter. The dividends had been territory, cash, and mutiny. The act of 1858 passed by parliament did not alter the case. The Queen's proclamation, however, in addition to proclaiming amnesty and religious toleration, included the sentence: "And it is Our further will that, so far as may be, Our subjects, of whatever race or creed, be freely and impartially admitted to offices in Our service, the duties of which they may be qualified by their education,

ability, and integrity duly to discharge." Whatever this meant specifically, its general significance clearly indicated a new and more sympathetic attitude toward the government and people of India.

The Indian councils act of 1861 supplemented and modified the act of 1858 and provided the system under which Indian legislation was framed until 1892. The constitution of the governor-general's council was modified for executive purposes, and for legislative purposes it was to be supplemented by from six to twelve nominated members, of whom at least half must be nonofficials and might include natives, as actually became the practice. Legislative councils were revived in Madras and Bombay and authorized for Bengal, where one was established in 1862; and the governor-general might introduce them into other provinces as he did into the Northwest Provinces in 1886 and into the Punjab in 1897. The governor-general's council might legislate for all India, and provincial councils for the provinces concerned. In both cases the executive had control of the matters introduced and a veto on the enactments. These bodies were really committees to frame laws, not legislative bodies empowered to consider the general welfare and take measures freely with reference to that end. Native members were not introduced to represent the natives but to acquaint the British with native opinion and conditions. The secretary of state in presenting this measure to parliament explicitly disavowed the idea of a representative legislative body in India as absolutely impracticable.

Municipal institutions, or, perhaps better, some forms of community organization, seem to have been a very ancient development among the peoples of the so-called Aryan race. Consequently, such institutions have long subsisted in India, but their operations have naturally been of a primitive and limited sort. In creating municipal organizations in India the British government does not seem to have built upon these foundations, but, rather, to have introduced schemes of its own invention. As early as 1850 an act permitted the establishment of municipal committees or councils in the Northwest Provinces, the Punjab, and Bombay; in 1856

there was an act for Bengal, and in 1865 for Madras. These measures allowed some nonofficial membership, permitted in principle rather than in practice choice by election, and sought to stimulate local interest and taxation with reference to a limited number of subjects.

Lord Mayo, who became viceroy in 1869, faced a difficult financial situation which he sought to remedy in part by transferring certain matters, with the accompanying financial burdens, to the control of local jurisdictions which should exercise the function of levying the necessarily increased taxes involved. Only the arrangement for Madras was enacted under his administration in 1871, but under his successor similar acts were framed for the other provinces. These measures emphasized the nonofficial membership, definitely introduced the practice of election in a limited way, and considerably extended the scope of jurisdiction to include, among other local matters, education. The plan was a financial expedient and was generally the subject of native protest because of the increased taxation. It did, however, involve a beginning in self-government and election, and it helped to educate some of the people of India to show interest and activity in public concerns. The municipal population potentially affected by the scheme was only one tenth of the total in the provinces concerned, and there remained a minority of these communities in which the councils were not introduced.

Under the second Gladstone ministry, 1880-1885, Lord Ripon and later Lord Dufferin were appointed viceroys of India and signalized their administrations by further measures for the development of the system of local councils. By new acts for each of the provinces in which the system of municipal councils had been authorized the size of the councils was increased; the proportion of official members was limited to one third; greater freedom of election was extended and encouraged; the choice of the chairman by election was permitted; the field of municipal legislation was enlarged; but certain reservations for executive control were included as both negative and positive safeguards. These measures, with some revision, have since continued

in force, and have worked with a reasonable degree of satisfaction, in some cases excellently, but in some cases unfortunately. The number of such municipalities in 1906 was 749, involving a population in excess of 16,000,000, or approximately seven per cent of the total for British India. These do not include the three great commercial centers, Calcutta, Bombay, and Madras, with their large foreign populations, which are administered under special acts of more liberal character.

The novel feature of Lord Ripon's reforms provided for the creation of somewhat similar boards in rural local jurisdictions and the districts throughout British India except Burma. This innovation called forth no little debate and, in the nature of things, has worked rather less satisfactorily than has the system of municipal councils. In 1913 there were 198 district boards with 5,032 members, of whom 2,364 were elected, while the local boards numbered 536 with a membership of 8,005, of whom 3,711 were elected. At the same date the number of municipalities was 712, consisting of 9,718 members, of whom 5,005 were elected. It will be seen, then, that there was a total of nearly 25,000 members of these various sorts of councils, of which number over 11,000 were elected; by far the larger proportion of the members were natives. These figures are significant for the evidence they give of the extension of the practice of self-government, thus fulfilling Lord Ripon's declaration that his plan was "chiefly desirable as an instrument of political and popular education."

The creation of the municipal and local councils was, however, part of a plan of administrative decentralization to relieve the paid officials from various duties and some responsibility and to lessen the financial burdens of the central and provincial governments, especially in matters which were of local interest but which involved increasing expenditure. The British officials were, in many cases, more anxious to secure information from competent natives which would assist them in administration than to afford the natives free debate and full responsibility in the matters concerned. British opinion, both at home and in India, revealed serious

doubt of the wisdom of the measures, and even strong disapproval of them.

Indian opinion was little more friendly because of the increased taxation and because of the restrictions upon the independence and responsibility of the councils. By failing to attend sessions and by unreadiness to participate in a spirit of independence coupled with coöperation, the native members often failed to get from the new institutions the full benefits which were available or to convince the British officials that the system was sufficiently worth while to justify more hearty efforts for its success. Notwithstanding the difficulties, the indifference, and the opposition, the latest reports available, those for 1920, show that the system is expanding; that native participation and elections are both on the increase; and, perhaps more interesting still, that in a considerable number of cases women may vote, and in some cases are eligible for the council.

While Lord Ripon's reforms of 1883 and 1884 established district and local rural councils with Indian members and with elective privileges, in the United Kingdom itself it was not until 1888 that the local-government act established elective county councils, and not until 1894 that the elective parish councils were created. It may also be noted that while the reform acts of 1832, 1867, and 1884 made successive extensions of the franchise, it was not till 1918 that a considerable portion of the male population of the United Kingdom received the right to vote, at the same time that the parliamentary franchise was extended to women. These facts need to be taken into consideration in passing judgment on the British policy in India.

Returning, then, to the subject of the major councils, we find that there was a growing demand for the revision of the act of 1861. This was accomplished by the Indian councils act of 1892. The measure provided for the increase of the number of nonofficial, and hence of native, members in the legislative council of the governor-general and in the provincial councils; the election of such members was permitted by a clumsily worded and indirect provision; and the privileges of debating the budget and of interpellation were

accorded. While in 1861 there had been deliberate avowal of the purpose not to create "a petty parliament," this measure involved more important steps in that direction, but the intimation that it anticipated the introduction of the representative system was promptly denied and reasons were adduced why the idea was impractical for India.

The act of 1892 was destined to remain in force only half as long as its predecessor before demand for still more liberal privileges made its revision necessary. It was criticized because the Mohammedans, the landowners, and the commercial classes, did not receive adequate representation, whereas thirty-six per cent of the nonofficial members of the councils belonged to the legal profession, this percentage being much larger in the elective portion of the membership. Whatever faults there may have been, the act of 1892 was a step in advance which led logically to further steps effected by the Indian councils act of 1909. Before considering that measure, it will be desirable to go back and take into account other developments which were contributory to this result.

In India there was the demand for participation not merely in the legislative but also in the administrative work of government. In the subordinate posts numerous natives had long been employed, but there was a natural resentment that all, or nearly all, the higher posts were reserved for Englishmen. After fruitless minor efforts at adjustment and after investigation and report by a special commission, several reforms were introduced in or about 1892, that is at about the date of the Indian councils act just discussed. These changes included the definite division into the Indian civil service, the provincial service, and the subordinate service. The two latter were almost wholly reserved for natives, and the terms of competition for appointment in the first were modified so as to give Indian candidates a reasonable chance. In addition there are certain small special services, such as forests, engineering, and public works, for which practically all the appointees are necessarily British.

The situation in the three principal services in 1904 was that, of 1,370 posts paying above £800, 1,263 were held by

Europeans, 15 by Eurasians, and 92 by natives; while of 26,908 posts paying under £800, Europeans held only 5,205, while Eurasians held 5,420, and natives 16,383. Though these figures do not show a marked change in favor of the natives, they do indicate that the trend was clearly in that direction. The training of natives in the practical tasks and responsibilities of administration must necessarily be accounted one of the important items in preparation for self-government.

While some recognition of the importance of education had been given by the British in India at earlier dates, the system really rests upon two fundamental documents, a minute drafted by Lord Macaulay in 1835 and the despatch of Sir Charles Wood in 1854 with the accompanying orders. These documents laid down the principle of education in English and placed the emphasis almost exclusively upon higher education. Since then there has been extensive development of secondary and collegiate schools and the numbers who have received training in them have been ample—indeed, in excess of the opportunities for corresponding employment. Serious criticisms have been made against the system at almost every point, but in two particulars which must be noted. In the first place, few of the institutions aside from those under mission control give attention to supplementing literary instruction with any form of character training. The other important objection is to the failure to provide scientific, technical, and vocational training which would fit the beneficiaries for employment and service in varied fields and make them participants in the development of the nation's economic life.

In contrast to the disproportionate attention to the development of higher education has been the neglect or, at best, unsystematic and slight consideration and support accorded to elementary education. Illiteracy in India is appalling, and as late as 1907 less than two per cent of the population was in attendance upon any form of elementary schools, most of which were of very inferior character. The government felt that it was inexpedient, if not impossible, to increase taxation to provide the necessary means

for an adequate educational system, and did not see its way to secure the funds by retrenchment of expenditures for other matters. Furthermore, it must be remembered that the three great measures regulating education in Great Britain itself bear such recent dates as 1870, 1902, and 1918.

To no small degree is the growth of unrest in India directly traceable to the faults of the educational system. The former and actual students of the high schools and colleges have furnished the most numerous and aggressive element in the several forms of agitation and outbursts of discontent. The great gulf between the highly educated few and the ignorant masses is a calamity of incalculable proportions and significance.

While the problem of education has been handled considerably better in India than in Egypt, the success of the British in dealing with questions of assessment and taxation in Egypt has not been duplicated in India. The permanent settlement of the revenue, that is, the establishment of a permanent assessment, effected in Bengal in 1793 under the administration of Lord Cornwallis, has won praises from the most bitter critics of the British, but the reason is that the permanence of the assessment has made impossible any readjustment upward so as to increase the revenue to meet changes in values and in needs. The settlements or assessments of the land revenue in other parts of India have been vigorously attacked because they are for fixed periods and do permit changes in the assessment. Such changes have been made and rates increased from time to time. These have led to complaints both of injustice in fixing the rates and of overtaxation. Successive administrations have steadily endeavored to mitigate the causes of complaint wherever the justice of the methods employed was questioned.

Under the rule both of the Company and later of the Crown there have been English civil servants in India who have displayed remarkable ability to enter into the life of the country and to labor sympathetically for the welfare of the people. British and Indians alike unite in honoring the memory of men like Sir Thomas Munro and James

Thomason. Several governors-general and viceroys, likewise, have exhibited a keen interest in measures for the welfare of the Indian peoples and sought to carry out reforms of benevolent character and of deep significance. The name of Lord William Bentinck will always be honorably remembered for the suppression of *sati*, or widow-burning, and of *thagi*, an evil which permeated the life of the country and has given us the word thug. That he was able successfully to brave the deep-seated prejudices of the people² in these matters is reasonable evidence that reforms of even more far-reaching importance might have been worked out by others laboring with equal courage, devotion, and sympathy. A later viceroy whose name is remembered with similar respect was the Marquess of Ripon, whose reforms in the matter of local councils have already been considered.

Just as in Egypt, the British in India have been accused of neglecting the development of sanitation, and even more of failure to take adequate measures against the chronic evil of India, famines. These criticisms do not mean that the British have not done a vast amount of work to remedy evils and to provide against plague and famine, but that they have not accomplished the desired ends. Anyone who has read Mr. Kipling's stories *William the Conqueror* and *The Tomb of His Ancestors* has vivid pictures in mind of the splendid work done. Even so it is an obvious excuse for criticism that after more than a century of British rule, there should be possible such frightful ravages as have resulted from both plague and famine in the past quarter century, not to mention the disgustingly unsanitary conditions which are still tolerated even in the largest and most Europeanized cities. No doubt ignorance and superstition, religion and caste have been obstacles to radical measures, but one may question whether all these would not have yielded to firm but sympathetic pressure had such measures as those of Lord William Bentinck been followed up consistently through the three generations since he left India.

Accusations made by vehement nationalists like Lajpat

² There were, however, Indian reformers who advocated the abolition of *sati*.

Rai, or by somewhat more moderate writers such as Romesh Chunder Dutt, that England has preferred revenue from India to reform for India are certainly exaggerated. Even though one dismisses as by-gones, which these Indians do not, the rapacity and greed under the Company in the eighteenth century on which Burke poured forth the vials of his indignation, or conditions far less objectionable during the later Company days in the early nineteenth century, there remains to be considered the situation under the government of the Crown. Great Britain has taken no governmental tribute from the people of India, but it has charged to the Indian exchequer expenses which the Indians allege are imperial, not Indian, and, in some cases, the British have considered the point sufficiently well taken to cause them to transfer certain items.

The chief accusation, however, is what the Indian economists and agitators describe as the economic drain, which they attribute to the suppression of native industry, the manipulation of trade, and interest charges on railroad bonds and other capital investments. The charge cuts deeper, however, for it goes beyond the mere economic drain to allege either serious errors in policy, such as preferring railway construction to canal and irrigation works, or deliberate sacrifice of Indian welfare to English economic advantage, as in yielding to the protests of the Lancashire cotton spinners against certain tariff duties. It would seem that there is too much smoke to preclude the existence of some fire.

The correspondence of the directors of the East India Company with their officials and agents in India affords plentiful evidence of their loyal devotion to dividends, and their opposition to measures either of imperial or of reform character which might appear in any way to endanger the size of the annual net income. None the less the agents of the Company did carry forward almost unremittingly a policy of conquest and of territorial absorption within India, which reached its climax in the extensive annexations effected by the great Marquess of Dalhousie, who was governor-general from 1848 to 1856. Dalhousie was a devout,

indomitable Scotchman who was intensely convinced that he was engaged in a great humanitarian undertaking—a conviction which an impartial reader will be inclined to share—but his too masterly policy overreached itself. The great Mutiny of 1857 was the result. Since then Great Britain has abandoned the policy of annexations within India and has been content to allow the native princes to govern, under its supervision, the considerable portions of the country which had not already been incorporated into British India.

Since the Mutiny, British policy with reference to India has been in the control of the secretary of state for India, a member of the British cabinet, responsible to parliament. His vision of India has been obtained from the point of view of the United Kingdom and of imperial interests. Down to the Anglo-Russian agreement in 1907 British imperial policy was dominated by fear of Russia, sedulously cultivated by returned civilians and military men from India. As a consequence of this situation, the British in India turned their activities from annexations within India to a policy of annexations along the frontiers and of building up buffer states under British influence for protection against the Russian bear's "irresistible advance into India." Imperialism in India had given place to imperialism in Asia.

As the old policy attained its climax under Lord Dalhousie, so this new policy finally overreached itself in the too masterly activities of Lord Curzon of Kedleston as viceroy from 1899 to 1905. He carried out annexations on the northwest frontier which he organized into the Northwest Frontier Province, and he sent the Younghusband mission to Tibet in 1904 and Sir Louis Dane to Afghanistan in 1905. These measures include the latest annexations of territory to the Indian Empire and the latest extensions of the British sphere of influence in territories adjacent to India. The horrid contrast of this splendid and expensive imperialism with the misery of plague and famine in the land could not fail to produce a reaction. It is a tribute to the development of the Indian peoples under British rule in the intervening half century that instead of Mutiny there was Unrest.

The half century had been marked by the development of the councils, national, provincial, and local; by great material development in the construction of railways, telegraphs, canals, and irrigation works; by famine relief and measures against disease; by improved financial arrangements; by civil service reforms; and by the spread of education—all which have been discussed; and by many minor measures of amelioration. What had been the reaction of all these on the Indian mind? What, moreover, is the character of Indian mentality?

It has been the fashion, as exemplified by Mr. Kipling, to consider the Indian mentality and western thinking as incommensurate. The Indians, not merely the Hindus, but also the Mohammedans, emphasize their spiritual-mindedness as contrasted with the material-mindedness of the occidentals. The Hindu has been exalted for his ability for abstruse and lofty thought. While there is perhaps some truth in all these notions, yet much is certainly to be found in the intellectual life of India to-day which is comparable with the mysticism and scholastic philosophy of the European Middle Ages, rather than with the present-day traits of western peoples.

Generalizations, always dangerous, are nowhere so likely to lead to false conclusions as in India. Its diversities of conditions really forbid generalization. Over against the abysmal ignorance of the vast masses there stand experimental scientists with broad philosophic vision like Sir J. C. Bose, and liberal-minded, well-balanced statesmen like Lord Sinha. The leadership of large sections of Indian opinion and action to-day has, however, been assumed by men of a different stamp. These belong to the higher castes, many of them Brahmins, who have received western education in the schools and colleges. That education has unfortunately been of the sort that passes examinations but not of the kind that trains the mind to grapple with problems and face situations involving hard facts. It has taught the student to memorize many facts, whether he understands and accepts them or not, in order to satisfy the examiner. It has, on the other hand, given him the ability to

read, outside the curriculum, books of advanced, if not incendiary thought. This reading, without the check of the careful analysis and searching criticism of the classroom, results in uncontrolled thinking, loose reasoning, and often irrational, even dangerous, conclusions.

In talking with men of this class one is frequently surprised at their adolescent evasion of facts, inability or unwillingness to reason logically, and imaginative zeal to arrive at conclusions in realities as well as in ideas regardless of intervening obstacles. The British problem is to find the needed supply of wise and sympathetic mentors for this group of men, mostly young, who are leading India they know not whither.³ They are as sheep without a shepherd. India needs good scout-masters skilled not in the craft of the forest or in jungle lore but in the lore and craft of politics, economics, sociology, and religion. The British civil, educational, and other services have provided not a few such excellent scout-masters, and the mission schools and colleges have furnished more. The supply of these men is woefully inadequate and in recent years has been decreasing not only relatively but absolutely. The real problem of the future of India is to increase greatly the supply of such wise and tactful guides. Force has been the stern school-master of India for centuries, and has failed; the warm heart and the sympathetic hand are yielding the desired results where they have a chance.

This, however, is getting ahead of the story, for we have been trying to collect and collate the data necessary for understanding the situation in India after Lord Curzon gave place to the Earl of Minto in 1905. Two items still remain for consideration, the attempts of the leaders of India to organize for the promotion of their aims and the external influences which may have been operating to stimulate their thought and action.

Since its organization in 1885 the Indian National Congress, an entirely unofficial and voluntary organization, chiefly but not exclusively Hindu, and largely Brahmin, has

³ It will be observed that this statement does not refer to the whole group of nationalists.

been the most widely recognized and influential spokesman of Indian opinion. The original platform of the congress did not present immoderate demands, but did contend for much more than the British authorities have yet been prepared to concede.

In the earlier years, and even as late as 1915, both the government and the congress recognized the desirability of maintaining some contacts. Several English people, including some prominent retired civil servants, have given their sympathy to the congress. Five times in the first thirty years, the presidency of the congress was held by Englishmen. Three times a Parsi, Mr. Dadabai Naoroji, was chosen to preside, and on three other occasions Mohammedans were selected for the presidency, which has at other times been held by Hindus. The registered attendance during this period averaged 775 annually. It reached 440 the second year and did not fall so low again until 1909, while it reached the maximum in the Calcutta meeting of 1906 due to the efforts to protest against the partition of Bengal. Radicalism grew steadily in the congress until it reached a climax in the stormy session at Surat in 1907, after which followed a period of milder councils. During the first twenty years, then, the congress movement had been gaining steadily in momentum. Not unfriendly relations had subsisted between it and the government, but as the years passed without producing any particular impression upon the government, the more radical elements gained strength.

Meanwhile external events were wielding an increasing influence upon Indian thought. It was the unwritten law of the British, never honored in the breach, not to permit any military reverse to pass without being promptly avenged. The consequent occidental prestige for invincibility remained unshattered until the crushing and unretrieved defeat of the Italians by the Abyssinians at Adowa in 1896. The success of the Boers in South Africa in withstanding for three years the greatest military effort which the British Empire had ever yet put forth was expensive to British prestige in Indian eyes, and was not redeemed by

the concession of responsible government to the two Boer states five years later, in 1906. A more convincing blow to European prestige was the defeat of Russia by Japan, an Asiatic nation, smaller, less populous, and poorer than India, and, unlike India, but recently emerged from its medieval seclusion.

Russia, furthermore, was that nation in awe of which Great Britain had held its breath and maneuvered its imperial policy for two generations. With such a convincing demonstration, why should India continue to cower before the British? India had been taught and believed that England must be tolerated to save India from the worse evil of Russian despotism. Whatever remained of that danger was removed by the Anglo-Russian agreement of 1907, which followed upon British success in out-manoeuvring Russia in Tibet and Afghanistan in 1904 and 1905. Freed from the Russian menace, there remained no foe against whom India needed British protection; India was free to deal with Great Britain on the merits of the question. The situation was not unlike that which arose in North America after the French menace had been removed from England's continental colonies by the treaty of 1763.

Within the British Empire, India had not received equitable treatment. It was true that the British monarch now plumed himself with the splendid title of Emperor of India and that Edward VII had recently been proclaimed at a magnificent *darbar* at Delhi in 1903. In the imperial conferences, however, which had been held occasionally since the Queen's jubilee in 1887, India had been accorded no part. India was good for show but not for counsel. In various ways India had contributed to the British success in South Africa, but the British government failed to assure Indian laborers and others in South Africa fair treatment after the war, and had left them to win their own battle as best they might. Then, too, Australia and Canada, other self-governing dominions, had contemptuously shown their unwillingness to accord the Indian equal treatment with the white citizens of the empire, but, rather, sought to exclude him as undesirable. Such denial of equitable treatment not

only hurt the Indian pride, but it sapped the Indian confidence in British fair-mindedness and justice.

In India itself things had not been going well. The financial crisis which affected the United States and other countries in the 'nineties of the last century hit India even more severely. Before that crisis had passed came famines more widespread than any in the modern history of the country. In 1900 the famine area was three and one-half times greater than the United Kingdom, with a population two and one third times as great. At one time the numbers gathered in relief camps equaled the population of Greater London. Then came the bubonic plague, which first appeared in India in 1896 and has become endemic. In 1904 it caused more than 1,000,000 deaths, and in the last twenty years 10,000,000 deaths. Against this dark background, in lurid contrast, stood out the bustling and expensive imperialism of Lord Curzon. Finally he, quite unwittingly, threw the lighted match into the tinder by proclaiming the partition of Bengal in 1905.

The division of this province, which exceeded the area of the United Kingdom by twenty-five per cent and the population by seventy-five per cent, was an obvious administrative necessity and was arranged on lines which were apparently expedient politically since they recognized the predominantly Mohammedan population of the sections which were separated to form a new province. This was denounced as British favoritism to the Mohammedans,⁴ since in the original province the Hindus had constituted the majority. The action was interpreted as a departure from the avowed British policy of not interfering in religious matters. In race and language there was no differentiation between the districts incorporated in the new province and the portions of Bengal left in the old province. It was easy to raise the cry that the British had cut in pieces "Mother Bengal," and that they had done so for their own evil purposes. Agitation ran rife; acts of violence occurred; the Indian national congress assembled in Calcutta in 1906 with unrivaled

⁴ Some Mohammedans, however, opposed the partition.

attendance and joined in denunciation of the outrage; and the *swadeshi* boycott of English goods was initiated. Never was such pressure brought to bear on the British government to reverse one of its policies in India. When Lord Curzon's quarrel with Lord Kitchener resulted in the former's resignation in 1905, it was confidently hoped that the change of administration would be accompanied by a reversal of the act, especially as the Liberal party had recently come into power in England. Mr. John Morley, the new secretary of state for India, however, declared the matter a *chose jugée* and adhered strictly to that policy.

Mr. Morley, and the new viceroy, the Earl of Minto, undertook to divert attention by liberal reforms of the national and provincial legislative councils. Progress was slow, for the reforms which were first outlined in a minute by Lord Minto in 1906 were not embodied into law until the passage of the Indian councils act of 1909, though Mr. Morley had called to the council of India in 1907 two Indians, one a Hindu and one a Mohammedan, and in 1909 an Indian was for the first time admitted to the viceroy's executive council; he was a Hindu, Mr., later Lord, Sinha.

The new councils act included provisions for enlarging the provincial legislative councils and giving them non-official majorities; for enlarging the legislative council of the viceroy, but retaining an official majority with a veto over the provincial councils; for representation of the Mohammedan minority; for the election of a proportion of the members of both the viceregal and provincial councils, with an arrangement of electoral constituencies; for increased privileges of budget discussion and interpellation; for the right to introduce resolutions; and for the later extension of executive and legislative councils to other provinces.

Comparison with the act of 1892 shows that the increase of privileges was both liberal and genuine. The Indians were given much larger opportunities for acquiring experience in the handling of important public questions and for exercising very considerable influence upon government policy. The presence of the official majority in the viceroy's council was a definite but reasonable restriction upon

complete native control and responsibility. It was justifiable as an intermediate step and also because the councils were only in the slightest degree representative of the peoples of India; they merely represented certain interests. In other respects the measure was disappointing to the reformers in the congress party and open to reasonable criticism, but it was a long step forward and a genuine one. Experience of its actual working, on the whole, quite thoroughly justified the wisdom both of going so far, and of not going further. These Morley-Minto reforms were not brilliant or epoch-making achievements, but they proved to be good solid statesmanship, constructive and progressive. In all fairness, they must be judged as an effort to establish not a permanent but a temporary system. The period of unrest which had started with the partition of Bengal was practically terminated by the reforms of 1909.

The councils act of 1861 had remained in force thirty-one years; the councils act of 1892, seventeen years; the Morley-Minto reforms of 1909 were destined to only a decade of life before being superseded. The immediate result of the reforms was favorable. Lord Minto left India amid approving plaudits in 1910, and his successor, Lord Hardinge, was welcomed in a similar spirit. The visit of King George V and Queen Mary for the proclamation of their accession at a great *darbar* at Delhi in 1911 was the first event of its kind and evoked great enthusiasm. The announcement on this occasion of the transfer of the capital from Calcutta to Delhi was perhaps a clever move, but the revision of the partition of Bengal which gratified Hindu sentiment was bound to give offense to the Mohammedans who had profited from the previous arrangement.

The Mohammedans of India had been much slower than the Hindus to avail themselves of the privileges of western education, but with the opening of the twentieth century this situation had begun to change. Furthermore, the Mohammedans had held aloof, as a rule, from the Indian national congress movement and had been inclined to find their interest in supporting British rule rather than in sympathizing with the Hindu reformers. Even when the All-

India Moslem League was formed in 1905 this attitude persisted. Education and events in other parts of the Moslem world were already modifying their views, when the revision of the Bengal settlement gave added incentive to change, which was still further accentuated by other events outside India.

In 1904 the Anglo-French agreement confirmed the English position in Egypt and the French hold on Morocco; the Anglo-Russian agreement of 1907 practically brought Persia under the sway of the two contracting powers; Italy seized Tripoli and Rhodes in 1911; and the Balkan wars of 1912-13 stripped the Ottoman Empire of most of its European lands. The Christian powers were apparently banded in an unholy league for the destruction of the political power of Islam, which could only be interpreted as precursing the subversion of the faith as well. The consequent growth of the Pan-Islamic movement did not fail to attract followers in India. The success of the Young Turk revolution of 1908 caused the more restless Moslem spirits in India to link up with its leaders and to draw inspiration from them. This tendency became pronounced at the time of the Balkan wars, when the Moslems of India bore their gifts to their sorely tried Ottoman brethren. The Indian Mohammedans were drifting rapidly into the same dubious position as the Hindus with reference to the British government.

Then came the World War. With surprising unanimity the Indian peoples, as well as the Indian princes, rallied to the support of the British Empire against the Germans. There seemed to be a sudden realization that, whatever its faults, British rule was preferable to German. The services of Indian troops on the western front in France in 1914-15 were of indispensable importance. Indian troops, often Mohammedans, did valiant service also in Mesopotamia, Palestine, and East Africa against Mohammedan coreligionists. The viceroy's legislative council passed important war measures not dissimilar to those enacted in England itself, voted unanimously a gift from the Indian government of £100,000,000 for the imperial war expenses, and later approved a loan for an additional £100,000,000 which was

promptly subscribed. Whether these acts were spontaneous and disinterested or not, India had clearly earned the right to have its affairs regarded by the British government in the future from "a new angle of vision," as Premier Asquith expressed it. The first evidence of such a change came when a native prince of India and a former Hindu member of the Indian legislative council were seated with the representatives from the self-governing dominions in the first Imperial war conference.

Recognition as a partner with the self-governing dominions in the empire suggested a larger measure of self-government for India. The first steps to this end were taken by Lord Hardinge before the close of his administration in 1916. His successor, Lord Chelmsford, later in the same year submitted to the government in London his project for reforms, but there were destined to be long delays before the British ministry and parliament could find time free to devote to Indian constitutional questions. The delay made the extremists in India increasingly impatient—a marked contrast to the patience of the Egyptian nationalists until after the armistice. The congress and the Moslem league drew closer together with the growing power of the radical element in each. Both met at Lucknow in 1916 and adopted resolutions embodying radical and insistent demands for the largest measure of self-government and for other reforms. It was on this occasion that the theosophical Mrs. Besant began the exercise of her remarkable and inflammatory influence upon the congress movement. Thus began a second period of unrest which apparently reached its culmination in the arrest of Mr. Gandhi in 1922.

The year 1917 saw an adjustment of the long-standing grievance over the cotton duties, the appointment of the Sadler commission to inquire into educational questions in India and of the Holland committee to study the industrial situation, the termination of indenturing Indians to work in the Fiji and West Indian islands, and other reforms. Toward the end of the year Mr. Montagu, who had been Mr. Morley's under-secretary, became secretary of state, for India and arrived in India to confer upon the question of

governmental reforms in accordance with an announcement that the policy would be not only "the increasing association of Indians in every branch of the administration, but also the greatest development of self-governing institutions with a view to the progressive realization of responsible government in India as an integral part of the British Empire." Though the announcement was carefully safeguarded with cautionary restrictions it marked a long step in advance since Mr. Morley had accompanied his reforms with a vigorous denial that he contemplated the ultimate bestowal of parliamentary institutions upon India.

Mr. Montagu completed his inquiries and conferences in India by signing in April, 1918, with Lord Chelmsford, the viceroy, a report which was presented to parliament in July. Long delays still ensued, which, indeed, contributed somewhat to the value of the result, before the measure was finally passed in December, 1919.

This government of India act of 1919 created a council of state of not more than sixty members, of whom not more than one third may be officials. This is an entirely new body and forms the upper house of the national legislature. The former legislative council has become the lower house, with the name of legislative assembly. It is composed of one hundred and forty-four members, of whom one hundred and three are elected and, of the remainder, only twenty-six may be officials. The term of the council of state is five years, and of the assembly, three years. In cases of disagreement the two bodies may sit in joint session to determine their differences. The reserve power which had been invested in the national legislature prior to this act of 1919 had, with this creation of a native majority, to be transferred to the viceroy, who, in certain cases, is granted power to "certify" measures as vital to the peace, safety, and welfare of India. The viceroy's executive council, which now numbers eight, has charge of the various departments of administration.

The reforms in the national government of India are paralleled on a somewhat more liberal scale by changes in the provincial government. In the eight more important

provinces (Burma has since been included) not only were there important changes made in the legislative councils and their powers and in the extension of the franchise, but a reform of vital significance was introduced in the character and powers of the provincial executive. These administrative powers are divided into two classes, one dealing with the "reserved" subjects, and one dealing with the "transferred" subjects. The "reserved" subjects are those which involve imperial interests, and remain in the charge of the governor-in-council. The "transferred" subjects, which deal with purely provincial matters, such as education, are under the charge of the governor assisted by ministers who are intended to be responsible to the legislative council of the province.

This novel constitutional scheme, which its inventors have called dyarchy, involves certain obvious limitations upon the freedom of action of the legislative chambers. This scheme was devised for the explicit purpose of transferring power and responsibility for certain matters of provincial, as contrasted with imperial, interest, to the people of India. It is confessedly an awkward arrangement, and its real justification is that it has been created to meet a peculiar necessity. It can scarcely be regarded as other than a temporary expedient, and as a step toward the gradual transfer of the direction of other departments of administration and legislation to native control, as rapidly as experience appears to justify such action.

It was recognized that these important changes in the government of British India would have an inevitable reaction upon the government of the numerous native states. Accordingly, provision was included for the establishment of a chamber of princes, in which the rulers of these states might meet for conference and action upon matters of general concern. Another important provision of the act recognized its provisional character, and required that once in ten years there should be a parliamentary commission of inquiry into the workings of the government, the progress of the people, and proposals for further changes in the form of government. This provision, which is, to all intents and

purposes, a scheme for the consideration of constitutional amendments, is of the highest importance, since it definitely commits the British government to a policy of progressive bestowal of self-government, and no longer leaves the question either to chance or to spasmodic adjustment.

The act obviously falls short of conferring upon India full dominion status, as the most advanced leaders in India had desired, and even demanded, as the necessary minimum. On the other hand, moderate opinion in India recognized the remarkable generosity of the new measure in the amount of self-government conferred, as contrasted with the measure of 1909. There was no longer any disavowal, by the statesmen of England, of the development of a genuine legislature, or of representative institutions, or even of a preliminary stage of responsible government. The measure did actually create a legislature based in large measure upon elections in accordance with the representative principle, and it contained also definite provision for the development of ministerial responsibility.

Naturally, British opinion, both in India and at home, was sharply divided upon the expediency of the measure. In both cases a large majority recognized the necessity, if not the wisdom, of the act, but in both groups there were numerous outspoken opponents who denounced the new governmental scheme as fraught with ruinous consequences. They declared that the people of India were not fitted for such responsibility, that the new legislatures and ministers could not be trusted to work with the best interests of the whole of the Indian people in mind, and especially did they denounce the surrender of British imperial interests.

Before the new acts were placed upon the statute book two events occurred which radically altered the situation in India. The first of these was the passage of the so-called Rowlatt acts. The other was the killing of nearly four hundred Indians and the wounding of about three times as many more by the orders of General Dyer at Jallianwala Bagh, at Amritsar, on April 13, 1919.

With the close of the war it was felt that the lapse of the special powers conferred by the defense of India act, cor-

responding to the British defense of the realm act, would deprive the government of the necessary powers for the prevention or suppression of sedition. To meet this situation two measures were framed by a committee under the presidency of Mr. Justice Rowlatt of the high court. In the legislative council, these proposals were denounced in the most vigorous terms by the native members, and the government was fully warned not merely of the inexpediency but of the danger of enacting these proposals. They were, however, passed by the votes of the official *bloc* in the council. In fact, the acts remained inoperative, and the only result of their passage was to inflame public opinion. The measures were not unreasonable or harsh as compared with similar laws in western countries, but the government would have been wise not to have pressed the measures prior to the establishment of the new legislative chambers under the Montagu-Chelmsford act which was soon to become a law.

Of the second matter, the unfortunate and ghastly affair at Amritsar, in the Punjab, it is sufficient to quote from the despatch of the British government: "The principle which has consistently governed the policy of His Majesty's Government in directing the methods to be employed where military action in support of civil authority is required, may be broadly stated as using the minimum force necessary. . . . It must regretfully, without possibility of doubt, be concluded that Brigadier-General Dyer's action at Jallianwala Bagh was in complete violation of this principle." The only charitable view is that in ordering a body of soldiers to fire without warning upon a defenseless mob General Dyer lost his head.

The British government was slow in appointing the so-called Hunter commission to investigate the affair, and it was more than a year after the tragedy before the commission's report appeared. These delays gave added weight to the fiery denunciations of the affair by the agitators throughout India. Though the report unqualifiedly condemned General Dyer's action, and both the government of India and the British government at home disavowed the affair, General Dyer was let off with mere dismissal from the

service, and other officers in the Punjab who were more or less implicated in this and other measures for the suppression of disturbances in that province not merely escaped without any penalty but like Sir Michael O'Dwyer, lieutenant-governor of the Punjab, were retired on pensions chargeable to the Indian revenues.

It was these two affairs which turned Mr. Gandhi into a thoroughgoing opponent of the British government, which he rightly claimed he had hitherto loyally supported, and made him the greatest leader that the people of India have produced. There is no more striking or interesting personality in the world to-day than this prophet, this holy man, who suddenly rose to the leadership of the people of India. He was a man of fifty, educated in the British schools in India, at London University, and at the Inner Temple, where he read for the bar. The major part of his mature life had been spent in South Africa, where he had acquired renown as the champion of the rights of his fellow Indians. Mr. Gandhi's power rested primarily upon his personality. His saintly character, his ascetic life, and his lofty spiritual principles have won universal admiration, and it is little wonder that the highly religious and mystical natives of India have revered him as a holy man and have, in spite of his own behest, insisted upon calling him Mahatma⁵ Gandhi, that is, the prophet Gandhi. It would be difficult to find any western parallel for the intense devotion to a man which the people of India have given to Mahatma Gandhi. Only in the Middle Ages of Europe may one find a counterpart to the mysticism, asceticism, and sanctity of Mr. Gandhi, but not even St. Francis of Assisi is an adequate parallel, nor does even the crusading zeal and enthusiasm aroused at the council of Clermont afford a comparison to the passionate devotion of the natives of India to their prophet.

In entering the field of political agitation in India, Mr. Gandhi was attempting a far more difficult role than he had practiced on the smaller stage of South Africa. Likewise, in attempting to preach for the three hundred millions of

⁵ The word literally means "great soul."

people of India ideals similar to those of a religious ascetic, he was attempting, as no other character in history has done, to carry his ideals to their logical conclusion in the sphere of government. Even Jesus of Nazareth had declared that his kingdom was not of this world, and had enjoined his followers to "render to Cæsar the things that are Cæsar's."

In proclaiming his doctrine of *swaraj*, Mr. Gandhi confused the idea of personal *swaraj*, or self-control, with national *swaraj*, or self-government. He insisted that the principles, which all religions teach, of the development of self-control as the way of righteousness and salvation, were equally applicable in the larger sphere of the regulation of masses of peoples in social and political affairs. One cannot but be astounded into admiration for the boldness and magnificence of his idealism, and one feels almost a sense of horror at applying cold reason to his great program. Even he himself seemed at times to waver in the face of the frightful evidence of the impracticability of his teachings. The doctrine of *swaraj* in political matters was not original with Mr. Gandhi. It had long been the ideal of the educated classes in India. It was only in his lofty spiritual interpretation of the doctrine that he was an innovator. The other elements of his practical program were likewise borrowed, but also more or less spiritualized by his idealism.

The idea of *swadeshi*, that is, home industries, had been one of the essential factors in the disturbances of 1906, but Mr. Gandhi declared not merely foreign goods, but all the material inventions, machines, and enterprises of the West, satanic, and bade his followers turn from them and return to the use of the distaff, the spinning wheel, the plow, and the flail, which had been the implements of Indian industry for thousands of years. The western civilizations of Persia and Greece and Rome and the empires of the foreign conquerors from Alexander to the Great Mughals had all passed away, but India alone stood firm after four thousand years, with the same religion and culture, the same economic and social system. The salvation of India obviously lay in rigorously throwing aside the material evils of the moribund civilization of the West and in disowning the British gov-

ernment, which his logic led him to denounce as satanic. He called upon the people to return to the eternal verities of the spiritual life of India embodied in the *Mahabharata* and the *Bhagavadgita*. To emphasize this teaching, he not only enjoined but practiced the use of the old-fashioned spinning wheel, the *charka*, for the making of the rough home-spun cloth in which he clad himself, and which he exhorted his followers to make and wear.

The third great ideal which he preached was that of brotherhood of the peoples of India. No one has ever struck so tremendous a blow at the system of caste as has Mr. Gandhi, both by precept and example. He has endeavored to persuade the Brahmin to overcome his scruples, and even to sit at table with "untouchables," that is, persons of the lower castes. One cannot doubt that the future historians of India will record that one of the greatest forces in the molding of unity of the peoples of India has been the work of Mahatma Gandhi in his labor to unite them all, regardless of caste or race or creed, into one great brotherhood of Indian people.

To the logic of this exalted ideal Mahatma Gandhi was not unfaithful. He recognized that in this great brotherhood not only must all the castes of Hinduism be merged but that Hindu and Mohammedan must be brought into affiliation. This led to the adoption of the fourth, and in some respects the most serious, item in his program, the acceptance of the caliphate doctrine and agitation current among the Mohammedan leaders under the inspiration of the hot-headed Ali brothers.

The caliphate movement owed its origin in the first place to the Pan-Islamic agitation and later to the movement led by the Young Turks, which resulted in the revolution of 1908 in the Ottoman Empire, but it received still greater stimulus from the steady breakdown by Christian European powers of the independence of Mohammedan states in the early years of the twentieth century. The World War witnessed the further disintegration of Turkish power, and the abortive treaty of Sèvres confirmed the results by stripping the Ottoman Empire of still more provinces, leav-

ing to it little more than a fragment of Asia Minor. The war had also witnessed an attempt to deprive the Ottoman sultan of the caliphate.

The dissatisfaction of the Mohammedans of India over certain internal matters, and the alarm at the steady decline in the extent of independent Mohammedan states had, however, not resulted in any serious manifestations in India until the treaty of Sèvres. The Mohammedans of India had first organized themselves for political purposes in 1905 in the All-India Moslem League, which was in general sympathetic to British rule and antagonistic to the congress movement. This original attitude had been slowly shifting until 1916, when the league took action in identical terms with the congress in demanding self-government for India. The caliphate question had no proper relation to political questions in India, but the Ali brothers, who had long been in sympathetic relations with the Young Turks, seized upon the treaty of Sèvres as a convenient political weapon to arouse Mohammedan sentiment in India to the danger of Christian aggression against Islam, and to the special menace of British rule in India to the interests of that country in general and of its Mohammedans in particular. The acceptance by Mr. Gandhi of the caliphate issue was a perfectly natural political agreement to clinch the coöperation of Hindu and Mohammedan in the struggle for national self-government.

The immediate purpose of the noncoöperation program was to withdraw support from the British government in India, and particularly to refuse any participation in the inauguration of the Montagu-Chelmsford reforms. Mr. Gandhi and his followers believed that it was possible, by maintaining a policy of nonresistance, to render the reforms ineffective and the British administration helpless. He did not contemplate the use of violence, but consistently denounced it. None the less, sporadic outbreaks of violence continually occurred.

As a consequence, the moderate element among the Indian population decided to accept the measure, and to coöperate in inaugurating the new legislative assemblies. This

was the first blow to the success of the Gandhi program. A second blow came from the Moplah affair in the western part of the Madras presidency. This was an attack by a fanatical group of Mohammedans upon their peaceful Hindu neighbors to convert them forcibly to Mohammedanism. The result was a grim scene of violence and bloodshed, which brought home to the Hindu population with great vividness that the much-heralded brotherhood of Hindu and Moslem might not result in an equal partnership, but in domination by the more vigorous and strenuous Mohammedans.

Meanwhile the Duke of Connaught, the last surviving son of Queen Victoria, came to India in 1921 as a personal representative of George V to inaugurate the new legislative assemblies, the assembly of the princes, and the more important provincial assemblies. In his various addresses he endeavored to allay the bitterness of race feeling, and to win for the new reforms a favorable trial. Later in the same year the government in London decided that the Prince of Wales should make an extensive tour of the Indian Empire. In many respects the occasion seemed to be highly unpropitious. His arrival in Bombay was the signal for serious rioting, and at Madras, Calcutta, and Allahabad, the *hartal*, or boycott, and other forms of unfriendly demonstration were disagreeably successful. As time went on, however, sentiment began to change, and the reception accorded to the prince from city to city became less hostile and more friendly. His reception in the native states was not merely friendly but highly gratifying. The closing weeks of his visit were spent at Delhi and in the Punjab, where he even visited Amritsar without any serious unpleasantness. Meanwhile the successful introduction of the reform measures and operation of the new legislatures were counteracting the efforts of the agitators.

Shortly after the inauguration of the new assemblies, Lord Chelmsford completed his term as viceroy, and was replaced by Lord Reading. Upon his arrival in India the new viceroy held extensive conferences with Mr. Gandhi and through him even communicated with the Ali brothers.

Efforts to establish an understanding between the government and the various agitating elements went to the length of a proposal, at the close of 1921, for a round-table conference. It did not require much consideration, however, to show that such a proposal was inexpedient, if not entirely impracticable. This was made particularly clear by the continued irresponsibility of the Ali brothers, who were finally arrested and given jail sentences. The Indian national congress in December, 1921, met at Ahmedabad, the home of Mr. Gandhi. The question of putting into full force the noncoöperation program was discussed with approval, but the determination of the time for action was left to Mr. Gandhi, who was practically intrusted with dictatorial powers by the congress.

As Mr. Gandhi confronted the immediate possibility of inaugurating his plan, he seems to have realized that the various acts of violence which have just been mentioned made it clear that noncoöperation might be proclaimed as a measure of passive resistance, but that, in spite of his first intentions, it would result in worse violence and more bloodshed. While he was in this frame of mind there occurred at Chauri Chaura in the United Provinces a mob attack which resulted in the burning of a police station with about twenty native policemen, early in February, 1922. Mr. Gandhi promptly denounced the affair, and declared that he would fast for several days as his personal expiation for the outrage. His indecision and hesitation grew more obvious, though the extremists were doing their best to spur him to action.

During this period, the question of Mr. Gandhi's arrest was a subject of general discussion. The natives declared that the British government did not dare touch him, and charged the authorities with injustice in their arrest of minor agents. The decision of the matter was precipitated in a way that could scarcely have been anticipated. Mr. Montagu, the secretary of state for India, who had been responsible for the reform policy and who was considered as being too lenient in dealing with the Indian situation, had evidently been for some time the object of attack by his

more conservative colleagues in the ministry. The publication by him of a despatch from Lord Reading dealing with the Mohammedan issue, without the customary consultation with the prime minister and his colleagues, led to his dismissal on March 9, 1922.

The following day Mr. Gandhi was placed under arrest, promptly tried, and sentenced to jail for six years without labor. The coincidence had a noteworthy effect upon Indian opinion, and since that time the government of India has followed a strong and consistent policy of enforcing law and order and has impressed upon the popular mind the genuineness of British power by sending bodies of troops on long marches through the country, simply as a matter of demonstration.

The new legislative councils have, under the circumstances, been working even more satisfactorily than might have been expected, and this fact has had a beneficial influence. It is, of course, easy to bring criticisms against them, either from the British or from the Indian point of view, with reference to lack of adequate representative basis, to personnel, to procedure in debate, to ability and readiness to assume responsibility along with privilege, and in other matters, but it must be remembered that things are in the experimental stage, and perfection cannot be expected at once, especially as it has not been attained in western lands.

The most serious problem, however, is that of financial deficits, which have appeared in each of the budgets handled by the assemblies. In face of the spirit of unwillingness to increase taxation the only recourse lies in economies. As a consequence the demand for a large decrease in the British army in the country, and even of the native portion of the army, has been greatly intensified. The saving in expense would be prompt and obvious, and it would be consonant with the desire for native self-rule, as opposed to British control. If looked at merely by themselves, the figures for the size of the army and for military expenditures are large, but if considered relatively with the population of the country, they are quite small.

The number of British troops in India is about one to

4,500 of the population, and the number of native troops about one to 1,800, or a total army of one to every 1,300 of the population. The annual cost is approximately one dollar *per capita* for the population. It will be seen, therefore, that the military establishment can hardly be regarded as excessive in size or cost. Its necessity has been shown constantly in the past four or five years by the serious troubles on the northwestern frontier, which have been almost continuous, as well as in the serious Afghan war of 1919.

A more reasoned and scientific undertaking to deal with the financial situation was the request for the creation of a commission of inquiry into expenditures. This commission, similar to the Geddes commission in England, is now at work under the presidency of Lord Inchcape, and may be expected to offer useful recommendations.

Since the arrest of Mr. Gandhi, the influence of the national congress has steadily declined. It is reported that the number of registered supporters is now only 25 per cent of what it was in 1921, and that the financial support has suffered a similar decline. Moreover, serious divisions have appeared in the congress party. One part, under the leadership of Mr. C. R. Das, who has recently been released from prison, advocates participation in the elections which will occur some months hence, in order to achieve their aims either by direct action in the councils or by pursuing a wrecking policy. This party, however, was defeated at the meeting of the national congress held at Gaya, in December, 1922, by the faction which proposed to adhere strictly to the extremist noncoöperation policy.⁶

Though the outlook for the successful application of an added measure of self-government under the Montagu-Chelmsford reforms is hopeful, it is not certain. The problems are tremendous, the difficulties enormous; the bulk of the people is illiterate; the extension of education progresses slowly; the economic and financial questions offer serious perplexities. To overcome these obstacles India's greatest asset is the will to win in the establishment of self-govern-

⁶See below, pages 105-108.

ment and to prove to the world its equality with the progressive nations of the West.

Having studied the program of the political movement in India down to the present moment, it is now desirable to survey the more important factors in the Indian situation, in order to understand the problems to be faced in the development of a system of self-government by the Indian peoples. In the first place, the Indian Empire comprises an area somewhat in excess of 1,800,000 square miles, that is, somewhat more than the area of the United States east of the Rocky Mountains.

About 700,000 square miles of this area are contained in native states, ruled by their own princes, with their own administration and laws in each case. Over these native states the British government exercises a certain benevolent supervision. In some of them the administration is highly progressive, and the conditions are better than in British India itself. This is apparently, however, the exception rather than the rule. Administration through native states, from the point of view of the British control, is a simple procedure, and has thus far afforded the imperial government a minimum of anxiety. Partly owing to this circumstance and partly owing to other reasons some persons have recently seriously proposed the breaking up of British India into a suitable number of small states, and placing them under native rulers. It would seem to be apparent that such a suggestion is both reactionary and impracticable, and that it would also fail to prove a solution of the problem of self-government acceptable to the people of India.⁷ The population of the native states, by the census of 1921, was 71,936,736.

The remainder of the Indian Empire, customarily spoken of as British India, has an area of about 1,100,000 square miles, and its population in 1921 was 247,138,396. This territory is divided into fifteen provincial units, of which

⁷Some nationalists, indeed, frankly express regret that all the native states were not wiped out and British India made coextensive with the Indian Empire, for they feel that the native states hamper the nationalist and reform movements.

nine have a population varying from 7,500,000 to 46,000,000, and areas varying from 53,000 square miles to 230,000 square miles. The remaining provinces are much smaller in area and in population, and the separate existence of each is due to some peculiarity in geography, race, or history. The nine principal provinces mentioned are Assam, Bengal, Bihar and Orissa, Bombay, Burma, Central Provinces and Berar, Madras, the Punjab, and the United Provinces. The history of the administration of these provinces has been already fully discussed.⁸

The major portion of the population of India belongs to the Indo-European or Aryan stock, but in southern India a large proportion of the population belongs to the Dravidian family. Besides these two main groups, ethnologists recognize at least five other distinct racial stocks among the peoples of India.

The diversity of languages is even greater. It is estimated that considerably more than one hundred different distinctive languages are spoken within the Indian Empire. Eleven languages are spoken by more than 10,000,000 persons each. Twelve others are spoken by more than 1,000,000 each, and ten others are spoken by more than 300,000 each, the last figure representing approximately the number to whom the English language is the native speech.

The peoples of India are indebted to the British and to their educational system for the gift of a common tongue in which to carry forward their nationalist propaganda. This somewhat humiliating fact has led to various suggestions of developing one of the more common native languages as the national speech. All suggestions to this end have hitherto met with such serious objection as to render any successful outcome unlikely, though Hindustani most nearly meets the requirements.

While, as has been seen, only about two thirds of India are directly under British rule, and more than one third remains under the control of a large number of petty native princes, yet British rule has given a definite unity to the

⁸See above, pages 57-60, 72-73, 76-77.

Indian Empire, such as has never existed before. It has also established and maintained absolute peace throughout the country ever since the Mutiny of 1857 and, despite the sporadic outbreaks of violence during the recent period of unrest, has maintained throughout the empire the rule of law and order, and enforced a civilized system of administering justice. These blessings were absolutely unknown to India prior to British rule. The existence of the vast number of petty states with the confusion of race and language and religion, involving innumerable and incessant wars, formerly prevented any possibility of the establishment of law and order. The prevalence of *dacoity* and *thagi*, in other words, of brigandage and organized pillage and murder, has been eliminated only as the result of the establishment of British sovereignty.

The principal religion in India is Hinduism, which numbers approximately 218,000,000 followers. Next in order come the Mohammedans, numbering nearly 70,000,000. Buddhism has become almost nonexistent in India proper; nearly all its 11,000,000 adherents within the empire are to be found in Burma. About an equal number practice some form of animistic religion. The Sikhs include about 3,000,000. The number of Christians is at present about 5,500,000, an increase within the past decade of over 40 per cent. Indeed, Christianity is the only one of the religions in India which has made progress out of proportion to the increase in population. It may be observed that its converts have come in major part from the lower classes. About 500,000 of the Christians are so-called Syrians, that is, represent a form of Christianity introduced into India many centuries ago, traditionally, by the apostle, St. Thomas. The Roman Catholics number about 2,000,000, and the Anglicans somewhat over 500,000. Christians, Mohammedans, Buddhists, and Sikhs do not recognize caste.

Caste is an institution associated with Hinduism. The question of how far caste is a religious institution and how far it is social, economic, or political, is one upon which experts are not agreed. At any rate, religion is only one factor in the case, and, to a certain extent, a caste is a sort

of professional, trade, or labor guild. The spread of modern ideas, especially the extension of rapid means of transportation and communication, and the growing complications in the provision of food supplies, have had a powerful effect in breaking down certain of the religious formalities and restrictions associated with caste. There have not been wanting, in recent years, advocates within Hinduism itself of the removal of many of these forms. Mr. Gandhi's attitude on the question of the "untouchables" is the most important illustration of the case.

The aggressive activities of the Brahmins as leaders in the nationalist movement and in other respects during the past two decades have produced as a reaction the development of a vigorous non-Brahmin movement. This has acquired such headway in the Madras presidency that the elections of the present assemblies resulted in a non-Brahmin majority, and, consequently, in the selection of non-Brahmin ministers. These circumstances have naturally tended to emphasize the economic, political, and social aspects of caste, as questions of debatable character.

These facts, taken together with the consequent breakdown of the rigid restrictions of religious formalism, have led to an increased emphasis upon the purely religious or spiritual aspect, perhaps one should say of Hinduism rather than of caste. The existence of the large number of castes with the hitherto rigid separations cutting across the economic, social, and political structures, has been a serious factor in the disintegrative character of Indian society in all its aspects. The growth of an Indian nationalist movement, therefore, will, of necessity, involve the softening of caste distinctions in many respects.

The peoples of India have not been dwellers in cities, but in small villages and hamlets. In 1881 there were no cities in India with 1,000,000 population, and but five with more than 200,000. The census of 1921 showed two cities with more than 1,000,000, and ten others in excess of 200,000. The number of cities of more than 50,000 increased during the forty years from sixty to seventy-five. The total urban population at the present time amounts to less than five per

cent of the population. The percentage of urban population in the United States by the census of 1920 was 51.4.

Agriculture, then, is the occupation of the major portion of the population. The annual area under crops in British India approximates very closely one acre *per capita*. Of this area, about 20 per cent is supplied with irrigation. There exist large areas of cultivable lands which are not adequately utilized, while other areas, particularly in the Ganges valley, suffer badly from overcrowding. It is a difficult problem to overcome the inertia of the natives sufficiently to secure their migration from the overcrowded districts to the regions where land is more readily available. There has, however, been considerable progress in the extension of the actually cultivated area, the increase amounting to not less than 20 per cent in the past twenty years.

In addition to rice and wheat, the more important crops include cotton, jute, and tea. The development of irrigation has, of course, been undertaken by the government, and considerable success has been attained in securing the stabilization of crops in spite of fluctuations in the rainfall. The amount of works for this purpose already constructed has been very large, and the process of extension is still going on. The British administration has also undertaken extensive work in the supervision and care of the forests. India has a considerably varied supply of minerals, but the size of the output remains comparatively small, including as its main items coal, petroleum, salt, gold, and manganese ore.

The manufacturing industries of most importance are those of cotton and jute. The number of mills working these materials increased from 237 with 295,000 employees in 1903 to 359 with 546,000 workers in 1921. While various efforts have been made to establish factories of the modern type under native management, they have not usually been attended with success, and most of the companies are under European management. One notable example of native management is that of the group of iron-working enterprises controlled by the Tata Sons Corporation, but even they have relied, to some extent at least, upon the services of Europeans. There is no doubt a large

field for the development of manufacturing enterprises in India, and it will be an important step in advancement when the Indian people learn to invest their money instead of hoarding it. It ought not to require a large amount of advice and assistance by western experts to give success to such undertakings.

The failure to secure the investment of native capital has been particularly notable in the construction of irrigation works, of railways, telegraph lines, and highways. Money for these purposes has had to be borrowed chiefly in England, though there is no doubt adequate wealth was lying idle in India, which might have been enlisted for these purposes, and so have retained the interest payments within the country. The development of the railway system, as well as of irrigation, has been one of the important safeguards against famine, though the two have not been similarly appreciated by the people. The total mileage of railways in operation in 1921 was slightly in excess of 37,000, largely state owned and partly state operated. They are, unfortunately, however, built upon three different gauges, which prevents interchange of equipment, and makes necessary frequent transfer both for passengers and for freight. There were in 1920 over 88,000 miles of telegraph lines, and the postal service is widely extended and efficient.

In the matter of external communication the British have resisted every suggestion of developing railway communication from India to outside countries. There can be little doubt that England will soon find it absolutely essential to reverse this policy, and to link up her railways from Burma to other parts of the Indo-China peninsula and to China itself, while, to the northwest, the time can scarcely be long delayed when connections will be established with the Russian Trans-Caspian line and, through Persia, with the Bagdad railway. Practically all Indian foreign trade and intercourse is carried on by sea, as it has been ever since the arrival of the Portuguese. This trade is mainly handled through a few ports, Karachi, Bombay, Colombo in Ceylon, Madras, Calcutta, and Rangoon, and to a slight extent through some minor ports.

The extension of the trade of India has been remarkable. The figures for 1921 represent a growth of forty-sevenfold over those for 1834, the first year after the abolition of the trading privileges of the East India Company. The absolute growth, however, has been vastly greater in the past sixty years, during which period the increase has been sixfold. The total foreign trade of India in 1921 amounted to approximately \$1,800,000,000. In the same year the United States with one third the population had a foreign trade three times that of India. For many years the amount of exports has considerably exceeded the imports of merchandise, but in 1921 the figures were sharply reversed. On the other hand, the imports of treasure, that is, of gold and silver, have regularly been enormously in excess of the exports. This may be taken as an evidence to some extent of hoarding, but it is also explained in part by use for ornaments. The stock of jewelry worn on the person is the Indian woman's savings bank deposit. These figures do not seem to confirm the theory of economic drain of India by England, which has been referred to previously.

The total of imperial and provincial revenues of India has increased from less than £60,000,000 in 1892 to over £135,000,000 in 1920, a gain of about 128 per cent. Whereas 25 per cent of the expenditures in 1892 was payable in Great Britain, in 1920 only 18 per cent was so payable. Though the absolute amount had grown from £15,000,000 to £27,000,000, the increase was not commensurate with the rise in prices. It would appear, therefore, that the government is endeavoring to lessen the causes for complaint with regard to these expenditures. In this connection it is pertinent to note that in the same period the railway mileage was increased from 17,000 to 37,000, the mileage of telegraph lines doubled, and vast outlays made for irrigation works which, incidentally, include at present more than 3,000 miles of navigable canals. The funds for these capital expenditures have had to be obtained, in large part, from Great Britain, so that corresponding interest payments must flow from India to Great Britain.

As in the case of Egypt, so with India, England has been

charged with a failure to develop properly sanitation and education. That England has done a large amount in the way of sanitation and of public health measures cannot be denied, but anyone who has walked the streets of even Calcutta and Bombay cannot have helped being impressed that certain obvious measures for public health have not been taken. The most distressing of these is the failure to segregate the lepers. One, of course, recognizes that the enforcement of sanitary measures affords peculiar difficulty because of the embarrassments created by the existence of caste.

The teachings of most of the religions of India, especially of Mohammedanism and only to a less degree of Hinduism, inculcate temperance, with special reference to the use of intoxicating drinks. Consequently, another charge brought against the English has been the spread of the drink traffic. This was one of the points on which Mr. Gandhi laid considerable stress. It fitted into his program both with reference to exaltation of traditional native principles and of boycotting the English government, because the manufacture and sale of drinks are carried on under government licenses and pay a considerable revenue to the government. This created a sort of native anti-saloon movement which was promptly seized upon by a well-known American prohibition campaigner, popularly known as "Pussyfoot" Johnson, who pursued his activities in India for some months.

The development of public education in India has already been discussed. The recent report of the Sadler commission will undoubtedly remove some of the worst evils, and is already clearly resulting in some marked improvements. The most essential is the emphasis which is being placed upon the development of residential colleges. The superiority in this respect of the church colleges has been convincing, and it is anticipated that emulation of their example will yield improved results in the institutions under the control of other faiths or under public management. More notable improvements are being introduced in secondary education, which has, until recently, received inadequate consideration.

The serious criticism with regard to both these fields is that attention has been too largely devoted to literature,

rather than to professional, technical, or vocational education, which would prepare the graduates for definite careers of usefulness. Recently, however, there has been a distinct change for the better in this direction. One of the most essential types of special schools is that for the training of teachers, and particular attention is being given at present to the development of normal schools as an indispensable preliminary to the extension of primary education.

The growth of primary education under provincial supervision in recent years has been rapid. The number of primary schools for males grew from 114,000 with 4,400,000 pupils in 1913 to 133,500 with 4,950,000 in 1920, while the number of primary schools for females in the same period grew from 13,700 with 830,000 pupils to 21,700 with 1,175,000 pupils. The total number of educational institutions has increased from 148,500 in 1902 to 202,900 in 1920. While the number of male students increased during this period from 4,083,000 to 6,829,000, the number of female pupils grew from 446,000 to 1,377,000. This evidence of the rapid extension of female education is one of the most significant factors in the case, for in India, as in Egypt, the breakdown of the social barriers which have kept women in seclusion and ignorance must be regarded as prerequisite to the development of society to anything corresponding substantially to western standards. In the development of primary education and of the education of women, the influence and actual contribution of Christian missions have been of the greatest importance.

Western influences are, of course, responsible for the development of journalism in India. There are not only a considerable number of newspapers in English and other European languages for the benefit of western residents, but there are also numerous periodicals published in each one of the more widely used native languages. Some of them are published in two or more languages. As in the case of Egypt, it is to be regretted that the character and tone of the native press are not very high, though there are notable exceptions. An excellent example is set by the English-language press in India, which is, on the whole, con-

ducted on a very high level. Such a paper as the *Pioneer*, of Allahabad, would be a credit to any city.

The use of the printing press, together with the growth of education and of nationalist ideals, has led to something like a literary revival. At any rate, the output of magazines and books in native languages has become extensive, and coincides with a deliberate effort not merely to exalt the glories of the country's ancient literature, but also to emulate them. There has been a great deal of investigation and publication with reference to the history, literature, religion, and philosophy of ancient India. A considerable portion of these works has been published in English. India has not failed to produce some scientists of high ability, and it is reasonable to anticipate that such worthy examples as that of Sir J. C. Bose will not lack for emulation.

Very naturally, native journalism in India is closely associated with the nationalist movement, and tends to express in extreme rather than moderate manner its aims and interests. The vehement, even violent, nature of its propaganda has brought the native press into considerable conflict with the government. Since the anti-British feeling has produced in these papers expressions which are not merely critical of the government but absolutely subversive to it, it has been deemed necessary, as a matter of self-preservation, for the government to intervene by the enactment and the enforcement of penal statutes.

It is natural, in every reform or revolutionary movement, that there should appear those radicals and extremists who carry their activities beyond legal or even reasonable limits. Consequently, when they fall under the penalty of the law, they endeavor to arouse, usually with considerable success, sympathy for themselves and added hostility to the government they seek to subvert.

This situation is peculiarly unfortunate in India, because of the temper of the people, who, less readily than in most countries, can adopt an attitude of moderation or of suspension of judgment until all the pertinent facts in a case can be reasonably weighed. It is, indeed, this peculiar mental characteristic, which is apparently more clearly marked

among the Hindus than among the Mohammedans, that makes western observers of India doubtful of the ability of these peoples successfully to develop and operate a system of self-government.

Representative self-governing institutions, as they exist in western countries, have measured their success by the degree in which the people concerned have been able to approach public questions in a judicial spirit and with a sense of fair play. The western observer fails to find in India what seems to him adequate evidence of the ability and readiness of its peoples to approach political problems in such a frame of mind. The people of India are able to see with great acuteness the arguments in favor of their own views and those which are disadvantageous to the other party, but they seem to lack the ability to see how these same arguments may look from the other side, or to consider other elements relevant to the case.

As has already been said, generalizations are always dangerous, and particularly so with reference to India, and when one makes such general statements as the preceding, one must, of course, recognize that there are brilliant exceptions to them. One must also recognize that the development of political-mindedness is, after all, a matter of slow growth, and comes with the practice of self-government. Fortunately, England has accorded to the peoples of India, in progressive measure, the privileges of constitutional government, and has been affording them the opportunity of political self-education.

To estimate the value of the result is extremely difficult. It is easy to point out certain obvious arguments both for the success and for the failure of the experiment. While one may conclude that the results have been as satisfactory as could have been expected, none the less, it is difficult to refrain from the conclusion that the results have been distinctly less satisfactory than is desirable.

Political-mindedness, in the western sense, requires a peculiar combination of independence and individualism with the spirit of coöperation. This may perhaps best be phrased by saying that in the matter of thinking and of co-

operating in political life the individual must enjoy full freedom. He must be able to arrive at his own conclusions from the facts before him, without fear or favor, and he must be equally free to join with those whose conclusions are similar, in seeking the political attainment of his ends.

Whenever institutions of a religious or social character, or conditions of an economic nature exist, which seriously interfere with this freedom of the individual, either in his thinking or in his action in political matters, self-governing institutions have not operated satisfactorily. The peoples of India are subject in unusual degree to such constraints upon thought and action. The differences of race, of historical experience, of religion, and especially the existence of caste with its far-reaching social and economic significance, operate both to direct the character of the thinking and to restrict the freedom of action of the individual.

If the people of India are to attain in satisfactory measure to representative self-government, they must develop ability to rise above these age-long restraints of race, religion, and social and economic order upon the freedom of the individual. Each must be able to arrive at his own conclusions upon consideration of the facts and to combine freely, regardless of these old orders, with those of any class, race, or creed, who arrive at similar conclusions and seek aims corresponding with his own.

If India is to develop as a nation and is to establish for itself a system of representative self-government, it must do so not as a utopian project, regardless of the past, but it must definitely rear the new structure upon the foundations of its history and of its present circumstances. India proper and, to a much higher degree, the territory which now forms the Indian Empire, owe whatever unity they possess to the establishment and maintenance of British rule. Never prior to the nineteenth century were all the provinces of India itself united under one single government.

There had always been many petty kingdoms and states, almost incessantly at war with one another; and the country owes absolutely to the establishment of British control the creation within its borders of a state of freedom from war,

of internal peace and security, and of law and order. Of the Indian borderlands, which have been brought within the empire chiefly since the Mutiny, only a small portion had ever been under the rule of an Indian state. Their presence within the empire is distinctly a novelty for which the British are entirely responsible.

If the people of India, therefore, are to establish for themselves in India proper and much more in the empire as a whole, including the borderlands, a unified Indian nationality, they must build very carefully upon the foundations of unity which have been established under British authority. Haste would result not merely in the falling away from the empire of some, if not all, of the borderlands, but would almost inevitably result in disintegration within India itself. For this reason, the success of the Indian experiment is dependent for a long period to come, until the welding together of races and the growth of identity of interests have progressed far, upon the persistence of a considerable degree of British control.

This necessity for British control arises, moreover, not only from the internal situation of India, but likewise from the necessity of safeguarding India against aggressions from without. It is unlikely at the present time, though it certainly was not true prior to the close of the World War, that there is danger that any European power would seek to replace England in India, but the situation upon the north-west frontier, as evidenced in a high degree during the past five years, shows that, even within Asia itself, India needs the protection of England's strong arm and the skill of its diplomacy.

To no less degree must the people of India take into account, in the creation of their nationality, the necessity of laying the foundations upon the control exercised by the British in more or less of the country for a century and a half. They must also recognize that it is solely from the British that they have derived the ideals both of nationality and representative self-government. It is the British who have not merely created an Indian nationality as a fact upon the map, but who have been responsible for the development

of the idea as a mental and moral fact. India must confess, as does every country on the continent of Europe or anywhere else which at the present day enjoys or is endeavoring to establish representative institutions, that the whole system, with the ideal involved and the method concerned, was developed by England, and has been by them borrowed for their several uses.

It would be absolute madness for the people of India to overlook the fact that they have enjoyed the rare privilege of public training in these matters by the inventors and great masters of the art, or for them to reject that guidance until they shall have erected the new superstructure upon the foundations already laid. Nowhere so truly as in India does the old adage apply, that the more haste, the less speed.

There is the other side of the case, and that is the obligation upon England with reference to its future conduct. England must fully and heartily recognize the aims and desires of the people of India. England can lose India irretrievably by endeavoring too strenuously to maintain its hold. The preachings of the hide-bound Tories and of the reactionary Die-Hards, that England must save itself in India, can have no other result than the complete alienation of India.

Generous and sympathetic treatment of India, on the other hand, can result in the establishment of unbreakable ties of friendship, which will yield to the British Empire far more valuable results when measured in terms of political profit or of trade or of financial investment or of intellectual and spiritual usefulness, than can possibly accrue from any policy of forcible maintenance of authority. It is entirely possible for England to follow such a generous policy as might result in the loss completely of political control over India, and yet of conserving to England a relationship with that country and its peoples of infinitely greater value than has yet accrued. This great truth has already been demonstrated in the case of Canada and the other dominions.

These facts have a pertinent relation to an immediate problem. The Indian nationalist leaders, even of the more

moderate sort, are demanding the prompt and thorough, though not necessarily complete, Indianization of both the army and the civil service. It may be readily conceded that a greater degree of Indianization of both is desirable, but the Indian people will seriously injure their own cause by undue insistence upon either of these policies, particularly the latter.

The nationalist agitation has seriously damaged the morale of the British civil service in India, and has almost completely arrested the recruiting of that service. The interests of both India and England require the continuance in India of at least as many English appointees, in both the civil service and the related services, as at present, and require that that personnel shall be of the highest quality. Any action, whether in India or in England, that interferes with such a result will be unfortunate to both parties. It is not necessary that the present distribution of the English civil servants and other officials in India shall continue, or that the powers exercised by them shall remain the same, but their presence as guides and councilors, as expert advisers and assistants is essential for a multitude of reasons.

One of these reasons is that India cannot become a nation unto itself. It must become a nation as a partner in the great society of nations; and if it is to do so, it must command the confidence of the other partners in the society. It may be humiliating to the pride of the Indian peoples, but it is a fact which must be reckoned with, that the continuance of such a group of British officials in India will be the most valuable contribution toward the creation and development of that confidence. The practice of Japan affords a clear example on this point.

The British, on their side, should take care to select only officials who will represent the best traditions of the service in tact and consideration for the peoples of India and who will conform to the growing demand for recognition of their political and social equality. There have been unfortunate examples of the harm that the acts and utterances of a tactless official can do. Objections have been frequently raised to the pensions paid from Indian revenues to British civil servants who almost invariably retire to England after the

completion of their stated period of service. If instead they should continue to reside in India after retirement, the drain of funds to England would cease and they might continue to contribute from their experience and wisdom to Indian national progress and welfare.

It is perhaps worth while to add a few words with regard to the relation of the United States to this situation. It does not occur to most Americans that there is any such relation, but in the minds of the people of India the relation is extremely obvious. The very existence of the United States is a notable argument in support of their case. The States were once colonies of England. They declared their independence, successfully maintained it, and have grown great and powerful.

It is extremely easy for the Indian nationalist to draw comparisons from the American conflict with England in the eighteenth century, and he arrives without any difficulty at all at the conclusion that the separation of the United States from England affords an absolute parallel and a perfectly decisive argument for the freedom of India. It can, therefore, be understood that the Indian people naturally look to the United States for friendship and encouragement as well as example. Their feeling is that they are trying to do what the Americans successfully accomplished and that the Americans ought, therefore, to be friendly disposed toward the aims of India and ready not merely to sympathize but to assist in the achieving of those aims.

The American in India cannot fail to be impressed with the alertness of the people to detect an American, and the eagerness to enter into conversation with him, which promptly turns in the political direction, nor can he have failed to note the sudden change of attitude upon the part of an Indian the moment he discovers an individual is an American and not a British citizen. It becomes almost amusing, therefore, when one raises the question as to what would be the attitude if the United States should be substituted for Great Britain in relation to India, to find them answering with alacrity, "We would feel just the same toward you then as we do toward them now."

It would be unfair to omit one further point. There is, after all, a limit to the self-confidence of the Indians in their ability to succeed unaided in the achievement of their nationalist aims. When brought fairly to face the ultimate situation, they will almost invariably acknowledge that the continuance of British authority in India in some form and to some degree will be indispensable to them for a considerable time to come. Even Mr. Gandhi himself seems never to have been able entirely to free himself from such a conclusion.

The future of India, therefore, would seem to lie in the steady growth of self-government under British protection and guidance. The safety of the future depends not upon listening to the rabid doctrines of the British Tory or of the Bengali Brahmin extremist, but in the development of ever-deepening sympathy and ever-widening coöperation. As the unification of India under British rule was the greatest achievement of its sort in the nineteenth century, so the successful establishment of Indian self-government under British leadership may be the greatest fact of its sort in the twentieth century, and prove one of the most important steps toward preparing the world for an effective brotherhood of nations.

RECENT EVENTS

In Bombay, which may be taken as an illustration of progressive provincial administration, during the five years ending in 1923, compulsory primary education was inaugurated, model tenement houses were constructed, improvements in sanitation were carried out, and work was started on an immense irrigation scheme at Sukkur in the Indus valley which is planned to open up for agriculture new land more extensive than the whole cultivated area in Egypt. An important labor reform affecting mining operations throughout India restricts the employment of women and children and limits the hours of work for men.

The commission headed by Lord Inchcape on the retrenchment of expenditures⁹ made its report in March, 1923,

⁹See above, page 87.

recommending a reduction of the estimates for annual general expenditures of £105,000,000 by £12,500,000. The government has proceeded with measures for a greater degree of Indianization of the army, and for the reduction of military expenditures. The decision to concentrate the government offices at Simla has been made with a view to further economies. Since the establishment of the new legislature under the Montagu-Chelmsford reforms, there has been a failure each year to balance the budget. The government motion for doubling the salt tax made in order to attain that end was rejected by the assembly in March, 1923, on the ground that this tax would fall heavily on those least able to bear it. Lord Reading then exercised his prerogative as viceroy by "certifying" the salt tax. This procedure was the subject of serious denunciation, and in July the assembly passed a resolution favoring the restriction of the viceregal power of certification.

In the earlier part of 1923 there seems to have been a subsidence of unrest. There were a few sporadic disturbances and some bolshevist agents were arrested. The adjustment of difficulties in the Crown colony of Kenya in East Africa proposed by the British government was unfavorable to the claims of the Indian immigrants to that region. The Indian people regarded the arrangement as a measure of unfair discrimination within the empire and denounced it with remarkable unanimity. In August, 1923, serious disturbances between the Hindus and Mohammedans, and between the Sunnite and Shiite Mohammedans began to occur and have since continued. In August also the Ali brothers, Lajpat Rai, and other important political prisoners were released. Finally on September 12 the viceroy announced the dissolution of the legislative assembly.

These circumstances were promptly followed by a special meeting of the Indian national congress at Delhi. The primary purpose was to allay the religious strife, and committees were appointed to investigate and report on the subject. With the approval of Mr. Gandhi it was agreed that the nationalists might stand as candidates at the approaching elections to the legislative assembly. Contrary to

the advice of Mr. Gandhi a boycott of British goods was proclaimed in protest against the Kenya arrangements. A proposal to extend the boycott to American goods, because of a decision of the United States supreme court that Hindus could not become citizens, failed. A resolution declaring complete independence the goal of the nationalist movement was defeated by a large majority, but plans were approved for organized civil disobedience.

At the end of December the regular meeting of the national congress assembled at Cocanada under the presidency of Mohammed Ali, whose utterances were criticized as unduly Mohammedan in tone. The actions of the congress were practically limited to affirmation of the decisions reached at Delhi in September, but friction over religious matters and between the different factions of the nationalists was ill-concealed. Mr. Das and his followers held a conference at Lucknow and issued an ultimatum that they would refuse to coöperate in the work of the legislative assemblies to which they had been elected unless the British government announced the concession of full responsible government. Some nationalists declined to follow this course. The proceedings of the caliphate congress which met under the presidency of Shevket Ali displayed an ultra-Mohammedan spirit. On February 4, 1924, Mr. Gandhi, owing to his ill health, was released by the Bombay government unconditionally. The wisdom of this act has been generally commended.

In the elections to the legislative assembly the nationalists obtained 50 of the 105 elective seats in the house of 145 members. In the provincial elections they won an overwhelming majority in the Central Provinces, but nowhere else did they secure a majority, though in Bengal they obtained 49 of the 113 elective members in a house of 139. In the Bombay presidency they secured less than a third of the elective members, and in Madras less than a tenth. In Bengal the governor, Lord Lytton, asked Mr. Das, the nationalist leader, to form a ministry, but he declined on the ground that it would be contrary to the policy of his party to undertake to conduct the government under the Montagu-

Chelmsford plan of dyarchy which it considers impracticable,¹⁰ instead of attempting to defeat its operation as a step toward securing genuine responsible government.

In February, 1924, the newly elected legislative assembly adopted a resolution in favor of a round-table discussion of the working of the Montagu-Chelmsford reforms and their possible revision. This drew forth a statement from the MacDonald ministry in the British parliament disapproving hasty action in Indian affairs. Two months later the situation in India became a subject of extended debate in the British house of commons. The MacDonald ministry rejected a proposal for a parliamentary commission to investigate the operation of the Montagu-Chelmsford reforms but it announced that ministerial investigations were in progress and matters were the subject of discussion with responsible Indian politicians. The secretary of state for India created a commission of eight members including Indians and British residents in India under the chairmanship of Sir Alexander Muddiman, with the purpose of investigating the details of the operation of the Montagu-Chelmsford act, but not with the purpose of undertaking a general revision of the measure. This commission began work in April. At the same time announcement was made of the establishment of a national convention at Allahabad to unify the workers for Indian home rule. The definitely

¹⁰Considerable evidence has been presented before the Muddiman commission to sustain the indictment of dyarchy by Mr. Das. It has been shown that ministers for transferred subjects are at a disadvantage both under the existing financial system and with regard to influencing budget proposals for their departments, that they are subject to constant government intervention in their administration of their departments, and that the conditions are such that they are practically powerless to give proper effect to such important measures as those for compulsory primary education. If this evidence is generally confirmed it will seem to justify the unwillingness of the nationalists to coöperate in administering the government under the Montagu-Chelmsford act as an intermediary step to securing a fuller installment of self-government at the expiration of the ten-year period provided in the act. In any case it explains the present demand for prompt revision of that act.

avowed purpose of this convention was announced to be the securing of authority from Great Britain to summon an independent or nonofficial convention to frame a constitution for India as a dominion. This proceeding is an obvious rejoinder to the appointment of the Muddiman commission, an official creation with a circumscribed sphere of action.

Meanwhile, the nationalists in the newly elected legislative assembly had mustered enough votes in March, 1924, to defeat the annual budget, which has since been "certified" by the viceroy. On May 27, the executive committee of the Indian national congress met in Ahmedabad, the home of Mr. Gandhi. In the opening discussions Mr. Gandhi was able to command a majority in opposition to Mr. Das. The intransigent behavior of the latter, however, led Mr. Gandhi to make concessions in order to avoid an open split. This weakness on the part of Mr. Gandhi resulted in an actual success for Mr. Das and his followers who, in contrast with Mr. Gandhi's teaching of nonresistance and noncoöperation, favor aggressive, though not violent, political activity, including participation in elections and accepting membership in the legislative councils but not coöperation in government until full responsible government shall be granted. Nevertheless, conditions seemed to improve and even in the legislative assembly the moderate swarajists or nationalists coöperated with the administration and proceedings were carried on satisfactorily.

More recently there have been some untoward occurrences which have accentuated existing causes for bitterness. A royal commission headed by Lord Lee of Fareham has been investigating the question of civil service. It appears that the compensation and other conditions are such that few satisfactory British candidates are now attracted and the possible effects are considered unfortunate. The recommendations of the commission have been the subject of severe criticism by the nationalists and have been rejected by the national legislative assembly, but it is anticipated that they will be "certified." The assembly has constituted a commission with extensive powers to inquire into the tax-

able capacity of the people and the distribution of the burden of taxation.

Religious conflicts between Mohammedans¹¹ and Hindus persisted, notably in Delhi, and disturbances were still rife on the northwestern frontier. On September 18, 1924, in spite of his weakened health, Mr. Gandhi announced his intention to fast for twenty-one days as penance for the religious strife. He declared:

"The recent events have proved unbearable for me. My hopelessness is still more unbearable. My religion teaches me that whenever one is very distressed which one cannot remove, one must fast and pray. I have done so in connection with my dearest ones. Nothing evidently that I say or write can bring the two communities together. I am therefore imposing on myself a fast. . . . As a penance I need not have taken the public into confidence, but publish the fast as, let me hope, an effective prayer both to the Hindus and the Mussalmans who have hitherto worked in unison, not to commit suicide. I respectfully invite the heads of all the communities, including the Englishmen, to meet and end this quarrel which is a disgrace to religion and humanity. It seems as if God has been dethroned. Let us reinstate him in our hearts."

In pursuance of this appeal representatives of the several religions, including Christianity, have been organized into a committee of fifteen, with Mr. Gandhi as chairman, to arbitrate all religious disputes.

SUGGESTIONS FOR READING

The Oxford History of India from the Earliest Times to the End of 1911 (Oxford, The Clarendon Press, 1920), by Vincent A. Smith, a former member of the Indian civil service, replaces all earlier works of the sort. The materials are presented in abridged form by the same author in *The Oxford Student's History of India* (8th ed., Oxford, The Clarendon Press, 1919). On the government of India, there is a good monograph study by Cecil

¹¹The action of the government of the Turks at Angora in deposing the caliph has occurred too recently to make it possible to determine the effect upon Mohammedan sentiment in India.

M. P. Cross entitled *The Development of Self-Government in India, 1858-1914* (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1922), and for the more recent developments there is *The Political System of British India with Special Reference to the Recent Constitutional Changes* (New York, Oxford University Press, 1923), by Professor E. A. Horne of the University of Patna.

The best analysis of the recent political movements in India will be found in *Indian Unrest* (London, Macmillan and Company, 1910) and in *India Old and New* (London, Macmillan and Company, 1921), both by Sir Valentine Chirol of the London *Times*. These may now be supplemented by *India in Ferment* (New York, D. Appleton & Company, 1923), by Professor Claude H. Van Tyne, of the University of Michigan, who visited India in 1922. *A Review of the Gandhi Movement in India* (*Political Science Quarterly*, vol. 38, pp. 227-248, June, 1923), by W. H. Roberts, is an excellent summary by a competent observer. The radical nationalist views are set forth by Lajpat Rai in *Young India, an Interpretation and a History of the Nationalist Movement from Within* (New York, B. W. Huebsch, 1916), and in *The Political Future of India* (New York, B. W. Huebsch, 1919). The situation is presented from another angle in *India's Silent Revolution* (New York, The Macmillan Company, 1920), by Fred B. Fisher, Bishop of the Methodist Episcopal Church, resident at Calcutta. A valuable account of the religious conditions and tendencies is given by John N. Farquhar, who has spent many years in India as a student of the situation, in *Modern Religious Movements in India* (New York, The Macmillan Company, 1915).

The Indian Empire, its Peoples, History, and Products (3rd ed., London, Smith, Elder & Co., 1893), by Sir William W. Hunter, was long the authoritative descriptive work on India. The plan of this work has been retained but the materials have been entirely rewritten and revised to date in vols. 1-4 of the third edition of *The Imperial Gazetteer of India* (Oxford, The Clarendon Press, 1907-09). An account of the several races and of castes will be found in *The People of India* (2nd ed., revised by W. Crooke, London, W. Thacker & Co., 1915), by Sir Herbert H. Risley, the late ethnographical expert to the Indian census.

The Economic History of British India (4th ed., London, K. Paul, Trench, Trübner & Co., Ltd., 1916) and its supplement, *The Economic History of India in the Victorian Age* (4th ed., London, K. Paul, Trench, Trübner & Co., Ltd., 1916), by Romesh C. Dutt, former member of the Bengal legislative council, are useful presentations of important information, but must be used with caution because of the excessively critical attitude toward British policy. The current economic problems are presented from opposite points of view in *The Economic Transition in India* (London, J. Murray, 1911), by Sir Theodore Morison, and in *The Foundations of*

Indian Economics (London, Longmans, Green & Co., 1916) by Radhakamal Mukerjee.

The annual reports published by the Government of India on the moral and material progress of India, of which the latest is *India in 1922-23* (Calcutta, 1923), edited by L. F. Rushbrook Williams, are rich in useful materials arranged in clear narrative form.

CHAPTER III

CHINA

IN dealing with India the problem presented was that of the relations between a single western ruling power and multitudes of subject native peoples who had previously fallen victims to division and despotic misgovernment. The Indian peoples are, in major part, members of the same racial stock as those of western Europe. India, moreover, has not only been under British control for a century and a half, but has also been in extensive and unbroken intercourse with western Europe throughout the past four centuries. The development of western ideas among the peoples of India, from a political point of view, has consisted in the achievement of union and progress in the establishment of self-government under the guidance of the western ruling power. Regardless of whether British rule has favored or opposed the spread in India of any form of western ideas, it remains true that, in every detail, the progress of modern ideas in India has been inseparably linked with the existence of British rule since the third quarter of the eighteenth century.

On turning to China one discovers a radically different situation. Racially the people of China are absolutely unrelated to the nations of western Europe. Though there has been a slight acquaintance between China and Europe for many centuries, the establishment of any considerable amount of intercourse between the Celestial Empire and the West dates from so recent a time as 1842. In that year England secured from the Chinese government the treaty of Nanking, which was soon followed by similar treaties negotiated by the United States and France. For many centuries, even millenniums, before that date China, unlike India, had enjoyed a degree of imperial unity seldom surpassed in other lands. China has never known anything but national independence. Even though the country has at

times been ruled by foreign dynasties, the seat of government has always been in China and the character of the government has always been essentially and fundamentally Chinese.

During the past century, in contrast with India, China has continued, in spite of all difficulties, to maintain the independence of its government and its national integrity. No matter what the attitude of the Chinese government, at any moment or in any case, has been toward modern ideas, the progress of those ideas in China has been absolutely conditioned by the continued maintenance of the national independence and integrity. In so far as China has acquired western forms of political organization and administration, it has not been the result of western compulsion but of the deliberate action of the Chinese themselves working under the authority of their own government and guarding jealously their sovereign independence and unity. The growth of modern ideas in China has, therefore, been entirely the intrusion of alien influence into territory and among peoples under independent rule, and the relations involved have been primarily diplomatic, though at times military, whereas the problem in India has been essentially political.

In the case of China, moreover, the various forms of modern ideas have had to win their way by definite struggle on every line and at every point. There has been no western power in the country, such as the British in India, to carry things through with a strong hand. For many and obvious reasons there is only a narrow range within which international pressure can be successfully applied to an independent nation to enforce the adoption of foreign ways. Even the Chinese government itself, unlike the Japanese, has made no effort to promote consistently the introduction and spread of approved modern ideas. Practically everything has been left to individual inclination and initiative. Almost every idea and every practice of western origin has had to win its own way in China. In no other country is the relation between the oriental people and the western ways so largely a matter of individual concern.

The reasons for the slowness to accept modern ideas, or

perhaps even for antagonism to them, are not to be found in the obtuseness of the Chinese or in the fact that they are of a racial stock different from the Europeans instead of one similar to them, as are the people of India. The Chinese, indeed, are perhaps somewhat more stolid than the natives of India, and perhaps a little more inclined to consider the loss of time as a matter of no consequence. The fact is that the Chinese have had an unbroken imperial history of four thousand years during which they have developed their political, economic, social, and religious institutions and their culture to a high degree. They have, therefore, quite naturally been inclined to value that which they have and to underrate the new ideas brought by the upstart nations of the West. A decade or even a century looms small in their historical perspective. Another factor which has made the Chinese very chary in the development of their intercourse with the western nations has been their knowledge of the aggressive policy of the European nations, especially that of England as displayed in the creation of its Indian Empire. There has been a real fear in China, not merely in recent years, but ever since the beginning of European contacts, of the aggression of Europeans. From the outset, the westerner has been to the Chinese a foreign devil—a conception which, it must be observed, still persists. A third factor explanatory of China's slowness in progress is the very bulk of the nation. Comparison, on this point, with Japan is illuminating.

The eighteen provinces of China proper have an area estimated at more than 1,500,000 square miles, about one sixth less than that of the Indian Empire. The population, at the lowest estimate, is somewhat over 300,000,000, or about the same as that of the Indian Empire, but other estimates increase this figure as much as forty per cent. If the outlying provinces, Manchuria, Mongolia, Tibet, and Chinese Turkestan are included, about 2,500,000 square miles must be added to the area and about 20,000,000 to the population. These enormous outlying regions are, of course, of great political significance. Whether considered with reference to the future of China or of the neighboring nations or of

Asia as a whole, their present sparsity of population is certainly not to be taken as any safe measure of their value. Each of these four areas presents a peculiar problem only incidentally related to the problem of China proper. Consequently, this discussion will be devoted primarily to the China of the eighteen provinces, with its population numbering probably one fifth of the total for the world.

Like Egypt and India, China is a land of ancient civilization. The valley of the Yang-tse, like the valleys of the Nile and of the Ganges, has been one of the cradles of the human race and one of the great sources from which civilization has been diffused. In more recent years scholars have been overcoming their skepticism with regard to the early annals of China and are now ready to concede that its history may, with little uncertainty, be traced into the third millennium before the Christian era and possibly farther. It is not necessary to concern ourselves with the succession of dynasties; it will suffice to note a few outstanding facts.

China has had intercourse overland with India and the countries farther west in Asia since an indefinitely early time. As evidence of these western contacts there may be enumerated some factors which persist in the life of China at the present day. Buddhism was brought from India about the first century of the Christian era. Both Judaism and Christianity came in at a somewhat later date and have left their traces. In due season Mohammedanism likewise spread into China, where it still numbers several millions of adherents. Travelers to Canton, for instance, will recall visiting an ancient mosque of peculiar type in the heart of that city.

China, like India, was brought clearly to the knowledge of western Europe at the close of the thirteenth century by Marco Polo, who spent nearly a score of years at the court of Kublai Khan, the Mongol conqueror of China and a grandson of Genghis Khan. Almost at the time that Marco Polo left China there arrived a Franciscan friar, John of Montecorvino, who established himself at Peking, where he was followed by other Franciscans. The Mongol khans, sprung from a small central Asian tribe unconnected with

any of the great religions, were quite tolerant and open-minded toward Christianity as well as toward the other faiths. This Christian connection continued until the overthrow of the Mongols and the establishment in 1368 of the native Ming dynasty. During the next century and a half there was almost no recorded contact between China and western Europe.

Direct and uninterrupted intercourse between western Europe and China began in 1517. In that year the Portuguese, who had reached India by sea in 1498, appeared at Canton under the command of Andrade. They soon established themselves at Macao, which they still control, and occasionally were able to trade at other points on the coast of China. Contacts with the Spanish began with the arrival of the latter in the Philippines, where the Chinese were already established in considerable numbers. Dutch and English traders commenced to appear in the course of the seventeenth century. Down to 1842 their trade was almost exclusively conducted through Canton, with constant reliance upon the Portuguese base at Macao. The activity of the French and of other Europeans in the trade with China prior to 1842 was occasional and inconsiderable, but beginning in 1784 the Americans became regular and important participants.

Under the Portuguese protection the Christian contact with China was renewed by the great Jesuit missionary, St. Francis Xavier, who died near Macao in 1552 shortly after his arrival. Within a half century one of his successors, Ricci, had established himself at Peking. From that time forward the Society of Jesus continued to be an active and influential agency for the propagation of the Christian faith in China, until it was superseded by the Lazarists in the eighteenth century. The history of Protestant missions in China does not begin until the arrival at Canton of the Englishman, Robert Morrison, in 1807 and of the American, Dr. Elijah Bridgman, in 1829.

It is necessary to record but one other fact in the earlier history of China, and that is the displacement of the native Ming dynasty by the foreign Manchu dynasty in 1644. It

was in the reign of Tao-kwang, the sixth emperor of this dynasty, that the events occurred which opened relations on a larger scale between China and the nations of the West, and that the second epoch in their intercourse began.

The abolition by act of the British parliament in 1833 of the monopoly of the East India Company in the trade with Canton led to certain difficulties with the Chinese. To these were soon added problems arising out of the trade in opium and the Chinese effort to suppress it. The ensuing hostilities are known by the English as the First China War, but are more often referred to as the Opium War. This conflict was terminated by the treaty of Nanking in 1842, by which the British obtained the cession of the island of Hong Kong, the right of trading at Canton, Amoy, Foochow, Ningpo, and Shanghai, known as the five treaty ports, and other privileges.

The United States took prompt notice of the situation and commissioned as its first diplomatic representative to China Caleb Cushing, who negotiated in 1844 the first treaty between the two countries. By this agreement the United States obtained, in addition to the privileges already granted to the English, the right of extra-territoriality, which may be considered the American equivalent for the cession of Hong Kong to the English.¹ The principle thus established has since prevailed with reference to the nationals of all western treaty powers in China and is comparable to the system of capitulations in Egypt.² The treaty also obtained several privileges in addition to those embodied in the English treaty, and included a so-called most favored nation clause guaranteeing to the United States equal enjoyment of privileges granted by China to other nations. The British had recently embodied such a provision in a supplementary treaty, and the French treaty, also signed in 1844, included a simi-

¹ The treaties of 1842 and 1843 did not secure to the English the right of extra-territoriality, but the supplementary regulations embodied the principle.

² In treaties negotiated since the World War, such as those with Germany and Russia, China has secured the abandonment of the privilege by some nations.

lar clause. Consequently the concessions accorded to each were shared by the other two powers. The French plenipotentiary also persuaded the Chinese government to grant toleration to the Roman Catholic faith and protection to its missionaries, for whom France henceforth posed as the guardian. These privileges were shortly afterward extended to other Christians.

These arrangements mark the real opening of China to intercourse with the western world. Henceforth European and American traders and Christian missionaries, though within narrowly defined limits, could live and prosecute their enterprises in China under full guaranties of security. In negotiating these original treaties no one of the countries had in view a policy of colonial expansion at Chinese expense; the prime motive in each case was the development of trade. Even the British acquisition of Hong Kong was not political in character, but commercial, comparable to its establishment of factories, such as Bombay, in India, in the seventeenth century. The American treaty was framed to secure equivalent results without the cession of territory. The American policy developed in the negotiations and in the treaty provisions assumed equality and coöperation with other trading nations in dealing with China. To this policy the United States has generally adhered; it is known, under the altered circumstances of recent times, as the open-door policy. Though the American theory was apparently that China was to be treated as an international equal, the treaty with the United States introduced the principle of extra-territoriality which has been ever since a serious infringement of Chinese sovereignty, and it copied the British precedent in establishing a conventional tariff which has likewise persisted till the present as a vexatious limitation on the national sovereignty of China.

It was during the Taiping rebellion in the next decade that the United States definitely developed its second fundamental policy in Far Eastern matters—the responsibility and territorial integrity of the Asiatic sovereign power as essential to the safeguard of treaty rights. The Taiping rebellion, which seems to have owed its origin, in some part, to the

teachings of Christian missionaries, was in considerable measure directed against the foreign Manchu dynasty. Its success would, no doubt, have resulted in the disruption of China. Humphrey Marshall, the American representative in China, was the first to grasp this fact, and he laid down the principle that it was to the interest of the United States for the assurance of its treaty rights to support the integrity of the political authority with which the treaty had been made. This was in contrast to the generally friendly attitude at first maintained by the other trading powers toward the Taiping rebels, but the correctness of the principle soon found acceptance with the other diplomatic representatives.

It was at least with the sympathy of these representatives of the foreign powers that the imperial government employed the services first of Frederick Ward, of Salem, later of Burgevine, another American, and finally of Major Charles George Gordon, a British officer, who thus won the name by which he is commonly known—Chinese Gordon. The creation and direction of the Ever-Victorious Army by these officers resulted, in time, in the suppression of the rebellion and the restoration of imperial authority.

Out of one incident of the Taiping rebellion, the seizure of Shanghai by a rebel force, came the establishment of the Imperial Maritime Customs Service, which still administers the collection of tariff duties. The service is an agency of the Chinese government, but its efficiency is dependent upon its foreign staff recruited from the treaty nations. One of its earliest members was Robert Hart, an Englishman, who came to be for a long period of years the head of the service and the most influential foreign personage in China.

Provisions in the original treaties permitted their revision after twelve years. Accordingly, the several powers engaged in negotiations to secure additional privileges and larger facilities for trade. The new treaties, after many delays, were signed in 1858. The circumstances connected with their negotiation had emphasized the disadvantageous conditions under which diplomatic intercourse had to be carried on and led to a determination that, in the future, negotiations should be conducted directly with the imperial

authorities at Peking and not through subordinates at a distance from the central government. To this end, it was decided that the ratifications must be exchanged at Peking.

The effort to achieve this result led to a new conflict which the English call the Second China War, but which is also known as the Anglo-French War with China. The Americans maintained an independent position except for the entirely unauthorized intervention of the naval officer, Commodore Tatnall, in one of the engagements in which he used the famous phrase, "Blood is thicker than water." Though it is difficult to find justification for all the actions of the British and French, the important fact was that the ratifications were exchanged and that the way for diplomatic intercourse at Peking was permanently opened. To meet this new situation the Chinese created, in 1860, the Tsung-li Yamen, or foreign office, the most important modification of their government effected in the nineteenth century. This achievement closed the second important epoch in the development of intercourse between the western nations and China.

It was at this time that the Russians acquired control of the provinces in the Amur valley over which China had heretofore claimed sovereignty. Russia also established its first regular diplomatic representation at Peking instead of depending upon the agency of priests of the Orthodox Church, who had been established there ever since the original treaty between Russia and China as far back as 1689. Russia was thus added to the group of leading western powers directly concerned in relations with China.

In 1861 President Lincoln nominated as the American minister at Peking, Anson Burlingame. He was a Harvard graduate and thoroughly in sympathy with the ideas represented in American politics by Charles Sumner. With such principles it was not unnatural that he should enter into far more intimate and sympathetic relations with the Chinese than had any previous foreign representative in the country. So completely did he win the confidence of the Chinese that in 1867 he resigned his post as American minister and accepted an appointment from the Chinese government as

plenipotentiary to all the western powers with which China had treaty relations.

Burlingame, with a company of about thirty Chinese officials, landed at San Francisco and visited many of the principal cities of the United States, arousing remarkable enthusiasm, interest, and sympathy for China. Finally, as head of the mission, he visited Washington and negotiated a supplementary treaty with Secretary Seward upon very liberal terms. Later he and the mission visited London, where they had satisfactory conversations with Lord Clarendon, the foreign secretary. Then they went on to Paris, Berlin, and St. Petersburg, where the activities of the mission came to an untimely end because of the death of Burlingame from pneumonia.

The services of Burlingame to both the United States and China will always be memorable as highly creditable to both nations. The mission which he headed to the western powers marks the third epoch in the development of the relations of the Celestial Empire with the western nations, since this was the first occasion on which China sent its envoys to the West and was followed by the establishment of regular Chinese diplomatic representation at western capitals. With this exception the generation following the treaties of 1858-1860 witnessed few changes of importance affecting the relations of China with the western powers and only minor ones affecting matters of trade. The outstanding events were the adoption by the United States of a policy of restricting Chinese immigration under a treaty negotiated in 1880; the settlement in 1881 with Russia of the question of Chinese Turkestan on terms favorable to China; and the less fortunate dealings with France relative to Indo-China.

China had for centuries exercised sovereignty over a large portion of the peninsula of Further India or Indo-China. The French had begun to establish themselves there about 1860 and had gradually extended their activities, which resulted in a war between France and China. At the termination of this war, in 1885, the latter was compelled to renounce its sovereignty over the Indo-China territories in favor of France. In the adjustment of this dispute China

was largely indebted to the good offices of the American minister, John Russell Young, and of Mr. Robert Hart. In 1886 China was constrained to recognize the establishment of British, instead of its own, sovereignty over Burma.

In the course of the period various other nations entered into treaty relations with China, so that the number of treaty powers was increased to nearly a score. The establishment of oceanic steam navigation, of improved postal communications, and of submarine cable service brought China into quicker and closer relations with all these nations. The growth of commerce in the period was considerable but not remarkable. Imports increased in far greater proportion than exports, a fact which showed that the Chinese were failing to awaken to proper utilization of their opportunities. This failure or indifference appears most clearly in the case of the tea trade, which reached its height in 1886 and then decreased rapidly. One circumstance highly unfavorable to China was the steady decline in exchange of silver, the medium of trade.

Prior to 1894 China, with trifling exceptions, managed to avoid contracting foreign loans or granting foreign concessions for railway, mining, or industrial development. Only in telegraph construction had China yielded, to any serious extent, to the pressure to introduce modern inventions and methods. There persisted the strongest disinclination for any action which might give the foreigner added grasp upon the resources of the nation or influence upon its government. The conclusion seems to be indisputable that the generation ending in 1894 was for China one of decline and of neglected opportunities. The contrast with Japan is illuminating. It was in 1854, a decade after the first group of treaties with China, that Commodore Perry, on behalf of the United States, negotiated the first treaty between Japan and a western nation. Beginning with the changes known as the Restoration, in 1868, the year of the Burlingame mission, Japan entered upon a regular policy of adjustment to modern and western ways. The dissimilar behavior of the two countries came to the test of war in 1894.

The fourth epoch in the relations between China and the

western nations included the important series of events beginning with the outbreak of war between China and Japan in 1894 and closing with the settlement with the western nations in 1901 after the Boxer rebellion. The defeat of China by Japan cost the empire its claim to the suzerainty over Korea and its possession of the island of Formosa. Only the intervention of Germany, Russia, and France prevented Japan from exacting even more severe terms, which would have included the possession of Port Arthur and the occupation of Wei-hai-wei pending the payment of an indemnity. How disinterested this intervention was appeared soon after, when Germany occupied Kiaochow in 1897, Russia obtained Port Arthur, and France acquired Kwangchow-wan, both in 1898. To offset these, Great Britain promptly negotiated leases of Wei-hai-wei and the Kowloon peninsula.

The occupation of these valuable strategic points was the culmination of a series of measures by which these four European powers and Japan had acquired numerous concessions in China for railway, mining, and other enterprises, and by which they had entered into agreements marking out their respective spheres of influence. The result of these various proceedings was to assure to the powers concerned the control directly or potentially of every Chinese port of any value and a practical monopoly of concessions in China. The humiliation suffered by China at the hands of these powers in the brief space of five years is without historical parallel. It was the penalty for neglect of the opportunities for the adoption of western ideas and for adjustment to modern conditions.

Only one power with large interests in China was not a party to the proceedings. Not only was the attention of the United States diverted by the Spanish War, but the aggressive acts of the powers were directly contrary to the American policy of maintaining the territorial integrity of China, of seeking nothing more than equality with any and every other power under the most favored nation clause, and of coöperating with all the treaty powers in commercial relations with China. The establishment of the United

States on the Pacific coast by the settlement of the Oregon boundary question in 1846 and by the annexation of California in 1848 had given the American people a larger direct concern than any other western power in Pacific Ocean and Far Eastern questions. The completion of the transcontinental railroad to San Francisco in 1869 had also brought the United States into quicker, easier, and cheaper communication with eastern Asia and all Pacific lands, in spite of the opening of the Suez canal in the same year.

Notwithstanding these facts, since the treaties of 1858, America's share in the trade with China had failed to keep pace with that of other countries. This was largely explicable by the conditions in the United States itself, which afforded more than abundant scope for American financial enterprise in the great period of railway construction and of agricultural and industrial development. The preoccupation of the United States government with numerous other interests nearer home had led to neglect to promote, or even to safeguard properly, American interests in the Far East, where in general the relations with Japan, rather than those with China, were receiving chief attention. This indifference to Pacific and Far Eastern affairs, which developed after the retirement in 1869 of Seward as secretary of state, had become practically a settled policy under the second administration of President Cleveland from 1893 to 1897.

Though the dispute with Spain had distracted the attention of the United States from China at the critical period of the European infringements upon that nation's territorial integrity, a lucky chance afforded by the Spanish War enabled the Americans to establish themselves in the Philippine Islands. This advantage offset the gains of the European powers without antagonizing either China or Japan. The further annexations of Hawaii and Guam gave a strategic line of communications, and clinched the position of the United States as the most important power in the northern Pacific. Henceforth the United States was irrevocably committed to a policy of active participation in the affairs of eastern Asia.

In 1899, the United States was free to turn its attention to the changed situation in China in order to protect its treaty rights and commercial interests from infringement arising from the recent aggressions, by the several great powers, upon Chinese territory and sovereignty, and to prevent the repetition of such acts. Through the ambassadors of the United States at the courts of the powers concerned, request was made for adherence to certain principles with regard to relations with China. The several powers obviously did not view these proposals with uniformly warm approbation, but each felt constrained to reply that it would assent provided all the others did. Acting upon the basis of these answers from all the powers, the United States announced that the principles laid down had been accepted by all parties interested.

This was the American diplomatic achievement of establishing the doctrine of the open door in China. In this action the United States was not inaugurating a new policy, but it was, under seriously altered conditions, reasserting two fundamental principles upon which American relations in the Far East have been based from the outset. It was taking action to maintain the integrity of China against further infringement of its territory and sovereignty by asserting the principle of equality of opportunity in trade. Furthermore, this action was based upon the principle of coöperation or concurrent action of the powers concerned. Whatever may be the real interest of any other power, there can be no doubt whatsoever that it is most consistent with the other aspects of American policy, as well as with the selfish interests of the United States, that the independence and integrity of the nations of the Far East should be maintained, and that in matters of trade and of other economic concerns there should be equality of opportunity among the nations such as was asserted by the United States and the other powers in their original treaties with China by the inclusion of the most favored nation clause. The United States soon had an opportunity to uphold these principles under entirely new conditions.

In 1898 the young Chinese emperor, inspired by the pro-

gressive scholar, Kang Yu-wei, undertook to assume the personal direction of the government and to inaugurate a policy of reform and of introduction of modern ideas. After a few weeks this presumptuous procedure was arrested by the vigorous empress dowager, who placed the young emperor in seclusion for the remainder of his days and took direct charge of the government. Ever since the Taiping rebellion, at least, the control of the Manchu dynasty over China had been obviously precarious. The foreign aggressions, beginning with the war with Japan and culminating in the European occupation of Chinese ports, had severely injured the prestige of the dynasty as well as menaced the integrity of the empire. These and other factors produced a sudden outburst of anti-Manchu feeling in many parts of the country. The empress dowager shrewdly seized the situation to strengthen the position of the dynasty by directing the movement against the western powers and their citizens and against all things western and Christian in general. The serious and widespread disturbances which ensued, known as the Boxer movement, culminated in the siege of the foreign legations in Peking in the summer of 1900.

The United States joined with the other powers in the military and other measures for the relief of the legations and later for the restoration of settled conditions and relations. The arrangements imposed by the western nations upon China in 1901 involved not merely punishments for outrages committed upon foreigners and payment of an indemnity, but also extension of privileges for foreigners in China. In these negotiations, the United States adhered to the policy of concurrent action of the powers, on the one hand, while on the other hand, it governed its procedure upon the basis of upholding the integrity of China and the authority of its government. At the time it was hard to understand why the empress dowager was permitted to remain in power, but when the policy involved is made clear the reasons are obvious and convincing. Scarcely any other action that might conceivably have been taken could have prevented the break up of China. Such a contingency could

not have resulted otherwise than disadvantageously for the United States, unless the American people were prepared to enter upon a policy of annexation of Asiatic territory with all the complications and difficulties involved.

This fourth epoch in the history of the relations of China to the western powers, which began with the opening of the war with Japan, had witnessed serious infringements upon the sovereignty of China and a consequent anti-foreign outbreak. This in turn had resulted in a general foreign intervention which had ended in breaking down, to a far greater extent than ever before, the barriers of Chinese seclusion and in throwing the country practically wide open to the influx of modern ideas and to the activities of the treaty powers.

The part which the United States had taken in recent events gave it a stronger position in the Far East than ever before. The justice of its attitude in the dealings with China created a favorable impression in that country which was greatly strengthened by the action of the United States, in 1907, in foregoing the balance of the indemnity money. Ever since then the Chinese have usually regarded the Americans as their best friends among the nations of the world. The opposite was true in the case of Russia which, in the years immediately following the Boxer rebellion, continued to pursue in Manchuria the same aggressive policy as in the years immediately preceding. The behavior of Russia aroused the indignation and fear not only of the Chinese but also of the treaty powers, especially Japan, which felt its own interests vitally imperiled. The first outcome of this situation was the formation in 1902 of the Anglo-Japanese alliance; the second was the declaration of war by Japan against Russia in 1904.

The victory of Japan over Russia in the war, which was fought in the very homeland of the Manchu dynasty while China looked on powerlessly, revealed clearly to the Chinese the advantages acquired by Japan through the adoption of modern ways. The achievement of Japan, a country much smaller than China, with less population and fewer resources, and with a civilization which the Chinese regarded as pri-

marily borrowed from their own, afforded emphatic proof that it was the effective utilization of western civilization which had enabled the Asiatic island empire to check the overwhelming power of European Russia.

The suppression of the Boxer movement by the joint action of the powers had secured the opening of China more widely to the activities of those powers, but it had by no means convinced the Chinese of the merits of modern ways. Since then China had been rather sullenly permitting the western powers to go ahead in the pursuit of their interests. After the Russo-Japanese War, the Chinese promptly adopted a more cordial attitude toward things occidental and sought in a much fuller measure than ever before the counsel of western advisers. The development of railways, telegraphs, and other improvements which had been initiated after the war with Japan began to go rapidly forward. This is shown by the following figures: in 1898 the number of miles of railroad in operation in the Chinese Empire was 250; in 1901, 950; in 1903, 2,800; in 1905, 3,700; in 1909, 4,730; in 1913, 5,960; and in 1920, 6,813.

A much more notable effect of Japan's defeat of Russia was the abolition of the time-honored examination system for the selection of provincial and national officials, and the determination to introduce, in place of the old Chinese classical education, training upon modern lines as a basis of qualification for public employment. This action was taken in 1905, a few weeks after the signing of the treaty which closed the war. While many influences contributed to this decision one of the most important was undoubtedly the work done in the schools and colleges maintained in China by the Protestant missions, a majority of which were under American management.

The government of China, as well as its culture, had been based upon education, of which an indigenous system had been in wide operation for centuries. This system, because of the examination method for selecting public officials, had developed a highly competitive character that was obviously individualistic in its effects. There were also sharply marked gradations of rank and privilege which gave a closely

bound corporate character to the scholarly class. China did not need western influence or missionary activities to teach it the value of education, but it had to learn from them the utility of western education with its greater flexibility and freedom as compared with its own traditional classical learning.

The introduction of modern education had immediate and extensive practical results in the establishment of numerous schools for training in fields of applied science, such as medicine, engineering, and agriculture. It emphasized the necessity for schools to train teachers in western methods, and consequently numerous normal and higher normal schools were created. At Peking and elsewhere under national, provincial, and private enterprise, universities, colleges, and lower schools of the western type began to spring up. When the United States remitted the indemnity money, it was with the understanding that it should be applied to the promotion of education, and China decided to use the funds for educating selected youth in the schools and universities of America.

In all these developments the influence of the missionary example, if not more direct assistance, was potent. China was brought into illuminating contact not merely with modern science and its useful applications but also with western political ideas, especially those of the United States. In this particular the influence of the American mission schools and colleges was without doubt of extraordinary significance. This does not mean that the missionaries had deliberately disseminated propaganda in favor of American political institutions. They had unconsciously and inevitably exemplified liberal and republican conceptions to their pupils in a multitude of ways, and these pupils had not been slow to study American history and constitutional development.

In 1908, within a few days of each other, occurred the deaths of the emperor and of the empress dowager. Under the established rule of succession, a child was placed on the throne. The regency was intrusted to the child's father, Prince Chun, a brother of the late emperor, who had visited Europe after the Boxer affair to offer the apologies of China

at Berlin. In her last years the empress dowager had been shrewd enough to recognize the changing situation and had sanctioned various cautious measures of reform, had yielded to the pressure of circumstances in other cases, and had authorized still other acts which might appear outwardly as concessions to progressive demands but were in reality intended to ward off genuine governmental reform. These measures included a reorganization of the ministries in 1906, and decrees in 1907 providing for provincial assemblies and a national assembly, which did actually meet in 1909 and 1910 respectively. Finally, in 1908, a few weeks before the death of the dowager empress, there was issued a program for constitutional reform to extend over nine years and to culminate in the meeting of an elected parliament.

Ever since the outbreak of war with Japan in 1894 there had been a steady cumulation of events which discredited the foreign Manchu dynasty. The policy of foreign loans for railway construction as well as for governmental purposes added to the general discontent. To face this situation the dynasty was represented by an infant monarch with a regent whose career could not inspire national pride or confidence. Neither among the other representatives of the dynasty nor among the Manchus was there to be found a single possible leader. The helplessness of the dynasty became even more apparent in May, 1911, when the old governmental councils were abolished and replaced by a cabinet and privy council with Prince Ching as prime minister. This individual was a septuagenarian whose inability and corrupt petty politics had long been as much the subject of jest in Peking as had been the similar characteristics of the Duke of Newcastle in London in the middle of the eighteenth century.

Since the suppression of the Taiping rebellion in 1864 there had been sporadic outbreaks at frequent intervals in many parts of the empire. Numerous secret societies of revolutionary tendencies had sprung up, while other organizations supported less extensive demands for reforms. Leadership in these movements was taken chiefly by foreign-trained students. The large number of these who had

studied in Japan since 1895 was considered to form the more radical group. A small number had been trained in the United States and in European countries. These together with the former students of the mission colleges seem to have been equally earnest in the desire for reform but to have advocated more moderate policies.

Outbreaks, apparently of the usual sporadic sort, occurred in the province of Sze-chuan in July, 1911, and at Hankow in October. Since it did not, however, prove possible to suppress them, the revolutionary movement spread, especially in the more southerly provinces. A single official, a Chinese not a Manchu, Yuan Shih-kai, had a record which marked him out as possibly able to save the country and the dynasty in the crisis. Though intrusted by the Manchus with all necessary powers, he soon discovered the impossibility of preserving either the dynasty or the monarchy. Accordingly, he decided that the welfare of the country required that he should come to terms with the revolutionary party. As a consequence, on February 12, 1912, it was announced that the emperor had abdicated, leaving authority in the hands of Yuan Shih-kai. At the same time Doctor Sun Yat-sen, the revolutionary leader, who had a few weeks earlier been elected provisional president of the republic, resigned. The revolutionary assembly promptly elected Yuan Shih-kai provisional president, and one of the revolutionary generals, Li Yuan-hung, vice-president. A republican document was proclaimed as the provisional constitution. These events, which are usually spoken of as the Revolution, constituted, as time has shown, the first phase of the revolutionary period. They also brought to a close the fifth epoch in the relations with western nations, which had been characterized by the Russo-Japanese War and its effects.

The firm establishment of the new government and the restoration of order throughout the country proved a slow and difficult process. The revolution had wrecked the internal financial system and left the new government practically without funds. It became necessary, therefore, to seek another foreign loan to tide over the period of recon-

struction. The negotiations were not completed till April, 1913, when Great Britain, France, Germany, Russia, and Japan agreed to furnish the so-called reorganization loan. One of the earliest acts of President Wilson's administration was to insist on the withdrawal of the American bankers from the arrangement on the ground that the conditions attached to the loan were infringements upon the administrative independence of China. The first parliament of the republic met just as the loan negotiations were being completed. The majority in the parliament represented the revolutionary party and had already become antagonistic to the president because of his conservative, if not reactionary, policy. In spite of the parliamentary attacks and refusal to sanction the loan, Yuan Shih-kai concluded the agreement which supplied him with funds adequate to carry out his program of reconstruction. A southern revolt in protest, supported by Sun Yat-sen, was soon suppressed, and Doctor Sun took refuge in Japan.

In October, 1913, Yuan Shih-kai was elected president for a regular term of five years. Soon afterward he expelled his opponents from the parliament, and in January proclaimed a dissolution. Later the provincial councils were also dismissed. A special body was promptly nominated to revise the constitution, and in May, 1914, the changes were proclaimed. At this point the outbreak of the World War seriously modified the conditions under which the reconstruction of China was to proceed. Since the close of the Russo-Japanese War the movement of international events had not seriously affected China, but the drift of things had tended to strengthen Japan and to increase its interests and influence in China. The situation created by the World War gave Japan practically a free hand in the Far East. In November, 1914, it seized the German concession of Kiaochao and assumed succession to German interests in Shantung. The famous "twenty-one demands" of Japan were presented in the following January, and in May, 1915, China was forced to accede to the major part of them.

Inconsistency and sudden shifts seem to mark the career of Yuan Shih-kai, but careful consideration reveals steadfast

adherence to a policy of seeking the reorganization of the country by means of the strongest and most centralized government procurable. For this reason he had endeavored to substitute the republican government for the imperial rule with as little break as possible; and later he had dissolved the unruly parliament and eliminated revolutionary leaders from power. The movement of internal events had transformed his position into a dictatorship; the intervention of Japan seemed convincing evidence that China needed a still stronger government, and Yuan began to plan for a restoration of the empire with himself as sovereign. Had this plan succeeded, it would have been a reasonably close parallel to the circumstances of the establishment of the Ming dynasty over five centuries earlier.

In November, 1915, a vote was secured naming Yuan as emperor, and a month later the revival of the monarchy was proclaimed. Thus far the Napoleonic methods worked admirably, but at this point the outbreak of widespread revolt rendered the plan abortive. Yuan was constrained to announce the abandonment of his ambitious plan and to revoke all the preliminary edicts which had been issued. He continued to cling to power until June, 1916, when he died a broken man. For four years Yuan's rule had held China together and maintained internal order, though it had not been able to resist the intervention of Japan. This was the second phase of the revolutionary era.

After Yuan's death the vice-president, Li Yuan-hung, at once assumed the presidency, and, true to his original revolutionary principles, recalled the parliament which had been dissolved a year and a half previously. The strong man in the administration, however, was the premier, Tuan Chi-jui, an adherent of Yuan Shih-kai, whose policies he tried to maintain through the changing situations of the ensuing four years. For a year events drifted steadily toward a rupture between the president, relying upon the support of the revolutionary element in parliament, and the premier, depending upon the aid of the military governors of the provinces. The power of the central government at Peking declined rapidly and the country came to be more and more at the

mercy of the provincial military governors, now called tuchuns, and of the troops under their commands.

Again the situation was complicated by the World War. In the winter of 1917, when the United States broke off diplomatic relations with Germany, pressure was placed upon China to follow suit. This it did in March. As soon as the United States declared war in April, China was urged to take the further step. The prime minister, supported by the military governors, was eager for war, as he hoped to secure a suspension of the Boxer indemnity. China would also be assured a seat at the peace conference and so be entitled to present its case with reference to the foreign infringements of the nation's sovereignty. The president and the parliamentary party wished at least to defer action, for they feared that war would afford the military governors opportunity to increase their power and defeat the cause of parliamentary government. The issues were sharply drawn. The president and his followers were accused of yielding to German influence, while the premier was charged with depending upon Japanese support. The rupture came in May, 1917, when the president refused to yield to the demands of Tuan Chi-jui and the tuchuns and dismissed the premier. Three troubled and critical months followed.

Tuan and the tuchuns formed a provisional government at Tientsin and began to concentrate troops about Peking. The president turned for assistance to an illiterate swashbuckler, General Chang Hsun. On reaching Peking the general ordered the president to dissolve parliament. On July 1 he proclaimed the restoration of the Manchu boy emperor, as a cloak for his own dictatorial ambitions. Within three weeks Tuan Chi-jui, with the support of the tuchuns, overwhelmed the impossible Chang Hsun, sent the young emperor back into seclusion, installed the vice-president, Feng Kuo-chang, as acting president instead of Li Yuan-hung, and resumed the premiership. A month later Premier Tuan was able to carry out his purpose of declaring war on Germany. Following the dissolution of parliament, a considerable group of the members installed themselves at Canton and claimed that they were the only representatives of con-

stitutional authority in the country. This crisis, with the establishment of a rival government at Canton and the entrance into the World War, brought to a close the third phase of the revolutionary movement.

The question of the policy to be pursued with reference to the revolt in the South promptly produced a breach between the acting president and the premier. The former favored a policy of conciliation; the latter, as was his habit, preferred stronger measures. The premier again forced the issue by resigning and appealing to the support of the tuchuns. General Chang Tso-lin, a former bandit chief who had become super-tuchun of Manchuria, intervened to restore Premier Tuan and to support his policy, which the acting president was constrained to accept. In order to give a color of constitutionality to his proceedings, Tuan Chi-jui, following the precedent established by his exemplar, Yuan Shih-kai, created a new body to revise the constitution again. The consequent changes were proclaimed in February, 1918, a new parliament was chosen, and a new president, Hsu Shih-chang, elected, who was installed on the anniversary of the revolution, October 10, 1918. The new administration took a conciliatory attitude toward the southern revolt, arranged an armistice, and carried on prolonged but futile negotiations for reunification of the nation.

When China declared war on Germany the Allied powers suspended payments due them on the Boxer indemnity and made promises of other measures advantageous to the Chinese. The action of the United States, in November, 1917, in entering into the Lansing-Ishii agreement with Japan, ostensibly guaranteed the open-door policy but actually recognized Japan's special interest in China. It was to prove the forerunner of President Wilson's ultimate concession to Japan on the Shantung question at the peace conference.

China's participation in the World War involved no direct military action, but thousands of coolies were sent to France, where their work behind the lines was of valuable assistance. To meet the situation in Asia created by the seizure of the control of the Russian government by the bolsheviks in November, 1917, Japan entered into a secret agreement with

the Peking government in the following March which was renewed a year later. This agreement furnished a basis for charges of pro-Japanese attitude brought against the administration of President Hsu and Premier Tuan. It was also alleged that large sums of Japanese money were expended in China to promote the continuance of unsettled conditions and so permit the strengthening of Japanese hold on the country. In any case there was at this time a remarkable increase of Japanese activities in China and its outlying provinces.

Whatever may have been the actual sympathies or purposes of the Peking government, public opinion in the country, so far as it existed, looked to the peace conference at Paris to secure relief from all impairments of the national sovereignty and recognition of full equality in the society of nations. This was considered the logical outcome from the principle of the self-determination of peoples. When it became apparent that the treaty would recognize Japan's position in Kiao-chao and Shantung there swept over China a tremendous wave of strikes and boycotts directed against the Japanese and their goods. So vehement was this protest that the Peking government was constrained to refuse to permit its representatives to sign the treaty of Versailles in June, 1919. Positive action in protection of national interests was prevented by the conflict between North and South, by the general administrative disintegration, and by the actual strength of Japan's position in the country.

Over a year elapsed after the signature of the treaty of Versailles without any significant change in the domestic or international situation of China. Dissatisfaction with Premier Tuan Chi-jui and his supporters known as the Anhwei party³ increased and denunciations of them as subservient to Japan constantly grew louder. Finally in July, 1920, the northern tuchuns felt constrained to permit General Wu Pei-fu, one of the few high military officials acceptable to the reform party, to drive Premier Tuan and his Anhwei adherents from office. The triumph of the

³ Also known as the An-fu (Anhwei-Fukien) party.

anti-Japanese movement in the expulsion of Tuan Chi-jui, who had been the most important personage in the government since the death of Yuan Shih-kai, closed another phase, the fourth, of the revolutionary period.

General Wu Pei-fu and the reformers were not yet destined to acquire control. The northern tuchuns, Chang Tso-lin of Manchuria and Tsao Kun of Chi-li, the province around Peking, did not relax their grip upon the situation. President Hsu, with a new cabinet, continued in office, but his tenure was at the discretion of the tuchuns. The government took two actions of international importance in the ensuing year. China now gave its adhesion to the League of Nations, and in December, 1920, was elected to the council of the League. In May, 1921, a separate treaty of peace with Germany was signed. This included one notable advantage for China, as Germany renounced its claim to the privilege of extra-territoriality in return for a guarantee of trial for any of its subjects in accordance with modern law in courts of modern type. The main occupations of the government, however, were fruitless negotiations over foreign loans, the funding, in February, 1921, of numerous domestic obligations by an internal loan guaranteed on the proceeds of the wine and tobacco taxes, and the relations with the rival southern government at Canton.

The revolutionary party, which had maintained some pretense of a government at Canton since 1916, formally proclaimed it the only legitimate government of the republic of China and elected Doctor Sun Yat-sen as president. Doctor Sun was born in 1867 of a Christian father and received his degree in medicine from the college in Hong Kong. While practicing his profession in Canton in 1895 he took part in a revolutionary plot and was forced to flee the country. He resided for varying periods in Hawaii, the United States, England, and Japan, but everywhere devoted himself to his revolutionary policies. When the revolution broke out in 1911 he hurried back to China and was promptly elected provisional president of the republic. He retired in favor of Yuan Shih-kai, with whom he coöperated for a time, especially promoting an elaborate project for a

national railway system. In 1913 he was identified with the abortive revolt and took refuge in Japan, but in 1916 became the leading figure in the establishment of the revolutionary government at Canton. Whatever other judgment may be passed upon his career at Canton, it must be recognized that the city has profited greatly from the extensive material improvements and the administrative reorganization which he inaugurated.

It can hardly be doubted that Doctor Sun is absolutely sincere in his republicanism, his liberal ideas, and his loyalty to the national interests of China. His behavior has often appeared, rightly or wrongly, as equivocal, especially his attitude toward Japan and other powers. Most observers consider him an idealist with no gifts as an administrator or statesman. His career bears some analogy to that of Samuel Adams, though the points of similarity between the two are extremely few. It is perhaps a fair judgment to say that he holds unwaveringly to his main principles, but in order to gain success for them he is ready to try many shifts. His actual experience in governmental responsibility has not been large enough to afford a fair basis for judgment. Events have repeatedly shown his inability to control the military situation in the South; indeed it has more than once been turned to his disadvantage, as in his expulsion from Canton in the summer of 1922. In spite of all that may be said to his disadvantage, it seems clear that far beyond any other individual he commands the admiration and the confidence of loyal and intelligent Chinese throughout the country.

The relations between the Peking and Canton governments must not be thought of as at all comparable to the relations of rigorous hostility and unremitting warfare between the North and the South in the United States during the Civil War. The North and the South in China represent respectively the solidly conservative and the distinctly liberal party types, but in revolutionary China it is the fashion to utilize retainers armed with rifles to support political policies. Each party type is prevalent but not dominant in its respective section. There are no sharply drawn lines,

geographical, political, or military. Military activities, indeed, are often so perfunctory as to suggest marionette maneuvers; sometimes they degenerate into banditry; again they attain to the dignity of political processions. The war in China is not so much a civil war as a *fronde*—a sling-shot war. In the autumn of 1921 the continuance of the Peking government seemed due to inertia rather than to any active support. It still enjoyed exclusive recognition by the foreign powers, in accordance with their policy dating from the time of the Taiping rebellion. Such support as the Canton government received was due to the active interest of the liberal element in the nation. On both sides were to be found many whose chief aims were money and office.

Such was the situation when it became known that a conference which would consider Pacific and Far Eastern questions was to meet in Washington in November, 1921, and that China was to be among the participating powers. The Peking government realized its responsibility for representing the interests of China as a whole regardless of partisan warfare, and set itself to secure the fullest possible presentation of China's case and to seek to remove every impairment of the nation's sovereignty. The outlook for success was far from bright, but the results were surprisingly advantageous.

The strictly conference actions gave treaty sanction in the most specific terms to the policy of the open door and provided for moderate readjustment of the tariff duties, for the abolition of the *likin* or provincial duties to be replaced by a customs surtax, and for periodical revision of the tariff duties. The conference also adopted resolutions providing for the discontinuance of the foreign post offices in China, for the elimination of foreign radio stations, for the withdrawal of foreign troops stationed in China, and for the creation of a commission to study the question of the abolition of the privilege of extra-territoriality, which it was recognized should take place as soon as Chinese laws and tribunals were qualified to handle cases of foreigners satisfactorily.

The question of Japan's position in Kiao-chao and Shan-

tung became the subject of direct negotiations between the two countries under the friendly offices of the United States and Great Britain. The result was a treaty providing for the complete withdrawal of Japan from political, military, and railway interests⁴ in Shantung and for the surrender of the leasehold of Kiao-chao. This action was accompanied by declarations from Great Britain and France that they would, under certain conditions, surrender their leases to Wei-hai-wei and Kwangchow-wan.

The conference arrangements did not affect the status of the outlying provinces of Manchuria, Mongolia, Chinese Turkestan, and Tibet, but they promised to free all territory of China proper from actual foreign control, except Macao under Portuguese jurisdiction, Hong Kong including Kowloon under British authority, and the foreign concessions in Shanghai and certain other ports.⁵ The action of the conference terminated the period in which the carving out of spheres of influence or even the partition of China by foreign powers had been impending. The continuance of the conventional tariff and of the port concessions and the failure to secure the prompt and definite termination of extra-territoriality were serious disappointments to China, as they were felt to be not merely impairments of the national sovereignty but also marks of the inferiority of China to other powers. On the other hand the conditions prevailing in China were abundant justification for the refusal of the foreign powers to make concession on these matters at the time. It is even doubtful whether it would have been a kindness to China if the powers had yielded to these demands.

The more important of these agreements arrived at in Washington have already been carried out, but some await the ratification of the treaties. It must be acknowledged that the events and conditions in China since the adjourn-

⁴ The transfer of the railway is subject to complicated provisions concerning financial compensations and control of operation.

⁵ The French conditions with regard to Kwangchow-wan, however, were such that there is little likelihood of its restoration to China in the near future.

ment of the Washington conference have thrown doubt upon the wisdom of the concessions accorded and have offered no encouragement for further consideration. Nothing was accomplished at the conference or has been done since to straighten out the financial situation aside from the provisions for tariff adjustments. China stands as a defaulter of both principal and interest on certain loans, and yet refuses to make any new loan agreement on terms acceptable to foreign bankers because it is feared that the terms would infringe the national independence.

Ever since Russia had acquired the Amur provinces from China in 1858, the activities of that nation in the outlying provinces of the empire had given serious concern not merely to China but also to other powers. This situation became even more annoying after the bolshevists came into power in 1917 and was further complicated by the establishment of the Far Eastern Republic in eastern Siberia. While it is impossible to give a precise narrative of the situation in each area, it is clear that in Chinese Turkestan, in Mongolia—especially outer or western Mongolia, and in northern Manchuria, Russia has been very active and has seriously weakened such control as China has claimed to exercise in these regions. In southern Manchuria and in inner or eastern Mongolia, Japanese penetration has been at least equally serious. The outlying provinces are mainly inhabited by Mongolian peoples of different nationalities from the Chinese but related to them. These sparsely settled and undeveloped areas are the natural field for the expansion of the crowded population of China proper. Bolshevik intrigue has also extended into China proper. At one time Doctor Sun Yat-sen was said to have made terms with the bolshevists on behalf of his Canton government, and it is certain that one of the most active bolshevist agents, Adolf Joffe, was in Peking in 1922.

At the close of 1921, while the Washington conference was in session, General Chang Tso-lin, super-tuchun of Manchuria, finally made bold to enter Peking and to exert more direct influence upon the government. A new cabinet under the premiership of a prominent financier, Liang Shih-yi,

was installed. Apparently this move was taken in anticipation of pecuniary as well as political advantages from the Washington conference. Another motive may have been to head off new activities of the reforming element, though one rumor at the time was to the contrary effect—that there was a *rapprochement* between General Chang and Doctor Sun. In any case, General Wu Pei-fu, who had become practically master of the Yang-tse valley and who was looked upon by the reforming party as the military leader most sympathetic with their aims, was not slow in responding to the challenge and marched toward Peking. After some months of political and military maneuvering, the crisis culminated in severe fighting near Peking. General Chang was signally defeated and forced to withdraw into Manchuria, where he has since attempted to maintain a more or less independent attitude. As a result of his victory, General Wu, in June, 1922, forced President Hsu Shih-chang into retirement and recalled ex-President Li Yuan-hung to office. With the successful conclusion of the Washington conference and the triumph of General Wu Pei-fu, the supporter of constitutional union, there ended the fifth phase of the revolutionary epoch. This date also closed the sixth period in the international relations of China, which had been characterized by the World War and the activities of Japan.

General Wu was anxious to put into effect his policy of establishing a constitutional regime and reuniting the country. Doctor Sun, who had already been in friendly communication with General Wu, was at this juncture in the summer of 1922 driven from Canton by one of his own generals. Nevertheless the Peking government continued to seek his coöperation. Through his influence those members of parliament who had withdrawn to Canton six years before returned to Peking and resumed sessions with the other members of the original parliament, who were likewise recalled. The opportunity was propitious for the establishment of a real parliamentary government, but the members showed that, since their original meeting, they had acquired no added sense of their political responsibilities.

With a soldier's instinct, General Wu desired to establish a strongly centralized administration as the best means of restoring unity and peace to the country. President Li, however, who viewed the situation rather as a politician, favored a federated system. To the failure of parliament to rise above petty politics and to the disagreement between the president and his Warwick there was added a third misfortune. The western-trained Chinese of the younger generation, especially those who had been educated in America, had looked to General Wu as the prospective national redeemer. Quite naturally several of these men were soon appointed to cabinet office, where they promptly became the targets for bitter attacks from all the conservative and reactionary elements.

The first attack was directed against the finance minister, Lo Wen-kan, who had effected a revision of a pre-war loan with German bankers on terms that were apparently distinctly advantageous to China and had applied the savings to the handling of certain railway bonds. Another indiscretion was the publication of a report on the financial situation in the matter both of debt and of current budget, which was, in character and effect, quite comparable to Necker's famous *Compte Rendu*. On trial the minister was acquitted, but he had been forced out of office. The premier, Wang Chung-hui, who had studied at Yale University, and the foreign minister, Wellington Koo, a graduate of Columbia University, were next driven from office and prosecuted. The factious nature of the opposition was made even clearer a little later when parliament confirmed all the new cabinet nominations except that of Dr. Alfred Sze to be minister of foreign affairs. Sze was a graduate of Cornell University and had rendered to his country no less distinguished services than his junior, Dr. Koo. The action of parliament in these cases is said to have been managed by members under the influence of Tsao Kun, the tuchun of Chi-li, in opposition to General Wu.

Thus far, however, General Wu continues to dominate the military situation and Peking is still garrisoned by his subordinate, the famous Christian general, Feng Yu-hsiang,

with his troops, which have been compared to Cromwell's Ironsides.⁶ This comparison is only one of many that may be made between the situation in England during the period from the execution of Charles I in 1649 to the restoration of Charles II in 1660, and affairs in China since the overthrow of the Manchu dynasty in 1911. Other comparisons may be made with conditions and events in the French Revolution, and still others in the American Revolution, especially in the period between the close of the war with England and the adoption of the constitution.

Having traced the history of western intercourse with China and its effect upon the nation, especially in political matters, we must next inquire to what extent the western developments known as the industrial revolution have affected the economic conditions of the Chinese. Even as late as a century ago a careful observer would have noted no marked difference between the material progress of China and that of the nations of continental Europe. The tremendous transformation wrought by the industrial revolution had then measurably affected no country except England. For three quarters of a century China deliberately remained stationary while western nations forged ahead. It is only within the last quarter century that China has, to any considerable degree, yielded to the introduction of modern inventions and the consequent changes in the methods of life and work.

China has always been and is still primarily an agricultural nation, for its first attention must be given to feeding its teeming millions. Such an enormous population could exist only in a land with an extensive fertile area. Until very recently the agricultural output has been almost exclusively food products intended for consumption within the country. The two articles of primary importance have long been rice and tea. Cattle have been scarce except as work animals. The people have therefore had little meat except pork for food, but have depended instead upon fowl and fish. Tea was eagerly sought by the early traders from the West, but since about 1885 the exports have fallen off

⁶For later developments, see below, pages 164, 166.

rapidly as the Chinese have failed to meet the requirements of western trade, which has come to depend mainly upon the teas of India and Ceylon. In the last decade beans, bean products, and eggs have become important items in China's export trade. Though the importation of opium and the cultivation of the poppy had been almost suppressed a dozen years ago, both the importation and the cultivation have again attained serious proportions.

Silk culture probably originated in China and is still one of the most important industries of the country. The export trade in silk seemed likely to suffer, as had that of tea, because of failure to maintain the quality of the output, but within the last few years there has been a distinct change for the better. The agricultural departments of two mission institutions, the University of Nanking and Canton Christian College, have undertaken to furnish eggs free from disease for silkworm culture, and to aid in other ways to improve the quality of the silk produced. The cultivation of cotton has been extended so that China has become, next to the United States and India, the greatest cotton-growing country.

No country has suffered more from the destruction of its forests. Reforestation and the systematic employment of scientific forestry are among the greatest needs of the country. The vast coastal plain of eastern China has long been subject to floods that work havoc both to life and to the soil. Reforestation would undoubtedly prove an important method of flood-prevention. On the other hand, other areas suffer from occasional or perennial drought, and so require the development of irrigation.

Owing either to flood or drought or to blight, crop failures, with consequent famine, are of almost constant occurrence in larger or smaller areas. Occasionally the disaster is widespread and affects millions of the population, as in the case of a large part of Shantung and portions of adjacent provinces in 1920-21, when the cause was flood. Though the Chinese have always struggled with the problem, the Shantung famine furnished the first illustration of the extensive application of modern scientific methods both to famine

relief and to measures of prevention. It has been estimated that a complete system of engineering works for the control of the rivers of China would not only solve the problems of flood-prevention and of irrigation but would also result in the reclamation of sufficient waste land to pay for the enormous cost of the undertaking. Probably no other single enterprise is more essential to the future welfare of China. Disastrous experiences through the centuries have shown that the lives of the people are absolutely dependent upon it.

China is a land of vast mineral wealth which has been only slightly exploited. It is believed that easily available supplies of coal, iron, and copper are adequate for the fullest industrial development of the country for generations. Though some of the mines have probably been worked continuously for a longer period than any others in the world, mining operations by modern methods are only in their beginnings and the output is still inconsiderable. China is, however, the chief source for antimony and is also one of the largest producers of tin. Some oil fields are being developed.

Chinese artisans have displayed remarkable skill in many sorts of manufacturing under the old-time domestic system. The implements or machines used are few and simple. The hand-loom is still employed in the chief industry, silk-weaving. In Shanghai and some other places there are filatures operated with power machinery and factories where silk-weaving is done with power-looms. Cotton goods, especially towels and coarser fabrics, are being manufactured in Canton and in several towns around Shanghai. There are match factories at Canton and elsewhere; glass works are to be found in many places; and flour-milling is perhaps the most rapidly developing industry. At Hanyang, near Hankow, iron works are in successful operation. These developments of manufacturing by power-driven machinery have meant the introduction of the factory system with capitalism and wage-working. In most cases the capital and management is foreign⁷; the labor is native, largely

⁷ Since the World War, however, native capital and management have been increasingly responsible for the extension of factories.

women and children. Many of the evils which have customarily accompanied the beginnings of the factory system are unfortunately to be found in China, but efforts are being made to prevent serious abuses, and some of the factories are admirably constructed and managed.

Next to a system of river control, already discussed, China's greatest need is for adequate means of transportation and communication. At the beginning of the nineteenth century conditions in China were certainly not inferior to those of Europe. In one particular China was in advance of Europe, for it had a more extensive system of canals. The vast number of native junks engaged in coast-wise shipping has been supplemented by a steadily increasing steamer service, which was, until recently, entirely under foreign ownership and management. Navigable rivers, lakes, and canals afford satisfactory service to considerable sections of the country, and on these the introduction of steamboats has begun.

Good roads have been scarce, but recently metaled roads of modern type have been constructed near some of the chief ports. In these ports many streets have been widened and paved with asphalt. These improvements have been coincident with the introduction of trolley cars, auto-buses, and private automobiles. In these and other municipal improvements the lead has naturally been taken by Canton, Shanghai and Tientsin. The use of the jinrikisha, it must be remembered, is almost a novelty, having been introduced in most cases since 1900, and in some cases only within a few years.

The most obvious improvement in means of transportation is the construction of railways, effected mainly since 1900. In China proper there are now approximately five thousand miles of railroad. If the mileage bore the same proportion to area as in the United States, China would require at least one hundred and twenty-five thousand miles. Most of the lines have been constructed with more or less foreign aid, but they are now under government control. The construction has usually been well done and the roads have, at least until recently, been well operated. The line

from Peking to Kalgan was built by a Chinese engineer and is an excellent piece of work.

China needs a great extension of its railways as an important safeguard against famine, as a means of transporting the output of the mines, as a means to the development of every form of commerce, and most of all as a means toward solving the political problem. National unity is dependent upon quick, cheap, and easy communication between the peoples of all sections of the country. The efficiency of the central government is dependent upon its means of communication with all parts of the country both that its action may be based on information and that its will may be enforced.

A comprehensive plan for a civil aviation service throughout the country is under consideration, and some beginnings have been made. An imperial postal service conducted with modern methods was inaugurated in 1897 in connection with the maritime customs service. Since 1911 it has been under direct government management through the ministry of communications, and in 1914 China became a member of the Universal Postal Union. The postal service has been extended throughout the empire and already operates more than ten thousand offices; it is well managed and the use of its facilities is increasing rapidly. The telegraph system is also under the ministry of communications and maintains over fifty thousand miles of lines connecting all the principal cities. It is being supplemented by wireless service, which is to be extended even to the outlying provinces. Telephones are in use in the chief cities, and plans are being made to install long distance service.

The conduct of both public and private business is largely dependent upon a satisfactory medium of exchange. Though much study has been given to the problem by the Chinese assisted by western experts, the country still lacks a properly standardized monetary system and a uniform currency, either metallic or paper. Such currency as exists is on a silver basis. For over a half century fluctuations in the value of silver have disturbed the monetary systems of the world. China did not follow other nations in the

adoption of the gold standard as a remedy, and since the close of the World War has consequently suffered severely from the wide and sudden fluctuations in exchange. Such uncertainty in values added to unsettled political conditions has been a serious damper on the development of new economic enterprises of any sort in China in recent years.

A sound and uniform banking system is another essential to the proper conduct of a nation's business. China continues largely dependent upon foreign banking institutions, though there are the Bank of China and the Bank of Communications, in which the government is a partner, and numerous private banks. Since 1918 there has been a great increase in the number of Chinese private banking corporations, partly due to the extraordinary opportunity offered by the fluctuations in exchange for the indulgence of the gambling instinct. Of better omen has been the introduction within the same period of savings banks and of a postal savings system.

It can hardly be doubted that China is actually as well as potentially a country of great wealth. Its business methods have not yet, however, become adjusted to the corporate form, such as joint-stock companies, for the conduct of business enterprises on the large scale necessary in modern mining, manufacturing, railroading, and other commercial activities. The progress in banking affairs may be regarded as preparatory to fuller participation of the Chinese themselves in the organization and conduct of their large business undertakings.

Because of the wide fluctuations in exchange and other unusual conditions it is impossible to furnish statistics of the commerce of China in the last decade from which any conclusions may safely be deduced. It seems clear, however, that there has been no considerable increase in imports but a distinct increase in exports. In view of the disturbed political and financial conditions, this expansion of trade is obviously gratifying. That imports have not increased is in part due to the decline in the importation of articles, such as cotton goods, flour, and matches, which China has begun to manufacture. The increase in exports is in agricultural

products, especially beans and bean products and eggs. The largest items on the import list are cotton goods, metals, petroleum products, cigarettes, and tobacco. Silk and silk goods head the list of exports, followed by beans and bean products, tea, tin, and various agricultural products. Owing to the extensive trade through Hong Kong, really accurate figures on the nation's trade cannot be obtained, but in 1920 it is estimated that 28 per cent of the trade of China was with Japan, 18 per cent with the British Empire, and 16 per cent with the United States. In the same year $2\frac{1}{2}$ per cent of the trade of the United States was with China.

The financial administration of the empire was broken down by the revolution in 1911, and since the death of Yuan Shih-kai, in 1916, the conditions have become increasingly chaotic. The receipts from the maritime customs and from the *gabelle*, or salt tax, are pledged for meeting the charges on foreign loans. Similarly the receipts from the wine and tobacco taxes are allocated for the charges on the recently consolidated internal loan. Only the surplus income from these sources is available to the central government for general expenses. The same is true of the receipts from the government railway, telegraph, and postal services. In addition there should accrue to the central government the receipts from a land tax, from stamp taxes, from the *likin* or provincial customs, and from minor duties. In recent years, the military governors have appropriated to their own purposes, especially the maintenance of their troops, a large part of the revenues collected in the provinces which should accrue to the national treasury.

The central government has consequently been reduced to serious financial straits, so much so that it has not even been able to meet the engagements connected with the foreign loans or to pay the salaries of government employees. The framing of a budget seems to have been abandoned as futile since 1919, when the estimates totaled less than 500,000,000 dollars Mexican, which is roughly equivalent to \$300,000,000 gold—or less than one dollar *per capita*. It is even impossible to get authoritative figures for the amount of the national debt, but, accepting the highest estimate, it is less

than \$1,200,000,000 gold.⁸ The *per capita* debt is therefore less than four dollars and possibly as low as three dollars, which compares with a burden of fifteen dollars *per capita* carried by the United States at the beginning of Washington's administration and of over \$200 at present.

There is no suggestion that China is unable to bear the burden of its debt and of the current needs of its government. Neither is there serious question of the ability of the Chinese to handle their own finances. The difficulties are two: the powerlessness of the central government and the deep-seated practice of "squeeze." In public and private business alike it is the custom for each individual who is a party to a transaction to compensate himself with a certain percentage of the amount involved. The practice is entirely comprehensible and not inherently dishonest, but it is a bad system and is open to flagrant corruption. Its elimination is absolutely prerequisite to the sound organization and healthy conduct of government business. The Chinese can be honest, efficient, and disinterested, but they need to learn that no other conduct is tolerable in public office.

Perhaps nowhere have the Chinese officials appeared to better advantage than in the modernization of the legal and judicial systems. The beginning was made in the closing years of Manchu rule, and in 1912 one of the first acts of the republic was the proclamation of the new criminal code. This has since been revised; codes of criminal procedure and of civil procedure have also been drafted; and civil and commercial codes are in preparation. The French codes have furnished the model for the work, though the substance is essentially Chinese.

Torture and other evils have been abolished. There is a supreme court which sits in six divisions—four civil and two criminal—and there is a system of inferior courts. In view of the disturbed political state of the country the progress in legal and judicial reform has been gratifying.

⁸ The official computation of the public debt at 2,355,570,840 dollars silver, given out in April, 1924, shows the substantial accuracy of this estimate.

Courts have been permitted to function, as in Canton, undisturbed by civic and military turmoil and overturns. Prison reform has also been undertaken, and there are already a fair number of modern prisons.

Confucianism remains under the republic, as it had been for twenty-five centuries, the ethical and moral system of the nation. Twice under the republic propositions to declare Confucianism the state religion have failed to secure approval. It has no priesthood. Its spirit is distinctly national and conservative, and intellectual rather than spiritual. There are two other great religions in China, Taoism, which is indigenous, and Buddhism, which was brought from India in the first century of the Christian era. These are both ritualistic and each has its priesthood. With the Chinese these three religions are not mutually exclusive, but mutually complementary and regularly professed and practiced alike by most of the population. The essential element in Chinese religion is the pious performance of the family rites, or ancestor worship, as it is called. Mohammedans and Christians each number a few millions, and they are both to be found in almost every section of the country. The progress of Christianity, especially of the Protestant missions, has been very rapid since 1900. The number of Protestant communicants has been trebled within a score of years. Religious toleration is guaranteed under the constitution of the republic.

Education has always had a prominent place in the life of China, and for centuries government officials have been systematically drawn from the educated class. Nevertheless the mass of the people of China has remained illiterate. The situation has been revolutionized by the introduction of the western type of education. The beginnings were due to mission schools and to a small number of Chinese educated in Christian lands. Less than thirty years ago the earliest efforts outside the mission schools were made to establish educational institutions in China to teach the modern subjects in accordance with western methods; for instance, the beginnings of the National University in Peking date from 1898. The decree of 1905 abolishing the old

system of examinations for public office gave tremendous impetus to the introduction of modern learning.

With the establishment of the republic in 1912 immediate measures were taken by the government to give the nation a fully organized modern educational system. Since that date schools of every grade and type have been established with remarkable rapidity in every part of the country. The disturbed political situation has prevented the completion of the plan as rapidly as had been proposed. Progress has been largely determined by local conditions, so that some provinces are still very backward while others, like Shansi which, under the rule of General Yen Hsi-shan, is considered a model province in this and other respects, have achieved most gratifying results.

At the head stand several national and private universities, then come the middle schools, the higher primary and the lower primary schools. There are numerous normal and higher normal schools, professional, technical, and vocational schools. The attendance is at the limit of capacity and the standards of work are well maintained. The latest statistics indicate a total of one hundred and thirty-four thousand schools of all grades with an attendance of four million five hundred thousand pupils. This is a satisfactory beginning, but it represents less than ten per cent of a national system proportionate to the situation in the United States. It is gratifying to observe the practical character of the movement. Suitable attention is being given to the establishment of normal schools to train teachers, law schools to prepare judicial officers, technical schools for engineers, medical schools for physicians, and also commercial and agricultural schools. Thus the Chinese are endeavoring to provide for their nation properly trained men for all the professions and occupations necessary to meet the demands of modern life.

The mission colleges and schools are continuing to increase in number and efficiency, and exercise a potent influence on the whole educational development. One field is peculiarly their own—the training for Christian leadership. Of immense significance is the radical change of attitude

with regard to the education of women. Under the new system they are allowed equal opportunities with the men, and they are showing remarkable readiness and ability to avail themselves of the privileges. Excepting the spread of Christianity, there is no single movement destined to have so far-reaching effects in the national life as the education of the women. Western education has also involved the introduction of athletics, which have a healthy influence not merely in cultivating physical well-being but also in creating a sense of good sportsmanship.

The growth of nationalism and the promotion of a general system of education have directed attention to the question of language. It is recognized that national unity practically requires that the diversity of dialects shall be replaced by one form of the spoken language used and understood by everyone throughout the nation. Naturally the tendency is to promote the general use of mandarin, which is already most widely spoken and has a sort of official standing. The process of adjustment will necessarily be slow and will depend largely upon the spread of education and the extension of the means of communication.

The question of the literary or written form of the language is even more difficult. For ordinary use three thousand to four thousand characters are said to be necessary, and for scholarly purposes the number of characters required is estimated at more than twenty-five thousand. These facts constitute an almost insuperable barrier to the education of the masses. Much study has consequently been given to the problem of simplification of the written language. In 1913 a phonetic system of thirty-nine letters was devised, which has since received official approval. It is expected that this alphabet will aid in unifying the spoken dialects, in the study of the regular characters, and in the education of the masses. There is also a strong movement for the use of the vernacular as a literary vehicle instead of the classical form of the language. Though this reform was launched only a few years ago its steady progress has already stamped it as one of the most characteristic and potentially influential manifestations of the time.

The growth of the Chinese periodical press has been one of the most significant facts under the republic. Prior to the revolution in 1911 there were about two hundred periodicals published in Chinese, now the number exceeds one thousand. Daily papers are published in every important city. Shanghai is said to have more than eighty newspapers, and Peking and Tientsin together more than a hundred. The publication of books and pamphlets is also conducted on an extensive scale. The reading public is increasing rapidly, but it must be borne in mind that the public reached by the content of the printed page is very considerably greater than the number of actual readers. Naturally the western-trained Chinese control a disproportionate share of the periodical press; the press is distinctly the instrument of the younger and progressive generation. The newspapers published in English, French, and Japanese for the foreign communities are numerous and in general of fairly high standard, so that they exercise a wholesome influence.

The educational movement is expressing itself not only through the press but also in various practical measures for the material, social, and political welfare. In addition to such matters as municipal improvements and new methods in agriculture which have already been noted, attention is given to questions of sanitation and public health. It is true that there are no such obvious results as those obtained by the wholesale measures enforced by the British in Egypt and India or even more fully by the Americans in the Philippines. None the less, foreign precept and example are making an impression, for the development of medical education and the remarkable extension of hospitals and clinics are evidences of a better day. The work done by the Red Cross in China has resulted not merely in the direct saving of many lives, but also in exerting a widespread and wholesome influence.

Social reforms are accomplished slowly. The tyranny of superstition and of custom is difficult to overcome. The Chinese are apparently more conservative than either the Indians or the Japanese; for instance, they much less readily adopt western dress. Considering the circumstances, the

progress toward the abolition of the queue, of foot-binding, and of opium-smoking has been remarkable. Less noticeable, perhaps, but no less genuine and distinctly more important, have been the improvements in the status of women, greater attention to child welfare, and modifications in the marriage customs and in the family life. Probably the most fundamental difference between the East and the West is in the status of women. Whether one attributes that difference to Christianity or to democracy or to individualism or to all three, there will be general agreement that improvement in the position and condition of women is the truest test of modernization in the East.

It remains to inquire what is the real nature of the transition through which China is passing, and what the probable outcome is to be. The student of Chinese history naturally compares the situation with the previous overturns of dynasties, of which there have been more than twenty in the four thousand years of the nation's history, and argues that the country will sooner or later come safely through this time as it has before. This case, however, is different, for it is not a substitution of one dynasty for another, it is the replacing of the monarchy by a new form of government. Almost every observer familiar with the situation, regardless of personal belief or sympathy, recognizes that the monarchy is gone beyond any hope of restoration. That is proved by the failures of Yuan Shih-kai and of Chang Hsun. Only a republic of some form is now considered possible as the government of China for the future. The question is, shall it be of the French centralized type or the American federated kind? The latter sort is undoubtedly more consonant with the nation's past, but present conditions and future needs seem to point to the other solution.

The student of western history logically seeks for comparisons in the English revolution of the seventeenth century, the American and French revolutions of the eighteenth century, and the Russian revolution of the twentieth century, and finds many similarities. In each case there is the transition from strict monarchical government to one more representative and liberal. Each of the four western cases

differs sharply from the others, and the Chinese revolution has elements radically unlike any of them. The western revolutions were primarily political and secondarily, in varying degrees, economic. The Chinese revolution is both political and economic, but it is also, and primarily, intellectual and social; it is more than a revolution, it is a renaissance. No previous dynastic overturn in China has involved, in any considerable degree, the introduction of new intellectual concepts or of changes in the social order; this revolution is working fundamental changes in the national life.

The casual observer notes that the revolution has resulted in the breakdown of the administration, national disintegration and bankruptcy, subjection to the will of corrupt, oppressive, military chieftains, and, in short, chaos and anarchy. If these are the real results or the only ones, the condition of the nation is indeed desperate. Fortunately these conditions are apparent rather than real, and they are not the only results. Since 1911 China has made important readjustments in its material conditions, it has maintained economic prosperity, it has developed a strong sense of nationality, it has conducted a successful foreign policy, it has enjoyed an extraordinary diffusion of liberal ideas, and the spirit of the nation has continued steadfastly hopeful.

What, then, are the real facts with regard to the apparently evil results of the revolution? They may be considered as the logical and necessary outcome of the ancient order which is in process of readjustment at the very points where the evils appear. Because of its vast size and the lack of convenient means of communication the Chinese Empire was never able to establish and maintain effective national administration of the provinces. Though China has passed through experiences suggestive of the feudalism of medieval Europe, it is necessary to go as far back as the ancient Persian Empire to find a fairly accurate parallel for the system of provincial administration.

In each case it was necessary for the central government, the emperor, to intrust each province to a governor with but slightly limited powers, who was held absolutely responsible for the satisfactory administration of the territory and

people concerned. The governor himself had to depend under similar conditions on subordinates for the districts, and so on down to the smallest governmental unit. Each provincial or district governor was a petty despot, a sub-emperor, over his territory. Loyalty, the maintenance of order, the levying of troops, and the regular transmission of the revenue were the principal requirements laid upon him. Removal of an unsatisfactory official was usually effected by deceit, assassination, or military force. Under normal conditions the imperial government had but slight contact with the people.

To the great mass of the people of China the government with which they were concerned was that of the village community. Whether in Persia or China, the ultimate unit of government was something more enduring than dynasties and probably something even older than the empire itself. Nothing has been so little changed in the cycles of Cathay as the life and organization of the rural village. To the present day its character has continued patriarchal, and the family, not the individual, has remained the social unit. Even the growth of cities has affected but slightly the family organization of society. The solidarity of the family in China may to some extent be understood by Europeans, but it is quite beyond the conception of an American. The patriarchal, not the paternalistic, spirit permeates the life of China.

The town life in China long ago developed an important modification of the patriarchal system, the guilds. These have been as far-reaching in their effects as were the various town guilds of medieval Europe in contrast with the feudal system. Prolonged experience with this type of social and economic organization has enabled the Chinese readily to adapt to their uses the more modern methods of organization, such as chambers of commerce, for the promotion of business and municipal interests. This same experience ought, in time, to result in successful civic undertakings for improved municipal administration. Indeed, instances of this sort may already be cited. Perhaps the most significant fact, however, about the Chinese guilds has been their dem-

ocratic character. As a consequence democratic ideas and practices are by no means novelties to the Chinese.

With the establishment of the republic, there came no reconstruction of the local government. For each province the central government continued to assign a civil governor and a military governor. As had often been the case during the last century under Manchu rule, but now more frequently, the military governor dominated the situation. To maintain his position he had to rely upon troops; to maintain them he appropriated the revenues instead of transmitting them to the national treasury. The national government was thus left without funds, so without troops, and consequently without power. The administrative collapse and bankruptcy of the central government, and, on the other hand, the rise of the military chieftains, the existence of great armed forces, and the apparent chaos and anarchy, become easily explicable. Over against this superficial situation is the fact that the great mass of the people of China have continued unconcernedly at their customary tasks and remained law-abiding. Local and municipal governments have continued to function. At bottom the peace and order of China have been little disturbed; indeed, conditions in the last dozen years have been no worse than those existing at various times in the preceding century under the Manchus.

While both for evil and for good the institutions and traditions of the empire have seemed to determine the form and manifestations of the revolution, the real revolution has been the development of new concepts radically affecting the whole ancient patriarchal system from the family to the empire. These new ideas, which are effecting the ultimate revolution, are individualism, social consciousness, national consciousness, and the sense of the obligation of the individual to society and to the nation. There is fortunately no suggestion of throwing the family into the discard; it is being transformed and perhaps ennobled. Neither is there much consideration for the communistic ideas which would substitute paternalism for patriarchal traditions.

The dangers confronting revolutionary China are both obvious and serious. At home there is the anarchy due to

the military governors and their armies; from abroad there is the danger of foreign intervention, direct or insidious; from both sides there is lack of confidence in the government because of its corruptibility due to the scramble for office and for wealth and to the deep-rooted system of "squeeze." To remove the first danger, it is necessary for the national government to deprive the military governors, or tuchuns, of their power to defy or ignore it. That means that there must be but one army exclusively under the control of the central government, which must in turn have the means of paying it and of returning all other soldiers to civil life. The problem is apparently one of money, and might be met by a loan either foreign or domestic; but the former alternative is open to serious objections and the latter seems impracticable. In this dilemma matters have remained for several years.

Another solution would be for the government to utilize one general and his army to disarm all the rest. General Wu Pei-fu has been in a position for months to do this but finds it beyond his powers. It is a case of fighting the hydra and would tend to produce universal brigandage. The superfluous soldiers must either be massacred or else assisted to sufficiently remunerative employment in civil life. Doctor Sun Yat-sen has made the proposal that the government begin at once a far-reaching scheme of public works on which the soldiers should be employed and paid. The idea is excellent but encounters the original difficulty of procuring funds, though such a wholesome result and such a productive investment might together appeal to public spirit and desire for gain combined.

Indeed, the whole question narrows down to the creation of a public spirit which will refuse to tolerate the present evil and which will be ready to carry out the necessary measures for relief. The business community can solve the problem when it realizes that it has not only a great public service to perform but also that it will be to its own interest to do it. In Canton, beginning in 1922, there has been evidence of the necessary awakening in the organization of a merchants' volunteer corps for the protection of their

business and property. China can rid itself of tuchuns, armies, and bandits whenever the Chinese decide to abate the nuisances; that is, whenever they develop the necessary social consciousness and sense of civic duty.

It was such a demonstration of the national will in the spring of 1919 that nullified the detested provisions of the treaty of Versailles and terminated the more obvious forms of Japanese intervention in China. That lesson was sufficient to end any idea of the partition of China by foreign powers or of their serious intermeddling in the nation's concerns. The treaties and agreements arranged at the Washington conference constitute international recognition of the integrity of China territorially and of the necessity of reasonably prompt removal of the other impairments of the nation's sovereignty by outside powers. It is true that Japan's "twenty-one demands" have not all been specifically disavowed, but, as far as China proper is concerned, they can hardly be considered worth the paper upon which they are written. They are a liability rather than an asset to Japan in its relations to China. At present Russia is the only power from which China has reason to fear serious difficulty, and in this case the other powers would probably support China.⁹

In the face of bankruptcy China has for several years refused to sanction any new foreign loan which involves any condition in the slightest measure restrictive of the full and free sovereignty of the nation. Foreign intervention except by joint or concurrent action of the powers party to the Washington conference is almost inconceivable, and the difficulties in the way of such action are so serious as to render it extremely unlikely. It would be the one thing most likely to produce a "rising tide of color," to make the fiction of the "yellow peril" a reality. Much water has flowed by the mill since 1900, and another expedition to Peking would produce results too serious to contemplate. China will appreciate the sympathy of the nations, but it will not tolerate any assistance which it does not freely and voluntarily invite.

⁹ See below, pages 168-169.

The danger from "squeeze" and the attendant evils can be met only in one way. China will have a government which will inspire respect and confidence at home and abroad only when the national consciousness asserts itself sufficiently to insist on the incorruptibility of public officials. It is perhaps wise to recall that two score years have not elapsed since President Cleveland found it necessary in the United States to preach and enforce the idea that "public office is a public trust." The elimination of "squeeze" is no less necessary in private than in public life; it is the greatest foe to industrial and commercial development.

The redemption and reconstruction of China can no more be wrought by a dictator, or "man on horseback," or "strong man" than by a monarch. The work cannot be done from the top down; it must begin at the bottom. When the intelligent people in China determine that things shall be done rightly and set themselves to the task, the work can be done; but not until then. The revolution will continue until individualism, social consciousness, and national consciousness have developed among the thinking people of China the sense of personal responsibility and obligation; or, in other words, until there has developed an enlightened and effective public opinion. That end may be attained suddenly but not quickly. This, it may be repeated, is more than a revolution; it is a renaissance. It is not the westernizing of China; it is the self-modernization of China.

The change must be wrought from the bottom upward, and at bottom China is essentially sound. Just as the Chinese are physically healthy though living in unsanitary surroundings, so despite many evils in their environment the Chinese are really a moral people. With those who know them intimately their honesty, industry, business ability, capacity for scholarship, thrift, and cheerfulness are proverbial. Probably no other people command more fully the respect of foreigners long resident among them. Strangers visiting the country frequently hear from the "old timers" the phrase "You will love the Chinese," and it usually proves true if one stays long enough to get acquainted.

Unlike India, China is free from caste. Though there is much that is more or less feudal in the social order, Chinese society is not feudalized into rigidly fixed compartments. There is something essentially democratic in the life of the people. Just as in the Christian Church the lad of humblest birth may become a priest or perchance a bishop, or even rise to the chair of Saint Peter, so in China no boy is too humble in origin to become a scholar, and a scholar may rise to the highest station in the government.

The scholars have been the nation's reliance in the past; they are its hope to-day. It was the students of 1919, the scholars of to-morrow, who aroused the national conscience against Japan. It has been the student class who have ventured forth into every land on missions of discovery and have brought home rich treasures, "more to be desired than gold," to be added to their nation's store of knowledge and to be utilized for its upbuilding. It is the students who are directly and indirectly diffusing the new learning into every section and among every class, and creating a national public opinion.

The European students of the fifteenth century with their new learning produced the Renaissance which gave Europe its new national states, its broadened culture, and its new religious life, and thereby its domination of the world. The Chinese students of the twentieth century are giving their country a new learning, a broader culture, a national consciousness, a religious reformation. It is not the work of a year or of a decade. Europe took more than a century for its renaissance; perhaps China will not be so slow. Time is necessary, however, for the old generation to pass from the stage before the new generation—the new-born—can play its part freely. The generation of China's renaissance faces the future with lofty purpose and high hope, with cheerfulness and confidence.

The students of to-day are no doubt the custodians of China's future, and education is their panacea for the nation's ills. In a large majority of cases it will be found that back of these students stands the missionary. The missionary and the mission school have directly trained him, aided

him, or given him his inspiration. The new learning which these students are bringing to their people is made up in no small measure of those things in the world's culture which are essentially Christian or the creation of Christian nations. The institutions and the learning of Christianity are lifeless without the spirit of the Christ. One dare not say that China needs the Christianity of the West as the life-giving element for its renaissance; it does need the spirit of the Christ. There are undoubtedly more Protestant Christians in China to-day than there were Christians in the world a century after the crucifixion and the resurrection. Even more than the students of China, the Christians of China are the leaven that will impart the new life to the nation.

Five years have elapsed since the close of the World War. In these years since the armistice, which has been the prey to armies, to anarchy and chaos the more, continental Europe or China? Which is in the healthier and more hopeful state to-day? In which are national differences being accentuated? In which is disintegration increasing? In which is the greater homogeneity? In which is the spirit of unity developing? Is it still true, "Better fifty years of Europe than a cycle of Cathay"? If so, how much longer will it be true?

What will happen if one fifth of the people of the world, using one language, joined in one nation, take the lead from Europe? Is it not of vital importance with what spirit they assume that leadership? Does it all matter to Europe? In any case it concerns the United States more vitally than any other nation except Japan. At the outset it was asserted that the problem of China, as contrasted with India or Egypt, has been primarily diplomatic. If this is still true, it is, without cavil, of the utmost importance what the diplomatic policy of the western powers is to be henceforth. Americans may flatter themselves that the open door is a good policy; the Golden Rule is the best policy.

RECENT EVENTS

At the Chinese New Year in February, 1923, the government was unable to comply with the traditional custom of

effecting an adjustment of its financial obligations.¹⁰ Shortly before that date the representatives of several of the foreign powers had sent an address to the Peking government admonishing it of the importance and nature of the desirable financial reforms. Finally, in October, it was announced that a commission had been created under the chairmanship of W. W. Yen for the readjustment of the finances. The commission included representatives of the foreign interests and was authorized to make recommendations not only with regard to international financial questions at issue, but also for the rehabilitation of the internal finances of the nation. The report of this commission, which was presented in April, 1924, revealed that the national expenditures were not excessive considering the size, population, and wealth of the nation. On the other hand, the revenues were proven seriously inadequate, and it was shown that only a portion of the collections actually reached Peking.

In March, 1923, the British government gave notice that it would comply with the promises of the Allied powers in 1917 to remit the balance due on account of the Boxer indemnity. More recently the United States has agreed to do likewise with the understanding that the amount involved should be used for the promotion of technical education in China. In contrast, France has insisted that China should continue payments, making them in gold rather than at the current rate of exchange, as China maintains it is entitled to do. One of the reasons adduced for the French failure to ratify the nine-power pact negotiated at the Washington conference has been the attitude of China in this matter. Japan has also made a proposal in some respects similar to that of the United States, concerning the portion of the indemnity due it.

A demand from the Peking government that Japan abrogate the treaty of 1915, which contained the "twenty-one demands," was rejected by the Japanese government in March, 1923. A revival of the anti-Japanese boycott and

¹⁰ See above, pages 143-144.

rioting, which was most serious at Changsha in the Yangtse valley, drew forth a vigorous exchange of notes between Peking and Tokyo. While Japan has carried out the arrangements entered into at the time of the Washington conference for withdrawal from Shantung and from the port of Kiao-chao, the negotiations with Great Britain over withdrawal from Wei-hai-wei have not yet been completed, and the French have failed to make any move to surrender Kwangchow-wan. It must be admitted that the administration of Kiao-chao by the Chinese was not satisfactory at the beginning, as it was managed by and for militarist elements.

Early in May a large number of foreign passengers were captured at Lincheng, near Süchow, from the Tientsin-Pukow express. In spite of the earnest efforts of the diplomatic corps at Peking several weeks elapsed before they were all released. Since then bandit outrages have been frequent in various parts of the country and piratical depredations have occurred at several points along the coast, especially near Canton. The foreign legations in Peking united in presenting a note to the Chinese government demanding that adequate measures be taken to suppress brigandage and to insure security to foreigners. Proposals were also made for a system of policing the railways under international supervision. After a considerable interchange of notes the Chinese authorities, in October, practically acceded to the demands. The Chinese resented the arrangement for international policing of the railways as an infringement of the national sovereignty, and have failed to take adequate steps to this end or to pay the promised indemnity.

Conditions, which had been growing steadily worse, culminated at the middle of June, 1923, in the expulsion of President Li Yuan-hung from Peking by the Christian general, Feng Yu-hsiang.¹¹ For weeks there was no regular acting president or premier. General Feng defended his action on the ground that the payment for his troops was in arrears

¹¹ General Feng has disclaimed responsibility for the act and has assigned it to the chief of police of Peking.

and that following the president's flight he was able to make the necessary payments. The action of General Feng, however, received vigorous condemnation from Chinese Christians. General Tsao Kun, the tuchun of Chihli, who had been closely associated with Yuan Shih-kai and Tuan Chi-jui, was regularly elected president by parliament on October 5, 1923. It was reported that the election was effected through wholesale corruption. In connection with the inauguration of Tsao Kun as president on the anniversary of the revolution, October 10, the new constitution, to replace the provisional document of 1912, was formally proclaimed. This constitution¹² consists of one hundred and forty-one articles and provides for a system of provincial decentralization. As yet there is little evidence that it is being put into operation. On October 15, when the new government made known its willingness to meet the Lincheng demands, the diplomatic corps offered formal congratulations to the new president. Though it was hoped that at least thirteen provinces would acknowledge the new Peking government, its authority was actually recognized in only the eight more northerly provinces, over which General Wu Pei-fu and two other generals were installed, in November, as high military inspecting commissioners. A new cabinet was not organized until January, 1924, when parliament at last chose Sun Pao-chi as premier. Doctor Wellington Koo, who had been recalled to office some months earlier, was continued as foreign minister.

The former president, Li Yuan-hung, endeavored for some months to cling to office but finally withdrew to Japan. In the South, Doctor Sun Yat-sen was able to return to Canton in February, 1923, and since then has been carrying on an extensive but doubtful warfare in the vicinity. It is believed that the forces opposed to him have received support from General Wu Pei-fu on behalf of the Peking government. In August and September, 1923, efforts were made to arrange a round-table conference at which Doctor Sun and the various northern leaders should undertake to reunite

¹² A translation will be found in *Current History*, vol. 19, pp. 660-665, January, 1924.

the nation. After the failure of this proposal and the inauguration of President Tsao Kun, Doctor Sun issued a vigorous denunciation of the new president and of the government in Peking and demanded that the diplomatic representatives of other nations should withhold recognition. Later Doctor Sun, who was apparently in serious financial straits, announced his intention of seizing the customs house at Canton and appropriating a portion of the revenues. The foreign powers took prompt measures for the protection of the customs service, because the revenues are pledged for the payment of the foreign loans.

In the early months of 1924, the Peking government obtained a considerable extension of its influence through the capture of Foochow and Chengtu. On May 22, shortly after a false report of his death, Doctor Sun issued a pronouncement demanding neutrality on the part of the powers as between the Peking and Canton governments, and insisting that the policy of recognizing the *de facto* government in Peking rendered unfair assistance to General Wu and the northern interests as a whole. During the summer further difficulties occurred at Canton, especially affecting the Anglo-French concession on the island of Shameen, on which most of the foreign population lived. The troubles involved strikes by the domestic and office employees of the foreign residents and, in the end, resulted in various concessions to the Chinese demands. On July 2, 1924, the premier, Sun Pao-chi, resigned and Doctor Koo became acting premier. In September W. W. Yen, a graduate of the University of Virginia, became premier.

Negotiations with representatives of soviet Russia, which had been in progress for many months, culminated in the signature of a provisional agreement on May 31 by Doctor Koo, the foreign minister, and by Mr. Karakhan, the soviet envoy. China unconditionally recognized the soviet government, and both parties agreed not to engage in propaganda subversive to the political and social systems of the other. Not only were the preceding treaties between the two countries abrogated but also provisions in the treaties of either with a third power affecting their mutual interests

were likewise annulled. The two parties arrogated to themselves the exclusive right to determine the future of the Chinese Eastern railway, and provision was made for the sale to China of the Russian interests in the road. The treaty also provided for the arrangement of new tariff schedules and in general for reciprocal relations between the two countries. Russia relinquished its claim to the balance of the Boxer indemnity, to extra-territoriality, and to all its concessions in China. Russia also renewed an earlier promise of the soviet government to withdraw from Chinese territories, including outer Mongolia. The signature of this treaty has radically changed the diplomatic situation in the Far East and its effects are difficult to forecast. Already Russia has named Mr. Karakhan ambassador at Peking, thus making him the head of the diplomatic corps at that capital. Furthermore, Russian negotiations with Japan, which had long been hanging fire, have been promptly renewed. Japan apparently realizes that its interests will require that it come to terms with both Russia and China on Far Eastern matters, under conditions no less advantageous to each of those powers than they have arranged with one another in the treaty of May 31. On the other hand, the advantages for China from the treaty with Russia have not as yet been realized. Apparently Russia has not been a disinterested spectator of the recent conflicts and changes in China.

China has felt seriously aggrieved because of its failure to receive reëlection to the council of the League of Nations at the sessions both of 1923 and of 1924, and has even threatened to withdraw from the League. China, moreover, has failed to pay its annual quotas for the League's expenses, and has protested against the proportion assessed, apparently with some reason. An agreement with Germany in the spring of 1924 supplemented the peace treaty and adjusted the question of German private property in China which had been sequestered during the war, together with certain related questions. For some time the Germans have been renewing their trading enterprises in China. Among their activities is a scheme to develop the extensive coal

deposits near Pukow on the Yang-tse opposite Nanking, under the management of a Stinnes corporation.

In spite of the troubled conditions there are various evidences of progress, especially in certain provinces such as Shansi. The question of improving the conditions of the working classes has been receiving fruitful consideration. In March, 1923, the Peking government issued regulations governing the employment of industrial workers and of miners. A committee on child labor appointed by the municipal council of Shanghai effected an agreement with the owners of the cotton mills in and near that city by which they discontinued on September 1, 1923, the employment of children under twelve years of age. Though the equipment and operation of the railways have suffered considerably from the military disturbances, projects for the extension of the system are under way. In January, 1924, preliminary agreements were made with a British firm for the construction of three new lines, and in July a group of Belgian and Chinese bankers contracted to finance the building of a railway from Chenchow in Honan to Sianfu in Shensi. Statistics for the total trade of the country in 1923 show a slight increase over the preceding year, but a remarkable increase of twenty-six per cent in the American share of that trade. Floods in several parts of the country in the summer of 1924 have wrought serious devastation and necessitated relief measures to feed and otherwise assist several million people.

Ever since 1920, General Lu Yung-hsiang had maintained his position as tuchun of the province of Chekiang in defiance of the Peking government and had even been able to extend his influence over the neighboring district around Shanghai in the province of Kiangsu which theoretically belonged under the jurisdiction of the super-tuchun, General Chi Hsieh-yuan, whose headquarters are at Nanking and who was a close ally of General Wu Pei-fu. Commercial interests and other influences succeeded in preventing open conflict between the two rivals until the end of August, 1924. Actual civil war began on September 3, which was immediately complicated by the intervention of General Wu's defeated rival, General Chang Tso-lin of Manchuria, who

had long been preparing to square accounts. Fighting ensued near Shanghai and in the vicinity of the great wall on the Manchurian border. Owing to his position geographically, it was alleged that General Chang was in more intimate relations with the Japanese and also with soviet Russia than were the Peking government and General Wu, and therefore possessed a special advantage.

Though General Chi soon succeeded in defeating his rival from Chekiang, General Wu made little headway against his Manchurian opponent who had more effectively used the two years since his previous defeat in preparing for the renewal of the struggle. In October impatience with General Wu for his incompetence and his failure to justify the hopes centered in him for political reconstruction burst forth in the revolt of the Christian general, Feng Yu-hsiang. He occupied Peking, forced the retirement of Tsao Kun from the presidency, and then turned his forces against General Wu. It is reported that this maneuver has once more made Tuan Chi-jui the foremost political personage in China. General Feng has avowed his purpose to bring the military conflict to an end and to secure the coöperation of the best minds in the nation for the establishment of a settled political order throughout the country.

In the period since the Washington conference the relations with the countries party to that conference have not grown more friendly. The feeling of irritation at their refusal to abandon the privileges of extra-territoriality and to make some other desired concessions has been accentuated by various episodes of international intercourse, such as the demands with regard to policing made in connection with the Lincheng affair, and the intervention over the customs question at Canton. On the contrary, China has turned in a more friendly spirit to Germany, Russia, and other nations which have consented to the abrogation of extra-territoriality and other special privileges. The nationals of these latter countries in general receive more favorable treatment in commercial and other relations than do the nationals of the powers which participated in the Washington conference, toward whom Chinese public sentiment

has grown distinctly less friendly. The anticipated improvements in the administration of justice in China have not yet warranted the general abandonment of extra-territoriality, especially in the matter of criminal jurisdiction, but it seems not unlikely that these powers will soon be obliged, singly or collectively, to make concessions to China on most other points in which China feels aggrieved. The continuance of military activities of rival generals, the failure to suppress banditry and piracy, and the prolonged inability of the Peking government to bring several practically independent sections of the country under its control, have not prevented this growth of the insistence upon the rights of Chinese as against other nations. Furthermore, there have been many evidences of a steady drift toward a situation in which the better elements will coöperate to replace turmoil and chaos with a unified and stable government.

SUGGESTIONS FOR READING

An introduction to the history and civilization of China may be obtained from *The Development of China* (3rd ed., Boston, Houghton Mifflin Company, 1924), by Professor K. S. Latourette, formerly of the College of Yale in China, now of Yale University, or from *The Civilization of China* (Home University Library, New York, Henry Holt & Company, 1911), by Professor H. A. Giles, of the University of Cambridge, formerly of the British consular service in China. Recent movements are described in *Contemporary Politics in the Far East* (New York, D. Appleton & Company, 1916), by S. K. Hornbeck, formerly a college teacher in China, later in the United States department of state; and in *Modern Constitutional Development in China* (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1920), by Professor Harold M. Vinacke of Miami University. The diplomatic history is admirably recorded in the magisterial work, *The International Relations of the Chinese Empire* (3 volumes, New York, Longmans, Green & Company, 1910-1918), by Hosea B. Morse, an American formerly in the Chinese maritime customs service; in *The Americans in Eastern Asia* (New York, The Macmillan Company, 1922), by Tyler Dennett, who has lived in China and who has utilized the archives of the United States department of state; and in *China at the Conference, A Report* (Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins Press, 1922), by Professor Westel W. Willoughby, of Johns Hopkins University, formerly legal adviser to the Chinese government and technical expert to the Chinese delegation at the Washington conference.

Chinese Characteristics (New York, Fleming H. Revell Company, 1894), by Arthur H. Smith, for many years a missionary in China, is a classic. *The Changing Chinese* (New York, The Century Company, 1911), by Professor Edward A. Ross, of the University of Wisconsin, is an excellent survey by a competent observer. *China: An Interpretation* (New York, The Abingdon Press, 1916), by the late James W. Bashford, Bishop of the Methodist Episcopal Church Resident in China, is in somewhat less popular style, but rich in information and sound in judgment. *China's Place in the Sun* (New York, The Macmillan Company, 1922), by Stanley High, an American traveler recently in China, is a good readable survey with some late information, though in the main confessedly dependent on works already mentioned. *China Yesterday and Today* (New York, Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1923), by Professor Edward T. Williams, of the University of California, combines an historical survey with numerous topical articles. The best compendium of information on Christian missions in China is *The Christian Occupation of China, a General Survey . . . Made by the Special Committee on Survey and Occupation, China Continuation Committee, 1918-1921* (Shanghai, 1922), edited by Milton T. Stauffer.

The China Year Book (New York, E. P. Dutton & Company) is an annual of nearly a thousand pages replete with the latest information and statistics. It includes a Who's Who section.

CHAPTER IV

JAPAN

JAPAN presents radical contrasts with the three countries already studied. In the first place, it is an island country of limited size, and not a vast continental area like India or China. Nor is it, on the other hand, comparable to Egypt with its small area of fertile lands hemmed in by vast stretches of desert. As continental areas, all three of the countries previously considered have been subject to repeated foreign invasion and conquest, whereas no successful attack has been made upon Japan in the thirty centuries of its history.

Furthermore, Egypt and India have been westernized or modernized primarily through British agency, while modernization has likewise been forced upon China, in considerable measure, by the activity of foreign powers interested in the nation's trade. Though Japan, on the other hand, was practically compelled by the United States and other powers to open its doors to their trade and to concede for a time the principle of extra-territoriality, the nation has never in any other way submitted to foreign dictation. The Japanese have acted as free agents in all the modernization or westernization which has been effected in their country in the last two generations. The story of Japan's development has been that of the deliberate effort of a people to carry out for themselves an industrial revolution and a readjustment of their political system to accord with new conditions.

The Japanese Empire to-day has an area of approximately 260,000 square miles, with a population somewhat over 77,000,000. This empire includes, in addition to Korea on the continent of Asia, a chain of islands extending from 20° north latitude to 50° north latitude; that is, if compared with America, from the southern coast of Cuba to the mouth of

the St. Lawrence. If the islands lying to the north and to the south of the main group and Korea, which have all been brought under Japanese control within about a half century, are excluded, Japan proper consists of four main islands with the immediately adjacent smaller islands, forming an area of about 148,000 square miles, and having a population of over 56,000,000. The situation of these four islands corresponds in latitude to the stretch from Jacksonville, Florida, to Eastport, Maine. Prior to 1870 the most northerly island, Hokkaido, was but thinly populated and of negligible importance in the nation's affairs. If, therefore, its area of 30,000 square miles be further deducted, the territory which formed the historic Japan prior to a half century ago amounted to about 110,000 square miles, and extended only as far north, approximately, as the latitude of New York City. Tokyo and Kyoto, the two great centers of Japan's national life, are in the latitude of Raleigh, North Carolina, and of Tangier in Morocco. In longitude, Japan is located exactly on the opposite side of the world from the middle of the Atlantic Ocean.

The situation of Japan adjacent to the eastern coast of Asia has often been compared to that of Britain adjacent to the western coast of Europe. Japan exceeds the British Islands, both in area and in population, by approximately 20 per cent. The growth of population has been considerably more rapid in Japan, as a half century ago its population was almost exactly the same as that of the British Islands. There are, however, marked differences as well as similarities to be observed. The British Islands, in their entirety, lie farther north than any part of the Japanese Empire, and much farther north than the main group of four islands.

In the second place, the distance across the Straits of Dover is but a little over twenty miles. The shortest distance from Japan to Korea across the Straits of Tsushima is over one hundred and twenty miles. This additional hundred miles of distance from the continent in the case of Japan has been of very great significance. The British Islands have been in unbroken intercourse with the adjacent

parts of the European continent ever since the beginning of history, and have been subject to repeated invasion and several conquests by European peoples. Japan, on the other hand, has frequently shut itself off from all intercourse with the neighboring continent, and in the thirty centuries of its history has rarely been attacked and never successfully invaded.

The British Islands have also been open to the steady penetration of cultural influences from the adjacent continent, and while the British, because of their insular position, have been able to give a national character to their culture, conditions have never permitted them to quarantine themselves against further alien infusions. The Japanese have likewise drawn their culture, in large measure at least, from the adjacent continent, but their distance from that continent has enabled them more than once to establish a rigid blockade against the influx of further influences, with the result that there are long periods of Japanese history when its culture has been so thoroughly insular and nationalized as to become practically static. The last such period came to an end with the intervention of the American Commodore Perry in 1853. It is only since that date that the Japanese people have set themselves to the task of catching up with the progress and civilization of the rest of the world.

Political and military activities on the continent of Europe have formed an important part of British history. For centuries considerable portions of the European continent were subject to English domination. In a similar fashion Japan has occasionally been engaged in political and military activities on the Asiatic continent, and more than once has claimed control of part or all of Korea, and momentarily even of other regions. In recent centuries British interests have tended to turn away from the European continent, and there has been built up since 1600 an enormous British empire, spreading into every quarter of the globe. Throughout most of this period the British have controlled a major part of the commerce upon the high seas. Only within the last half century has Japan in any measure emulated this phase of British development. The consequent extension

of its island empire both to the north and to the south, and, more important still, the rapid growth of its commercial and shipping enterprises are remarkable.

As is well known, the British population is made up of various racial stocks, roughly divided into Celtic and Teutonic groups, which have never become fully amalgamated. In Japan there are likewise different racial stocks but, though they were originally more diverse in character than the peoples who settled in the British Islands, they have become, perhaps because of the long periods of national isolation, much more thoroughly amalgamated. There are in the Japanese population apparently two main elements, the Mongolian and the Malay. The latter type is obviously more prevalent in the south, as would naturally be expected, a fact that would seem to indicate that it had reached Japan by following northward from the East Indies along the almost unbroken chain of islands. It is of the greatest significance that the racial blending in Japan has become so complete as to have produced a peculiarly strong sense of national unity and solidarity, and that the whole population uses but a single language.

Since the Norman conquest, so intimate have been the relations between England and the continent that the steady influx of new cultural influence has been habitual, and at no time has there been manifested a clear national consciousness of cultural borrowing or of the intrusion of alien influences. On the other hand, no steady cultural stream has flowed from the Asiatic continent or elsewhere into Japan. The occasions when foreign cultural influences have entered Japan have been sharply marked, and the people have been keenly conscious of the process of cultural modification. These changes have come to Japan purely as cultural movements, as Christianity was brought to England in the sixth and seventh centuries, and not as the result of foreign invasion or military pressure, as in the case of the Norman conquest.

The Japanese people have been free to receive or reject the new ideas. The adoption of anything novel in political, economic, social, literary, or artistic institutions and life has

come as the result of careful consideration and deliberate determination. This attitude or spirit, displayed on earlier occasions, reveals itself constantly in the changes which have come in the last threescore years. The Japanese have often been accused of being imitative, of being borrowers rather than originators or creators. While this allegation may to some extent be true, it is also true that the Japanese people have not passively submitted to cultural change, but that they have actively studied new ideas and methods, and have rejected or adopted them in accordance with their own free will and judgment.

The historical conditions under which the intensely national character of the Japanese has developed must be studied in order to understand the radical differences from the nations already considered, in the country's attitude toward the adoption of modern culture and in its relations with the great powers of the West. Japan proudly lists its present emperor as the one hundred twenty-second in unbroken hereditary succession from their first emperor, whose date is customarily placed at 660 B. C. Originally the political, as well as the religious and social, organization was largely patriarchal. Comparisons might in some ways, though by no means in all, be made with the earliest history of Ireland and of the Celtic portions of Britain. Clan and local traditions were strong, and the power of the emperor was probably rarely exerted to any serious degree much beyond the immediate locality in which he and the imperial family lived. There seems to have been little in the way of a genuinely national system of administration. There was not even a capital or fixed seat of government.

In the course of time, however, two important developments occurred. The imperial power became strengthened and concentrated to such a degree that Japan was able to conquer, and for a considerable period to hold in subjection, a large part of Korea, over which its suzerainty was recognized down to 668 A. D. The other development, which was of far greater significance for the national history, was the establishment of intercourse with the continent and the consequent influx of Chinese ideas, which came, no doubt,

largely through Korea, but probably also, to some extent, directly. As early as the third century A. D., Confucianism spread into Japan, and about the middle of the sixth century Buddhism began to come in and grew rapidly in influence. While Buddhism never replaced entirely the original religion of the people, which was primarily a form of ancestor worship, it has been, until recent years, the most active religious force in the nation's life and development.

Just as the year 1868 is the great critical date in the modern history of Japan, so the year 645 A. D., which began the Daika era, or great reformation, is the central date in its earlier history. Beginning with that year there occurred a period of reform marked by the adoption of political ideas and methods of organization from China. Instead of the chief importance in the nation's affairs belonging to the hereditary heads of clans or families under the old patriarchal system, the emperor was henceforth surrounded by a group of ministers and subordinate officials whose positions were not hereditary but appointive. There also seems to have been an attempt at a complete economic reorganization. All lands were declared to be the property of the emperor, and were carefully assigned out on a regular system in proportion to population. Landholding thus became a personal matter on a sort of feudal tenure basis. The taxes or rents were payable in rice and other produce, and in labor in a way somewhat similar to the European *corvée*.

The influx of new ideas from China continued, and numerous new departures in Japanese culture are to be dated from the latter part of the seventh century and from the eighth. At the beginning of the eighth century the government became definitely settled at Nara, which for nearly a hundred years was the imperial residence and the national capital. The accompanying growth of Buddhism and spread of learning have left a permanent impress on the national life. The great bronze Buddha at Nara and numerous temples were erected, and the earliest pieces of Japanese literature were reduced to writing. At about this time scholars who had studied in China, where they had also come under the influence of Sanskrit learning, introduced a phonetic

script, known as the *kana*, which still remains in use.¹ It employs about fifty syllabic signs modified from Chinese characters. At the close of the eighth century the capital was transferred to Kyoto, which was destined to be the imperial residence until 1869.

Important and far-reaching as the reforms were, they could not seriously alter the patriarchal character of the national life. The wealth or power acquired by certain families gave them an influence which could not be overlooked for long. There was also a natural tendency for ministers and other great officials to endeavor to transmit their powers and honors in their own families. In time there came emperors who lacked the ability and will to exert strong authority, and ministers who were less loyal and disinterested. Consequently the decline in imperial power gave opportunity for the development of an hereditary official and propertied class. This change in Japan corresponds, at least superficially, to the contemporaneous decline of the Carolingian Empire in western Europe. Just as feudalism developed in medieval Europe, so in a somewhat similar fashion it grew up in Japan, where it continued to hold sway until the latter half of the nineteenth century. Feudal chieftains or counts, called *daimyo*, with their knights, or *samurai*, made themselves practically absolute masters of the different sections of the islands.

The height of the feudal period was marked by the supremacy of the Fujiwara family in civil affairs, and by the rivalries of the two great military families of Taira and Minamoto, which ended in the triumph of the Minamoto under Yoritomo and the extinction of the Taira in 1185. The result of this struggle was the practical annihilation of the authority of the emperor and the assumption of real power by the feudal lords, or *daimyo*, at the head of whom stood Yoritomo, who consequently wielded the real power of government. In 1192 he had the emperor confer upon him the title of shogun, or commander-in-chief. From that date until 1867 the shoguns were customarily the actual rulers of Japan.

¹ There are, in fact, two systems of *kana*.

Titular emperors continued to succeed one another, or, rather, were set up and pulled down by the shoguns at will. The nominal emperor was regularly kept in carefully guarded seclusion at Kyoto, and was little more than a figurehead, adorned with a sort of halo of sanctity as the living representative of the ancient imperial family. The government of the shoguns, which lasted for nearly seven hundred years, was characterized by the continuance, with little change, of the feudal conditions, and the shogun himself was merely the greatest of the feudal lords. This protracted existence of feudalism until a date only a little more than a half century ago has left a deep impress upon the national character, and has given to the Japanese the unique code of chivalry known as *bushido*.

The military caste, that is the *daimyo* and the *samurai*, was the sole one of recognized importance. The agricultural, artisan, and trading classes remained until the very end of this period submerged to a low level quite outside the workings of the code of honor. Still further down in the social scale was yet another group, though not a large one, known as the *eta* class, composed of those engaged in certain occupations which were regarded as peculiarly humiliating.

Though feudalism was officially abolished in 1871, the persistence of its influence is shown by the continuance of political power almost exclusively in the hands of former members of the feudal aristocracy of the old clans, or of their descendants. The same persistence of the old traditional class distinctions also appears at the lower end of the scale. Though the invidious discriminations against the *eta* class were legally abolished some time ago, the differentiations have continued to prevail in practice and are at the present moment the subject of agitation.

About a century after Yoritomo's establishment of the shogunate occurred the most serious efforts at invasion which Japan has ever had to resist. These attempts were undertaken at the direction of the great Mongol emperor of China, Kublai Khan. The repulse of the final and most serious of these attacks in 1281 has sometimes been com-

pared to the destruction of the Spanish Armada in English history. Another importance, however, attaches to this episode, for at this time there was resident at the court of Kublai Khan the Venetian traveler, Marco Polo, who gleaned such information as he could with regard to the island empire. This information, recorded in his famous book of travels, gave western Europe its first knowledge of Japan.

Not long after this great event, the shogunate passed in 1336 into the hands of a member of the Ashikaga family, whose descendants continued to fill the office until 1573. Near the close of this period, in 1542, Japan was for the first time visited by Europeans, a small boatload of Portuguese who happened upon the coast. Very shortly afterward the great Jesuit missionary, St. Francis Xavier, arrived and began successfully Christian missionary work. The European relations were almost exclusively with the southern island, Kiushiu, which had been in closer contact with the Asiatic continent than the other islands, and which had earlier been the object of the Mongol attack. The Europeans were welcomed perhaps even more for their firearms than for their Christianity or trade. The feudal lords of Kiushiu were very quick to recognize the advantage which firearms would give them in their rivalries with the feudal lords farther north. For nearly a century the westerners were hospitably received in Kiushiu, and many of the natives, including some of high rank, accepted Christianity.

The importance of this era of the close of the sixteenth century and the beginning of the seventeenth in Japan is to be found, not in the earliest contacts with Europeans, but in the careers of a group of the most able warriors and statesmen that Japan has ever produced. It was, in a sense, the heroic period of the nation's history, and its foremost figure was the famous Hideyoshi, who undertook, after the lapse of nearly a thousand years, to restore Japanese sway in Korea. Shortly after the death of Hideyoshi, which occurred in 1598, his most able and trusted subordinate, Ieyasu, of the Tokugawa family, succeeded in defeating his rivals and assuming, in 1603, the shogunate, which contin-

ued in his family until 1867. Two acts of Iyeyasu are of significance. He removed the capital of the shoguns, which had been at Kamakura ever since the time of Yoritomo, to Yedo, the modern Tokyo.

Iyeyasu also sent an agent to Europe to study Christianity and other matters. The unfavorable report led to the continuation of the anti-Christian policy of Hideyoshi, which culminated, in 1637, under one of his successors, Iyemitsu, in the complete extirpation of Christianity and the closing of the island empire. The termination of western intercourse and the adoption of the policy of isolation seems a curious and somewhat impotent close for the heroic period. This change has often been interpreted as the result of an anti-Christian policy. It is true that the Christian missionaries were driven out and that the native Christians were compelled to renounce their faith or suffer martyrdom.

The Christian missionaries to Japan, however, were Roman Catholics, mostly Jesuits, and politically they were identified with Spain, which under Philip II had, in 1580, seized Portugal and succeeded to the Portuguese interests in the Far East. Furthermore, the missionaries often reached Japan by way of the Philippine Islands, where they had been zealous agents in the recent establishment of Spanish control. The Japanese were undoubtedly familiar with the importance of Spain in European affairs and also aware of the aggressive character of the activities of both Portuguese and Spaniards in Asia and the East Indies. The policy of the Japanese shoguns may, therefore, be interpreted as one of rigorous determination to prevent the aggressive and domineering Europeans from acquiring any foothold whatsoever in their country. Furthermore, the establishment of the shogunate in the Tokugawa family, with its capital at Yedo, or Tokyo, represented the triumph of the northern clans and the definite subjection of the clans of the southern island, who had been most involved in intercourse with the Europeans.

The policy of isolation and of prohibition of outside intercourse, initiated in 1637, was rigorously maintained until the arrival of Commodore Perry in 1853. Throughout these

two centuries the shoguns shrewdly permitted one little chink to remain open through which they might obtain some information of the movement of events in the outer world. This was done by permitting the Protestant Dutch, who cleverly made known their hostility to the Roman Catholic Spaniards, to carry on a limited amount of trade on the little island of Deshima in the harbor of Nagasaki. Far to the north there were some other contacts of even less significance, where the Japanese found themselves confronted by the extension of the imperialistic activities of the Russians to Saghalien and the Kurile Islands.

Toward the middle of the nineteenth century Americans and others began to push whaling, fishing, and trading activities into the northern Pacific. Even though it was known that Japan was a forbidden land, these enterprises were bound to result in a certain number of contacts due to shipwreck, stress of weather, and other accidents. It was directly out of such occurrences that there developed a situation which led the government of the United States to send the expedition under Commodore Perry to Japan to insist upon the establishment of satisfactory relations.

Even had Japan not been opened from without by Perry's expedition, forces were already at work within Japan which would, before long, have broken down the policy of isolation. In the first place, Japanese scholars were turning their attention to a study of ancient Japan prior to the intrusion of Chinese influences which had resulted in the great governmental change of 645 A. D. Such studies meant the revival of certain ideas and customs which had been current in the centuries before Buddhism and feudalism had become established in the islands. Especially did they suggest the restoration of the ancient patriarchal authority of the emperor as the real ruler of the nation, instead of his continuing a mere figurehead, as had been the case for so many centuries.

In the second place, certain Japanese scholars, although it was unlawful, managed to obtain books from the Dutch which opened up vistas of ideas quite new to the nation. One case was of peculiar interest. A certain book obtained from the Dutch set forth some facts directly contrary to the

accepted teachings derived from the Chinese sources. It was determined to make a test to discover which was correct. The result of the experiment afforded convincing proof of the fallaciousness of the Chinese teachings and gave corresponding prestige to the ideas derived from the West.

Still other forces were at work. The power of the shoguns was obviously declining in the face of increasing rivalries among the clans. For two centuries not only had there been no intercourse, either friendly or hostile, with foreign nations, but practically complete peace had been maintained within the empire. After this long suspension of military operations the repressed desires for vigorous activity once more began to appear. The study of the earlier period of the nation's history had revealed the ability of the Japanese to subdue and rule other peoples. Consequently, the motive of extending the national power was added to the other influences making in favor of change from the old policy of isolation. There were thus forces operating within the country as well as from without which were preparing the way for startling changes in the nation's life.

Commodore Perry's first visit to Japan in 1853 produced no immediate result, but in the ensuing year the shogun consented to enter into the first treaty made by Japan with an outside power. This treaty with the United States was revised in 1858, through negotiations conducted by the consul-general of the United States to Japan, Townsend Harris. Other treaties were made at about the same time with the British, Dutch, and Russians. As in the first treaties with China, in the preceding decade, these agreements provided for extra-territoriality, conventional tariffs, and the most-favored-nation treatment. All these negotiations were peaceably conducted, except for Perry's display of force; thus the establishment of western intercourse with Japan was marked by no such untoward event as the Opium War in the case of China.

In these negotiations the shogun found it necessary to pose as the emperor. This presumption, together with the inevitable identification of the shogunate with the intrusion of the suspected if not hated foreigners, when taken together

with the operation of the internal forces already described, made the termination of the shogunate merely a question of time. It was in the closing weeks of 1867 that the last of the Tokugawa shoguns wisely recognized the situation and honorably resigned his authority. His abdication was followed in the opening days of 1868 by the proclamation of the emperor, Mutsuhito, who had recently succeeded to the title, as the sole and actual ruler of the nation.

This radical change very naturally rendered uncertain the status of the treaties recently negotiated with the western nations and placed the small group of foreign residents in a highly critical position. The atmosphere was promptly cleared by a proclamation of the emperor guaranteeing observance of the treaties and protection to the foreigners. The first stages of the revolution had been entirely peaceful, but it was not destined to be fully accomplished without bloodshed, for certain internal complications produced a short period of civil war which ended in the complete triumph of the emperor.

The overthrow of the Tokugawa shogunate was in large measure due to the activity of the western and southern clans, which had been excluded from power when the Tokugawa had assumed control of the government two centuries and a half before. The emperor found himself, if not under the control of these clans, at least dependent upon them for the maintenance of his position and the conduct of his government. They appropriated to themselves the control of the army and navy, and to this day a large proportion of the higher officials in the army are members of the Choshu clan and in the navy of the Satsuma clan. It was not impossible that the fall of the Tokugawa might have been followed, as on earlier occasions, by the establishment of a new dynasty of shoguns representative of one of these clans. The movement of events, in no small measure due to the rapid influx of modern influences, soon rendered any such contingency impossible.

The earliest results of the revolution with regard to the conduct of the government were somewhat parallel to the changes in 645, but in inverse direction. In matters of re-

ligion there was a distinct attempt to separate the indigenous worship known as Shinto from the Buddhist influences which had overlaid it for so many centuries. The spirit of the new order was embodied in an early proclamation of the emperor known as the imperial oath, or the charter oath. This promised that henceforth government measures should be decided by impartial discussion; that the civil and military powers should be concentrated in a single whole, thus maintaining the national unity and assuring the rights of all; that uncivilized customs should be done away and that justice should rule; and finally, that "intellect and learning shall be sought for throughout the world in order to establish the foundations of the empire."

It was obvious that if there was to be unity of national authority, many of the practices of feudalism would need to be abolished, so that the local administration might be brought fully under the imperial control. The problem of abolishing feudalism, therefore, became of primary importance. In 1869 the *daimyo* of the southern and western clans offered to surrender to the emperor their feudal rights. This action was speedily followed by practically all the other *daimyo*, and in 1871 an imperial edict finally pronounced the formal abolition of feudalism.

Some arrangement was necessary to compensate the *daimyo* and the *samurai* for the renunciation of their rights, which had included the surrender of important sources of income. This was managed by a system of pensions, which were, however, calculated on a scale too liberal for the national resources. Consequently, in 1873, a plan was initiated for commuting the pensions for certain payments in cash and government bonds. This reduction of the compensation, which was at first voluntary, was widely accepted, and finally, in 1876, was made compulsory. Thus Japan was freed from feudalism and the privileged status of the military class was brought to an end.

These measures by which the ancient feudal system was, in the course of a half-dozen years, wiped out of existence involved a wide range of destructive consequences. They practically swept away both the military and financial

systems of the nation. It was obviously necessary that corresponding constructive efforts should be made synchronously. The first constructive measure was undertaken in 1870, very shortly after the beginning of the voluntary surrenders of feudal privileges. It was decreed that, henceforth, the army should be recruited by a system of universal conscription. This single act created a general citizen army to replace the *samurai* as the sole military class of the nation. A few years later followed the final blow at the pride of the *samurai*, which deprived them henceforth of the distinctive honor of carrying swords.

The second important constructive measure was the introduction, in 1872, of a general land tax payable in money. This gave the government a regular revenue in currency, assured it financial stability and independence from any intervention of the feudal nobility, and assured freedom from the uncertainties of fluctuating values and other inconveniences inherent in the old system of payments in rice and other produce. At about the same time an imperial mint was established and the emission of a standard coinage was begun. These reforms, taken together, placed the new government in a position of great strategic advantage as against any class or local opposition or any effort for reversion to the old order.

The abolition of feudal rights, privileges, and tenures, in spite of the original financial adjustment, meant a serious monetary loss to the old privileged classes. This loss was greatly increased by the final readjustments of the compensation arrangements. The creation of the land-tax system, at least at first, inevitably worked to their disadvantage in comparison with the popular classes. It also provided the government with the necessary financial resources to overawe them in case of necessity. The abrogation of the military privileges of the *samurai* and the establishment of a military system based upon universal conscription, at a single stroke, deprived the feudal nobility of their traditional position in the national society and took from them the means which they had always enjoyed of enforcing their will. On the other hand, it gave the government an army

to maintain its authority, which was absolutely independent of both class and local interests.

When it is considered how radical a revolution had thus been wrought in the social, economic, military, and political order, it arouses wonder that the reform had been effected with so little manifest opposition. It could, however, hardly have been expected that the change would pass entirely without protest or revolt. The insurrection came in 1877 after the changes had all been worked out, but also after plans had been well laid to make the protest effective. The revolt, though it undoubtedly had a much wider sympathy in its favor, was actually limited almost exclusively to one clan—Satsuma, in Kiushiu, the southern island. Indeed, it largely centered around a single person, one of the heads of that clan, Saigo, a member of the original group of reformers who had effected the overthrow of the shogunate. There can be little doubt that personal ambition and clan interests were actually more important factors than the great reform measures in producing this revolt.

The struggle was fought with tremendous bitterness. The military forces engaged on both sides probably numbered about one hundred thousand and over one third of these fell in the struggle. All the leaders in the revolt either were slain in battle or took their own lives. This Satsuma rebellion or Saigo insurrection, which occupied a few months in 1877, has been the only civil conflict in the nation's history since the restoration of 1868, and it served to prove to the whole nation that the new order was irrevocably established.

The changes which have thus far been recorded represent but a small proportion of the great program of reform which was launched at the restoration. It had been obvious that among the internal forces which were working for the destruction of the shogunate was a revival of imperial ambitions in the nation. Another force which had operated against the shogunate had been the unpopularity of the foreign treaties and of the intrusion of the foreigners. Naturally, therefore, the new government, although it had promptly accepted the foreign treaties and given to the foreigners their desired guaranties, felt compelled to heed

the popular feeling. Diplomatic missions were accordingly sent abroad to the several treaty nations for the purpose of securing a revision of the treaties which should eliminate some of the most objectionable provisions. The earlier efforts proved entirely futile.

Out of the movement in favor of reviving the ancient imperialistic policy arose disagreements with China, especially with reference to Korea, toward which country these ambitions were naturally directed. Other questions arose over the island of Formosa and the chain of intervening islands known as Liu Chiu. In the north there were disputes with Russia over Saghalien and the Kurile Islands. The chauvinistic elements were eager to uphold the national pride and make war, especially over the Korean affair. The failure of the government to secure a revision of the foreign treaties added fuel to the fire. On the other hand, those who had been involved in the abortive diplomatic missions had learned wisdom, and were insistent in counseling peaceful measures. The genuine reformers also realized that war would delay rather than advance the policies which they had at heart. The consequent decision in favor of a peaceful settlement of the several questions mentioned was, therefore, highly significant. This was, incidentally, another factor in the discontent which culminated in the Satsuma rebellion.

The measures to which the reformers had set themselves at the restoration in 1868, and to the achievement of which they had thus far successfully insisted that the government must attend as its first duty, involved an almost sweeping introduction of modern western institutions, inventions, and methods. These, in turn, were calculated to produce further radical changes in the government and to alter the outward forms if not the inherent character of the economic and social order. Traditional restrictions against change of occupation and residence are disappearing; provincial and local differences are vanishing; class distinctions are steadily yielding to the demand for equality; the dominance of the family is being greatly modified by the growth of individualism. In short, the old feudal regime of fixed status

is giving place to a new social order which is increasingly flexible and mobile. Changes in dress and in many social customs have been, in part, revivals of earlier usages, as well as, in part, adaptations from the West.

In accordance with the declaration of the imperial oath in favor of seeking "intellect and learning" throughout the world, experts in many matters were welcomed from America, England, France, Germany, and other countries. They assisted in planning the new form of local government, in developing the new army and navy, in revising the legal system, and in other reforms of an institutional and administrative character. They coöperated in the establishment of a system of education on modern lines, in teaching medical science, in the improvement of agriculture, and in starting a great enterprise for the colonization of the almost unoccupied northern island of Hokkaido. They helped to plan a commercial code, to develop a merchant marine, to erect lighthouses, and to create systems of railway, telegraph, and postal communications. Even the esthetic temperament of the nation expressed itself by calling in persons capable of instructing in the achievements of the western nations in the various fine arts. It is impossible to measure precisely the progress made within a given period in all these lines. A few illustrations must suffice. The first railway was opened in 1875, and by 1883, over 200 miles had been constructed. By the same date there were already in operation nearly 5,000 miles of telegraph lines, and over 5,000 post offices were rendering service.

Many of these foreign experts were men of remarkable force of character, who left a deep personal impress upon the groups of young men with whom they came in contact. A notable illustration was President Clark, of Amherst Agricultural College, who spent some months in Japan in 1876-1877 in organizing the Imperial College of Agriculture at Sapporo, in the northern island. His memory, like that of several others, is still held in high honor by the eastern people whom he served. Peculiar interest attaches to the visit made to Japan, in the summer of 1879, by General Grant while on the tour around the world, which he made

following his retirement from the presidency. No occidental of eminence had previously visited Japan, nor has one of equal distinction done so since. He was the recipient of even more attention in Japan than in India or China, and his judgments were sought with great deference.

While it was not an item in the program of reform it was inevitable that Christian missions should again appear in Japan. The Roman Catholics returned and, curiously, discovered in the vicinity of Nagasaki a small group of people who had, for more than two centuries, preserved the traditions of Christianity, which had been introduced at the close of the sixteenth century but had been rigidly under the ban since 1637. From Russia also came representatives of the Greek Orthodox Church. Even more important, however, was the arrival of representatives of the leading Protestant denominations, of whom several had established their work as early as 1875. The foremost Japanese Christians of to-day were young men who were numbered among the earliest converts.

While Japan was applying "intellect and learning" brought from the outside world, it was not failing to bear in mind the first proposition in the imperial oath, that "all measures shall be decided by impartial discussion." It is quite unnecessary to follow in detail the various changes effected in the organization of the central government between the restoration in 1868 and the proclamation of the constitution in 1889. Various temporary expedients were utilized and several experiments were made. As early as 1874, a demand was publicly voiced for a national parliament, and from 1877, the year of the Satsuma rebellion, onward, several prominent members of the group of reformers and various political societies maintained an agitation for the establishment of representative institutions. From the beginning, though constrained to refuse to introduce a parliament prematurely, the government felt it necessary to make gestures of concession. In 1875 the governors of the kens, or prefectures, were summoned in a national assembly for consultation. This was merely an administrative device and in no way a form of representation.

In 1878 the first step toward genuine representative institutions was undertaken, by a provision for representative assemblies in the prefectures. Two years later lesser local assemblies were also authorized. The introduction of similar institutions, on a somewhat more liberal pattern, by the British in India, as already described, extended over the generation from 1850 to 1885. These institutions in Japan were elective and representative, but they had very narrowly limited functions. Their chief activity was in fixing the rates of taxation but, even in this their decision was subject to review by the higher administrative officers. At the same time the system of local administration in the prefectures and lesser districts, under the direction and control of the central government, was being worked out. There was developing throughout the country a local bureaucracy, largely composed of former *samurai*, working under the supervision of the national department of home affairs.

In 1881 Mr., later Count, Okuma, who had rendered brilliant service as minister of finance in the final adjustment of compensations to the feudal nobility, left the government and placed himself at the head of a progressive group (the predecessor of the later Kokuminto party) in favor of a national parliament. The government met this move by an imperial proclamation, promising that a national diet should be summoned in 1890, and that meanwhile the government would engage in the necessary study and preparation for the new departure. To one of the younger members of the group of reformers fell the main responsibility in this matter. He was Mr., later Prince, Ito.

In 1882 and 1883 Ito, with an extensive suite of experts and secretaries, spent some months in Europe and the United States acquainting himself with western institutions. Not unnaturally he fell under the spell of the dominant personality of the time, Prince Bismarck, and found in the latter's constitution of the new German Empire many ideas which seemed to him suitable to appropriate, though he was planning a constitution for a unified and centralized state and not for a federated empire. While holding various offices at different times during the nine years, Ito was the most

important figure in the central administration, and was steadily adjusting the system in the manner necessary to effect the transition to parliamentary institutions with as little break as possible. Among the transitional measures was the creation, in 1884, of a new nobility in five orders, quite unrelated to the old feudal nobility, though a large proportion of the newly created nobles were members of the old feudal noble families. In 1885 a cabinet of the German type, with Ito himself as minister-president, was installed; in 1888 a privy council was created, and in 1889 a competitive civil service was inaugurated. The new constitution, which seems to have been as fully the work of Ito as the German constitution of 1867 was the creation of Bismarck, was finally proclaimed on February 11, 1889, the two thousand five hundred and forty-ninth anniversary of the accession of the first emperor, and the first meeting of the imperial diet assembled a year later.

The constitution of Japan is not a fundamental law created by the people in their sovereign legislative capacity acting through some form of constitutional convention. It was proclaimed by the emperor in his sovereign capacity as a statement of the plan by which he proposed to conduct the government, and as a grant by the hereditary and hitherto autocratic sovereign to his people. The constitution carefully conserves in theory and form the complete powers of the sovereign.

The essential change effected by the constitution was the establishment of a national legislature, called the imperial diet. The consent of this body is requisite to every act of lawmaking. The initiation of laws may be exercised by the emperor or his ministers, or by the legislature itself. The powers of proroguing or dissolving the diet, which have been exercised on various occasions, reserve to the emperor an important degree of control over its proceedings. The diet is composed of two chambers, the house of peers and the house of representatives. Originally it was planned that each house should consist of three hundred members, but the number was not definitely fixed and, under laws supplementary to the constitution itself, the membership of each

body has been considerably enlarged, so that at present the house of peers consists of three hundred and seventy-three members, and the house of representatives of four hundred and sixty-three members. The emperor is advised and assisted in the conduct of the government by a ministry responsible to himself and not to the diet. The several ministers are heads of departments, and are responsible individually, as was the case under the German imperial constitution, not collectively, as is the case in England. The emperor also has two other bodies of advisers, the privy council, and the *genro*, or elder statesmen. The original members of the latter group were the more important survivors of the co-workers in the restoration. While the powers of this body are not clearly defined, its influence has frequently been far-reaching and decisive and has, in general, been conservative. Its attitude has usually been considered imperialistic and militaristic.

This constitution was the first ever proclaimed in any nation not of European origin, and it established the first representative body as a national legislature among people of non-European stock. The Japanese have also claimed that it is the only constitution ever freely granted by a monarch to his subjects. This claim is true in the letter, perhaps, but certainly not in spirit, for in promising to grant the constitution the emperor had obviously yielded to political agitation. On the other hand, there is no doubt that the constitution permitted the determination of governmental policies by discussion in a way far in advance of what was anticipated some twenty years before in the first clause of the imperial oath.

The provisions of the constitution, however, were not sufficiently liberal to satisfy those who had been agitating in favor of the establishment of constitutional government. These men were particularly disappointed at the provision for ministerial responsibility to the emperor rather than to parliament. This point became the center of political attack for many years. The ministers selected by the emperor were denounced not merely as bureaucrats but as agents of clan government. These charges were substantially

true. Nearly all the ministers were chosen from two of the southern and western clans, Choshu and Satsuma. The restriction of the tenancy of the war and navy ministries to high officers in the respective services, imposed in 1895, placed these two departments almost inevitably under the control of these two clans respectively, laid the government open to the charge of being militaristic, and effectively blocked efforts to render the cabinet responsible to the diet.

Though the new constitution had been established partly as the result of political agitation, many observers doubted whether the people of Japan were prepared to operate a representative government. The new educational system had certainly not yet been in operation a sufficient time to create a body of literate citizens of any considerable size. Neither had the Japanese people enjoyed the privilege of experience in the exercise of the elective franchise or in the operation of representative institutions, except in some local matters for less than fifteen years. These reasons certainly justified a very narrow limitation of the franchise at the initiation of constitutional government. These limitations naturally furnished a further cause for agitation. Though some extension of the suffrage has since been granted, the right to vote still remains closely restricted. Meanwhile, the rapid development of the educational system has been fitting the whole mass of the Japanese people for political privileges.

Though the constitution was criticized from the outset for its failure to permit party government, there really existed no political parties in a proper sense upon which such institutions might have been based. Prior to the meeting of the first session of the diet there were small followings of a few prominent politicians. These groups were based upon personal loyalty rather than upon political principles. In the earlier sessions of the diet this situation was perpetuated, but with a growth in the size and importance of the followings of some of the leaders. The resulting political system is entirely dissimilar to either American or British experience. Despite the constitutional differences, the conditions may perhaps best be compared with the contemporaneous political situation in France, with the same rapid

rise and fall of cabinets due to the constant shiftings in the combination of small party groups which were frequently personal followings. In both cases the tendency was to center interest on men rather than on principles. This comparison with France is of some significance because it shows that the ensuing situation in Japan was due, not necessarily to the constitution, but certainly in some measure to the experience with political groups rather than with a two-party system. Survivals of clan relations, interests, and spirit are also definite, if not easily measurable, factors responsible for group rather than party organization and politics.

Unfortunately circumstances gave color to charges, which were freely bandied about on more than one occasion, that the votes of members of parliament were controlled by patronage and corruption. In like manner the conduct of elections aroused serious criticism. In the earlier elections violence, even resulting in death, was not an infrequent occurrence. Though voting was later conducted somewhat more peacefully, campaigning methods gave rise to serious complaint and to repeated allegations of bribery.

These circumstances tended to discredit seriously the demand for party government, and even the conduct of representative institutions themselves. Throughout the first four years the proceedings of the diet were distracted by the filibustering activities of the advocates of a parliamentary ministry and of revision of the treaties with western nations. It was only the use of the emperor's power of proroguing and dissolving the diet and the consistent opposition of the house of peers to parties and party cabinets that saved the nation from political disaster. These unfortunate conditions were temporarily interrupted and somewhat modified by the outbreak of the war with China in 1894. As long as the war endured, all party strife was laid aside.

Count Ito, who had again become prime minister in 1892, recognized the unsatisfactory character of the experiences in trying to establish constitutional government and the impossibility of reconciling the demand that ministers should be responsible to the diet with the constitutional provision

for their responsibility to the emperor. He seems to have deliberately welcomed the pretext for war furnished by China as a means of distracting public attention both at home and abroad from these facts. He has been charged with abandoning policies of internal reform in order to conceal the failure of his constitution by the glories of a foreign war.

By a treaty of 1885 Japan and China had recognized a sort of joint interest in Korea and had agreed on a plan of common action in case it should be necessary to intervene in that nation's affairs. In 1894 China accepted an invitation to intervene in Korea, evidently reckoning the party dispute in Japan as serious enough to prevent its protesting effectively. On the contrary, domestic discord was stilled, and both by land and sea Japan was uniformly successful. Victories whetted the nation's appetite for military glory, and consequently "On to Peking" became the watchword. The extension of the war from Manchuria into China proper was prevented by China's suing for peace. The terms were inadequate to gratify public opinion. The failure to march on Peking and to exact more rigorous terms from China was promptly followed by another event which bitterly enraged Japanese sentiment. Russia, Germany, and France intervened to compel Japan to relinquish the Liao-tung peninsula in return for a slight increase in the war indemnity to be paid by China. These humiliations undermined the popularity of Count Ito. Nevertheless Japan did emerge from the war with China as the first nation in Asia to win substantial consideration from European powers.

Japan had made rapid strides. Its constitution had been proclaimed in 1889. Parliamentary institutions had been in operation for five years and were working about as well as those of France, while Russia had not yet undertaken such liberal measures. The war with China had been a complete success. The acquisition of Formosa and the Pescadores extended Japanese control over the whole chain of islands from Kamchatka southward to the Philippines. Furthermore, China was compelled to withdraw its claims over Korea and to recognize instead Japan's interest in that

country. The Japanese imperialistic program may be compared with the policy of the English sovereigns in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, when they were intent upon extending English domination throughout the British Islands and on controlling extensive territories in France. There was, however, a much more recent model before Japanese eyes in the achievements of Bismarck in the aggrandizement of Prussia between 1863 and 1871. Count Ito's admiration for Bismarck and emulation of his policies appear here as well as in his constitution-making.

Furthermore, two weeks before the outbreak of the war, Japanese diplomacy had won a brilliant triumph in securing a treaty with England providing for the abolition of extra-territoriality after five years. This stroke, perhaps no less than the war, was of peculiar importance to the Ito ministry in discrediting the opposition in the diet. The intense desire of the Japanese people to free themselves from the stigma of national inferiority involved in the existing treaty provisions conferring upon the western powers the privileges of extra-territoriality had exercised a dominant influence in the establishment of constitutional government and in the political activities under that constitution. While the Japanese were indulging in further violent anti-foreign agitation after the collapse of negotiations in Tokyo with the representatives of all the treaty powers, Count Ito secretly transferred the negotiations to London and soon obtained the distinctly favorable treaty, which was signed in 1894. Great Britain assented to the termination of the privilege of extra-territoriality after the expiration of five years, provided the Japanese government should have given one year's previous notice that it was prepared to undertake the consequent responsibilities. This delay was cleverly planned by the Japanese to afford adequate time for the framing of a new legal code and the adjusting of the judicial system, while the provision for one year's notice was to give Japan the appearance of exercising the initiative instead of redrafting its laws in compliance with the foreign demand.

The treaty did not, however, put an end to the conventional tariff. On the contrary, new tariff concessions were

the price paid by Japan for British assent to the abolition of extra-territoriality. The conventional tariff, henceforth, was limited to certain articles which constituted the bulk of British trade with the country, but it was provided that for all other articles Japan might establish a statutory tariff and that the conventional tariff should expire at the end of seventeen years, that is, in 1911.

The ice having been broken, the other powers could scarcely refuse to enter into similar arrangements. By 1899 all the other powers had consented to the necessary treaty revision, and on June 30 of that year Japan celebrated the restoration of the integrity of its national sovereignty. The only discordant note came from the foreign populations in the old treaty ports of Yokohama, Kobe, and Nagasaki, whose acrid criticism of Japanese laws and administration revealed their fears for their persons and property under the new order. With wise generosity the Japanese overlooked the criticisms and took extraordinary pains to avoid the difficulties which the foreign element had anticipated.

The diplomatic situation at the close of the war with China, as already noted, made the position of the prime minister, now Marquis Ito, unpopular and difficult. Though the indemnity considerably exceeded the actual cost of the war, the resulting imperialistic policy of greater armaments necessitated a serious increase in the burden of taxation. Owing to the war and to the receipt of the indemnity money there was a sudden and distressing rise in prices which produced a momentary but unhealthy prosperity followed by sharp financial reverses. These circumstances increased the difficulties confronting the government. The war also produced an effect upon the constitutional and political situation. The governorship of Formosa and other appointments were promptly appropriated by the clan oligarchy. The military and naval interests associated with the Choshu and Satsuma clans tremendously strengthened their influence in the government by legislation insuring their control of the war and navy departments.

Thus, in the face of hostile opinion in the diet and in the nation, Marquis Ito had to frame his new budget. He met

the situation by proposing to supplement the annual budget by a special budget for a seven-year period which would spread over a series of years the anticipated heavy extraordinary expenditures for military and naval purposes and for internal improvements. Another post-war problem was the administration of the territories brought under Japanese control as a result of the war. Both in Formosa, where political corruption and incompetence were rife, and in Korea, where the queen was murdered, apparently with Japanese connivance, the beginnings were exceedingly unfortunate. The government, however, took prompt measures to remedy the worst evils, so that a satisfactory administration was soon operating in Formosa and the supervision of Korea was exercised more reasonably.

Though party strife had been laid aside during the war and though it did not again revert to the same bitter and violent form that had characterized the early days of constitutional government, the fundamental problems remained unsolved. Throughout the interval between the war with China and the war with Russia partisan strife continued acrimonious, and both in the elections and in the diet conditions still existed which seemed to justify charges of corruption and of unfair political manipulation. The question of ministerial responsibility may be said to have remained in abeyance. The immediate issue was over imperialism and militarism. This was due not entirely to conditions within the country, but partly to the highly disturbed situation in eastern Asia.

As far as the internal situation was concerned, the political struggle reached a climax from 1896 to 1898, after which the control of the militarists was steadily strengthened. A progressive party, the Shimpoto, after 1911 known as the Kokuminto, under the leadership of Count Okuma endeavored to enforce the principle of collective ministerial responsibility to the lower house of the diet. On the other hand, the militarist element led by the *genro*, or elder statesmen, sought to obtain higher taxes in order to insure more liberal appropriations for the army and navy. At first Count Okuma was able to secure a portfolio in a ministry headed

by Count Matsukata, with the understanding that the principle of ministerial responsibility would be accepted. This arrangement failed in 1897, but not until the administration had made itself memorable by the establishment of the Japanese currency on the gold standard. A new ministry of colorless character, under Marquis Ito, came into power, and secured the acceptance of the new legal code which was necessary to procure the abolition of extra-territoriality in 1899 as provided by the treaties.

A radical realignment of party groups and a new election resulted in a large majority in the new diet for the progressive party headed by Count Okuma and his allies. Marquis Ito resigned and recommended the selection of Okuma as prime minister, while he himself undertook a mission to China to investigate the acute situation there. This Okuma ministry was the first one whose choice was determined with direct reference to the majority in the lower house, but the dominant party was utterly unprepared to assume responsibility for the government and so failed miserably.

A new cabinet, formed by Marquis Yamagata in November, 1898, represented the triumph of the partisans of militarism and clan politics. Though Yamagata, who was one of the highest officers in the army, disdained all parties, he found it necessary to effect arrangements for party support in order to get the diet to pass his measures for an enlarged military budget and for increased taxes. Nevertheless, his hostility to parties led him to discredit the very factions upon which he had relied and then to resign office. Yamagata's measures were purchased at the expense of an important reform enacted in 1900 which increased the membership of the lower house to three hundred and eighty-one, provided for a more equitable distribution of representation, reduced the property qualification for the franchise, abolished the requirement for signing ballots, and made election districts coterminous with the prefectures. Marquis Ito, who was intensely opposed to the militaristic policies of Marquis Yamagata, had labored zealously to secure his overthrow, and made that event the occasion for the creation of a new party, the Seiyukai, which has since played a highly

important part in Japanese politics. Ito, like Yamagata, was one of the elder statesmen, like him supported the imperial prerogative in the question of responsibility and appointment of ministers, and also like him was a believer in oligarchical rather than popular government. The essential difference between the two men was that Yamagata was a militarist while Ito had become the advocate of a program for the material and intellectual advancement of the nation.

Though Marquis Ito succeeded to the prime ministership, his triumph was short-lived. Only his personal control over his new party enabled him to secure the adoption of his budget proposals in the lower house. When these came before the house of peers, they were promptly rejected, but an imperial rescript compelled the peers to pass the measure. This utilization of the imperial prerogative was not only extraordinary but dangerous. Indeed, it is doubtful whether Ito himself was responsible for the action. It was so much to his disadvantage that it is possible that it was suggested by his militarist opponents. In any case, Ito was soon forced to resign.

A prolonged ministerial crisis ensued, in which the various party leaders, and Ito himself, were discomfited and discredited, owing to the machinations of Yamagata, who ultimately secured the organization of a ministry under the presidency of Count Katsura. This was the first ministry which did not contain any of the elder statesmen. It was frankly militaristic in character and professedly neutral with regard to parties. Once more the budget question produced strained relations between the two houses. By means of a political deal and some concessions in the terms of the measure, Katsura secured the adoption of his budget in the lower house, only to have it rejected by the peers. He then took up his original budget and secured its enactment by both houses. Thus on two occasions the political and constitutional struggle had brought the two houses of the diet into sharp antagonism. Only the support of the militarist element among the elder statesmen and the acrimony of party strife enabled Katsura to continue in office. He was able, however, to score an important success in the signing of the

Anglo-Japanese alliance in January, 1902, before the new elections to the diet took place.

The election in 1902 was the first under the reformed election laws and resulted in returning an increased number of the Seiyukai. The new house promptly defeated Count Katsura's budget proposals for a new land tax and a program of military development. Katsura at once dissolved the new diet and, in accordance with the constitution, extended the previous budget for another year. This action was deliberately punitive, as it required members to stand the expense of a second election within a year. The prevalent corruption involved such heavy expenditure by the candidates that it was estimated that at least four years' salary was necessary to recoup them. The new election in 1903 resulted in no substantial change in the membership of the diet, but this time the budget was approved, because Marquis Ito, who foresaw the approaching conflict with Russia, dragooned his followers to its support. This action ended Ito's career in politics. The leadership of the Seiyukai passed to Marquis Saionji, and Ito was named by the emperor to the privy council.

The last political maneuver before the outbreak of war with Russia was the dramatic personal act of Mr. Kono, the president of the lower house, at the opening of the new session in December, 1903, when, instead of the customary formal address to the emperor, he proposed an address denouncing the weak policy of the ministers, which was adopted without dissent. This extraordinary action resulted in the immediate dissolution of the house. There can be little doubt, however, that Kono's purpose was an entirely patriotic desire to forewarn the country of the approaching struggle with Russia, which began in the following February. The war promptly hushed party strife and the new elections to the diet in March still remain memorable for freedom from bitter contests and corruption. In spite of these facts, Katsura, unlike Ito, does not seem to have sought foreign war as a balm for party dissension but to have pursued a deliberate and definite militarist plan for a war of conquest.

Only a few words can be devoted to the international re-

lations of Japan following the close of the war with China or during the war with Russia. Japan had been compelled in 1898 to watch with almost impotent wrath the seizure of Port Arthur by Russia, and of other ports in China by other European powers. The only response that Japan could make to this situation at the time was the creation of the supreme advisory military council composed of Marquis Yamagata and his supporters. In 1900 Japan eagerly seized the opportunity to participate in the expedition to relieve the foreign legations in Peking from the siege by the Boxer rebels.

Events during the preceding decade had convinced Japanese statesmen that they could not look for support to any power on the European continent. The sympathies of those governments for obvious reasons would be with Russia, whose activities in the Far East were becoming yearly more menacing to Japan. The United States had long been distinctly friendly to Japan, but could not be looked to as an ally in view of its traditional policy. Under these circumstances the Japanese had for some years been considering the possibilities of an alliance with England. English interests in Asia were no less than those of Russia, and the Russian policy appeared even more menacing to the British in India than to the Japanese. It was not unnatural, therefore, in spite of the surprise of the western powers, that the Anglo-Japanese alliance should be formed in January, 1902—the first alliance of a European with an Asiatic power on terms of national equality.

It is possible that, in 1904, the Russians, like the Chinese in 1894, mistook the political strife in Japan for national weakness and unpreparedness. At any rate, Russian aggressions were conducted in Manchuria with insolent defiance of the rights and interests of all peoples in eastern Asia, and to the intense indignation of most European powers. After fruitless attempts to bring Russia peacefully to terms, Japan declared war in February, 1904. This struggle was regarded as a war of national defense and once more domestic differences were laid aside and the nation entered whole-heartedly into the struggle. The initial success of

Japan revived the imperialistic program, and "On to Baikal" became the watchword. Russia was to be defeated and driven out of all eastern Asia, which was to be brought under Japanese control as far west as Lake Baikal. Though China remained helplessly neutral, Japan anticipated extending its sphere of influence over Manchuria and Mongolia if not over other parts of the Chinese Empire, as it had done over Korea at the close of the previous war.

As the war progressed, however, it became clear to the military authorities that the anticipated success was not being obtained, for the retreating Russians were not being effectively defeated. Indeed, the Japanese government became convinced of the practical impossibility of administering a crushing blow to Russia or of acquiring any considerable part of Russia's territory in eastern Asia. They also realized that without an overwhelming defeat of the Russians a war indemnity could not be exacted from them. Under these circumstances the government was prepared to accept the good offices extended by President Roosevelt, and in the end came to terms with Russia at Portsmouth in August, 1905. As a result Japanese suzerainty over Korea was assured and Japan replaced Russia in the control of southern Manchuria and in the ownership of southern Saghalien. The bitter disappointment to the Japanese people at the failure to obtain more extensive territory and an indemnity found expression in serious riots and was disastrous to the popularity of the ministers and diplomats concerned. The popular indignation was intensified by the vast increase of the national debt and by the sudden addition to the burden of taxation. The war and the treaty had, none the less, resulted in genuine advantages to Japan. The militarist and clan statesmen might well feel satisfied with the degree of success achieved.

The decade following the war was to witness no intermission in the prosecution of militarist policies. The national position was strengthened by the renewal in 1905 of the alliance with England in stronger terms and with a wider scope. Furthermore, synchronously with the Anglo-Russian *entente* of 1907, Japan entered into agreements with Russia

and France based upon the maintenance of the existing status in the Far East. Nevertheless, the policy pursued by Japan after 1905 with Korea, Manchuria, and China can with difficulty be differentiated in character from that of Russia prior to the war. The behavior of Japan did not improve the feeling of the European powers toward her, lost her the sympathy of the United States, and even resulted in a weakening of the provisions of the alliance with England when it was again renewed in 1911. The only offset, strangely enough, was to be found in the relations with Russia, which began to take on a more friendly aspect and to contemplate coöperation of the two countries in dealing with the affairs of eastern Asia. It was especially the Japanese administration in Korea and ultimately the annexation of that country in 1910 which cost Japan the friendly attitude of other powers and the favorable judgment of the world at large.

As was the case at the close of the war with China, the months immediately following the termination of the war with Russia were marked by violent fluctuations in the economic and financial affairs of Japan. The government, with some difficulty, carried through a general program of financial readjustment, and in addition undertook the national purchase of all the principal railways of the country. This procedure was possibly unconstitutional, certainly arbitrary, as regards the rights of the owners of the railways. It was, however, equally culpable on the other side because of the excessive liberality of the compensation allowed. In private business, the period witnessed the organization of many new corporations and unrestrained speculation in their shares. Prices rose rapidly to extraordinary heights and fell even more quickly and sharply. The resulting depression was not entirely overcome until the outbreak of the World War, though the period was not without a certain amount of development in industrial enterprise at home and in commercial operations abroad.

Count Katsura, who had remained in power throughout the war, was compelled by the popular clamor against the terms of peace to yield the prime ministership to Marquis

Saionji. In 1908, however, Katsura was able to regain office, to set aside Prince Ito, who had been intrusted with the administration of Korea, and ultimately, in 1910, to carry through the annexation of that country. His chief agent was General Terauchi, who had been minister of war since 1902 and who was now despatched to take charge of affairs in Korea.

The second Katsura ministry is notable not merely for its handling of the Korean problem and for the renewal of the alliance with England, but also for its domestic policy. The budgets were arranged to provide for the annual payment of fifty million yen on the foreign debt and for the refunding of the domestic debt at four per cent. The latter procedure was arbitrary in view of the state of the money market, and was regarded as more or less confiscatory because of the sharp reduction of the interest rate, the consequent decline in the market value of the bonds, and the renewal of the government policy of buying bonds in the open market for redemption rather than in purchasing them by lot at par, as had for some time been the custom. Though Count Katsura had replaced Marquis Saionji, the leader of the Seiyukai, in office, he was able to rely upon the support of that party because of its general principles, and because, it was alleged, of the use of bribes and patronage. One untoward incident of the administration was the so-called sugar scandal, which involved the punishment for bribery of several members of the diet who were concerned in the wrecking of a sugar company which had sought to secure special advantages from favoring legislation.

It also fell to the lot of the Katsura ministry to revise the tariff and commercial treaties in accordance with the earlier treaty agreements. Important changes were made in the statutory tariff, but a blunder of the foreign minister, Count Komura, prevented the negotiation of new treaties on as favorable terms as had been desired. Finally a measure for universal manhood suffrage, which had been passed by the the lower house, was thrown out by the house of peers with vehement denunciations of the measure as contrary to the spirit of the constitution.

In August, 1911, Count Katsura voluntarily gave place to Marquis Saionji, during whose ministry the emperor, Mutsuhito, posthumously known as the Meiji Tenno, died on July 30, 1912, after a memorable reign of forty-five years, and was succeeded by his only son, Yoshihito. Soon after this event occurred the fall of the Saionji ministry under peculiar conditions. The demand of the war minister for two additional army divisions for service in Korea was negatived and the minister resigned. The refusal of the army to provide another high officer as minister necessarily involved the resignation of the cabinet. It was apparently the purpose of Prince Yamagata and the clan statesmen to force the issue to their own advantage.

Prince Katsura, who had apparently broken with Yamagata, after some unusual measures, managed to take office for a third time. His action was, however, in defiance of public opinion, which did not seem to grasp the import of the situation. After launching a new political party in his own support, Katsura had to confess defeat and resign early in 1913, and before the year was out he died. This crisis is particularly notable for the influence exercised by public opinion and by the mob in Tokyo. Katsura had undertaken to duplicate the maneuvers of Ito eleven years earlier to defy the elder statesmen, but had failed even more miserably.

Since the Choshu clan could furnish no satisfactory candidate for the premiership, the choice of the *genro* fell upon Admiral Count Yamamoto, of the Satsuma clan. This ministry, and the triumph of the *genro*, however, were short-lived, owing to a scandal involving the trial of high officials in the navy, charged with bribery in connection with the building of a warship. In April, 1914, the prime ministership passed to Count Okuma, the leader of the Kokuminto party which, under changing names, had long opposed both the *genro* and the Seiyukai. The Okuma ministry was associated with Japan's entrance into the World War, the capture of the German possessions in the Far East and in the Pacific, and the enforcement of the so-called "twenty-one demands" upon China.

The years preceding the outbreak of the World War, as

has been seen, had witnessed the steady embitterment of Japanese politics. The situation had reached a crisis in the naval scandal on the eve of the war. The formation of the Okuma ministry was a triumph for the elements which had been opposing the demands for increased military and naval expenditures. The ministry entered office with a program denouncing corruption, opposing militaristic expenditure, and favoring measures for economic and social welfare. It was a strange irony, therefore, that this ministry was called upon to face the situation created by the outbreak of the World War.

In August, 1914, in accordance with the requirements of the alliance with England, Japan declared war, and a few days later began the attack upon the German leasehold of Kiao-chao on the China coast. This territory was surrendered to Japan in November, while the Caroline, Mariana, and Marshall islands, the north Pacific insular colonies of Germany, had been occupied by the Japanese forces in the preceding month.

On the assembly of the diet at the end of the year the ministry asked unanimous approval for a greatly enlarged naval and military budget for the ensuing year. The diet refused to lay aside its partisanship as it had done in the case of the wars with China and Russia, and the budget proposals were rejected in both houses. In face of such opposition the only practicable measure was dissolution of the diet and appeal to the electorate. The results were favorable to Count Okuma and his ministry, though it was alleged that the elections were marked, to an unusual degree, by corruption and official pressure in favor of ministerial candidates. The new diet promptly granted the army and navy increases, including various demands of this sort which dated back to the cabinet crisis of 1912.

On the eve of the assembly of the new diet in May, 1915, it was announced that China had yielded to the Japanese ultimatum in the matter known as "the twenty-one demands." Though the new diet approved the increased budget, vigorous attacks were made upon this aggressive Chinese policy of Count Okuma, and also charges were

pressed against one of the ministers in another matter. A cabinet crisis ensued which permitted Count Okuma to reorganize his ministry with new nominees in place of the foreign minister and his colleague against whom the attacks had been directed.

After the seizure of the German possessions in the Far East there was naturally question about the part which Japan should henceforth play in the World War. While it was decided not to send troops to the western front in Europe, Japan undertook to contribute to the supply of munitions for the Allies, and in October became a party to the Allied agreement known as the pact of London. This was followed in 1916 by an agreement with Russia on matters of Asiatic policy. Of Count Okuma's original platform of economic and social reform only two details of significance were embodied in law. These were provisions against child labor and in favor of accident compensation to workingmen.

The advanced age and failing health of Count Okuma made him unwilling to continue to face the persistent attacks in the diet, and so in October, 1916, he retired and a new ministry with Count Terauchi at the head was formed. This new ministry did not command a majority in the diet and was at once denounced as ultra-militaristic. Of particular vehemence were the attacks made upon the foreign policy of the government, especially with regard to China. Terauchi accordingly secured the dissolution of the diet and in the new elections in April, 1917, won a victory, thanks to the support of the Seiyukai. The year 1917 was marked by an acute rise in prices in Japan which resulted in numerous strikes by the workingmen. In most cases these disturbances were short-lived, and resulted in the concession of greatly increased wages.

The victory of the Terauchi ministry in the spring of 1917 occurred shortly after the declaration of war against Germany by the United States and the outbreak of the revolution in Russia. These two circumstances soon involved new developments in Japanese policy. While the country continued to contribute to the Allied supply of munitions

and to extend its trade rapidly, especially in fields once almost monopolized by the British, its aggressive policy toward China received surprising confirmation from the United States, in the Lansing-Ishii agreement of November, 1917. Later, in 1918, owing to the progress of the Russian revolution and its possible bearing upon the World War, Japan, if not at the suggestion of the United States, at least with its coöperation, undertook intervention in Siberia. With the progress of the war, however, Count Terauchi seems to have been losing confidence in the Allied cause, and to have convinced himself of the probability of German success. It is said that he was actually on the point of reversing Japanese policy in July, 1918, when the tide of the war suddenly and decisively changed in favor of the Allies. Furthermore, his administration incurred serious unpopularity for its failure to alleviate the economic distress caused by the extraordinary rise of prices.

In September Count Terauchi's ministry had to give place to one under Mr. Hara, the leader of the Seiyukai, the first Japanese commoner to attain the premiership. Though the new cabinet represented less militaristic and more liberal views than its predecessor, it conducted the peace negotiations at Versailles in accordance with the vigorous chauvinistic policy which had prevailed since the accession to office of Count Okuma. The insistence upon securing for Japan a position in Shantung distinctly superior to that held by Germany before the war was so flagrant as to produce a revulsion of feeling against Japan not merely in China but practically throughout the civilized world.

During the war Japan had enjoyed abnormal industrial and commercial prosperity. It had at the same time witnessed the evils of profiteering both in the production of inferior goods and in the exaction of excessive prices. These facts, taken together with the policy affecting China, seriously discredited Japan throughout the East. The crisis came in 1920 when the balance of trade was suddenly reversed, and runs on the banks occurred. The reaction was felt most severely in the newly developing industrial centers where abnormally high wages suddenly gave place to unem-

ployment and strikes. Fortunately for the country the ministry took prompt measures to secure a satisfactory adjustment of domestic affairs through the enactment of various laws dealing with economic matters and local administration.

Though concessions adopted in 1918 increased the size of the electorate from two and one half per cent to five per cent of the population, the agitation in favor of a more liberal suffrage law—indeed, of universal manhood suffrage—continued to develop in persistence and force. The dissolution of the diet in 1920 was ascribed, in part, to a purpose of defeating these demands. As had been the case in the two previous instances, the new elections were vehemently contested but resulted in favor of the Seiyukai and the ministry in power. Intimately bound up with the agitation for a more liberal franchise was the demand for better educational facilities, which proved scarcely less futile. These proposed reforms were also closely associated with opposition to the militaristic policy of the government and included demands for diminished expenditure on naval and military affairs, for the modification of the conscription plan of military service, and for withdrawal from the aggressive and unsuccessful policies in China and Siberia.

Still another difficulty which confronted the government was the matter of relations with the United States, which had been growing steadily more unsatisfactory. The problems involved included the education, land, and immigration questions, which arose mainly from the action of the state of California, but they also included the effects of a possible renewal of the Anglo-Japanese alliance and of the continuation of the aggressive Japanese policy in China and Siberia. There was, in general, an American suspicion of Japanese militarism, which, it must be confessed, was somewhat offset by a Japanese suspicion of American militarism, especially in view of the continued increase of the United States navy after the war. The policy of the Japanese government in dealing with the current situation had long been the subject of unfavorable comment in the United States and in other countries. This suspicion of Japan's disingenuousness was confirmed by the protracted delay in fulfilling Premier

Hara's promise of September, 1920, to withdraw from Siberia. The disturbances which developed in Korea in 1919 and the consequent Japanese measures of repression aroused extraordinary disapproval, which was but slowly allayed by the more politic administration of the new governor-general, Baron Saito. The immediate subject at issue was the seemingly insignificant question of Yap. It involved, however, the fundamental principle of the rights of the United States in territories placed under mandate by the treaty of Versailles and the important practical matter of the security of American telegraphic communications with the Philippines and other Far Eastern countries.

While it must not be assumed that all the complaints represented an intelligent knowledge of facts or a fair and impartial judgment upon them, there is no question of the significance of their effect upon public opinion in Japan, in China, in the United States, and in other countries. There can be little doubt that the situation in the year 1921 was highly critical. Fortunately the attitude of the new American administration under President Harding opened the way to a vast improvement, through the planning of the Washington conference and through the negotiations which were there brought to a conclusion.²

The year 1921 was also marked by the journey of the crown prince to visit the Allied countries in Europe. This action was of extraordinary significance, because it was the first occasion on which a prince in the imperial succession had ever left Japan. The journey was undertaken in spite of serious opposition, and its successful conclusion was regarded as a triumph for the liberal cause. Shortly after the return of the crown prince he was named regent owing to the long-continued ill-health of the emperor.

Just at the moment of the meeting of the Washington conference, Premier Hara was assassinated. In his stead Baron Takahashi became prime minister, but in June, 1922, shortly after the return of the mission from Washington, its head, Baron Kato, succeeded to the premiership. This

² See above, pages 139-141. The question of Yap was settled to the satisfaction of the United States.

change of ministry was of great significance not merely because it carried approval of the Washington conference but also because Baron Kato accepted office on specific condition of a policy of army and navy reduction and of the evacuation of Siberia. This was the first case in which a premier was chosen under conditions that enabled him to bring the clan statesmen to terms in the selection of the army and navy ministers. Baron Kato was not only able to defy long-established traditions in entering upon office but he has also been able to continue in power despite the direct censure of his administration by the privy council with especial reference to the policy concerning China.

The trend of events during the year following the Washington conference has been away from militarism and toward liberalism. It has also revealed a marked alleviation of conditions in Japan, even though there has been little in the way of reform legislation. The international relations and reputation of Japan have been greatly improved, owing to the wisdom and sincerity displayed by its representatives in the agreements made at Washington and in their execution. The continued validity of these agreements, it must be observed, will be dependent on the accession of Russia to them whenever that country is readmitted to international comity. Contrary action by Russia would once more embroil the whole Far Eastern situation and drive Japan back to militarism.³

In retrospect, from the opening of the country to foreign intercourse in 1854 till 1894, Japan officially adhered to a policy of internal development and of nonintervention in foreign affairs. Advocates of a vigorous foreign policy appeared throughout the period, and at least once, in 1873, nearly brought the country into war. From 1894, when revision of the treaties was secured and war was declared against China, until the treaty of Versailles in 1919, Japanese policy was, in varying degrees, militaristic and chauvinistic. The high tides of aggressive or imperialistic spirit were undoubtedly in the years 1895, 1905, and 1919, which re-

* For later developments, see below, pages 231ff.

spectively marked the close of the three great wars to which the nation was a party. Yet each of these dates also witnessed the sharp disappointment of the national ambition. In 1895 foreign intervention robbed Japan of the fruits of victory; in 1905 popular indignation was vented on the administration which had wisely recognized that the resources of the nation were inadequate to win more than a partial victory over Russia; in 1919 the treaty provisions secured to Japan a fuller concession of its demands than was obtained by any other party to the peace, but the nation had to learn that terms guaranteed on paper were impracticable of realization. It is greatly to the credit of the Japanese government and people that they seem to have been able to take to heart the last unpleasant lesson as well as the former ones. The policy of Baron Kato apparently represents a reversion to the principles of the first quarter century of the Meiji era—progress at home, peace with honor abroad. It would seem that Baron Kato is actually succeeding with the program for which Marquis Ito in 1902 and Prince Katsura in 1912 struggled in vain.

The trend of internal political developments is far less easy to discern and explain. The movement of events from year to year has already been recorded; it is now necessary to undertake to determine their significance. The restoration of 1868 replaced the emperor in autocratic control of the government. In theory that autocratic, almost theocratic, power remains supreme: practically, by the grant of the constitution in 1889, the emperor has not divested himself of his prerogatives but has given them legal definition and established the principles and methods through which they shall operate. Vastly more divinity appertains to the Japanese emperor than hedges the British sovereign. Every one from the premier down still bows in alert obedience to the imperial behest. That finality still attaches to the expressed will of the emperor is, no doubt, due to the remarkable discretion which has characterized imperial intervention in political matters.

From the restoration to the grant of the constitution progress was administrative rather than political. Reforms

were wrought by imperial mandate, but the work was done by advisers and ministers drawn almost entirely from the four southern and western clans, mainly from Choshu and Satsuma. This was not unnatural, as the services of these clans had achieved the restoration and as these clans were those which the circumstances of the establishment of western intercourse had made most progressive. Political agitation in this period was confined to small groups and aimed at parliamentary government and treaty revision. With the election of the first diet these groups developed into political parties, and during the next four years their advocacy of these two causes was far more vehement than discreet. Though there have probably been more stormy sessions of the diet in later days, the attitude assumed on constitutional questions has never again been so violent.

The periods of the wars with China and Russia were times of political truce or quiescence. With the close of each war political strife revived. The question of parliamentary government came to be treated as a matter of political expediency rather than as a constitutional issue. The emphasis was upon men rather than measures. Though both Ito and Katsura were originally identified with highly imperialistic policies, the responsibilities and experience of office seem, in the end, to have convinced each that internal progress was more essential than expansion abroad. Both fell victims to the peculiar power wielded by those leaders of the military clans known as the elder statesmen. It is not unfair to assume that behind the elder statesmen was a very powerful body of public opinion, and that the tactics of the earlier parliamentary politicians had not been of the kind to command popular support.

The entrance of Japan into the World War in 1914 did not set a period to partisan strife as had been the case in 1894 and 1904. Politics seemed, on the contrary, to grow more corrupt and acrimonious, and members of the diet more violent and irresponsible. The Okuma ministry, which entered office in 1914 on a liberal platform, out-Heroded its predecessors in imperialism, militarism, and corruption. The succeeding ministry under Terauchi per-

petuated the evil tradition. These conditions brought their own Nemesis. The prolonged indifference to the popular needs had permitted the cumulation of evils crying for reform. The economic effects of the war contributed to the crisis which forced the Terauchi cabinet from power in 1918. Meanwhile the operation of the educational system had produced what did not exist when the constitution was proclaimed in 1889, namely, a literate citizenry which was rapidly growing in intelligence and interest in public affairs. These people cared little for the rivalries of politicians; they wanted increased educational facilities, better working conditions, lower prices, and the right to vote; they opposed military conscription, excessive taxation, increased armaments, and a foreign policy fraught with opprobrium and economic ruin. Premier Hara began to discern the signs of the times; Premier Kato seems fully awake to them.

Sympathetic understanding of modern tendencies seems also to characterize the recently proclaimed prince regent. Born in the twentieth century, this young sovereign is already showing an inclination to emulate western monarchs in manner and policy rather than to imitate the patriarchal attitude of his illustrious and revered grandsire. With the deaths, in 1922, of Prince Yamagata and Marquis Okuma, the *genro*, the elder statesmen, who were the mainstay of the benevolent despotism of the Meiji era, have practically passed from the stage. Even the men of the second generation who still utilize the house of peers as a stronghold of conservatism are giving place to younger blood. Few members are now sitting in the lower house whose terms of service antedate the war with Russia. The positions of power, influence, and responsibility are rapidly being filled by men of the younger generation, trained in modern schools, to whom the old Japan is but a hazy tradition.

Many circumstances indicate that the nation, after a generation of experience with representative institutions and limited suffrage under the constitution of 1889, is prepared to take another step forward. Liberal extension of the franchise alone will not suffice. Conditions now seem to require and justify closer correlation of the administration

with the diet, if not its responsibility thereto; further development of the educational system, and improved conditions for the working classes. These reforms are demanded by a growing public opinion, which sums up its desires in the word "democracy." This democracy, however, is not republican; it is sanely combined with a deep sense of loyalty to the ancient ruling house.

The popular currency of democratic ideas, derived chiefly from England and the United States, is doubtless due to familiarity with the English language, which is regularly taught in all schools above elementary grade. The Japanese are a nation of readers. On the trains, for instance, greater numbers of both men and women may be seen reading books and periodicals than in any other country except the United States. Public libraries have been multiplied in recent years on a scale far surpassing any other eastern nation. In the publication of books, the press of Japan rivals the progressive nations of the West. The number of periodicals published has risen from about one thousand in 1900 to about thirty-five hundred at the present time. The various types of weeklies and monthlies familiar in England and America have their counterparts in Japan. Daily newspapers, which date from 1871, are numerous and as varied in character and color as in the United States. Some of them claim a circulation of a quarter of a million. The censorship restrictions, which were formerly reminiscent of German procedure, have been considerably relaxed in recent years. The foreign-language papers, which in some cases antedate the Japanese, are mostly of high grade, as exemplified by the admirable *Japan Advertiser*, edited by a native of the United States. These developments certify to the steady growth of an informed and alert public opinion. Today the Japanese people are educated for a more liberal government.

The constitution of 1889 probably provided as large a degree of self-government as the people were then competent to exercise. In so far as it followed any western examples it was built upon continental European models, for only there could be found constitutional governments of a mon-

archical type. It would have been not only almost incomprehensible but also extremely unwise had the Japanese suddenly broken with their venerable monarchical past and launched out, as China attempted to do at a later date, on an entirely new experiment in governmental forms and methods. It was perhaps wise also that they proceeded with deliberation in the extension of political privileges instead of adopting universal suffrage as Bismarck had done in Germany. The failure to follow another German precedent, that of federation, and the adherence instead to the native traditions of centralization, somewhat improved by study of the French system and methods, illustrates clearly the difference of the Japanese situation from that of the Chinese.

The wisdom which dictated the conservative character of the constitution in 1889 should now dictate its liberalization. The changes should be natural outgrowths of the nation's past and not mere alien grafts upon the ancient stock. On the other hand, to refuse or long delay the grant of certain reforms, for which there is widespread popular demand and for which the nation is clearly prepared, would be to court revolution. Chauvinism and militarism have thus far postponed concession to the demands for constitutional progress, and they may again be called into use to secure further delay.

Chauvinism seems to run in the Japanese blood as it does in the French; each of the last three decades has seen a notable manifestation of it, and clearly the danger of recurrence is not entirely imaginary. Japan overestimates its primacy in the Far East and its progressiveness, just as the French have been wont to do in Europe ever since the revolution of 1789. This spirit of international knight-errantry is, however, in some degree, offset by a stability in the internal political life which is comparable to the solidity of British constitutional development rather than to the fickleness of French political experimentation. For the immediate future the fortunes of Japan are in the hands of the generation which has been trained under the constitution of 1889, but also under the regime of militarism. It is too soon to determine whether its dominant desire will be for

political progress or for military achievement. Happily, present indications point to the former alternative.

The spirit of the new Japan certainly insists on a fuller measure of social and political equality in the national life. Internationally it expresses itself unequivocally, though not in a militarist manner, in the demand for racial equality. The mass of the Japanese people apparently desires peace and prosperity, which it would promote by a policy, advocated by such progressive leaders as the veteran parliamentarian, Mr. Ozaki, of disarmament by international agreement. The aims and achievements of the Washington conference found a hearty response throughout the nation. The lessening of the burdens of universal military service and of public expenditures for army and navy is considered prerequisite to the undertaking of an extensive new program of economic and social improvement.

The national budget for 1922-1923, it is estimated, will balance at \$730,000,000. The public debt at the close of 1920 amounted to \$843,000,000 in internal loans and \$714,000,000 in foreign loans, a total of \$1,557,000,000. The loans are at rates bearing from four to five per cent interest. The annual expenditure is \$13 *per capita* and the debt amounts to \$27.80 *per capita*. These rates are surprisingly low in comparison with various western nations, but they are felt in Japan to be excessive. The country is on a sound financial basis, having adopted the gold standard, and it has an extensive banking system which dates from 1872. There are numerous private banking corporations and over six hundred savings banks, with a considerable number of agricultural and industrial banks in addition to a postal savings system.

Japan has made good progress in the development of internal communications. The total mileage of railways in operation in 1880 was 73; in 1900, 3,638; in 1920, 8,207. Most of the lines were unfortunately constructed on a narrow gauge. As far back as 1906 Japan had undertaken a policy of nationalization of its railroads, at least of all the important lines. At the outbreak of the war in 1914 a policy of railroad development to extend over a period of

ten years had already been entered upon. Considerable progress was made even during the period of the war, and at its close further extensions of the policy, including a scheme of electrification and plans for the adoption of a standard gauge, were sanctioned. These undertakings are scheduled for completion in twenty years. There are electric tramways in the more important cities, amounting to 732 miles in 1918. The jinrikisha, now widely used throughout the Far East, was devised by a missionary in Japan. Telegraph lines amounted to 28,000 miles in 1921, and telephone systems are in operation in the more important cities. There are about 8,000 post offices.

It was noted at the outset that the area of Japan proper is about 148,000 square miles, and that its population in 1920 was over 56,000,000, that is, about 380 persons to the square mile. Until the opening of Japan to intercourse with western nations in 1853 the population had necessarily to support itself from the country. Since then, however, the population has increased with tremendous rapidity. As late as 1880 Japan had approximately only 36,000,000 inhabitants. In the five years 1917-1921 inclusive the average annual increment has been 550,000. This increase in population has naturally produced a problem of securing the necessary sustenance. If the whole area of Japan, or even one half of it, were cultivable land, the problem would not be an impossible one. Only 14 per cent of this area, however, is reported to be under tillage. Some persons contend that much of the rest is entirely unfitted for agricultural purposes, and that the remainder could be adapted to cultivation only with great effort and without assurance of a satisfactorily compensating return in productivity. On the other hand, it is alleged that the cultivated area could easily be increased by at least one third. Trade statistics do not show that Japan falls much short of self-sufficiency in food supply. In 1919 only 16 per cent of its imports were articles of food, while 7 per cent of the exports were food products, leaving the net importation less than 10 per cent of the total trade.

Until very recently, Japan was primarily an agricultural country, like the other eastern lands which have been con-

sidered. So long as the nation is compelled to be self-supporting or makes it a policy to depend upon its own food supply, and so long as the population remains almost exclusively agricultural in occupation, the difficulty of the problem is obvious. There are three possible solutions. The first of these is the extension of the cultivated area, together with increased productivity of the lands under tillage by the application of scientific methods. Some advance is being made in both these directions.

The second solution is in a national policy of expansion, either political and economic, or merely economic. The last half century has seen important efforts made in these ways. The first of these was within Japan itself by the policy of colonization in the northern island, Hokkaido. That island contains a considerable area capable of cultivation; but the climatic and soil conditions are both considerably different from those of the rest of the country. The Japanese have not yet proved their ability to adapt themselves and their modes of life to the more severe climate, nor have they readily adjusted themselves to the necessary changes in agricultural methods. The slowness in the growth of the population of the island is sufficient evidence on this point.

In the next place, Japan looked to two other areas near at hand but not under its jurisdiction. One was Formosa, an island possession of China, which was acquired as one of the results of the war with that nation in 1895. The other was Korea, in which Japan had a traditional interest. This country had its own monarchical government and owed to China a certain amount of allegiance, which was likewise eliminated by the war in 1895. Just as Hokkaido is too cold, so Formosa is too warm, and the Japanese have not taken any more kindly to its climate. In Formosa also the agricultural conditions differ, and while the Japanese have made a remarkable showing in many respects in their administration of the island and its development, they have failed, as the figures of population show, to make it a new Japanese homeland.

In Korea, Japan steadily improved its political position until it formally annexed the country in 1910. From

1895 onward, and increasingly since 1910, Japan has undertaken in various ways not merely the exploitation but also the colonization of Korea. The difference in climatic conditions is perhaps a little less serious in this case, and the same is more or less true with regard to the conditions for agriculture. Apparently the Japanese effort has broken down in this case because Korea was a country with a national history as long as that of Japan itself and with a population more or less proportional to the area and its productivity. Furthermore, the Koreans were accustomed to a narrower margin of existence and a cheaper rate of living, which has rendered Japanese competition rather impracticable. This too is said with all recognition of the remarkable achievements of Japan in the material improvement of Korea. It has proved to be, in fact, a development of Korea by the Japanese which is working out economically to the advantage of the Koreans rather than of Japan. Looking at it from a somewhat different angle, and speaking in mining phraseology, Korea is a low-grade proposition, and the Japanese lack the necessary qualities to make it pay.

After the war with Russia, and more especially after the outbreak of the World War in 1914, the Japanese began to consider much more ambitious and far-reaching enterprises. First and most naturally, they interested themselves in Manchuria, where it had seemed there was ample opportunity for expansion with the possibilities of acquiring political control. Again the Japanese have not shown ability, in any considerable measure, to adapt themselves to the awkward conditions of life and work. Then, too, they encountered rivals with whom they could not compete. Manchuria is more accessible to China than to Japan. It is a natural field for Chinese expansion and, quite apart from any question of political control, Chinese migration has been rapidly pouring into this country in recent years. The Chinese readily adapt themselves to the new situation and, when placed on an equal basis with the Japanese, are certain winners in the economic competition. Japanese activities extended even as far afield as inner Mongolia, but what is true of Manchuria is of even greater force in the case of Mongolia.

In the next place, Japan seized the German port of Kiaochao and claimed to supersede the Germans in control in the Chinese province of Shantung as a sphere of influence. While census statistics are not available, it seems probable that this province is even more densely populated than Japan itself. Quite apart from the diplomatic and political questions involved, Japan seems to have discovered that any notion of considering Shantung as a field for Japanese colonization or agricultural exploitation was impracticable. At any rate, Japan offered remarkably little objection, in negotiations conducted in connection with the Washington conference, to withdrawing from the position which it had undertaken to assume therein. In still another Chinese province, during the period of the World War, Japan took steps toward creating a sphere of influence. But in this province, Fukien, which was of interest to Japan because of its proximity to Formosa, they made less progress than anywhere else.

The one country where the Japanese seems to find himself readily at home, aside from the small Hawaiian group, is California.⁴ The reasons against Japanese activities in either of these places are, however, so overwhelming as to require no mention beyond the acceptance by Japan, in the "gentlemen's agreement" of 1907, of the restriction of immigration into the United States. It seems, in conclusion, that Japan has made some progress, but not to a satisfactory degree, in its effort to couple political and economic expansion, as shown in the cases of Formosa and Korea. It has, thus far, fared little better in its efforts at purely economic exploitation of a colonizing and agricultural type. This series of experiences has revealed a lack of ability on the part of the Japanese to adapt themselves easily or quickly to new physical surroundings. It has also shown that they possess too little imagination, tact, and sense of humor to enable them to govern successfully other peoples such as the Koreans,

⁴Probably Australia would have proved equally alluring had it not been for the inflexible exclusion of all Asiatics from that continent. Canada is less desirable for the Japanese and its policy has been but slightly more hospitable.

or to win the confidence of the Chinese. Though the partial failure in Korea may possibly be dismissed as negligible, it is absolutely essential to the political peace and the economic prosperity of Japan that the blunders and shortcomings in China shall be retrieved without delay. China can dispense with Japan, but Japan can hardly hope to survive in the new age of economic development without unhampered access to the resources and markets of China.

There remains the third possible solution of Japan's increasing population, that is, an occupational readjustment—an industrial revolution. That movement is in progress and is, on the whole, apparently working successfully. Japan is an oceanic country surrounded by waters teeming with fish. Since Perry's visit to Japan the rapid growth of the fisheries enterprises has been an important factor in developing a valuable source of food supply and in affording occupation to a considerable number of people. The value of the marine products increased from somewhat over \$6,000,000 in 1893 to more than \$85,000,000 twenty-five years later.

A second outlet was found in the development of maritime trade. The growth of Japanese merchant shipping has been a remarkable achievement. In 1888 it amounted to less than 200,000 tons. Twenty years later it was 1,200,000; and ten years later still, it was approximately 2,800,000 tons. This development on the part of the Japanese is quite as natural as the growth of British maritime power since the time of Queen Elizabeth. Taken together, however, the fisheries and maritime commerce afford a living to a comparatively small proportion of the population, and do not directly make a large contribution toward solving the problem of food supply. Indirectly, the extension of the Japanese maritime shipping business offers a means of securing advantageously from other countries the necessary food supplies to make up the home deficiency.

The expansion of Japanese trade, however, must in large measure depend upon the ability of Japan to produce commodities which can be sold at advantage in the world's markets or in exchange for food supplies. This means a development of manufacturing enterprise or the possession of

mineral products which can be exported. In the latter case, however, Japan is peculiarly unfortunate. Whereas England has a remarkable wealth of coal and iron, Japan lacks a supply of these minerals adequate for its own needs, and it has no surplus wealth of any other mineral product. Consequently the question narrows down to that of manufactures. By this process of logical exclusion, it would seem that the nation has recognized the necessity of directing its genius into this new line of activity with all possible zeal.

The growth of manufacturing enterprises in Japan stands absolutely unrivaled by any country outside of Europe and North America. It is true, the progress thus far made is not great as compared with the United States, Great Britain, Germany, and some other countries. Nevertheless it is sufficient to indicate the ability of the Japanese to engage in such undertakings, and the possibility, even the probability, of their finding therein a successful solution of their problem. In 1918, the latest date for which statistics are available, the industrial census showed that Japan had 22,391 factories employing more than ten hands each, in which 1,409,196 workers were employed, of whom more than half were females. The chief products were cotton, silk, and woolen goods, paper, matches, earthenware, lacquers, matting, and leather. In addition to these, Japan produces various minor articles which, taken together, count for a considerable amount in the national exports. The possibility of Japanese industrial competition with the United States and other western nations is sometimes suggested as a menace. Lack of sufficient raw materials, if no other reason, will prevent the Japanese from effective competition with western nations, except in a few special lines. Japan must find its principal markets in the neighboring eastern lands.

By all odds the most important product of Japan, from the point of view of agriculture, manufacturing, and commerce combined, is silk. Of this article Japan produces a large proportion of the world's supply, its chief competitors being China and Italy. The value of the silk exports of Japan in 1921 amounted to over \$250,000,000, being over

two fifths of the nation's total export trade for the year. In considering the distribution of the Japanese export trade it appears that, in 1920, 29 per cent went to the United States, 21 per cent to China, and the next most important customers in order were British India, the Dutch Indies, Great Britain, Hong Kong, and Australia. Of the import trade, in 1920, 37 per cent came from the United States, and then followed in order British India, Great Britain, China with 9 per cent, Australia, and the Dutch Indies. Japan now ranks third among the nations from which the United States makes imports and fifth among those which take its exports.

As in every country, prior to the industrial revolution, there was necessarily a considerable amount of manufacturing under the so-called domestic system. Most of the product was for local consumption, but little went into the wider market of the nation at large, and only a very small part found its way into the international market. This was still true in Japan less than forty years ago, and even now continues, to some extent, to be the case, for the industrial revolution is only at the beginning of its development in the country. Twenty years ago there were some factories of the modern type. To-day, as the figures already given have shown, there is a goodly number of factories, employing a considerable percentage of the population.

As in England and other countries, the industrial revolution is associated not merely with a transition from agricultural to industrial occupations, but also with a movement of population from the country into cities. The urban population of Japan has increased at a remarkable rate during the last twenty years, while the rural population has shown a comparatively slight growth. In 1898 there were only two cities with over 400,000 population, Tokyo and Osaka, which together had 2,261,000 inhabitants. In 1918 these two cities each exceeded 1,250,000 in population and had a total of 3,425,000, and there were four other cities with over 400,000. The total number of cities with over 100,000 inhabitants in 1898 was eight; in 1918 it was fourteen, while five others fell but a little short of that figure.

This development of great urban populations has carried with it the same evils with which western nations have been familiar, but perhaps to a somewhat heightened degree. Osaka is Japan's great industrial center, and the problems of labor and pauperism found there are as acute probably as in any place in the world. The conditions are vividly portrayed in the widely circulated writings of Toyohiko Kagawa, a graduate of Princeton University, who is living as a Christian social worker in the slums of Kobe and who is considered "the most influential labor leader in the Japanese Empire." It is only fair, however, to consider the present situation as one of momentary transition, and to believe that the Japanese will display the necessary qualities to solve the extraordinary new problems which confront them.

One evidence for this belief is the way in which the Japanese have handled the question of education. Elementary education is not merely compulsory by law, but is actually operative as successfully as anywhere in the world, so that Japan is at present able to pride itself on its statistics for literacy in comparison with the most advanced nations of the West. In 1918 over 8,000,000 children were in attendance at elementary schools. There is a fair number of higher schools and of universities. While the elementary schools and the universities are perhaps reasonably meeting the demands placed upon them, the number of middle or high schools is insufficient, as is also the case with professional, technical, and vocational schools. The demands for admission to these far exceed the capacity, and only a small proportion of those examined each year gain admission. Undoubtedly with a more adequate development of these schools the demand for university training would increase correspondingly and would require greater facilities. The government is earnestly striving to solve this problem. This favorable comparison of Japanese educational conditions with the situation in China, Egypt, or India may, therefore, be taken as justification for the judgment just offered, that Japan will presumably prove as efficient as western nations in solving the problem of urban population.

The great changes in Japan which date from the restoration have not been without important consequences in the religious life of the nation. While the constitution guarantees complete freedom of faith, two religions have long enjoyed full legal status. The ancient religion of the country is Shintoism; Buddhism has prevailed throughout the country since the seventh century. The latter, owing to its more highly developed character, long exercised a marked influence upon the older religion. The two faiths were not necessarily mutually exclusive and in course of time tended to become more or less blended with one another. While the restoration was in no wise hostile to Buddhism it naturally gave its chief patronage to Shintoism. Efforts were made to dissociate the latter from its Buddhist connection and restore it to its ancient purity and simplicity. The results, however, have not been enduring. Buddhism, thus stimulated to activity, has appropriated various modern methods to recover and extend its influence.

The restoration opened the way for the readmission to Japan of another religion, Christianity, which three centuries before had made its first appearance in the country, only to be driven out by the early Tokugawa shoguns. The year 1872, practically speaking, marks the beginning of successful missionary enterprises undertaken by the Greek Orthodox, Roman Catholic, and Protestant churches. Measured by the number of converts, their achievements have not been remarkable. To-day there are somewhat more than 100,000 Protestants, less than that number of Roman Catholics, and less than 50,000 Greek Orthodox adherents. Christianity, however, has made highly important contributions to the development of education both through its own institutions and through its influence upon the national system. Christianity has also wielded a moral influence of extraordinary importance, entirely out of proportion to the number of its professed followers, as witnessed, for example, by the extensive practice of using Sunday as a day of rest. Both the standards of private life and the ideals of national life have been profoundly modified by influences emanating from Christianity, and its adherents are among the foremost

promoters of all undertakings for the advancement of the nation.

As the Confucian code of ethics has fixed the standard of national life for China, so the code of honor has determined the ideals and actions of the Japanese. The Confucian ethics were the creation of a scholar and ministered to the individual's spirit of contemplation and sense of complacency. *Bushido* is, however, the code of chivalry inspiring the individual to knightly activity and accomplishment. The code of ethics and the code of honor symbolize the differences in national character and achievement between the Chinese and the Japanese. The spirit of *bushido* stamps every movement in the extraordinary progress of the nation in the last half century. The defects as well as the merits of the Japanese achievement have been inherent in *bushido*. Sympathetic critics have observed that where the Japanese have not succeeded, the failure has been a moral one—an inability to understand and cope with the moral forces involved by bringing superior moral power to bear. *Bushido* is as inadequate for Japan as Confucianism is for China. Each nation must find the missing element and introduce it into its life. The past generation has given Japan material and political progress: the new generation faces the task of developing the nation's spiritual resources and moral power.

RECENT EVENTS

After the death of Baron Kato on August 24, 1923, though the Seiyukai had a majority in the diet, a nonparty cabinet was formed under the leadership of Count Yamamoto, who had been premier in 1913-1914.⁵ This ministry was in the process of organization when the earthquake of September 1 occurred, and fortunately Baron Goto, formerly mayor of Tokyo, had already been selected for the home office. Though the main task of the ministry was the handling of the difficult situation following the earthquake and the formulation of plans for reconstruction, its political tenure was insecure because of the opposition of the Seiyu-

⁵ See above, pages 209, 215.

kai. The attitude of one group in the administration was indicated in the proposal by Baron Goto and Mr. Inukai, the minister of posts, to introduce a bill for manhood suffrage. Suggestions of reforms affecting the house of peers were also discussed. The fall of this ministry on December 29, however, was immediately occasioned by the attempted assassination of the prince regent while he was driving to the ceremony of opening the regular session of the diet two days earlier.

Again a nonparty cabinet was formed. For the post of premier there was selected Viscount Kiyoura, a man seventy-three years of age, who had spent his life in government office and had frequently occupied cabinet positions as a trusted lieutenant of Prince Yamagata. Though the selection, as in the previous instance, seemed to indicate a reactionary tendency, it was probably influenced by a distrust of party politicians and particularly of the Seiyukai. The questions of party government and ministerial responsibility have also apparently produced a contest for power between the two houses of the diet. Attempts were made to form a coalition of opposition elements on a platform of manhood suffrage. After the failure of this plan, a break was forced in the ranks of the Seiyukai and one hundred and forty-eight seceders, calling themselves the Seiyu-honto, rallied to the support of the premier. In the tense political situation, a train on which three opposition leaders were traveling to Tokyo was wrecked. The consequent outburst of disturbance in the lower house on January 31, 1924 led to the dissolution of the diet.

The ensuing elections for a new diet which occurred on May 10, 1924 were marked by more than usual disorder and corruption. It is estimated that under the existing franchise, five sixths of the members of the lower house are returned by rural voters. Owing to the small number of urban members, the industrial and commercial interests of the country are insufficiently represented. A surprising result of the balloting was the small number of candidates for reelection who were chosen. About two hundred and fifty of the successful candidates were new members. The ele-

ments opposed to the ministry in power demanded universal suffrage, constitutional government, and reform of the upper house of the diet. The returns showed the election of one hundred and forty-six members of the Kenseikai; one hundred and twenty of the newly organized Seiyu-honto; one hundred and one of the Seiyukai; and ninety-seven of other affiliations. The defeat of the ministry was unmistakable, and on June 10 it resigned. Viscount Takaaki Kato, the leader of the Kenseikai, formed a new ministry with the assistance of the Seiyukai and the Kakushin Club. In contrast with the previous ministry, which was drawn largely from the upper house, the new cabinet, with a single exception, is drawn from the lower house. Though it represents the younger and less reactionary elements, the new ministry has been so distracted with questions of international concern in the few months of its existence that it has had no opportunity to initiate a program of reform legislation in internal affairs, other than financial.

The earthquake of September 1, which destroyed nearly the whole city of Yokohama, the major portion of Tokyo, the naval port of Yokosuka, and many other places within a considerable radius from Tokyo, resulted in the loss of about one hundred and fifty thousand lives, the injury of about as many more persons, and a property loss officially estimated at from 7,000,000,000 to 10,000,000,000 yen.⁶ The prompt response of sympathetic and generous aid from most civilized countries, especially from the United States, was remarkable. The warm expressions of appreciation by the Japanese of American assistance augured for an era of better relations between the two countries. This situation was suddenly changed in November when the United States supreme court announced decisions upholding the constitutionality of the anti-Japanese land laws of California and Washington. Much more serious cause of displeasure was given by the congress of the United States when it passed, in April, 1924, in defiance of the protest of President Coolidge and Secretary Hughes, the new immigration act

⁶ One yen is almost exactly equal to fifty cents in American money.

including a provision annulling the "gentlemen's agreement" of 1907, under which the restriction of Japanese immigration to the United States had been administered primarily by the Japanese government. Though there are plausible explanations for the congressional action, they do not remove the cause of provocation felt by Japan. In July, Japan enacted a new citizenship law abolishing dual nationality, with the purpose of removing one of the causes of complaint alleged in the United States.

In view of the demands for retrenchment of expenditures and, more recently, in view of the vast outlays entailed by the earthquake, the budget of 1924 was fixed at \$635,000,000, a saving of \$52,000,000 as compared with the 1923 budget, in which extensive economies were effected after the earthquake. The diet, in December, 1923, even scaled down the proposed appropriations for reconstruction, so that the government was forced to announce important modifications in the plans for rebuilding Tokyo. The first international loans for reconstruction were floated on terms which were regarded as eminently fair among international financiers, but in Japan as none too favorable. The extraordinary difficulties of the economic situation led the Kiyoura cabinet to create an imperial economic council composed of one hundred and ten leading representatives of the financial and economic interests of the nation as an advisory body which first met in April. Owing to the unfavorable movement of trade during the first half of 1924, which resulted in a heavy excess of imports over exports, due to the importation of materials for reconstruction and of luxuries, the government introduced a measure placing an import duty of one hundred per cent on two hundred and fifty articles of luxury, which was promptly passed in July. A committee is also engaged in an effort to reorganize the administrative offices of the government with a view to reducing the number of positions and curtailing expenses. Further plans for army reduction, which will probably limit the period of service with the colors to one year, are also under consideration.

In March, 1923, an agreement was reached between Japan

and the United States for the abrogation of the Lansing-Ishii agreement, with the understanding that it would be supplanted by the nine-power treaty signed at the Washington conference. The disarmament treaty drafted at the Washington conference was finally ratified by France in August, and later in the same month the ratifications of this treaty were exchanged in Washington. The so-called nine-power treaty, however, still awaits similar ratification.⁷ Owing to these agreements the Japanese government was able to cut approximately \$20,000,000 from the estimates for the navy both for 1923 and for 1924. There has been a reduction of the army by four divisions, and the military budget for 1924 is nearly \$100,000,000 below that of 1923. The appropriations for education have been increased. The arbitration treaty between Japan and the United States was extended in April, 1924, for a term of five years. It has been announced that the American Red Cross will furnish \$3,000,000 for hospital construction in Tokyo and that the Rockefeller Foundation will contribute \$1,000,000 toward the rebuilding of the University of Tokyo.

The Japanese government has been alarmed not only over its relations with the United States but also over those with China and Russia. The representatives of soviet Russia had been negotiating, at intervals, for many months with both China and Japan when their treaty with China of May 31, 1924, was suddenly announced. The Japanese, especially among the commercial classes, who favored the reopening of relations with Russia, felt confirmed in their views and demanded the prompt renewal of negotiations. In July it was announced that the cabinet had agreed upon the bases for negotiations with Russia and on August 7 negotiations were actually resumed in Peking. No announcement of the results has yet appeared. With reference both to Russia and China, the attitude of the Kato ministry is clearly conciliatory and apparently inspired by the desire to establish as favorable economic relations with both nations as possible.

The Kiyoura ministry was responsible in March, 1923,

⁷ See above, page 139.

for the final enactment of a reform measure of distinct importance which provides for the introduction of jury trial. A commission is at present visiting other countries to study the subject, preparatory to putting the measure into operation. Recent statistics have shown the remarkable rise of wages in recent years. For work in Kobe which received in 1914 a maximum daily compensation of one yen, the maximum is now from four to five yen. Reports concerning the conditions in Korea are favorable. The foreign trade of Korea for 1923 surpassed all previous records. The death of Prince Matsukata in July, 1924, removed the last survivor of the elder statesmen, with the exception of Marquis Saionji. The marriage of the prince regent to Princess Nagako, eldest daughter of Prince Kuni, was celebrated in the early part of 1924. The public demonstrations, especially in Tokyo, testified to the popularity of the young sovereign. In the effort, at the meeting of the assembly of the League of Nations in Geneva in September, 1924, to draft preliminary measures in anticipation of a scheme of universal disarmament, Japan, inspired with the idea of promoting equality of racial treatment for its own citizens, and for Asiatics in general, insisted on certain adjustments of the provisional plan as the condition of its adherence.

SUGGESTIONS FOR READING

A brief introductory survey of Japanese history is furnished by Professor Kenneth S. Latourette of Yale University in *The Development of Japan* (New York, The Macmillan Company, 1918); and a more scholarly account by Professor Katsuro Hara, of the University of Kyoto, in *An Introduction to the History of Japan* (New York, G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1920). *A Political History of Japan during the Meiji Era, 1867-1912* (New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1916), by Professor Walter W. McLaren, of Williams College, gives a reasonably complete and accurate, but rather unsympathetic, account of the great period of modernization. A comprehensive survey of the various phases of Japanese life and their development during the same period written by native authorities will be found in *Fifty Years of New Japan* (2nd ed., 2 vols., New York, E. P. Dutton & Company, 1910), edited by Count Shigenobu Okuma, former prime minister.

Some acquaintance with the Japanese people, their life, thought, and institutions may be obtained from *Things Japanese* (5th ed.,

London, J. Murray, 1905), by Basil H. Chamberlain; *Japan, Day by Day, 1877, 1878-79, 1882-83* (2 vols., Boston, Houghton Mifflin Company, 1917), by Edward S. Morse; *Japan, an Attempt at Interpretation* (New York, The Macmillan Company, 1904), by Lafcadio Hearn; and *The Foundations of Japan, Notes Made during Journeys of 6,000 Miles in Rural Districts as a Basis for a Sounder Knowledge of the Japanese People* (New York, D. Appleton & Company, 1922), by J. W. Robertson Scott, who all write from extended first-hand acquaintance. *A History of Christianity in Japan* (2 vols., New York, Fleming H. Revell & Company, 1909), by Otis Cary, is a comprehensive survey.

For the relations between Japan and the United States good accounts will be found in *The Early Diplomatic Relations between the United States and Japan, 1853-1865* (Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins Press, 1917), and *Japan and the United States, 1853-1921* (Boston, Houghton Mifflin Company, 1921), both by Professor Payson J. Treat of Stanford University, and in *The Americans in Eastern Asia* (New York, The Macmillan Company, 1922), by Tyler Dennett, who has been permitted to use the archives of the American department of state. *Japan's Pacific Policy, especially in Relation to China, the Far East, and the Washington Conference* (New York, E. P. Dutton & Company, 1922), is by Kiyoshi K. Kawakami, who is also the author of several other works written to interpret to the American people the Japanese and their interests.

The Japan Year Book (16th year, 1921-22, New York, Dixie Book Shop, 1922), edited by Professor Y. Takenob, of the Waseda University, Tokyo, contains a wealth of current information, including a Who's Who section.

CHAPTER V

THE PHILIPPINES

THE Philippine Islands are, in the extent of cultivated area and in size of population, closely comparable to Egypt. The island character of the area involved and the racial traits of the people relate the situation, in some particulars, to that in Japan. The problems of status and government are comparable to those of Egypt and of India. As Egypt is valuable to England for maintenance of control of the route to India, so the Philippine Islands are useful to the United States in affording a convenient base for commerce and other interests in eastern Asia and in the western Pacific. The Filipino peoples, within a more limited range, exhibit almost as many ethnographic varieties and linguistic diversities as do the people of India.

In an important particular, however, the Filipinos stand out in sharp contrast against the populations of the other four countries which have here been studied. Over 90 per cent of them are Christian and have been so for about three centuries. This Christian character of the Filipino peoples not only distinguishes them from all other eastern peoples in religion, but has helped to develop an attitude toward western civilization radically different from that of any other people in the East.

This difference is clearly evidenced in the higher status of women. Religious, legal, and social restrictions do not seclude or hamper them like their sisters in other eastern lands. In the Philippines woman plays her part in all the affairs of life in a way not very different from the customs of the West. The emancipation of women is, therefore, in the Philippines, unlike the other eastern countries, a question already settled in most particulars other than political. The freer status of women in the Philippines greatly simplifies many of the problems of assimilating the national life to the conditions obtaining in western lands.

In still another important particular there is a marked contrast between the Filipinos and the other eastern peoples whose problems have here been considered. The Filipinos are not the possessors of an ancient culture or of a national history extending over millenniums. Their rise to the higher stages of culture has been chiefly during the period of their contact with western civilization. Under the tutelage of Spain for three centuries and a half their rate of progress was slow, but the total advance attained was considerable and has made possible the remarkable progress during the quarter century of American supervision. The absence of long-established cultural and political forms and of deep-seated traditions accounts for the remarkable mobility and adaptability displayed by the Filipino people in their extraordinary advancement during recent years.

These cultural diversities from the peoples of the Asiatic continent are, no doubt, in considerable measure explained by the insularity of the Philippines and by their location at a distance from the continent five times greater than in the case of Japan. The Philippines consist of 11 larger islands, 2,400 smaller ones, and 4,600 of trivial size. In this respect the group is much more broken up than is Japan. Furthermore, the four main islands of Japan are so close to one another as to permit of regular railway connections by ferries. The smaller size of the main islands of the Philippines and the greater distances separating them have prevented anything like the unity of development that has occurred in Japan. The total area of the Philippines is 115,026 square miles, of which 10 per cent only is under cultivation. The area is between 75 and 80 per cent of that of Japan proper and about 95 per cent of that of the British Islands. The group lies between 5° and 20° north latitude, corresponding to Central America and the extreme northern part of South America. Manila is situated about 14° north of the equator, approximately on the same parallel as the city of Guatemala, the island of Martinique, and Cape Verde.

According to census returns, the population of the Philippine Islands increased from 7,635,426 in 1903 to 10,314,310 in 1918. At the latter date there were domiciled in the

islands 43,802 Chinese, 7,806 Japanese, 5,774 Americans, 3,945 Spanish, 1,140 British, and 1,570 other foreigners. Practically the whole trade of the islands is controlled by these various peoples of alien origin. Manila has a population of nearly 300,000. There are seven other cities with populations ranging from 50,000 down to 10,000 inhabitants. As most of the alien population is found in the cities it will be seen that the vast majority—over 90 per cent—of the Filipino people is rural in character and unacquainted with urban life.

Scientists count 43 ethnographic groups or tribes among the Filipino peoples, but these tribes are almost exclusively of Malay stock. Though the number of distinct dialects spoken is 87, eight¹ being used by more than 500,000 each, many of these languages are more or less closely related. In general, the diversity of race and language in the Philippines among 10,000,000 people corresponds to the conditions in both respects among the 300,000,000 people of India; but in India both the racial and the linguistic variations are much more marked, for some of the races and languages of India are radically different in character from others.

The diffusion of so many tribes with such a variety of languages over such a scattered and broken island area has naturally operated against the development of national cohesion. Though the islands were under Spanish rule for over three centuries the Spaniards accomplished comparatively little in breaking down either tribal or linguistic barriers. Not over 10 per cent of the people acquired the use of the Spanish language.² The one great service wrought by the Spaniards was the introduction and establishment of the Christian religion. About 4 per cent of the population, massed in the extreme southern islands, are

¹ These leading native languages are: 1, Tagalog, used by 1,789,049; the three chief Visayan dialects: 2, Panayan, 1,289,142; 3, Cebúan, 1,848,613; 4, Samar-Leyte, 601,683; 5, Iloko, 988,841; 6, Bikol, 685,309. The other two are the leading non-native tongues: 7, Spanish spoken by 757,463 persons over ten years of age; 8, English spoken by 896,238 persons over ten years of age. These figures are for 1918.

² *Census of the Philippine Islands, 1903*, vol. 2, p. 78.

Mohammedans. In the rest of the islands about 5 per cent of the population, mostly in the remoter and more mountainous areas, remain pagan. Approximately 91 per cent of the population, therefore, are Christian and predominantly Roman Catholic.

Since the American occupation several Protestant denominations have undertaken missionary work and have won a considerable number of converts. The Protestant Episcopal Church has followed the policy of limiting its labors to the non-Christian tribes. Other denominations have imposed no such restrictions upon their activities, but have agreed to work in separate districts. While proselyting by one Christian denomination from another is open to criticism, it cannot be denied that Protestant missions have had a valuable influence in toning up the Roman Catholic Church by their presence and competition. The educational and medical enterprises conducted by the missions have been valuable in themselves and have afforded an excellent example.

Unlike the Japanese, who can boast of a single native dynasty covering their twenty-five centuries of history, the Filipino peoples have practically never enjoyed independence, much less unity, of government. Prior to the arrival of the Spaniards in 1565 the islands, as far back as it is possible to trace their history, had been more or less controlled by some Malay empire with headquarters in Indo-China, Sumatra, Java, or Borneo. Besides, in a larger or smaller number of the islands, there had been periods of Chinese and of Japanese intervention.

At the time of the arrival of the Spaniards the Malay migration was still in progress, as it had been for an indefinite number of centuries. There still remain in the archipelago small tribes of primitive peoples representing two races that antedate the coming of the Malays. The earlier and more primitive of these peoples belong to the race known as negritos. The later group, whose representatives are now somewhat more advanced than the negritos, are known to the ethnologists as Indonesians. Their racial affinities are with certain of the older elements among the peoples of India. In general, the path of migration into

the Philippines has been from the south northward. The descendants of the earliest comers of Malay race are to be found mainly in Luzon, the most northerly of the main islands. The latest comers, who did not arrive until Mohammedanism had spread to the East Indies, are to be found in the most southerly of the large islands, Mindanao, and in the Sulu archipelago to the southward. To these latest comers, whom they were never able to bring under their sway, the Spaniards gave the name of Moros because of their Mohammedan religion.

The stage of civilization attained by the pagan Malay Filipinos, before the arrival of the Spaniards, in agricultural and industrial life was not inferior to that reached by the Incas in Peru. Though it is doubtful whether they had made equal advancement in their social organization, they had surpassed the Incas by developing alphabets and a considerable written literature.³ Politically they had failed to establish an indigenous empire and at best had been distant members of some short-lived Malay empire. The Spaniards found well-ordered towns. Manila, already a city with extensive commercial connections, was fortified and defended with cannon made in a local foundry. It would perhaps not be unfair to compare the Moros with the Aztecs as a fighting race, though not as the creators of an empire. The Moro pirate, though no less ruthless than the Aztec warrior, had at least outgrown the practice of human sacrifice, which seems to have been unknown in the Philippines. The custom of head-hunting, however, prevailed among a few of the more primitive mountain tribes.

The establishment of Spanish control was largely accomplished by Legazpi, who, in a milder-mannered fashion, was to the Philippines what Cortez was to Mexico. The work of establishing Spanish domination throughout the archipelago took approximately a half century. On most of the early voyages, except the first one under Magellan, the Spaniards arrived in the Philippines from Mexico. The consequence was that the islands remained administratively

³ C. E. Russell, *Outlook for the Philippines*, pp. 27-30, and illustration, p. 48.

dependent upon Mexico until 1821, when that country became independent of Spain. In this period a single annual ship, known as the Manila galleon, served to carry the trade of the islands to and from Mexico. Commercially and politically, therefore, Spanish rule in the Philippines was not a matter of great importance prior to 1821.

The most significant fact of Spanish domination in this period was the zealous activity of Roman Catholic missionaries, mainly members of the several mendicant orders. The islands may be said to have been under the rule of the friars rather than under the rule of Spain. As a consequence of their conversion through the activities of these missionaries, the Filipinos have ever since been proud to rank themselves as the only Christian nation in the Orient. During the period of Spanish rule a considerable number of schools was established, but they were mainly church schools and not very efficient. The University of Santo Tomas, established at Manila in 1611, robs Harvard of the honor of being the oldest university under the American flag.

Only a single episode interfered with the uneventful course of existence in the islands during this period. That was the seizure of Manila by a British expedition fitted out from Madras in 1762 at the close of the Seven Years' War. In accordance with the treaty of Paris in 1763 the English restored the archipelago to Spain.

From that date forward, the administration of the islands was conducted on somewhat more liberal lines, and was, on the whole, not open to serious criticism. After the independence of Mexico in 1821, the government was administered directly from Spain and the trade relations were correspondingly readjusted and permitted to develop more freely. The expulsion of the Jesuits in 1767 left the religious activities in the islands almost exclusively in the hands of the friars, whose influence both over the life of the people and over the government tended to increase. The introduction of steam navigation about 1850 and the opening of a shorter trade route through the Suez canal in 1869 brought the Philippines into closer relations with the mother country and stimulated trade. This development of commerce made

necessary renewed efforts to extend Spanish sway in the southern islands of the group and to repress the piratical activities of the Moros.

The revolution of 1868 in Spain, which dethroned Isabella II, resulted in a brief period of unusually progressive administration in the islands but, after the restoration of the monarchy under Alfonso XII, the policy of the government became reactionary and the influence of the friars reached its height. It was under these conditions that the first manifestations of serious discontent among the Filipino people appeared. Soon after 1890 secret societies to promote policies of reform and even of revolution began to organize. Insurrection finally broke out in August, 1896, and the execution, on December 30, 1896, of José Rizal, the brilliant exponent of Filipino aspirations, whose novels⁴ had scathingly indicted the friars and the abuses under the Spanish regime, inflamed feeling throughout the islands. As a result of negotiations and of the promise of reforms by the Spanish authorities, the insurgent leader Aguinaldo was persuaded to leave the islands in December, 1897. Nevertheless, order had not been fully restored when war between Spain and the United States was declared in April, 1898.

The rule of Spain in the Philippines during more than three centuries had resulted in important contributions to the advancement of the people. Western civilization was thoroughly established, Christianity had been introduced and made the prevalent religion, schools and even a university had been founded, the position of woman had been improved in accordance with Christian ideals, European forms of government and law were in operation, a considerable trade, especially with Spain, had been developed; the Filipino people, in short, had come to live in regular contact with the West and its civilization. Not a few Filipinos had traveled and resided abroad, especially as students. The Spanish had accomplished in the Philippines what no other European power had done in any eastern land in the same period: they had established Christianity and European civilization

⁴*Noli Me Tangere* (*The Social Cancer*), and *El Filibusterismo* (*The Reign of Greed*).

as the prevalent condition. Despite certain obvious faults, the Spanish administration had in a large way proved beneficent.

Throughout this period the Filipino people had shown themselves responsive to the efforts for their advancement, and at its close were clearly prepared for greater progress than the reactionary government of Alfonso XII and the queen regent was prepared to concede. The blame for conditions perhaps attaches more correctly, not to the Spanish government, but to the clericals in Spain and to the strongly intrenched friars in the islands. There was also an economic element in the problem arising from the extensive landed interests of the friars, whose treatment of the peasant laborers on their estates was far from liberal. The grievances which led to the insurrection were considerable and obvious. Though Rizal had put forward a definite and reasonable program of reform, it is not so certain that Aguinaldo and his revolutionary followers entertained such intelligent ideas or were prepared to carry into execution a definite and consistent policy to establish independent government and improved conditions.

Admiral Dewey's naval victory in Manila Bay on May 1, 1898, was soon followed by the landing of American forces in the island of Luzon and the capture of Manila on August 13. The presence of the Americans revived the insurrectionary movement, and Aguinaldo was brought back from Hong Kong, on an American ship, to resume his leadership. The claim made by Aguinaldo and his followers that they were promised independence has, however, been specifically denied by Admiral Dewey. The United States did not consider its connivance at the activities of the insurgents against Spain as constituting recognition of their insurrectionary government or approval of their aims. Indeed, the United States for months avoided committing itself to any policy with regard to the Philippines and debated at length the question of the disposition of the islands. In the course of the negotiations with Spain the United States finally demanded the cession of the islands, which was accorded in the treaty of peace of December 10, 1898. The relations

between the Americans and the insurgents had been growing steadily less satisfactory. Immediately after the news of the cession arrived, an insurgent government was formed under the so-called Malolos constitution, with Aguinaldo as president. Soon after, on February 4, 1899, fighting broke out between the insurgents and the Americans around Manila. The details of the insurrection and of its suppression may be passed over as without special relevance to the discussion in hand.

The entrance of the Americans into the Philippines came entirely as a war measure directed against Spain, and without any anticipation of the consequences involved. When the war was over, the resulting problem had to be solved. President McKinley ultimately decided to demand the cession of the islands because he felt that the Filipinos were not prepared to establish a stable and satisfactory government for themselves, that it would be unjust to return them to Spanish control, that it would be unjustifiable to leave them as a prey to any other imperialistic power, and that consequently by process of elimination it became necessary for the United States to assume possession or control. President McKinley, however, was determined that this control should, from the outset, be exercised exclusively for the benefit of the Filipino people and their advancement toward self-government. He undoubtedly hoped that the Filipino people would accept this arrangement and did not foresee the serious insurrection which followed. The insurgents, on their side, felt that the cession was an unjustifiable transfer from one alien domination to another. Whether rightly or wrongly, they also felt that the Americans had not dealt with them fairly and honorably. Whatever may have been the original purpose of the insurrection, whether directed against Spanish authority or against the Americans, it became a struggle for independence.

Though the Filipinos made a brave fight, it soon became clear to them that their effort to combat the American forces was hopeless. They also discovered that the American government was proceeding to introduce all the reforms which Rizal had demanded or which the Spaniards had promised

to Aguinaldo. They were, accordingly, gradually convinced that submission was necessary and that American rule would be a vast improvement over any which they had previously experienced. They found that the American government was prepared to do even more for them through its policies of sanitation and of education, as well as through its policy of acquiring the lands of the friars and of detaching the activities of the Roman Catholic Church entirely from control both of the land and of the government. They learned further that the administrative policies and methods of the United States were aimed, not at maintaining the old tribal and linguistic barriers, but at breaking them down and merging all the Filipino peoples into a single national group speaking a single language.

It must be admitted that the policy of the American government toward the Philippine Islands, both with regard to acquiring control of them and with regard to developing administrative policies, is open to criticism, and that it was already receiving extremely vigorous discussion within the United States at that time. The suppression of the Filipino insurrection was regarded by many in the United States with emotions very different from those of pride. Even those in the United States who favored the assumption and exercise of American control in the islands were prone to regard the undertaking as a disagreeable necessity rather than as a desirable or laudable national enterprise. There were some in the United States, on the other hand, who had a clear conception of the significance of the occupation of the Philippines with reference to the promotion of American interests, both commercially and politically, in the western Pacific and in eastern Asia.

Whatever may have been the attitude of extreme imperialists or anti-imperialists, and whatever may have been the ignorance of the mass of the American people concerning the Filipinos, their progress and culture, or their insurrectionary government, there can be no doubt that the general sentiment in the United States was accurately voiced by President McKinley. Beginning with his instructions of May 19, 1898, to the secretary of war, every one of his

utterances and formulations of policy expressed a high determination to safeguard the interests of the Filipino people and to promote their welfare. His instructions of December 21, 1898, to General Otis, after providing that civil and municipal government shall be conducted "by officers chosen as far as may be practicable among the inhabitants of the islands," concluded with these words:

"Finally it should be the earnest and paramount aim of the military administration to win the confidence, respect, and affection of the inhabitants of the Philippines by assuring to them in every possible way that full measure of individual rights and liberties which is the heritage of free peoples, and by proving to them that the mission of the United States is one of benevolent assimilation, substituting the mild sway of justice and right for arbitrary rule. In the fulfillment of this high mission, supporting the temperate administration of affairs for the greatest good of the governed, there must be sedulously maintained the strong arm of authority to repress disturbance and to overcome all obstacles to the bestowal of the blessings of good and stable government upon the people of the Philippine Islands under the free flag of the United States."

A month later and two weeks prior to the outbreak of the insurrection his instructions to the first Philippine commission, headed by Doctor Schurman, closed with the expression of the hope that they would be received "as bearers of the good will, the protection, and the richest blessings of a liberating rather than a conquering nation." Probably more than to any other single individual the credit for the definite formulation of American policy in the Philippines is due to Elihu Root, who served as secretary of war from August 1, 1899, to February 1, 1904.

It is not necessary to describe in detail the successive forms of administration through which American control of the islands has been exercised. Military government was maintained from 1898 to 1900. In 1899 a supreme court was established with six of the nine justices Filipinos. From 1900 to 1907 the government was conducted by the Philippine commission, of which three members were Fili-

pinos after 1901.⁵ William H. Taft, the president of the second commission, was installed as civil governor in 1901. He was succeeded, in 1904, by Luke E. Wright, whose title was changed, in 1905, to governor-general. In 1907 the people were permitted to elect an assembly which shared legislative authority with the commission. This situation endured until 1913, when a further change was made by President Wilson in substituting a Filipino majority for an American majority in the membership of the commission.

In 1916, under the Jones act, the commission disappeared; the United States government was represented instead by a governor-general and a vice-governor; and the Filipino people were authorized to elect both a senate and an assembly, which taken together were henceforth to exercise full lawmaking powers and, with certain limitations, to control the finances. Such is the form of government at present prevailing. In the local administration in the Christian provinces, many officials have been elected almost since the establishment of American civil administration.⁶ The judicial officials are likewise almost entirely native except that five of the nine members of the supreme court are now Americans. Positions in the civil service have from the outset been open by preference to the natives. In 1913 they held 72 per cent of the places; in 1921 they occupied 96 per cent of the posts.

The supreme court of the United States reaffirmed in 1901 its previous judgment that "the constitution is applicable to territories acquired by purchase or conquest only when and so far as congress shall so direct," and that full legislative power with regard to such territory was vested in congress.⁷ Accordingly, congress undertook, as soon as conditions in the islands permitted, to legislate for the establishment of civil government therein. Its acts have been,

⁵ The number of American members was five.

⁶ The Maura act of 1893, under Spanish rule, had made somewhat similar provision, but no great progress had been made toward putting it into operation. Under American rule all the municipal officials, except the treasurer, and about half the provincial officials, are elected.

⁷ *Downes vs. Bidwell* 182 U. S. 244.

from the beginning, without exception, inspired by the same high principles which President McKinley had earlier enunciated. By its action there has been extended to the Philippine people every practicable American constitutional guarantee, and every law passed by it has provided for its application equally to Americans and to Filipinos in the islands, with a single exception, the proviso that preference shall be given to Filipinos in civil service appointments. By the tariff act of 1909 free trade was established between the islands and the United States. It may be added that congress has not acted to make the eighteenth and nineteenth amendments to the constitution applicable within the islands.⁸

The Democratic party in the United States had consistently denounced the policy of the Republican administrations as imperialistic. Consequently, when President Wilson entered office in 1913 he promptly adopted a more liberal attitude toward the Philippines and selected, as governor-general, Congressman Francis Burton Harrison, who was known to be acceptable to the Filipinos. Throughout his administration Governor-General Harrison pursued a policy of Filipinization and of friendly coöperation with the Filipino leaders. After the passage of the Jones act in 1916 he allowed himself and the Philippine legislature to interpret and apply it with marked liberality. Though the Jones act did not alter the preceding practice of separation of powers between the executive and legislative branches of the government, he took upon himself the responsibility of creating an extra-legal body, called the council of state, which was composed, in addition to himself and the heads of the executive departments, of the president of the senate, Mr. Quezon, and of the speaker of the house, Mr. Osmena, the two recognized political leaders of the Filipinos. This body established a link between the executive and the legislature, and provided a certain degree of legislative control

⁸ In 1924 the United States department of justice ruled that, though the Volstead act does not apply to the Philippines, the eighteenth amendment by its own terms does apply and that the administration may and must act in accordance therewith in so far as practicable in the absence of an enforcement act.

over the administration, though it did not actually introduce full parliamentary responsibility. Subsequent acts passed by the legislature confirmed this body and extended its powers by intrusting to it the execution of certain measures. Governor-General Harrison also permitted the speakers of the two houses to exercise a large influence over official appointments and administrative policy. Finally, near the close of their administrations, both Governor-General Harrison and President Wilson definitely committed themselves in favor of the prompt bestowal of Philippine independence.

When President Harding, the choice of the Republican party, entered office in 1921, he consequently faced the problem of determining promptly whether the proposal of his predecessor should be carried out. In order to secure information to govern his decision, he appointed Major-General Leonard Wood and former Governor-General W. Cameron Forbes as special commissioners to make a full investigation of conditions in the islands. Their report, submitted on October 8, 1921, revealed the thoroughness of their investigations and the judicious temper in which they had approached their problem. They offered certain criticisms of the Harrison administration and indicated certain reasons which they believed proved that the Filipinos were not yet prepared to maintain a stable government. Soon after the presentation of the report President Harding appointed General Wood governor-general. He also gave assurance that there should be "no backward step" in the American policy toward the Philippines. While this promise has been literally observed, it has been the practice of Governor-General Wood, in contrast with his predecessor, to interpret and apply the Jones act strictly. The Filipinos took strong exceptions to certain portions of the Wood-Forbes report and viewed the appointment of General Wood with distrust. It is not surprising, therefore, that, as the administration has progressed, there has developed a steadily widening breach between the governor-general and the legislature. The discussion of the various problems and issues involved must occupy the remainder of this lecture.⁹

⁹ For later developments, see below, pages 291ff.

This liberality of governmental privileges accorded by the United States to the Filipinos far surpasses anything granted by the British in the administration of Egypt¹⁰ or of India. The people of the Philippines enjoy self-government, in general, as fully as do the Japanese. In 1920, 5 per cent of the population of Japan were legally entitled to vote; in 1919, 11 per cent of the Filipinos were qualified electors, and 6.5 per cent actually did vote.¹¹ The Philippine senate and assembly under the Jones act have fuller legislative power than is granted to the diet in Japan under the constitution of 1889.

The attention given to education in the Philippine Islands under American control is probably without parallel in the history of colonial administration. From the very outset of American occupation careful attention has been given to the development of an adequate school system, based upon the use of English as a common language. In order to lay the foundations for the new system, a large number of American teachers was engaged for service in the islands in 1901 and succeeding years. The trials experienced by these earlier teachers and the value of the work which they accomplished can scarcely be exaggerated. Evidence of the success of the new system of education appeared very promptly. By 1902 there were approximately 200,000 pupils enrolled; in 1907, 480,000; in 1914, 621,000; and in 1920, approximately 943,000. The present total school enrollment, when the attendance at the private schools is included, somewhat exceeds the million mark; but the total number of children between six and fourteen years of age in 1918 was over 2,400,000.

Quite properly, the chief attention has been centered upon the development of elementary schools as widely as possible

¹⁰ True only prior to the proclamation of the constitution and the termination of martial law in Egypt, in July, 1923, though it will again become true should the United States enact the Fairfield bill (see below, pages 295-296) or a similar measure.

¹¹ The census of 1918 showed 2,125,423 males over twenty-one years of age, of whom 1,097,937 were qualified to vote. The number of voters registered in 1919 was 717,295, and the number of votes cast was 672,122. See below, page 291.

through the islands, but such institutions are not yet accommodating one half of the population of suitable age for attendance. The difficulties involved in establishing schools sufficient to accommodate the whole population of suitable age are due to several conditions. The population is primarily rural, and widely diffused. The costs of securing land and erecting a school building, of employing a teacher and maintaining a school, are all items of very considerable weight. Perhaps the most difficult problem is the securing of teachers adequately trained to teach both the elementary subjects and the English tongue.

The progress of instruction in the quarter century since the American occupation has been notable and creditable, but it will obviously take another quarter century to make elementary education available for the whole population, and to insure that every Filipino child may be trained to become a literate person. The census of 1918 showed over 30 per cent of the total population literate. The advancement of women is shown by the fact that 28 per cent of the females are literate as compared with 32 per cent of the males. At the present time, it is estimated that 37 per cent of the total population are literate. Japan is the only nation in the East with a better record, and no other eastern nation approaches anywhere near the standard attained by the Filipinos.

The significance of a uniform system of education, furnishing a common body of instruction to the youth of the whole nation, has an importance far beyond imparting the ability to read and write. The educational system is a highly efficient agency for breaking down the old tribal barriers and for the creation of the spirit of unity and nationality. It also tends to obliterate certain quasi-feudal conditions which have survived from the Spanish regime, or perhaps even from the days prior to the arrival of Europeans. Instead, the schools are daily inculcating the principles of democracy and self-reliance. Not the least important elements in the educational system are provisions for the care of the health, for physical training, and for athletics. Nowhere in the East have these modern methods been so fully utilized. The

valuable results are daily becoming more obvious in both the physical and mental alertness of the people.

From the very beginning of American occupation it was considered that the diversity of native dialects made impossible the selection of any one of them as the common language for the islands. Some recent writers have contended that this decision was both unjustifiable and unwise. Their arguments are based upon a later experiment, made under the Dutch in Java, to substitute a single common dialect for a group of diverse but related ones, through training in the schools. The small extent to which Spanish had come into use likewise ruled it out. The American authorities, therefore, determined to make English the common language and to introduce its use through training in the schools.

The gratifying character of the results is shown by the fact that, after a quarter century of American occupation, the prevalence of English in the islands exceeds that of Spanish, though three centuries and a half have elapsed since the Spanish conquest.¹² The utilization of English as the common language for the islands instead of some indigenous tongue has the decisive advantage of giving to the people one of the great culture languages of the world, which affords them immediate access to all that is most important in human knowledge. English is more advantageous than either a native language or even Spanish, because of its widespread use, even outside of strictly English-speaking lands, especially in commercial intercourse in the Far East.

Nevertheless, the extension of the use of English is still, perhaps, the most vital single problem which conditions the future of the islands. Belgium with two languages in co-ordinate use, and Switzerland with four, are, indeed, examples of successful national unity in spite of linguistic diversity, but they do not disprove the importance of a single language as a bond of nationality. There can be no Philippine nation characterized by genuine unity until all the people of the islands abandon their eighty-seven diverse tongues

¹² Owing to instruction in the schools probably a larger proportion of the Filipinos can use Spanish now than in 1898. It is noteworthy that more can read Spanish than can speak it.

for a common language. It is accepted almost without dispute that such uniform language for the Philippines must be English. Only when it does actually come to be used by substantially the whole population will one of the fundamental conditions for the creation of a Philippine nation have been met. Even Mr. Quezon is reported to have acknowledged recently that it might be desirable to postpone the establishment of independence for ten or a dozen years to permit the more general establishment of English as the national language.

The diffusion of knowledge of English must be effected almost exclusively through the elementary schools. It is, therefore, necessary that the teachers in the schools shall have received training adequate to make them proficient in the language, not merely in its written form, but also as a spoken vehicle. As it is impossible to supply a sufficient number of American teachers for this purpose, native teachers must be given the necessary training, which ought, in a goodly proportion of cases, to include a period of residence and study in the United States or some other English-speaking country. There should be enough American teachers devoting their attention exclusively to language instruction to provide regular normal training and also supplementary vacation courses. There should also be an adequate number of Americans to serve as supervisors of instruction in English in the schools. To meet these two requirements there should be two or three times the present number of Americans on the staff of the department of education in the islands. It has been a serious misfortune that the policy of the government under the Harrison administration led to a decrease in the number of American teachers by approximately 50 per cent, whereas the undoubted need was for an increase of approximately the same proportion.

Effort has rightly been directed toward the extension of the number of elementary schools and little attention has been given to secondary and higher schools. Only approximately one per cent of the population of the islands has hitherto received an education of a higher grade than that fur-

nished by the primary schools. There are good high schools, especially in the cities, and there has been organized the University of the Philippines, which has over four thousand students. In addition, there are various private, denominational, and special schools of higher standing. The educational system in the islands will, of course, lack much of perfection until there has been developed a number of high schools and colleges, and especially of normal schools and other institutions for professional and vocational education, adequate to supply the needs of the islands.

As yet advanced training of any sort is practically reserved for those who can afford the private expense, and consequently this privilege is open only to a very small class. Similar opportunities can come to the youth of the islands in general only when sufficient educational institutions of higher grade are established and maintained at public expense. Fortunately a considerable number of the Filipino youth are seeking higher education abroad, mainly in the United States. Because of their broader horizon they should wield greater influence when they return to spend their lives in service among their own people. A spirit of generous helpfulness displayed toward them by the American people, among whom they may temporarily reside, can do much to strengthen the bonds of friendship between the great republic and the island people. Closely associated with the development of higher education is the extension of scientific research in the Philippines. Experts are rendering highly important service in nearly every branch of the government. The correlation of their activities through the bureau of science has proved very advantageous.

Credit for the remarkable educational advancement made in the Philippine Islands during the past quarter century is due not merely to the enlightened and liberal policy of the United States government, but also to the earnestness of the Filipinos in availing themselves of the opportunities placed at their disposal. Not only does the younger generation show itself eager to secure education of a primary and even of a higher grade, but the older generation is also wise enough to sympathize with the ambitions of youth, and to make ex-

traordinary sacrifices to assist the children in acquiring education.

The development of journalism in the Philippine Islands has been, in large measure, an achievement of the period since American occupation. Under Spanish rule, the press was, in all its activities, an instrumentality controlled almost exclusively by the government and the church. This restrictive care has disappeared under American rule, and the diversified activities of a free press constitute an important supplement to the educational system. The standard of Filipino journalism is fairly creditable, though by no means so excellent as might be desired. Manila, for instance, has some moderately good newspapers, but they do not compare with the two best dailies of either Hartford or New Haven, each of which cities is less than half as large. Neither do they equal the best English journals printed in Japan, China, or India. Besides the papers published in English, there are also journals in Spanish and in several of the native dialects. Some newspapers are published bilingually, and a few trilingually. The circulation of the papers is not very extensive, the total of all periodicals in the islands being equal to only about 3 per cent of the population. A much larger development of journalism and the establishment of a higher standard are indispensable to the existence of an intelligent electorate.

The public health work conducted under the American administration presents an excellent record of achievement. The reduction of the death rate in Manila has amounted to approximately 50 per cent, and in the provinces to about 20 per cent. The decline of infant mortality is even more striking. The birth rate in Manila has shown a considerable increase, while in the provinces there has been a slight decline. Among the activities of the Federation of Women's Clubs in the Philippines, none has been more important than its contribution to the improvement of conditions in connection with maternity and the care of infants.

The favorable showing in mortality statistics is subject to some modification for the period of the Harrison administration, from 1913 to 1921, when there was a slight increase

in the death rate.¹³ The same period also showed an increase in the number of cases of preventable diseases, such as typhoid and tuberculosis. On the other hand, this administration effected a very considerable extension of hospital and dispensary work, though the facilities of both sorts are still woefully inadequate to the needs of the islands as a whole. There are, for instance, less than one thousand nurses for a population in excess of ten millions. There is a similar shortage in the number of properly trained physicians and surgeons.

The sanitary work accomplished by the Americans in the Philippine Islands undoubtedly surpasses anything achieved by the British in the East, though it still falls far short of what needs to be done. As in the matter of education, the response of the Filipinos to the measures of sanitary reform has been remarkable, so that to-day they rank as the cleanest of oriental peoples. Though dire poverty exists in Manila, one does not now find conditions in any section of the city so repulsive or pitiful as those that one frequently encounters in nearly every city of the East. A related fact, which should be recorded to the credit of the Filipino people, is the almost complete absence of mendicancy, which is prevalent in most eastern lands.

The maintenance of public health requires extensive public works in order to provide pure drinking water, to dispose of sewage, and to eliminate unhealthy surroundings, as well as provision for hospitals and dispensaries. The work accomplished in these matters has been creditable, but much yet remains to be done. The Filipino government must in the future consider as one of its chief obligations the prosecution of all reasonable measures for the maintenance of public health, and the supply, through taxation, of adequate funds for the purpose. In a similar way much work at public expense must be undertaken for the purpose of ex-

¹³ The number of deaths per thousand was 16.82 in 1913; 17.57 in 1914; 18.55 in 1915; 20.04 in 1916; 21.10 in 1917; 35.47 in 1918, owing to epidemics of influenza, cholera, and smallpox, and 29.98 in 1919. Later figures are not available. In both 1918 and 1919 the number of deaths exceeded the number of births.

tending agriculture by means of irrigation and reclamation projects.

As only 10 per cent of the land of the islands is under tillage, and as it has usually been necessary to make considerable yearly importations of rice, which is the staple food, it is clearly one of the obligations of the government to undertake measures for bringing additional lands under cultivation at an early date. In the Philippines there is no question, as there is in Japan, of the existence of enough land available for agriculture to make the population of the islands self-sufficing. The allotment of these lands has been thoroughly safeguarded by wise legislation. No change in the land laws can be made without the approval of the president of the United States. In the future only Americans or Filipinos may acquire land from the public domain. The existing laws also contemplate the allotment of land from the public domain primarily to peasant proprietors rather than the creation of large landed estates or exploitation through a system of great plantations controlled by commercial corporations, such as has been demanded for the encouragement of the production of rubber.

A large portion of the friar lands, acquired in 1902 (the actual transfers were made in 1904 and 1905) for \$7,000,000 through negotiations conducted by Mr. Taft, has already been sold by the government to peasant proprietors. The forests of the islands are extensive and offer valuable opportunities for their scientific exploitation. Competent observers are convinced that the islands are capable of supplying the necessary amounts of every sort of tropical product needed by the United States. The large extension of the cultivated area under American rule and the success of the efforts already made to supply the American market with Filipino products are a fair indication of what may be accomplished. Just as natural conditions seem to require that the future development of Japan shall be industrial, so they point to the promotion of agriculture as the wisest economic policy for the Philippines.

The agricultural development of the islands, and especially the ability to place the products at the disposal of American

and international trade, will require adequate means of communication and transportation. Under American rule, there has been no great extension of the railroad mileage. At the present time there are approximately only nine hundred miles of railroads in operation, as compared with one hundred and twenty miles in 1898. This small mileage, however, gives access to about one quarter of the population. The existing lines are inferior in construction and equipment. On the other hand, over six thousand miles of highways have been constructed, of which nearly half are rated as first-class metaled roads. Moreover, automobile transportation for both passengers and goods is being steadily developed, and it is possible that the transportation problem of the islands will, in considerable measure, be solved in this manner rather than by the construction of railways. During the Harrison administration the extension and care of roads was not up to the standard set in earlier days of American occupation. If all parts of the islands are to be brought into satisfactory communication, the Filipino government in the future must be prepared to make large expenditures both for new roads and for maintenance of the system. The matter of communications in the Philippines, however, is by no means entirely a land problem. The number of the islands and their scattered location require a large degree of dependence upon methods of interisland navigation. To solve this problem there will be required expenditures not merely for the establishment of numerous steamer lines but also for harbors, lighthouses, and various other improvements of navigation. Though this phase of the problem has hitherto received less attention than it deserves, there are already in operation in interisland navigation about four hundred boats, and the number is being steadily increased, especially by motor boats. Political as well as commercial interests require the existence of adequate, cheap, and easy means of intercommunication throughout the archipelago. The national unity of the Filipino people cannot be attained without full and constant intercourse among the diverse peoples and various sections of the islands.

The foreign trade of the Philippine Islands has expanded

with remarkable rapidity during the period of American control.¹⁴ This commerce reached an annual value of \$50,000,000 in 1901. By 1912 it had increased to \$100,000,000, and in 1920 the total was in excess of \$300,000,000. Over 60 per cent of this trade is at present with the United States, whereas prior to 1898 the annual trade between the United States and the Philippines did not exceed \$5,000,000. The chief exports are sugar, hemp, tobacco, and coconut products. Hats and embroideries, which are perhaps the most important manufactures of the islands, are also largely exported.

From the point of view of the United States the trade of the Philippines is a very minor matter in comparison with its total commerce. The United States could conceivably lose the whole trade of the islands without any serious inconvenience. Potentially, however, the trade with the Philippines, through extension of the cultivation of various tropical products, might become of the greatest value to the United States. The position of the islands in the western Pacific and in relation to eastern Asia constitutes an important strategic advantage to the United States commercially as well as politically.¹⁵ For American exports the Philippines might become a market of some value, but it is unlikely that the United States will ever find it possible to sell any considerable portion of its manufactured goods in the islands themselves. For the period of American occupation as a whole the balance of trade, both for the total trade and for the trade with the United States, has been in favor of the Philippines.

On the other side, the loss of the American market would, at least for a considerable period of years, be a serious misfortune for the Filipinos. At the present time the products of the Philippine Islands enjoy free entry into the United

¹⁴ Compare the contemporaneous growth of the trade of Formosa under Japanese rule. The comparison on other lines, as well, between American policy in the Philippines and Japanese policy in Formosa is illuminating. See Ralston Hayden, *Japan's New Policy in Korea and Formosa*. (*Foreign Affairs*, 2, 474-487, March 15, 1924.)

¹⁵ Numerous proposals have been made to establish Manila as a free port. See below, page 292.

States. This privilege could not continue if the islands became independent or passed under the control of any other power. It will be seen, therefore, that the economic argument against independence is a very strong one when the question is viewed from the Philippine side, but is of less concern when viewed from the American side.

This problem, however, is not quite so simple. There are objections, both from the Filipinos and from other nations interested in the trade of the islands, to the American action, in 1909 and 1913, establishing free trade between the United States and the Philippines.¹⁶ These measures are criticized because they indirectly give the United States a monopolistic position with reference to the trade of the Philippines, as is shown by the resultant doubling of its percentage therein. While this arrangement is not so objectionable as the colonial trade restrictions of most other countries, it is much less liberal than the practice prevailing within the British Commonwealth of Nations, for example, in India, where the trade is open to other nations on absolutely equal terms with the English. Moreover, in contrast with its policy of insisting on the open door in China, the United States is practically maintaining a closed door in the Philippines. The objection raised by the Filipinos is that they are placed at the mercy of the American capitalists both in their buying and selling, because the disadvantages created by the tariff duties make it impracticable for them, in many cases, to trade with anyone but Americans. The United States ought certainly to investigate these complaints, and if the regulations concerned operate unjustly to the disadvantage of the Filipinos or unfairly internationally, remedy should be sought. Ever since President McKinley's announcement at the beginning of American occupation the United States has repeatedly disclaimed any intention of exploiting the Filipino

¹⁶ By the Underwood tariff of 1913 the duties on imports into the Philippines from countries other than the United States are, in general, distinctly lower than the rates established in the United States. An act of congress has authorized the president, by proclamation, to include the Philippines within the operation of the law restricting coastwise shipping to American vessels but, wisely, the power has not been exercised.

people. It is, therefore, in honor bound to repeal or modify any legislation that operates to the contrary, even though there was no evil intent in its enactment. Under the Jones act of 1916, indeed, a partial remedy has already been placed in the hands of the Philippine legislature, which is empowered to enact tariff laws with reference to countries other than the United States, but the authority has remained practically unexercised. A further objection to the free entry of American goods is that it deprives the Philippine government of needed revenue, for the receipts from customs duties would be trebled if imports from the United States paid the regular tariff rates. Even if this deduction be valid it does not prove that free trade is injurious or unjust to the Filipinos.

Closely related to this question of trade is the exploitation of the islands through capital investment. Very few Filipinos hitherto have had sufficient capital for investment except in land. The development of industrial, commercial, and banking institutions has, therefore, become dependent upon capital supplied by the government or attracted from outside. Prior to the American occupation a small amount of foreign capital had been invested in the islands. The most notable case was the British corporation known as the Manila Railroad Company. Since that time, however, but little capital, either foreign or American, has been attracted. More recent enterprises have been dependent upon government rather than private capital.

A wholesome fear of falling into the clutches of American "big business" and of creating a privileged interest which would oppose independence has led the insular government to enter upon a number of important financial undertakings requiring considerable capital. The first of these was the chartering of the Philippine National Bank in order to free the islands from the control of the foreign banking institutions which were doing business in Manila. This was followed by the purchase of the Manila Railroad Company from the British stockholders. Later there were created the National Coal Company, the National Cement Company, and a few other corporations. These quasi-public cor-

porations have served the purpose for which they were intended, but have met with severe criticism from the supporters of the American capitalistic interests. This attitude was in part responsible for the unfortunate experiences of the bank, which also had to meet the intrenched opposition and vigorous competition of the great and long-established English banks in the Far East. These corporations are, strictly speaking, not socialistic in character, but are a governmental expedient to protect the Filipinos from alien or American exploitation. Their very existence has sufficed to check the forms of alien exploitation which have aroused so much resentment in both China and India.

There is, however, real question whether, in the absence of Filipino capital for investment, suitable laws might not be devised to attract American private capital for the development of the islands, yet with abundant safeguards against the evils of exploitation of the people, land, or resources. Means must be found to secure a much fuller development of the insular resources as a basis both for the economic stability and progress of the archipelago and for the creation of a body of taxable wealth competent to support the necessarily increasing costs of government. New York state, for example, has almost precisely the same population as the Philippines, but only 40 per cent of the area, yet its expenditures for the state government alone are three times those of the Philippine government. The taxable capacity of the islands is indicated by the income-tax returns, of which there were 9,519 in 1920, distributed as follows: Filipinos, 3,667; Chinese, 3,123; Americans, 1,434; other foreigners, 1,295. Thus, 1 out of 14 of the non-Filipinos filed an income-tax return, exactly the same proportion as in the United States, but only 1 out of 2,790 Filipinos did.

The Filipino people, as already indicated, are almost exclusively engaged in agricultural pursuits. Such manufacturing as is conducted is largely under the domestic system. Factories are almost unknown. Mercantile and commercial activities are rarely carried on by the Filipinos. Practically the entire wholesale and retail trade of the islands is in the hands of aliens. The leading business people are the Chi-

nese, but Japanese, Americans, British, and others share in the conduct of commercial enterprise. Consequently, the Filipino people, as in the case of Egypt, lack the private experience in money matters which is a necessary prerequisite to ability to handle successfully problems of public finance. It is unfortunately necessary to record that the Filipinos have not yet developed a proper sense of the value of money, or good judgment in business matters. What is worse, their standards of honor in handling of banking and of public funds have been brought under serious suspicion in the proved mismanagement of the Philippine National Bank in its earlier years.

It is to be alleged on behalf of the Filipino that the economic policy of Spain did not permit his acquiring any large degree of commercial or even of minor mercantile experience. This was due both to the policy of trade restriction and also to the policy of utilizing Filipino labor in agriculture, as on the friar lands. Experience since the American occupation has, however, revealed the adaptability of the Filipino to many pursuits other than agriculture. The primitive instinct for the sea reappears in the success with which Filipinos have undertaken the conduct of the interisland shipping, and in the extent to which they have entered a wider range of seafaring occupations. The American and foreign business houses in Manila and other ports of the islands have followed, in recent years, a policy of steady Filipinization of their staffs of clerks and other employees. Moreover, there is a growing number of Filipinos who are successfully undertaking mercantile and industrial enterprises on their own account. These are certainly signs of hope for the future.

Another legitimate plea may be entered in defense of the Filipino in business. Many of his early undertakings coincided with the period of the World War, and consequently suffered seriously from the unusual conditions obtaining in the financial world at that time and, even more, immediately after the close of the war. This fact may be alleged in mitigation of the misadventures of the Philippine National Bank. The experience of Filipino financial under-

takings, during these years, was not without numerous parallels in similar enterprises, both native and foreign, in every other Far Eastern land. This is not commendation, but it is evidence thoroughly relevant to the formation of a fair judgment of Filipino character and ability.

The evil influence of the World War upon the financial and economic conditions in the Philippines was far-reaching. Specie was drawn from the islands to the United States in payment for generous subscriptions to liberty loans and to Red Cross and similar war charities, as well as in other extraordinary ways. The diversion of trade from normal channels caused varied and serious difficulties, which led to a policy of government control for price regulation in the case of certain commodities, especially of rice. This experiment at government regulation of business proved distinctly unfortunate. The wide and rapid fluctuations in exchange throughout the East were a constant temptation to speculate, one might almost say to gamble. That conditions in the Philippines were not so bad as they have been sometimes painted is clearly shown by the stability of the peso, which fluctuated in value less than any other oriental currency, not excepting the dollars of Hong Kong or the Straits Settlements.

In government finance, practice in the islands was really in advance of that in the United States, for the budget system was adopted by the first Filipino Legislature under the Jones act in 1916, five years ahead of similar action by the United States government. The increase in annual expenditure and in the debt of the insular government has not been disproportionate since the outbreak of the World War in 1914. The authorization, in 1921, for the increase of the debt limit of the insular government from \$15,000,000 to \$30,000,000, exclusive of \$7,000,000 friar land bonds, has been fully utilized, and has afforded somewhat greater flexibility to the financial situation. In 1922 congress raised the debt limit to ten per cent of the assessed value of real property, which amounts, by the latest assessment, to about \$74,000,000.

Prior to American occupation, and for some years there-

after, nearly all European trade with the Philippines, not reserved by Spain, was in British hands. For several years after 1898, indeed, the British controlled a larger share of the trade of the islands than any other country, not excepting the United States. Though the proportion of British trade has fallen rapidly in later years, the British trading community in the islands continues to exercise an influence quite out of proportion to its numbers. The Americans were surprisingly slow in developing their commercial and financial interests in the islands. It was not until the civil service policy of Governor-General Harrison in 1913 forbade office holders to engage in trade that considerable numbers began to give their exclusive attention to commercial affairs. This number was still further increased by the unusual conditions in the years during the World War and the period immediately thereafter.

The commercial connections of the Philippines with the neighboring lands of the Far East are important, especially with China. Apparently Chinese had been trading in large numbers with the islands for centuries before Magellan's arrival, and, despite several attempts by the Spaniards to expel them, they have continued to trade there ever since. A large part of the retail trade of the islands has been in their hands. Their position is not viewed very kindly by the Filipinos, who seem to think of them somewhat as the Turk does of the Greek or Armenian trader. The Chinese interests in the islands have not, however, expanded on the large scale to which they have developed in the Straits Settlements.

The situation with regard to the foreign business community in the Philippines is not dissimilar to that which has already been discussed in the case of Egypt. Contrary to the practice in India, the foreign business community has no voice in the legislature. It is true that Americans may become Philippine citizens and thus vote for legislative representatives, but they have not done so. The consequence is that the financial and economic interests of the country are not likely to secure such thorough consideration as might be desired. It may be argued that this result is not dissonant with the interests of the Philippine nation at large, since over

90 per cent of its population is rural and agricultural. On the other hand, if the Filipino people are to achieve their independence in the near future, there are many considerations which will compel their serious attention to economic questions of far-reaching significance. This being the case, one of the questions which might be raised is whether it would not be to the advantage of the Filipinos to secure an arrangement by which they should have commercial attaches in connection with the American consular service, at those ports, especially in the Far East, where their trade is most considerable. This would certainly be a helpful step in preparation for self-government.

It must be admitted that the people of the Philippine Islands have had little opportunity to acquire experience in business matters, and that a single failure or several failures must not be taken as conclusive evidence of inherent incompetence. The real question is whether they show ability to profit by their mistakes. If the people of the Philippines are wise, they will set themselves to the task of mastering mercantile affairs and acquiring control of a reasonable share of their own wholesale and retail trade, instead of depending, as hitherto, upon foreigners. It is also essential that they shall develop, both in legislative and administrative positions, the ability to deal both intelligently and honestly with economic questions. Furthermore, they must secure the investment of sufficient capital to assure the steady development of the national resources. A country which fails to do so cannot maintain a stable government.

The question is one not merely of business ability but also of individual thrift. Perhaps the Filipinos have never developed this virtue; at any rate its practice does not seem to have been encouraged under the rule of the Spanish and the friars. The development of education and the extension of other privileges under American rule are encouraging in the ordinary Filipino a sense of self-dependence and of the desirability of personal financial solvency. The shortcomings of the Filipino in economic matters are but the faults of his virtues. Among the finest traits of the Filipino are his generosity and his cheerful, care-free disposition. To steady

these virtues and to prevent their lapsing into faults is another prerequisite to the development of the quality of national character which will assure genuine independence. Postal savings banks are already inculcating thrift, and in time, no doubt, other influences will conduce to the attainment of sound business sense, without any undue sacrifice of the characteristic virtues of the nation.

Although the Filipinos are not good business managers, that is not the main reason why public taxation and expenditure have been considerably increased in the period since 1916, when they acquired full legislative control of the insular finances. The necessities of education, sanitation, transportation, and other public concerns have naturally appealed to the Filipinos for prompt and liberal expenditures. As long as the responsibility rested with the agents of the United States government there was a natural hesitation to proceed with undue rapidity in these matters. A moderate tax levied by alien authority might readily be more vehemently criticized than four times that sum levied by the representatives of the people themselves. In 1913 the rate of taxation was estimated at \$1.32 *per capita*. By 1920 it had risen to \$2.50 *per capita*.¹⁷ National taxes alone in the United States are in excess of \$25 *per capita*.

The Philippine government is equally fortunate in the smallness of its net indebtedness, which amounts to about \$3 *per capita*. Though the taxes and the indebtedness of the Philippines are apparently trivial, they amount to really considerable sums when judged by the relative economic advancement of the people as compared with conditions in the United States. The Philippine government does not, however, pay all the costs involved. The United States government pays the charges for army, transport, navy, fortifications, diplomacy, coast survey, and in addition has made other occasional appropriations rightly chargeable to the

¹⁷ Had the decline in the purchasing power of money been as great as in the United States, this would have meant no real increase in taxation. Though proper data are not available to determine the change in price levels in the Philippines, it is probable that the change was not as great as in the United States.

administration of the islands. It is estimated that the total disbursements by the American government on the Philippine account have amounted to about \$700,000,000.¹⁸ The credit of the United States government, not merely in theory, but in absolute fact, has supported the currency of the islands in accordance with the gold standard, the bonds issued by the government, and even the Philippine National Bank.

In the administration of justice the Filipinos have, from the beginning of the American occupation, enjoyed a large amount of responsibility. The local or minor courts are regularly officered by Filipinos. At the present time the only distinct reservation of judicial office to Americans is in the case of five of the nine appointments to the supreme court of the islands. The chief justice, however, is a Filipino. This almost complete native control of the judicial system has probably worked as well as could have been expected.

Unfortunately, there have arisen considerable causes for criticism. A certain amount of laxity and of delinquency in the conclusion of cases might naturally be anticipated with an oriental people. This is undesirable, but not serious. On the other hand, there have been rather too many complaints that the judicial officers have allowed political and other improper influences to determine the disposition of cases before them, especially of those which deal with elections. This is due not so much to lack of honesty or capacity on the part of officials as to the lack of reasonable safeguards to assure their judicial integrity. There does not exist a body of enlightened public opinion sufficient to hold judges to strict account. There is likewise no suitable governmental supervision or instruction which would serve to hold local officials to a rigidly upright and impartial attitude in the discharge of their duties.

In two respects the judicial administration in the Philip-

¹⁸ This sum equals the total expenditures of the Philippine governments, insular, provincial, and municipal, for the same period. Such claims as are made in the article, *Philippine Government Is Self-Supporting*, *Philippine Press Bulletin*, January, 1924, are, therefore, misleading.

pires differs radically from that in the United States. The local official combines administrative and judicial functions, and furthermore acts without a jury. These practices, like the legal system, are inherited from Spanish rule. The arrangement has its faults, but on the whole works with reasonable satisfaction, and efforts are being made to remove the more obvious objections. Every year of American control, however, witnesses a large and natural extension of the ideas and forms of American law. The tendency to alter to an American standard is naturally very much stronger in the law regarding persons than in the law of property. The absence of a guaranty of jury trial in all cases seems, from the American point of view, open to serious criticism, but it is, in fact, not discordant with the established legal conditions in the islands. Criticism of the absence of guaranty seems to come not so much from the Filipinos themselves as from some Americans who speak with sentiment rather than with knowledge.

In the offices of civil administration the record is similar. Many Filipinos have displayed a high degree of competency and of official integrity, but there have also been rather too many examples of the opposite sort. The reasons already alleged in explanation in the case of judicial office hold equally in this instance. Though President McKinley had laid down the principle that, whenever possible, Filipinos were to be employed as their own governmental officials, a goodly number of Americans held governmental positions in the islands down until 1913. At that date Americans occupied approximately 2,600 out of 9,000 positions in the classified civil service in the Philippines. The criticism was not so much against the proportion of Americans in the service as against their almost exclusive monopoly of the higher offices.

In 1913 Governor-General Harrison reported that only one bureau was under a Filipino chief. He made it his policy, wherever possible, to replace the American incumbent by a Filipino, so that at the close of his administration in 1921 there were 30 Filipino chiefs of bureaus. Only nine bureaus, which required scientific experts to direct them,

remained under American chiefs. In the words of Governor-General Harrison, "for a period of a year from the date of my arrival the number [of separations of Americans from the civil service] was 716, but their places were filled by Filipinos, not by Americans brought over for the purpose." A regulation forbidding civil servants to engage in business caused many Americans to resign office; the Osmena retirement act in 1916, which provided a bonus to officials retiring after six years or more of service, resulted in the withdrawal, in the ensuing five years, of 913 Americans, as contrasted with 212 Filipinos. A third explanation of extensive withdrawals of Americans from the Philippine civil service was the World War, which called many into military service or other positions elsewhere.

The Filipinization of the civil service has been in compliance with the demand for self-government, but there is serious doubt whether the process has not been carried too far, or at least introduced too rapidly. As a rule, Filipinos have avoided seeking positions requiring expert scientific ability, but even in the broader fields of general administration it is not unlikely that better results might be obtained through the employment of a somewhat larger number of expert Americans. Doubt has also been raised whether Christian Filipino officials can serve acceptably among the Mohammedan Moros or among the pagan aborigines. Experience has tended to remove this doubt.

The American civil officials in the islands, especially in higher positions, are brought into contact incessantly with officers of the American army, and to some extent with officers of the American navy. In general the relations with naval officers have afforded little cause for complaint. The same cannot be said in the case of the army officers. From the time when Mr. Taft became civil governor to the close of the administration of Governor-General Harrison, friction between the military and civil officials developed repeatedly. As a rule, wisdom has seemed to be on the side of the civil officers, and the tendency has been to increase the power of the civil authority at the expense of the military. The unfortunate emphasis placed by Governor-General Harrison

upon the impolitic and reactionary character of army officers, at the close of his administration and in his book issued shortly thereafter, seriously prejudiced the situation at the arrival of the Wood-Forbes commission, and later at the appointment of General Wood as governor-general. In view of these circumstances and of the events which have since occurred, it seems that, in spite of the high character and ability of General Wood, the appointment of an army officer to the governor-generalship was ill-advised.

Under the Jones act the franchise may be exercised by men 21 years of age who can read and write either Spanish, English, or a native language, or by those owning real property worth at least 500 pesos or paying taxes of at least 30 pesos annually. Under these restrictions, the census of 1918 showed that 53 per cent of the men of voting age enjoyed the right of suffrage.¹⁹ This proportion is very much greater than is authorized in any other eastern land. It is sometimes objected that free exercise of the franchise, especially in the more backward rural communities, is restricted by the traditional influence of certain individuals of local importance, because of official position, the headship of the family, or wealth. It is impossible to form a satisfactory judgment of the validity of these charges. Even if they are true, they are not necessarily serious in their consequences, and they may be overcome by the extension of education and the development of more intelligent public opinion. On the other hand, it may be reasonably argued that a much more liberal extension of the franchise should precede independence, and that it should be obtained through enabling a much larger proportion of the population to meet the educational qualification. It is doubtful whether a government can be considered stable which rests upon the suffrages of only 6.5 per cent of the population, as was the case with the legislature elected in 1919.

The bicameral legislature established by the Jones act possesses wide powers of legislation subject to veto by the governor-general. A vetoed measure may be passed by

¹⁹ See above, page 252, footnote 11.

a two-thirds vote of both houses, but even then the governor-general may withhold such a measure for final decision by the president of the United States. Moreover, all legislative enactments must be reported to the congress of the United States, which has power of annulment, though it has never been exercised. This legislature also chooses two resident commissioners to Washington for terms of three years, who have the right of participating in debate in the house of representatives. The membership of the legislature is made up entirely of Filipinos, all elected, except two senators and nine representatives appointed by the governor-general to represent the non-Christian tribes. In this respect the legislature is as completely native as in China or Japan, and far more representative, because practically every member is elected for a short and definite term of years, under a distinctly liberal franchise. No Americans or aliens sit in the legislature, a contrast to the situation prevailing in India.

Both in the legislative assembly established in 1907, and in the full legislature created by the Jones act in 1916, the Filipinos have shown themselves surprisingly good parliamentarians, and, in general, the conduct of the sessions has been thoroughly commendable. Taken as a whole, the legislation enacted has been ample in quantity and of high character. While the Filipino may rightly be proud of the behavior of his legislative representatives, a disinterested observer can hardly avoid recognizing the insufficient character of their parliamentary experience to justify the concession of full responsibility or independence for the present. It is true that within the space of less than a quarter century they have established an apparently stable government, but it must be remembered that the English required centuries of similar experience to perfect their parliamentary institutions.²⁰ In view of the extensive powers already enjoyed, it does not seem unfair that the Filipinos should be asked to consult their own future welfare and await patiently the establishment of their desired independence until further progress and experience shall have

²⁰ The Filipino nationalists quite naturally prefer the comparison with Japan, but the two cases are not analogous.

furnished additional guaranties for its successful maintenance.

As it may be admitted without risk of serious dispute that the present status of the Philippines cannot satisfactorily be maintained for a much longer time, the question arises concerning the practicability of other possible solutions. In all cases of territory acquired by the United States prior to 1898 ultimate incorporation into the Union through statehood was finally conceded, with the single exception that Alaska has not yet attained such rank. There can be little doubt that the Filipino people would, with almost complete unanimity, reject the proposal of statehood, and that the American people would be equally averse to granting it. In spite of this strong adverse opinion, the idea is not without merits, and might simplify some of the problems more satisfactorily than any other solution.²¹ The Filipinos reject the plan because it is not consonant with their ideas of independence. American opposition arises partly from anti-imperialists, and partly from a general antipathy to annexing a distant area whose defense would be a constant liability and to incorporating people of an alien race. American opinion is profoundly influenced by experience with the negro question, and there is a marked unwillingness to take on any other racial problem. This latter point of view is undoubtedly exaggerated by the ignorant assumption that the Filipinos are a backward people inferior to the negroes.

Though dominion status might not be more desirable than statehood as the ultimate solution of the Philippine question, it is not improbable that it may be the wisest arrangement for the immediate future. By dominion status would be signified such a quasi-independent relation as obtains between the Dominion of Canada and the United Kingdom, together with the form of responsible parliamentary government which is in operation in Canada and the other British dominions. This plan seems to have been in the minds of Governor-General Harrison and of his Filipino advisers when they desired to replace the former by a Filipino gover-

²¹ On the other hand it would give the Philippines equal voice with New York in congress and in all national matters.

nor-general and to secure permission for Filipino representatives at the Paris peace conference. Both these proposals were negatived by President Wilson. While individuals may have different opinions on the abstract question of the relative desirability of the British system of responsible parliamentary government and of the American system of presidential government or of government by a system of checks and balances, it may be admitted that a modified form of dominion status with responsible parliamentary government offers the most convenient temporary solution for the Philippine problem. It has usually been overlooked that the mutual relations between the United States and the Philippines are not, and never can be, parallel to those between Great Britain and its self-governing dominions. They are more nearly comparable to those between Great Britain and India.

One of the strong arguments against immediate independence might also be an argument against the concession of dominion status, were it not that this arrangement would provide a satisfactory period of trial and experience antecedent to independence. Practically speaking, there are no parties among the Filipinos, though there have been occasional efforts to secure an alignment with reference to a greater or lesser degree of self-government, or to immediate or deferred independence. The active political forces in the islands are practically all nationalists and supporters of the demand for Philippine independence at the earliest possible date. This is of genuine significance, for where no party of opposition exists there is no means of enforcing upon the majority and upon its representatives in a ministry a sense of legislative responsibility.

If, on the other hand, the representatives in the senate and assembly were more or less evenly divided into two groups representing, for instance, radical and conservative views with regard to the establishment of national independence, the minority party would constitute an unfailing check upon the majority and hold that party to a substantially consistent policy and behavior. The minority would also be chastened by the realization that at any time a turn

of the political wheel might place them in the majority. It is at this point that the Filipinos have not yet obtained the sort of experience in effecting a real party organization, both without and within the legislature, which is essential to the successful working of parliamentary institutions, whether of the British or of the American type. Insufficient time has elapsed to determine whether the split in the Nacionalista party in 1922 between Osmena and Quezon will result in real advance toward the development of parties. The nonpartisan character of the Filipino senate and assembly would almost inevitably disappear with the establishment of independence or of dominion status, and parties or groups would undoubtedly arise in these bodies. A situation would then present itself for which the Filipinos would be totally unprepared by experience, which might be obtained more wisely under dominion status than after the establishment of independence.

Whether with dominion status or under some other new adjustment, the real interests of the Filipino people in their progress toward self-government clearly render desirable, for a considerable period of time, their continued enjoyment of the benefit of a small but effective amount of American guidance and supervision. It is not merely that the expert knowledge of the Americans furnishes a certain measure of enlightenment to the Filipinos in dealing with governmental problems, but it is perhaps of even greater importance that the Americans, in a capacity as instructors or supervisors, can act impartially in toning up the Filipino officials to a high standard of honesty, justice, and efficiency. Americans are needed in the government of the islands to furnish advice and sympathetic guidance, rather than to dictate or control.

Thus far, during the period of American occupation, the educated Filipinos have, in general, been those trained during the period of Spanish domination. For some time to come Filipinos of this type may continue to be in the majority and to exercise a controlling influence in political affairs. It is perfectly obvious that these men, no matter how sincere may be their loyalty and their good intentions,

are prevented by the circumstances of their training from being genuinely competent supporters of a regime in which American ideals are dominant. The new generation, trained under American auspices, will be free from certain prejudiced influences which necessarily affect the older generation, and they will have grown up in full acquaintance with American methods and ideals, so that they should be able to approach all matters of public concern with far greater hope for success in dealing with them. It has already become possible to see the difference of attitude toward public matters displayed by the old Spanish-trained generation and by the young American-trained generation.

At this point it becomes necessary to refer to the most delicate question involved in the future of the islands. The Spanish-trained generation was also a friar-trained generation, or at least grew up in a political society in which church and state were almost synonymous terms. Since over 88 per cent of the Filipino people are Catholics, of whom over 75 per cent are Roman Catholics, the immediate or early establishment of self-government and independence might permit the Roman Catholic Church, with a personnel which has not yet forgotten its days of supreme influence under Spanish rule, once more to dominate the islands. When it is recalled that the insurrection of 1896 was directed rather against the church than against the Spanish government, it appears how natural a return to the former condition would be. A sufficient period of time prior to independence and complete self-government ought to elapse to permit the thorough establishment of the American principle and practice of separation of church and state and of the full emancipation of the individual from clerical control in matters not of spiritual concern.²² The statement of this very vital situation is made absolutely without prejudice to the spiritual leadership of the Roman Catholic Church among the Filipino people.

While emphasis is thus laid on the firm establishment of the principle of separation of church and state, it must be

²² The experiences of the several Latin-American nations are suggestive in this connection.

admitted that the attitude of the Catholic Church has appeared favorable to American control rather than to the aspirations for independence. Catholic opposition to independence may be explained by fear of the development of a definitely anti-clerical movement in the islands, if the restraining influence of the United States were removed. There does indeed exist throughout the archipelago an independent Catholic Church, popularly known as the Aglipayan Church, established in 1902, under the leadership of Gregorio Aglipay, a priest who was active in the insurrection. The census of 1918 showed that 13 per cent of the people were adherents of this church, which is hostile to the Roman Catholic hierarchy.

The need for American assistance has already been pointed out as essential not only in matters of government but also for the completion of an educational system that will establish English as a common language, for the development of better journalism and a more active press with greatly extended circulation, and for the establishment of an improved system of public works, to provide for sanitation, communications, and transportation. All these matters are things essential to the welding of the Filipino peoples into a unified and intelligent nation, competent for self-government. With American assistance the desired end can undoubtedly be attained more rapidly than by the hastier, though perhaps more gratifying, method of immediate independence. It would seem to be a far greater injustice to the Filipino people for the Americans to leave the islands without accomplishing these tasks essential to national unity and genuine independence than for them to continue their control and to refuse a premature grant of complete independence.

The American people may justly pride themselves on their achievement in the Philippines. They have made enormous advances toward molding the diverse tribes into a single, united people, and for the first time have actually established the supremacy of a single government over them all. They have made extraordinary progress in extending the use of one of the great culture languages as the common speech, and have rapidly enlarged and improved the fa-

cilities for education. A single system of law uniformly administered has been extended through the archipelago. The public health has been improved by extensive measures of sanitation to a degree which has permitted the rapid growth of the population. By the construction of roads and by numerous other means, improved methods of transportation and communication have been established. The Americans have carried out, with remarkable consistency and sincerity, a policy of training the Filipino people for self-government, and they have administered the financial and commercial regime in a manner so satisfactory as to produce remarkably little discontent. Indeed, the American treatment of the Filipinos in these particulars has been exceedingly generous. Although the problem of dealing with the Philippines, both as regards area and the amount of population, is a comparatively small one, yet the American people may justly feel that they can challenge comparison with any other nation in the administration of a dependency inhabited by people of a different race from themselves.

The liberality of the American policy toward the Filipinos has, in numerous cases, actually resulted in more liberal or progressive legislation for the islands than has been enacted in the United States itself. This situation has been not unlike that of Ireland, for which British legislation was more liberal, in many particulars, than for England itself. In their respective cases the Americans and the British were undoubtedly on their good behavior and dared not do less in behalf of the wards for whom they had gratuitously made themselves guardians. On the other hand, it may be inquired whether the Filipinos could have achieved similar results within the same time had Aguinaldo and the insurgents won in their struggle twenty-five years ago. With all due credit to the Filipinos for their share in the achievement of the past quarter century, there can be little doubt that this question must be answered in the negative, for they were not a unified nation with a long-established government like the Japanese. They had, moreover, never had the benefit of experience in governmental affairs.

The Filipinos are a virile people, not a dying race like the

aboriginal population of many of the islands of the Pacific. They are, on the contrary, increasing rapidly in numbers and also advancing in culture. Furthermore, the Filipinos are a moral people. Western observers, from the earliest times, have found few immoral practices or barbarous customs among them, and contact with western peoples has not introduced alien vices. The faults which have been charged against the Filipino character are negative or passive in nature rather than offensive and active. Contact with the Chinese has not introduced the opium habit, nor has contact with Europeans or Americans made the Filipinos addicted to drink. It is true that there are native drinks of an alcoholic character, and that the wealthier classes import liquors, but drunkenness is practically unknown among them. There are strong arguments for the application of the eighteenth amendment to the Philippine Islands, but no one has suggested that it is necessary as a protection so far as the Filipinos are concerned, contrary to American experience where the negro has been involved. The chief argument, indeed, for the application of prohibition in the islands would be, if not to save the white residents from themselves, at least to save them from becoming ridiculous in the eyes of the Filipinos. Chastity, as well as sobriety, is one of the characteristic virtues of the Filipinos. Their attitude toward commercialized vice has been far more commendable than that of the white population. Efforts for its suppression, indeed, have been among the acts creditable to Filipino opinion and officials.

The Filipino people have shown themselves remarkably loyal to the United States, and eager to fit themselves, with all promptitude, for self-government in accordance with American ideals. They have been quick and generous in their recognition of all that the United States has done for them. They also recognize that there are certain advantages which can accrue to them only through American control or protection. Reciprocally they concede that some form of American occupation in the islands, even though it be as limited as a naval base, is not merely essential for the Filipinos themselves, but of very great value to the United

States with reference to the western Pacific and eastern Asia.

While from the point of view of political idealism and abstract justice it may be conceded that the United States should withdraw from the islands, and accord to the Filipino people immediate and complete independence, the dictates of practical politics, in the existing period of international turmoil and competition, furnish abundant reasons why the United States should continue to maintain a position in the Philippine Islands as a suitable safeguard both for its extensive interests in the regions of the Far East and for the welfare of the Filipinos. No nation outside of eastern Asia itself has a greater interest in the future developments in eastern Asia and the western Pacific than has the United States.

The Philippine Islands are too small in area and in population to be able to maintain independence and security under present world conditions. American control or protectorate is essential unless similar control by some other nation is to be substituted. The islands offer such rich advantages, through their intrinsic wealth and through the strategic nature of their location, that they would naturally attract the covetous interest of various powers. Governor-General Harrison and many others felt convinced that the establishment of the League of Nations would solve satisfactorily the problem of international status for the Philippines, without resort to an American protectorate or to a specific international act of neutralization.²³ This hopeful augury has not been justified by ensuing events, particularly since the United States has not entered the League.

It is, therefore, a matter of mutual concern to the American people and to the peoples of the Philippines that, in some form, American control over the islands should be continued. The problem of determining what that form

²³ Such an international act would now involve modification of the four-power pact signed by the United States, Great Britain, France, and Japan at the Washington conference, and would be valueless without the assent of each of these powers. See below, pages 284-286, 290-291, 296.

shall be is open to a variety of possible solutions. The continuance of the present status or the adoption of a policy of anticipating statehood have been shown to be impracticable. Dominion status has been discussed as a possible next step of a temporary character. The impracticability of absolute independence, as has been seen,²⁴ is admitted even by the Filipinos.

There remain two possible solutions, somewhat similar in character, but differing rather in form. The first would be complete independence and self-government safeguarded by an offensive and defensive alliance with the United States. While this plan would apparently afford a nearer approach in form to absolutely independent international status, it would practically bind the Philippines to the United States in permanent subordination, with less power to influence American policy than under present conditions. The other solution, that of qualified independence, has been repeatedly suggested, ever since 1898, and has usually been accepted as satisfactory by all Filipinos except some extremists. Its advantages to the United States are not so clear. It would seem to impose liabilities out of proportion to the benefits that might be derived. The exact form which such qualified independence might take is usually defined as an arrangement somewhat similar to the Platt Amendment in the case of Cuba. Owing to the vastly greater distance of the Philippines from the United States the application of this plan to them might not be so satisfactory to either party, and would certainly involve some different adjustments.

Either of these two solutions which have just been suggested involves the question of defense or protection of the Philippine Islands in their international status. Since 1898 the responsibility for this has rested entirely upon the army and navy of the United States, and the expense has been entirely defrayed by the American government. The defense of the islands also involves some responsibility in matters of foreign intercourse. The detached position of the islands, moreover, has made it convenient, if not necessary, that the governor-general shall be responsible for

²⁴ See above, page 281.

handling a good many matters of international concern. Particularly during the period of the World War, important responsibilities and burdensome routine of this sort rested upon him.

When the United States was engaged in the World War, it almost entirely denuded the islands of troops and diverted its effective naval vessels to other waters. The thoroughly pacific conditions in the islands during that period are eloquent testimony to the satisfactory character of the American administration and of the behavior of the Filipino people. They desired to organize a volunteer force to be placed at the disposal of the United States government in the war. This generous proposal, unfortunately, received rather cavalier treatment by the authorities in Washington. The only native organization in the nature of a defense force is the Philippine constabulary, numbering about five thousand, which has for twenty years proved itself an excellent organization, somewhat similar to the state police forces in the United States. Its activities are more varied and exacting. Upon it rests the responsibility for maintenance of order in the less civilized portions of the islands.

It is only possible to surmise from the attitude of neighboring or interested nations since the American occupation of the Philippines what their attitude would be toward the islands as an independent, or even quasi-independent, state. In 1898 and the immediately following years the chief bugbear was the possibility of German intervention in the islands, or German ambition to seize them. At that time the attitude of Japan was considered favorable, but since the Russo-Japanese War imperialistic designs of that country upon the archipelago have been repeatedly alleged. Japanese experience in Formosa, however, as well as in the Philippines themselves, has shown that it is extremely unlikely, if not impossible, that the islands should become a field for Japanese colonization. Their experience in undertaking business projects in the islands has also been unsatisfactory, and indicates the lack of qualities necessary for dealing satisfactorily with the Filipino as a laborer. It is doubtful, therefore, whether Japan would seriously consider

intervention in the islands unless provoked thereto. The danger of aggression by the Chinese in any political form is apparently beyond the bounds of immediate possibility, but their economic expansion in the islands might at any time create serious difficulties unless their migration into the archipelago continues to be carefully restricted.

It is by no means likely that any one of the European powers with colonies in the vicinity of the Philippines, namely, the British, French, Dutch, and Portuguese, would undertake intervention unfavorable to an independent Philippine nation unless they were given serious provocation. The islands would offer few, if any, advantages additional to those enjoyed in the territories they already possess, and would, on the contrary, impose upon them serious new problems. On the other hand, there is no doubt that the policy pursued by the American government since its occupation of the Philippines is viewed with impatience and disapproval by each one of these countries, especially by the colonial officials and by those interested in colonial exploitation. This feeling would undoubtedly be increased to serious irritation by the grant of full independence or quasi-independence to the Philippines. The reason for this attitude is that the United States has pursued toward the Philippines a policy infinitely more progressive and liberal than has any one of these other nations in dealing with eastern peoples.

The rapid extension of educational facilities and the avowed and maintained policy of preparing the Filipinos for self-government have set an example which the European colonizing powers view with alarm. That this alarm is not without foundation is obvious from the encouragement which the natives of British India, of French Indo-China, and of the Dutch East Indies have drawn from the steady progress made by the Filipinos in enlightenment and political capacity. The American policy and Filipino achievement have driven each of these European powers to adopt for their eastern possessions policies of an unwontedly liberal character. Should the United States grant independence, either complete or conditional, to the Philippines,

Great Britain would find it extremely difficult to withhold similar concessions from India, and the other powers would be impelled to bestow liberal reforms as an alternative to revolution. Even the Japanese situation in Korea would be affected. Under these circumstances it is not at all surprising that these governments should permit, if not encourage, their press to assume a critical attitude toward the American administration in the islands and particularly toward the independence movement.

The attitude of President Wilson's administration in refusing to enlist a Filipino corps in the United States army during the World War, his efforts to prevent a Filipino commission from visiting Washington after the armistice, and his refusal to permit a Filipino delegation to the Paris peace conference are close, almost illuminating, parallels to the British policy toward Egypt on exactly the same points. The discordance of these procedures with the general tenor of President Wilson's policy suggests that in these matters he was making concessions to British susceptibilities. President Harding's reply to the Filipino delegation in 1922 was certainly franker and in strict accord with the policy of preceding Republican administrations, though the nature of his declarations could not have been considered acceptable to a large body of Filipino opinion. In spite of these official rebuffs Filipino nationalists have continued to maintain an extremely skillful propaganda in the United States, and their appeal to the spirit of American institutions is ably conceived and difficult to resist.

It is not easy to combat the argument that the spirit of the Declaration of Independence and of the Constitution of the United States does not accord with the maintenance of American control over the Filipino people, or to dissent from the Filipino assertion that their ambitions are identical with those pursued by the Americans in their own struggle for liberty.

In one form or another, with more or less definiteness, at many times during the twenty-five years of American occupation, it has been announced that it was the policy of the United States to accord to the people of the Philippine

Islands full self-government. In certain instances, notably in President Roosevelt's message to congress in 1908 and in President Wilson's message to the Filipino people in October, 1913, the word "independence" has also been used. Many people in the United States believe that the nation is definitely and officially pledged to accord to the Philippine Islands, in the immediate future, not only complete self-government but also full independence. As for the Filipino peoples, there can be no doubt that they have interpreted the American promises in the most favorable construction as regards the early concession of both self-government and independence.

The critical case in question is the preamble of the Jones act of 1916, especially its second clause, which reads:

"Whereas it is, as it has always been, the purpose of the people of the United States to withdraw their sovereignty over the Philippine Islands and to recognize their independence as soon as a stable government can be established therein."

Much argument has been consequently spent upon the question whether a stable government has yet been established in the islands, and over the meaning of the phrase "stable government." The significance of this preamble was emphasized by an important episode in the debates over the bill.

An amendment introduced by Senator Clarke of Arkansas provided for the complete and unqualified independence of the Philippines in not less than two years and not more than four years from the date of the approval of the act. This amendment passed the senate by the deciding vote of Vice-President Marshall. It was understood that it had the approval of President Wilson. The amendment was defeated in the house of representatives by a vote of 213 to 165. It has been alleged that this defeat was due to the opposition of twenty-eight Democrats, who were nearly all adherents of the Roman Catholic Church, and whose action was at the instigation of the ecclesiastical authorities in the Philippines. Whether this allegation is justified or not, the circumstance gave occasion for a clever and pertinent re-

joinder by Mr. Quezon, the president of the Philippine senate, at the ensuing St. Patrick's Day banquet in Manila. Referring to Irish politics he said, "We wish for your Irishmen the same independence you wished for us."

Many observers, not only Americans and Filipinos, but also from other nations, have expressed the judgment that the United States should promptly fulfil these promises, actual or assumed, and have declared that failure to do so would involve a serious conflict between the Americans and the Filipinos. Other observers take the more moderate view that the United States should definitely announce its policy, whether it is to be that of granting independence in the near future in full or in modified form, or whether such grant is to be delayed for some specified period, or is to be postponed indefinitely. These latter feel that the real difficulty in the situation is not with which policy may be adopted, but chiefly in the uncertainty which now exists. This view is probably more nearly correct than the former, but it is doubtful whether it is either possible or necessary that the American government should make a definite and binding pronouncement at this or any future time. The situation is open to so many possibilities of change that it is impossible for even the most far-seeing statesman to lay down a policy which circumstances might not render undesirable at any moment.

The generosity, justice, and progressiveness of American rule in the Philippines have been so complete that it is exceedingly difficult for anyone to find reason for objection or serious criticism. The differences of judgment have to do almost entirely with questions of status and but slightly with the policy of ordinary administration. Americans may well be proud of the high character of their record in the Philippine Islands, and, indeed, the Filipinos are frank and generous in their recognition of the benefits which they have received. The liberal reforms accomplished quite outdistance the program sketched by Rizal less than thirty years ago. The progress made in the Philippine Islands in the past quarter century has not been due solely to the Americans. It has been due, in at least as great a degree, to the

readiness with which the people of the islands have accepted American rule and coöperated with the administration in carrying out the various reforms and measures for improvement.

The advance made by the Filipino people themselves is an achievement which it would be difficult to parallel and is most highly praiseworthy. At the present time a considerable percentage of the people of the islands is fitted, at least to a moderate degree, to undertake self-government, but an adequate proportion of the people of the islands will not be fitted for complete independence until a system of compulsory primary education with suitable higher schools is in full operation throughout the archipelago. It is difficult to consider a government based upon the present limited suffrage, which is really a government by a few leaders, by a sort of Filipino aristocracy, as conforming reasonably to the definition of a "stable government." Substantially the whole population of voting age, at least among the Christian element, should become qualified to vote and a reasonable proportion of them should customarily exercise the suffrage, as a prerequisite to independence. As previously indicated, there are other advances, such as the general use of English and greater ability to deal with economic questions, which will also be necessary to fit the people as a whole to undertake self-government with satisfactory prospect of success. These reasons seem to indicate that some measure of American guidance and protection will be necessary for perhaps another generation. Meanwhile, the wisest provisional arrangement will probably be found in the establishment of some form of the dominion type of responsible government.

No one will doubt that the American government can and should guarantee to the Filipinos the same constitutional rights, the same excellent administration, the same privileges of self-government which they have hitherto enjoyed under the sovereignty of the United States, in other words, that there shall be "no backward step." The American government should also assure the people of the islands that it will be the continued policy to promote the spread of educa-

tion, the improvement of public health, and all other measures for the public advancement and welfare which have already been undertaken, with the purpose of extending these advantages as rapidly and completely as possible throughout the islands. A third assurance can also be given by the United States, that the interests and security of the islands internationally will be protected. On a fourth point the United States can give assurance, namely, that adequate hearing shall be given to the Filipino people at Washington on all matters which concern them, by guaranteeing the continuance of the privileges now exercised through their resident commissioners in Washington and, if necessary, by creating additional agencies.

It is, however, seriously doubtful whether it is expedient for the United States to make any promises or give any guarantees with reference to the question of independence or as to future changes in the governmental status. These questions should be solved when the time is ripe, without any prejudices from promises of a prophetic character. At the present time American relations to the Philippines are almost entirely in the nature of according international protection and political guidance, or, in other words, of maintaining and guaranteeing the safety and stability of their position and government. The absolutely political character of American relations to the Philippines needs to be considered in contrast with the rule of Japan in Korea, of France in Indo-China, of the Dutch in the East Indies, and of the British in Malaya, where each power is actually exercising administrative authority over subject peoples which have at best only trifling voice in the management of their governmental affairs. Each one of these dominant powers would naturally assume an unfriendly attitude toward an independent Philippine state, which might prove seriously detrimental without extending to any measures of a hostile character.

The international status of the Philippine Islands was affected both favorably and unfavorably by the actions of the Washington conference. The international guaranty of territorial possessions in the Pacific by the powers con-

cerned²⁵ may be considered as assurance that the Philippine peoples need have no fears of aggressive action from the several nations party to that conference. Should the Philippines, however, assume an entirely independent national status, they would not be a party to the Washington treaties, without new international agreements to that intent. The disarmament provisions adopted by the conference, on the other hand, prevent any further fortification or strengthening of the islands as an American naval base. This, unfortunately, will leave the strategic situation of the Philippine Islands at a disadvantage in comparison with Japan and with the neighboring British possessions, though it may be fairly assumed that there need be no fear of action, by either of these nations, hostile to the interests of the Americans in the islands, or of the Filipinos themselves.

The future of the Philippines will be as bright as has been their past under American rule, if both peoples will continue to deal with one another in the same spirit of justice and fair play, of magnanimity and coöperation, that they have hitherto displayed. It is to the credit of both nations that the highest attainment in the matter of self-government by any eastern people has been achieved by the Filipinos under American guidance. The premier nation of the East in the acceptance and practice of Christianity and democracy is entitled to sing of itself as

Land of the morning.

RECENT EVENTS

The results of the elections held in 1922 involved no significant change. Eighty-six per cent of the 824,058 registered electors voted, a larger number but a smaller proportion than in 1919.²⁶ The session of the Philippine legislature in the early part of 1923 resulted in almost no

²⁵ The four-power pact signed by the United States, Great Britain, France, and Japan affords substantial assurances, though it is not an explicit and ironclad mutual guaranty of their respective possessions.

²⁶ See above, pages 251-252.

completed legislation. Among the measures considered were bills to permit the introduction of woman suffrage, to establish hospitals in each of the twenty-eight of the forty-eight provinces still without them, and to make Manila a free port. Various projects are being carried out and others have been suggested for the improvement of Manila. The design is to make it not merely an important distributing port for American trade in the Far East, but also one of the greatest ports of the whole East.

In the summer of 1923 Governor-General Wood called the legislature into special session to consider legislation to encourage the growing of rubber, and other matters. It is the policy of Governor-General Wood to withdraw the government from connection with the Philippine National Bank,²⁷ with the railroads, and with other business enterprises; and instead to secure legislation which shall attract American capital for the development of resources and business. The legislature is strongly opposed to both these proposals, which are reversals of the policy of the Harrison administration.

The dispute between the governor-general and the legislature, however, actually came to a head over a minor incident on July 23, 1923, when the two houses of the legislature adopted a joint resolution demanding his immediate recall. A week previous the cabinet had presented its resignation, for which the immediate pretext was the reinstatement, as chief of the secret service, of Ray Conley, who had been tried three times on charges of bribery and acquitted. It is alleged that these charges were brought against him because of his activities in suppressing gambling, in which certain influential Filipinos were interested. On the other hand, the action of the governor-general was censured as a breach of Filipino legislation enacted in pursuance of the Jones act and, consequently, as an unwarranted and arbitrary exercise of power. The governor-general continued to conduct the administration through the under-secretaries of the departments and, in general, administrative affairs

²⁷ The government is still fully associated with the bank, which is steadily recovering from its unfortunate experience.

seemed to run smoothly. The fiscal year ending in 1923 was closed with a surplus, as the result of a policy of rigorous retrenchment by which expenditures were reduced from \$50,600,000 in 1921 to \$33,500,000 in 1923. A further saving of \$150,000 is promised in the budget for 1924.

Political agitation, on the other hand, continued active, with Mr. Quezon as the chief spokesman for the supporters of independence. Governor-General Harrison, by his creation of the council of state, with Speaker Osmena of the house and President Quezon of the senate as members, and by his regular consultation with these two nationalist leaders on questions of appointment and policy, had given these two men and the interests which they represented large influence and power. Governor-General Wood, on the contrary, by his policy of interpreting the Jones act strictly and conducting the administration as nearly as possible independently of the legislature, distinctly lessened the influence in governmental matters wielded by these two men. They have, however, adhered consistently to the principles of self-government and independence, which they have advocated throughout their public careers, and have insisted that their opposition to Governor-General Wood is based entirely upon principle. They believe that the executive authority in the Philippines should be responsible to the legislature, and that such responsibility is not inconsistent with the Jones act but, rather, in accordance with its spirit.

The governor-general, on his side, has maintained that, in his position as chief executive in the islands, he is responsible to the American government. He adheres to the principle enunciated in the final paragraph of the Wood-Forbes report that, so long as the government of the United States holds "a position of responsibility" in the Philippines, it must not be "without authority." This difference in point of view between the legislature and the governor-general is due to apparently contradictory provisions in a single sentence of the Jones act:

"The Philippine legislature may thereafter by appropriate legislation increase the number or abolish any of the executive departments, or make such changes in the names

and duties thereof as it may see fit, and shall provide for the appointment and removal of the heads of the executive departments by the governor-general: Provided, That all executive functions of the government must be directly under the governor-general or within one of the executive departments under the supervision and control of the governor-general."

The legislature practically rests its case in favor of parliamentary responsibility on the first part of the above sentence; the governor-general depends upon the latter part of the sentence in asserting his control over the administration. A further complaint of the legislature and the nationalists against Governor-General Wood is that he has vetoed a considerable number of measures of strictly local legislation. They argue that the veto power conferred by the Jones act does not properly extend to this class of measures.

There are, then, two main issues involved: the constitutional relation between the government of the United States and the government of the islands and the provision of capital for the development of insular resources. As set forth in the original lecture,²⁸ the best solution of the former question would probably be the concession to the Philippines of responsible self-government more or less similar to the British type of dominion government. Though Great Britain has responsibility for its dominions, it has practically surrendered authority over them. It is questionable whether corresponding concession is desirable in the case of the Philippines. Dominion status would obviously carry with it the determination of the other issue in accordance with the wishes of the Philippine legislature, unless a different plan should be authorized in the new constituent act. The absence of capital in the islands sufficient for business investment makes doubtful the practicability of the legislature's policy. Either support of Philippine credit by the United States government or arrangements for the investment of American private capital seems to be the alternative if the insular resources are to be developed. Hitherto

²⁸ See above, pages 275-276.

the economic elements in the problem of independence have received too little consideration.

Dominion status, as a provisional arrangement, seems acceptable to the Filipino leaders, as indicated by a joint resolution of the legislature on October 17, 1923, renewing the petition for the recall of Governor-General Wood and adding a request for the appointment of a Filipino in his stead. On the following day Secretary of War Weeks issued a statement upholding Governor-General Wood and his use of the veto power. Advantage was taken of a special election for a member of the Philippine senate to register an expression of opinion on the questions at issue. Though the Nacionalista candidate won, his Democrata opponent received 42 per cent of the votes. In November, leaders of the Democrata party offered their coöperation to the governor-general, perhaps with the hope of receiving appointments to the vacant cabinet offices.

The legislature decided to send Mr. Manuel Roxas, who had succeeded Osmena as speaker of the house, on a special mission to Washington in advocacy of the independence cause. On March 5, 1924, in reply to Speaker Roxas's presentation of the case to him, President Coolidge issued a reply strongly upholding the administration of Governor-General Wood and declaring in the most specific terms that the Filipinos could not yet be considered prepared for self-government. This statement was probably the most pointed and severe in tone of any that ever emanated from the government of the United States with reference to the government of the Philippines. The absence of evidences of conciliation may possibly be explained on the ground that the document was addressed as much to the opponents of the presidential policy in the United States as to the advocates of independence in the islands. On May 10, 1924, the committee on insular affairs of the house of representatives reported a bill introduced by Representative Fairfield of Indiana which has the approval of Mr. Quezon. This measure, known as the Philippine Commonwealth bill, provides that the people of the island shall draft a constitution for the Commonwealth of the Philippines, subject to certain reser-

vations including the final jurisdiction of the United States supreme court, the ultimate supremacy of the president of the United States, American control of foreign affairs, and financial guaranties. There is to be a commissioner appointed by the president and directly representing him in the islands. At the expiration of twenty years, the Philippines shall be recognized by the United States as independent, but with the proviso, similar to the Platt Amendment in the case of Cuba, that the national constitution shall contain certain guaranties, mainly financial. The new nation, it is further provided, "shall never enter into any treaty or other compact with any other foreign power or powers which will impair, or tend to impair the independence of the Philippine Islands, nor in any manner authorize or permit any other foreign power or powers to obtain by colonization or for military or naval purposes or otherwise, lodgment in or control over any portion of said islands." The United States, however, may retain such military and naval reservations as the President may consider necessary. A somewhat similar measure prepared by the corresponding committee of the senate provides for a plebiscite in the islands on the question of independence in 1935.

In the presidential election of 1924, the platform of the Republican party declared, "When it is evident to congress that independence would be better for the people of the Philippines with respect to both their domestic concerns and their status in the world, and the Filipino people then desire complete independence, the American government will gladly accord it." It then continued, "The time for such action has not yet arrived." On the other hand, the Democratic platform announced, "It is now our liberty and our duty to keep our promise to these people by granting them immediately their independence, which they so honorably covet." The Independent Progressive party platform made no reference to the Philippines. Aside from the platform pronouncements, the subject seems to have attracted no discussion in the campaign. In view of these party declarations and of the bills before congress, it seems likely that there may be enacted in the near future a measure,

more or less similar to the Fairfield bill, establishing provisionally a government of the dominion type and fixing a date for the determination of the question of independence. Apparently in expectation of this result, the relations between the administration in the islands and the nationalists have tended to become less strained in recent months.

For some years there has appeared as a permanent item in the Philippine budget an annual appropriation of 1,000,000 pesos (\$500,000) for the promotion of the independence cause. Within recent months this item has been the subject of serious discussion both in Washington and Manila. Though Governor-General Wood has meticulously avoided any interference in this matter, the auditor of accounts in the Philippines has recently forbidden any further drafts on this fund, and the attorney-general of the United States has sustained the ruling. To offset this action an attempt has been made, apparently with success, to raise a sum twice as large by popular subscription.

Considerable disturbances occurred in the southern part of the archipelago among the more backward Mohammedan Moros during several months in 1923-1924. The troubles were, in part, caused by religious fanatics, but it is also alleged that they represented a Mohammedan protest against the participation of Christian Filipinos in their government and against the independence movement. Another unpleasant episode occurred in July, 1924, when it was discovered that a strike plot existed among the Filipino scouts or constabulary. The purpose of the plot, which resulted in the trial and conviction of a considerable number, was to demand pay equal to that of the United States army in the islands.

The latest report of the bureau of education shows the existence of 8,174 schools in the Philippines, of which 7,641 are public schools with 1,394,472 pupils, while the 533 private schools have an attendance of 64,835. The total number of teachers employed is 24,878, of whom only 341 are Americans. The budget for 1924 assigns over twenty-five per cent of the appropriations to the support of education. Arrangements have been made for a commission of Amer-

ican educational experts to visit the Philippines in the near future to investigate the working of the school system and to present recommendations.

SUGGESTIONS FOR READING

Brief surveys of Philippine history are given by Professor David P. Barrows of the University of California, formerly director of education for the Philippines, in *A History of the Philippines* (3rd ed., Yonkers, World Book Company, 1914), and by Professor Leandro H. Fernández, of the University of the Philippines, in *A Brief History of the Philippines* (Boston, Ginn & Company, 1919). A fuller account of the Spanish period will be found in *The Philippine Islands* (3rd ed., New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1906), by John Foreman, an English observer. For the close of Spanish rule and the establishment of American administration the three following works are standard accounts and include much descriptive as well as historical material: *The Americans in the Philippines* (2 vols., Boston, Houghton Mifflin Company, 1914), by James A. Le Roy, covers events to 1900; *The Philippines Past and Present* (2 vols., New York, The Macmillan Company, 1914), by Dean C. Worcester, member of the Philippine commission from 1900 to 1913, covers events to 1913; and *The Philippines* (2 vols., Indianapolis, The Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1916-17), by Charles B. Elliott, member of the Philippine commission from 1910 to 1912, covers to 1916. These may be supplemented by *The Corner-stone of Philippine Independence, a Narrative of Seven Years* (New York, The Century Co., 1922), by Francis Burton Harrison, governor-general of the Philippines from 1913 to 1921, though its chief value is as an *apologia* for his administration.

A readable, descriptive volume is *Philippine Life in Town and Country* (New York, G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1905), by James A. Le Roy, who was for a time connected with the Philippine commission. The following manuals of information on economic and social conditions present much information in convenient form: *A Handbook of the Philippines* (3rd ed., Chicago, A. C. McClurg & Co., 1909), by Hamilton M. Wright; and *Economic Conditions in the Philippines* (2nd ed., Boston, Ginn & Company, 1920), by Hugo H. Miller; both by authors acquainted at first-hand with the islands. An excellent manual on governmental and political affairs is *Philippine Government* (New York, D. C. Heath & Company, 1923), by George A. Malcolm, a justice of the supreme court of the Philippines, and Maximo M. Kalaw.

The views of the Filipino advocates of independence are set forth by Professor Maximo M. Kalaw, of the University of the Philippines, in *The Case for the Filipinos* (New York, The Century Co., 1916), and in *Self-Government in the Philippines* (New York,

The Century Co., 1919). The *Philippine Commission of Independence Press Bulletin* (Washington, 1919ff.), issued nine times a year, is an able compilation of the latest materials for propaganda purposes. The *Philippine Republic* (Washington, 1923ff.) is an illustrated monthly devoted to the spread of information favorable to Philippine independence. There is no good recent exposition of the case except from the Philippine side, but a carefully impartial statement is the article, *Philippine Independence* (*Foreign Affairs*, 2, 488-499, March 15, 1924), by Charles C. Batchelder, who was delegate of the secretary of the interior of the Philippine Islands from 1914 to 1916.

Of fundamental importance, despite its brevity, is the famous Wood-Forbes Report: *Condition in Philippine Islands, Report of the Special Mission to the Philippine Islands to the Secretary of War* (House of Representatives, 67th Congress, 2nd Session, Document No. 325, Washington, Government Printing Office, 1921). In reply to it there has been issued the *Filipino Appeal for Freedom, the Philippine Parliamentary Mission's Statement of the Actual Conditions in the Philippine Islands and a Summary of Philippine Problems* (House of Representatives, 67th Congress, 4th Session, Document No. 511, Washington, Government Printing Office, 1923). Owing to its later publication it utilizes information not available at the writing of the Wood-Forbes Report.

CHAPTER VI

PROBLEMS OF PROGRESS IN THE EAST

THE contacts of western nations with eastern peoples are not primarily the contacts of superiors with inferiors. It is customary for most people in western lands to look down upon the populations of the East in general as distinctly inferior to themselves. It must be borne in mind, however, that in making comparisons between two different sets of peoples it is necessary to make them with a certain amount of detail, taking care always that people of the same corresponding position in the two nations are brought into comparison. It is absurd, for instance, that people of noble birth or of high intellectual training should be regarded as typical of the West, but the coolie laborer as representative of the Chinese.

Most peoples of the East are of entirely different race from the peoples of the West, so that the comparison involves the question of the relative merits of the different races. It is customary for members of the white race to regard themselves as unquestionably superior to any others. In America, where the white is brought into sharp relief against the African negro, there is a tendency to regard all persons not of white race as being as much inferior to the best of white people as are the majority of the descendants of negro slaves once brought from the Guinea coast of Africa. This inference is obviously erroneous when one is dealing, as in the case of the Filipinos, with peoples who have been Christianized for about three centuries, or with a people with centuries of high artistic development like the Japanese, or with peoples such as the Hindus, with more than two millenniums of literary tradition.

In the comparison of East and West it is customary for the westerner to regard whatever backwardness there may

be in the East as due to the inferiority of eastern peoples. To westerners, the persons of the Asiatic nations seem to be on a distinctly lower intellectual and moral level and incapable of the same sort of achievement as their own. Hence they talk in the parlance of Kipling of "the white man's burden." It is, of course, true that there are differences in the degree of development between the nations of western Europe and those of eastern Asia, and it is also true that there are various gradations in the different countries of eastern Asia. There are those to whom the idea of the white man's burden is fairly applicable, while there are others to whom it is utterly irrelevant. An educated American lady visitor to the Louisiana Purchase Exposition at St. Louis who was being guided through certain exhibits by a young Filipino friend of mine expressed great surprise that a Filipino could be so cultured and intelligent. She had just seen in a different part of the exposition some Igorrots, who belong to one of the most backward tribes in the world and who happen to live in the Philippine Islands. The young man who was her guide, however, was descended from a long lineage of Christian and cultured people and might fairly claim equality with people of Christian culture in any land.

If the contacts of the western nations with the eastern nations are not primarily the relations of superiors with inferiors, the question arises as to what the nature of those contacts really is, what the proper comparisons between the contrasting racial types may be. Careful comparison of the culture and progress of any European people at any date prior to 1500 with the conditions obtaining among the peoples of Egypt, India, China, or Japan at the same date would reveal surprisingly few differences in relative advancement in civilization, due attention being given to comparing groups of like social status. Down to about that date the eastern and western peoples alike maintained substantially the same status of existence and progress.

For the West, however, at the opening of the sixteenth century, the voyages of Columbus and Vasco da Gama, the scientific discoveries of Copernicus and Vesalius, the religious

reforms of Luther and Calvin, and later the new philosophy of Bacon and Descartes, loosened old bonds and broke through old barriers so that the West was set free to think and act. One may speculate on the different results for the future of the world had an Indian fleet reached the coast of Portugal in 1498 and had a Chinese expedition entered San Francisco Bay in 1492. The fact is they did not, and therein lies the difference between the nations of Asia and the nations of Europe. The changes which took place in the West and which are spoken of as constituting the Renaissance have had no parallel in the East and, while in the West it became possible to get beyond the scholastic philosophy and theology of the Middle Ages, in the East there was no such new departure. The Chinese continued to think in the terms of the teaching of Confucius, who had been in his grave for more than twenty centuries, and in a similar way the peoples of the other eastern lands remained under bondage to old traditions of thought.

Comparisons of the East with the West in 1750 would have shown no great differences among the masses of the peoples, but would have revealed the leaders, the better classes in the East, clearly but not hopelessly distanced by their western compeers. The critical changes had been in the relative areas of geographical and intellectual activity. The peoples of Europe by their voyages of geographical discovery had brought the whole circuit of the globe within their ken. No such enlargement of the geographical horizon occurred for any of the eastern peoples. They remained hemmed in by the same narrow bounds for the physical world as had encompassed their ancestors. While in the West great scientific thinkers were teaching entirely new views of the relation of the earth to the universe, no corresponding broadening of the view of life as a whole in the universe occurred in the East.

In the West the Renaissance brought to Christianity, after fifteen centuries of development, the advantages of comparison with the highest intellectual attainments of ancient Greece and Rome. This developed a broader way of looking at the problems of life in all that group of ideas customarily

called religion. In the East it is true that Buddhism, for instance, has for centuries stood the test of contact with other faiths, but with a different result, probably due to differences in the nature of the comparisons made. The comparative tests of religions in Egypt and India have served to sharpen the lines of demarcation between the faiths, and in China and Japan, on the other hand, to blur them, rather than to give to the leaders of each, or any, of the faiths a broadened vision.

As has been indicated, between 1500 and 1750 there had occurred in the West a broadening of the outlook of the cultured class upon the world and upon life, while the East had seen no similar change. On the other hand, as late as 1750, no changes had taken place in either the East or the West, which sufficiently affected the conditions under which people lived and worked to create a clear contrast between Europe and Asia, nor had marked differences yet appeared in matters of government. The description of the condition of peasant life in France in the eighteenth century, given by numerous writers and made familiar by Taine, might well apply with slight change to the peasant of China at the same date. The administration of the French government under Louis XV stands in comparison rather than contrast with that of China under his contemporary, Ch'ien Lun. The French navigator La Perouse, who visited Manila in 1787, declared of the Filipinos, "These people seemed to me no way inferior to those of Europe."

The industrial revolution in England and the political revolutions in America and France in the latter half of the eighteenth century started Europe and America ahead of the Asiatic countries by leaps and bounds. One might again speculate on the difference for the world's history had James Watt, Benjamin Franklin, and George Stephenson been Chinese, and had India produced Washington and Jefferson, Rousseau and Napoleon. It is not yet determinable what the relative potentialities of European and Asiatic peoples may be. The fact is that the orientals have not developed their potentialities but remain medieval while the occidentals have developed, have passed through the Renaissance and the

industrial and political revolutions, and have become modern. There is no need to discuss questions of inferiority and superiority. There are two insuperable facts, the existence of a difference and the nature of the difference which is that between medieval and modern.

As the Renaissance had affected the freedom of man's thought and the breadth of his vision, so the industrial revolution altered the conditions under which people lived and worked, and the American and French Revolutions radically modified both the form of government and the views of the people concerning the relations between themselves and government. These latter changes, which happened contemporaneously, might conceivably have occurred at different times. They both took place long after the Renaissance, though there is no very good reason why either or both of them might not have occurred at the same time with that great movement. This point with regard to the time element in these changes is of significance to the present discussion because the nations of the East are at the present time being called upon to crowd together at the same time all three of these movements. They are being asked to gulp down in a single generation the dose of reform at which the Europeans sipped slowly for four centuries or more. This incidentally brings into question the relative potentialities of the East and the West for adaptation and progress.

The political reform represented by the American and French Revolutions has given the world that great complex of political ideals and governmental methods known as democracy. It has, indeed, changed the form of government by creating republics and setting up parliaments where once monarchs governed, as they claimed, by divine right and imposed laws by their own personal authority. The growth of democracy has, however, involved a great deal more than this outward change of the form of government. It has effected an enormous extension in the size of the political class. In the monarchies of the olden time there was, in addition to the king or emperor, a very small number of people to whom he intrusted authority and upon whom

he relied for the execution of his will. The political class was, consequently, but a very small fraction of the whole community.

Democracy, on the other hand, has by rapid stages brought one group after another of the population into the political class. First, the right of suffrage was granted to large property owners; next, the franchise was extended so that all property owners might enjoy it; then came the idea of universal manhood suffrage; and only yesterday, as it were, women were allowed the enjoyment of this same privilege. The change, however, has been more even than the enlargement of the political class; it has also given to these successive groups the facilities to become politically minded so that they might be intelligent actors in the civic life of their nations. The change may be summed up as the transition of the individual from the status of subject to the status of citizen.

The industrial revolution, which began in England with Watt's invention of the steam engine in 1765, had not yet had time to spread beyond the bounds of England before the French Revolution upset conditions upon the continent of Europe. This great political upheaval postponed the spread of the industrial revolution among the continental nations until after the overthrow of Napoleon. From that time forward it progressed rapidly in western Europe, particularly in France and in the valley of the Rhine, and less rapidly in other nations in proportion as one moved further south, east, or north. The United States was brought within the scope of this movement by the necessities of the Napoleonic struggle which, for it, culminated in the War of 1812. The first clear evidence of a change in the United States is registered in the tariff act of 1816.

The phrase industrial revolution covers a vast range of ideas which it is necessary to define with some clearness. In its broadest sense the industrial revolution includes all changes in the processes of economic production and distribution. In its narrowest sense, however, the phrase is customarily applied to the change in the methods of manufacture brought about by the substitution of power-driven

machinery for hand work.¹ Even so, it includes more than the mere mechanical change, because under the old order it was possible for practically any individual to be a manufacturer in his own home. Under the new system the cost of installing and maintaining the machinery was prohibitive to any such arrangement. It became necessary to erect the machinery in special buildings and to provide, by the utilization of capital, for the great cost involved. The workers then came and contracted with the individuals who controlled the capital, and hence the manufacturing machinery, to operate the machines in return for fixed payments known as wages. Thus the industrial revolution changed both the method of manufacture from hand work to machine work and the condition of life of the industrial workers from the domestic to the factory system.

As the factories turned out more goods it was necessary to find larger markets in which to sell the goods, and the demand for the manufactured goods, in its turn, made it necessary to draw from larger and more distant sources of supply the raw materials which were to be utilized. In other words, both in securing the materials to manufacture and in marketing the output the industrial revolution created a commercial revolution. Each of these, because of their large demands for prompt and easy exchange of commodities and of the necessity of utilizing invested capital either to maintain the factory or to carry stocks of goods in transit between the producer and the consumer, required, in addition, the development of banking on an extensive scale. Even the workingman had his need of the bank, and for his

¹ The potent fact was that the new machines were power-driven. This required not merely the establishment of factories, but also their location where streams furnished water power or where coal mines assured a convenient supply of fuel to develop steam power. Hence arose the aggregation of workers in urban industrial communities. Progress in the distribution of electric power may not only diffuse the factories among smaller communities, but even displace the factory system by a new domestic scheme of manufacturing. Other factors, such as efficiency of operation, may, however, prevent such a reversion.

purposes, in large measure, grew up the savings banks, and later still the postal savings banks.

The development of the factory system carried with it the gathering of large numbers of people into areas closely adjacent to the factories. This took them away from the land, so that they were no longer able, as had been the case under the domestic system, to work part of their time in raising their food supply from the plot of land on which they lived and to devote odd hours to their particular manufacturing enterprise. Henceforth they lived packed in tenement quarters without any such opportunity and entirely dependent for their food supply upon their money wages. There was thus created in the population a large element which made no contribution whatsoever to the production of the food which they ate. This made it necessary that those who still remained on the land should supply a larger output of edible products. This in its turn, therefore, meant an agricultural revolution which involved the use of improved implements and of farm machinery as well as the development of scientific methods of agriculture and of animal husbandry.

Furthermore, all these changes involved the prompt transportation of goods from one place to another; of food from the farm to the factory city, of the raw materials, perhaps from distant countries, to the factory, and of the manufactured goods from the industrial centers to the consumers in all parts of the world. These demands made necessary extraordinary improvements in the means of transportation. First came the development of the steamboat, followed soon by oceanic steam navigation. Then came the railroad, and much more recently the trolley and the automobile and most recently of all, the aeroplane. Then, too, it became necessary to make communication upon business propositions more promptly. It became important, for instance, that both buyer and seller should be aware of the prices ruling at a particular moment, hence came improvements in the postal service and the development of the telegraph and the telephone.

The differences between the East and the West resulting

from the political and industrial revolutions reached the maximum about 1880, when constitutional government and the new industrial system had become well established in most European countries and in America, while but few, if any, of their effects were visible in the eastern lands. At this critical juncture, following the Congress of Berlin, began the intense rivalry of the western nations in the commercial and colonial exploitation of Asia and Africa. In other words, at about this date most of the European countries had attained the full development of the most important changes involved in the political and industrial revolutions while as yet practically none of these changes had occurred in the East.

The contrast appeared with peculiar sharpness, since the European nations, all enjoying the benefits of these changes, found themselves plunged into bitter competition with one another in the effort to secure more advantageously the necessary supplies of raw materials and of food, while at the same time seeking extended markets for their products. Under the mistaken theory that trade follows the flag, the commercial competition became rather more obviously a race in colonial expansion. Each of the different nations sought to secure monopoly control for itself over a large part of the earth's surface and of its population. This contest began about 1880 and reached its climax in the World War, which came at a time when the available supply of unappropriated lands and peoples was practically exhausted, and when the competition between the expanding, exploiting nations had become keenest.

This aggressive activity of the western peoples has in its turn forced upon the eastern peoples a struggle for economic and political existence. The peoples of Japan and China and India are finding that the conditions of life for them are not being determined in their own communities or their own nations but are dependent upon conditions far from them. Large numbers in Japan and China, for instance, are dependent upon the rate ruling in the silk market in New York. The question of food or famine for the people of India appears to be determined by the price of wheat on the

Liverpool exchange. The importation of an adequate, instead of an inadequate, supply of rice into the Philippine Islands is dependent not upon the market conditions at Manila or Saigon, but on the price quotations in London and New York.

Though the oriental has long experienced the necessity of reducing his wants to a minimum and has complacently sought in philosophy and religion to achieve the negation of desire, he is now confronted not only by an economic order directed to the abundant satisfaction of needs but also by religious and philosophical systems intent on the stimulation of desire. The philosophic and economic asceticism of the East is being placed on trial in competition with a philosophy of satiety and a system of economic abundance.

Politically, in like manner, the activities of the western nations have radically changed conditions for the nations of Asia. The problem of government in China to-day might exist in a measure were there none of these western contacts, but it would not exist in the same kind or to the same degree except for these very western contacts. More than twenty times in its history China has turned out one dynasty of monarchs and established another, but never before has China turned out its monarchs and created instead a republic. China has changed its dynasties repeatedly without any consideration of even the existence of Europe or America. To-day the rise and fall of its cabinet ministers are dependent in no small measure upon the frowns or the smiles of the statesmen of Europe and America. More important still is the fact that the people of China, of Japan, and of India are coming to think of their problems of government in very much the same way that the people of England and of the United States do. The process of the extension of the franchise is going forward rapidly. The transition from subject to citizen is occurring at many times the rate of speed under which it was effected in western lands.

This juxtaposition of the civilization of the West, moved by the industrial revolution, with the old civilizations of the East, absolutely unchanged by any readjustments for many

centuries, raises the serious question which of the two will be able to survive the inevitable conflict. Will the whole world be plunged back into medievalism by an Asiatic triumph, or will all move forward together in modern ways under the leadership of the more progressive western nations? The situation is not wholly unlike that which existed when the Germanic barbarians confronted the ancient Roman Empire and its classical culture.

While this struggle is inevitable, and one or the other of the two types of civilization, the medieval or the modern, must triumph, there can be little doubt that the fittest will survive, that western material progress has made the world so small that it will force the eastern peoples to adjust their economic life to the modern system created by the industrial revolution. Such evidence as is available from the changes which have already taken place clearly indicates this as the probable result. Thus far at any rate it is the West which is modifying the East, and it is not the East which is causing readjustments in the West.

As the industrial revolution in the West coincided with a tremendous political change—the development of greater democracy in government—so it seems inevitable that if the eastern nations are to accept the changes involved in the industrial revolution they too will find it obligatory to reconstruct their political systems. They will, however, find this necessary not merely for the purpose of democratization to correspond with the rights in economic welfare and in intellectual development of the masses, but they will also find it indispensable as a means of guaranteeing their own national integrity and of assuring to themselves freedom for the development of their own national life. They must give themselves vigorous governments able to contend on equal terms with the great imperialistic governments of the West unless their political independence is to go down at the very time that they are accepting the western economic methods in place of their own.

It must not, however, be inferred that the constitutional and administrative changes in the eastern nations will be along the same lines as in the West, or that they will result

in producing the same types of government. There are elements in the racial character, the geographical surroundings, and the historical developments of the eastern peoples that make it not merely possible, but probable, that they will find it expedient to work out their political progress in accordance with new theories and with the creation of new methods and instrumentalities suitable to their peculiar conditions and needs.

In each one of the countries studied in these lectures the last forty years have seen rapid extension of all the modern forms of improved communication and transportation: steam navigation, railways, metaled roads and automobiles, telegraphs and telephones, even wireless and aeroplanes. In every case there is an obvious intention to carry these developments further rather than to check them. The East is clearly finding it to its own advantage to adopt these important inventions of the West. It might seem to be a fair test of the degree of progress of these different eastern countries to take the ratio of railway mileage to the area of the country, or to its population. That, however, would result in certain inequalities in each case, but especially in the case of the Philippine Islands, where there is an unusual degree of dependence upon shipping; yet the ratios of railway mileage to area may be indicated for such rough value as they may possess. The number of square miles of area to one mile of railroad is approximately 18 in Japan, 48 in India, 115 in Egypt, 143 in the Philippines, and 278 in China, as compared with 12 in the United States. A more exact measure is probably to be found in the ratio of telegraph mileage to area. The number of square miles of area to one mile of telegraph line is approximately 5 in Japan, 17 in the Philippines, 20 in India, 38 in China, and 40 in Egypt, as compared with 10 in the United States, where the development has been limited by the unexampled extension of the telephone service. Outside large cities with considerable foreign communities, the telephone is rarely found in the eastern countries named.

None the less, the improvements in transportation which have been effected in the several countries have resulted in

a tremendous expansion of commerce in each case, and this the eastern peoples as well as the western are clearly finding to their advantage to maintain and develop. In 1921 the proportion of the total foreign trade to each inhabitant was about \$4 in China, \$6 in India, \$19 in the Philippines, \$25 in Japan, and \$29 in Egypt, as compared with \$70 for the United States and \$180 for the United Kingdom. For 1922 the figures are apparently somewhat higher, amounting in the case of both Egypt and the Philippines to about \$35. This growth of commerce has resulted in the steady replacement of barter by the use of money, which in turn has resulted in rapid expansion, especially in the last twenty years, of banking facilities. These changes have likewise found obvious and ready acceptance in the East, though the several nations differ widely in their capacity to profit by their utilization.

In the fields of manufacturing, mining, and agriculture, however, the situation is radically different. These occupations concern the habits of life and work and the interests of the great masses of the people instead of the affairs of small selected classes who have been chiefly affected by the changes previously considered. The eastern peoples have been accustomed to carry on such manufactures as they found desirable in their homes, or in neighboring little shops, with a minimum use of primitive tools or appliances. Manufacturing with them remains prevailingly a mere adjunct to other occupations of life as was formerly the case in Europe and America. Indeed, it has largely been a matter of family economy or, in certain respects, of village economy, to make the articles necessary to supply the needs of the immediate group. This domestic system continues to exist everywhere throughout the East and the observer will see abundant evidences of it as he passes along the street in any city or village.

Beside this ancient domestic system, there is, however, growing up the new factory system of the West. In India, China, or Japan the introduction of this new system involves more radical adjustments to-day than it did in Europe a century ago, and consequently greater hardships for the

working classes. Except in Japan the development of the factory system has been mainly dependent on foreign enterprise, and in no case has the progress been very remarkable until since the outbreak of the World War in 1914. It is, therefore, quite too soon to venture a prediction of the outcome.

The new system offers two entirely different sets of problems. In the first place, there is the problem of the migration of people from the rural districts into new and rapidly growing urban communities, and, therefore, into crowded and unsanitary surroundings. It places the people in entirely unfamiliar conditions of living and produces not only the absolutely inevitable evils of poverty, but also numerous social evils which are more difficult either to avoid or to combat.

The East, however, has the advantage of being forewarned and also forearmed by the experience of the western nations with exactly these same difficulties in their own industrial revolution. The East is not avoiding and cannot entirely evade these unpleasant developments, but it can do much to hasten their passing and to ameliorate the evil conditions while they last. The East has the advantage of being able to benefit by the experience of the West, not only through observation, but also through the direct advice and assistance of those familiar with the problems in the West, who are anxious to assist the East to avoid such evil practices as child labor, excessive hours of work, unsanitary factories, and unguarded machines.

On the other hand, there are not merely the problems of the actual manual labor involved in manufacture but also the managerial and capitalistic problems. There can be little doubt that the peoples of the East can learn to become more or less efficient factory workers. One who has visited the factories of Japan or China or India can testify to their skill. It must be recognized, however, that there is genuine doubt as to the ability of any of these eastern peoples to compete in efficiency with the factory workers of western Europe or the United States. Perhaps it is only a matter of time and experience to bring them up to similar stand-

ards, though it is more probable that a really fundamental change will be required, for the oriental must learn the value of the quick use of time. The oriental attitude is that of having all the time there is, and such a view of life does not make for efficiency in terms of the factory system.

On the managerial side the situation is apparently even worse. Oriental management of factory enterprises, whether in the supervision of the shops or in organization and direction through the office, has revealed unfortunately few examples of ability and success comparable to those demanded and achieved in the West. Cases have been cited where attempts have been made to carry out manufacturing enterprises as purely native undertakings, and where, after their failure, a few western experts have stepped in and made the same plants with the same workers not merely successful, but highly profitable. In the matter of capital Japan is the only one of the oriental nations which has yet learned the lesson, to any considerable degree, of the conduct of business enterprises on the joint-stock corporation basis, which in the West has come to be regarded as indispensable in all great industrial undertakings.

The Philippines is the only one of the five countries under consideration which may be regarded as a new or young nation economically. In the other four countries the economic order is hoary with age but suffering from arrested development. Japan is the only one of the four that has made considerable progress in the modernization of its venerable economic order. The outstanding fact is the terrific poverty, the enormous masses living very close to the margin of existence. Modern methods and greater efficiency can probably raise the standard of living, but these will require capital. With the masses living close to the margin of existence the countries have no stores of savings on which to draw. The deposits *per capita* in their postal and other savings banks are pitifully small. There is undoubtedly a large amount of hoarded, consequently unproductive, wealth mainly in the hands of a small number of persons, especially in India, but to a less degree probably in China as well.

The welfare of these eastern peoples demands that they

learn as speedily as possible to get their talents out of the napkins and into investments in productive enterprises of their own. Until this happens their talents will continue to be taken from them and given in interest payments to the western investors who already have more. Egypt, India, and China each already have considerable burdens of indebtedness to the West, partly, if not chiefly, incurred for the development of railways and other modern enterprises necessary for the progress of the country. Japan and the Philippines are not free from these encumbrances but their obligations are less onerous. The faster the East learns to invest such funds as it has, the more rapidly will it develop its own supplies of capital and the sooner will it be able to free itself from economic dependence and from indebtedness to the West. Pending this accomplishment, eastern nations must make such accommodations of their affairs as will not merely permit but actually attract the investment of western capital to assist in their development. The financiers of the West, on their side, should limit to the minimum their demands for guaranties of political, legal, and economic security, in order to make the period of economic dependence as brief and as little irritating as possible.

Undoubtedly the East will find itself compelled to accommodate itself to the West, or more correctly to the modern economic order created by the industrial revolution, not only in the matter of capital but also in its labor system. Already Japan, the most progressive of these nations, finds itself confronted by a labor problem, that is, a readjustment of the position of the laborer in the economic and social order. Ideas of social democracy, and even of socialism, have gained extraordinary currency in Japan in the last decade. Undoubtedly similar influences will pervade the other countries as soon as they attain similar progress in their industrial revolution.

It is a real puzzle for an occidental to understand how it has happened that the vast mineral resources of some of these eastern lands have remained hitherto almost untouched. There are, however, several factors which furnish

the explanation. Besides the difficulty of actually extracting the minerals from the earth there are the problems of carrying on the processes necessary to transform the crude minerals into usable metal products. Furthermore, there are the questions of capital investment, of management, of labor, and of transportation. When all these items are considered it does not appear so strange that little mining had been conducted in any eastern country prior to the present generation.

At least one other factor of importance enters into the case. In China, for instance, the system of "squeeze" is said to be so serious as to make it almost prohibitive to mine and market coal which is found in perfectly satisfactory condition and location with reference to important cities. Meanwhile those cities are importing from overseas, at great expense, such coal as they can afford to use. Again, except in Japan, the exploitation of mineral wealth in the East has been conducted chiefly by foreigners, and in all cases the major development has been within the present decade.

Turning to agriculture, it must be observed that most of the land now under cultivation in these countries of the East is of necessity, owing to the character of the land or to the size of the holdings, worked on the small farming, or almost horticultural, basis. Rarely in any of these countries, except in newly developed sections such as Hokkaido, the northern island in Japan, or Manchuria, can large-scale farming with modern agricultural machinery be carried on. Most of the farm work is done with primitive implements and by methods which have been employed for centuries but have passed out of use even in the small farming areas of western Europe. Much advantage could be gained by the use of the improved hand implements of western lands. The steel hoe and spade possess a far greater efficiency than the miserable makeshifts still in use in China, India, and elsewhere.

Scientific agriculture seems still to be a novelty in western countries, but it already has achieved highly important results which can render rich contribution to the needs of

the East through studies of fertilizers, seeds, pests, and many other subjects. This same observation also applies in the case of animal husbandry. Beginnings are actually being made in each of the countries studied but, except in a few special lines such as silk culture in Japan and in certain areas of China, no considerable results have yet been obtained.

One of the greatest achievements effected by the eastern peoples themselves with reference to agriculture, and one to which western experts have also added most, has been the extension of irrigation. This has had the double advantage of enlarging the cultivable area and of helping to stabilize production. A considerable extension of the area of tillage has also been effected in recent years in each of the countries through other means as well.

The use of improved implements and methods and the application of science will be absolutely necessary in the agricultural development of all these lands if the industrial revolution in its other phases is to proceed in them as it has in Europe. These changes cannot be effected rapidly enough under the normal working of economic laws. Much will need to be done by various educational methods such as have been worked out by the agricultural schools and colleges of the western nations in their extension services.

In every one of the countries discussed the poverty is appalling and is increasing with the growth of the urban population, but in the major portion of their areas the climatic conditions reduce needs for a tolerable existence to a minimum. In spite of the destitution in southern China and India, for instance, little expenditure is required for housing, heat, or clothing, which are all indispensable and expensive for those living in cooler climates. Even the food supply involves less difficulty and expense. If the West with its industrial revolution continues to press upon the East, there must result either the adoption of the western methods for increasing and cheapening the supply of the necessities of life, or famine. A tragic aspect of the destitution is the number unfitted by age, disease, and physical defects to support themselves properly in the social conditions under which they exist.

Underlying the various considerations which have been thus far presented are two fundamental economic considerations known as the law of diminishing returns and the Malthusian theory of population. With the probable exception of the Philippines, it seems clear that the law of diminishing returns is already operating. Japan, China, and Egypt are importing more food products than they export. India is exporting slightly more than it imports, but the situation is deceptive, partly because a large proportion of the exports is for the single item, tea, and partly because of the British control of the economic situation. India really needs far more than Mr. Gandhi's emphasis on home industries, the active consideration of its agricultural situation and the development of its food supply. Though the Philippine exports of food articles greatly exceed in value the food imports, the exports are made up chiefly of two specialized items, coconut products and sugar, but the imports include considerable amounts of several staple articles, especially rice. In view of these facts it does not seem probable that any of these countries, except the Philippines, can expect to maintain a population much in excess of the present number, even when allowance is made for possible extensions of the cultivable area and for the utilization of improved methods of agriculture.

Turning to consider the application of the Malthusian theory to the situation, it appears from the latest census returns that the population of Egypt has increased 85% in 30 years; of the Philippines, 35% in 15 years; of Japan, 52% in 38 years; of India, 11% in 30 years; of the United Kingdom, 24% in 30 years, and of the United States, 68% in 30 years. The annual rate of increase in the United States, the Philippines, and Egypt has therefore been nearly identical; for Japan, which has increased a little more than half as rapidly, the rate has been about 50% greater than in the United Kingdom, while in India the rate has been less than half that for the United Kingdom. The evidence is unmistakable that the extraordinary rates of growth in Egypt and the Philippines were due to the unusual conditions created by the British and American occupations

respectively, just as it is that the rate in the United States was due to immigration. In the case of each of the countries mentioned the census returns show that the rate of increase was slower in the last ten-year period, except in the Philippines, for which a census return is not available, but their records of vital statistics reveal a similar decline in the rate of growth. Though such calamities as war and plague were prevalent in the decade, careful study of the data proves that they were not wholly accountable for the decline.

These facts indicate that the law of diminishing returns is already operative, in accordance with the Malthusian theory, to check the growth of population. For China no reliable data are available, but careful students have come to the conclusion that, whereas the population increased with extraordinary rapidity in the eighteenth century, it has remained stationary or nearly so through the past century. Observers are practically unanimous in the conviction that not even the utilization of undeveloped lands and of improved agricultural methods will permit China to maintain a population much in excess of the present number. Consequently, if better sanitary conditions and medical service shall reduce the present excessive death rate, there must be a corresponding limitation of the present unusually high birth rate. The situation of India is substantially similar. Only some extraordinary economic readjustment, which one cannot now forecast, will relieve Egypt from arresting its abnormal increase of population in the very near future. The Philippines may be able to postpone for some time the diminishing of its birth rate, but only by rapid expansion and improvement of its agriculture. The case of Japan has already received full consideration.²

If, therefore, as seems probable, the situation in these eastern lands is resolving itself in accordance with the Malthusian theory, the time is not far distant when extreme economic distress will confront them each unless the birth rate is limited to the point necessary to maintain a stable

² See above, pages 222-229.

population, as has become the case in France.³ The alternatives are apparently restricted to vast importations of food products or to migration. The opportunities for either of these solutions are already limited and are annually being lessened, quite apart from any question of international action or race prejudice. The effort of any one of these nations to force an adjustment on either of these lines, especially the latter, such as has been frequently imputed to Japan, could scarcely fail to produce an international catastrophe. Passion or sentiment are dangerous explosives to employ in the matter. Thorough study and expert adjustment alone can furnish a secure and reasonable settlement of the problem in its international ramifications.

From the West the East needs to learn the methods for arresting the spread of plague and other preventable pestilences, and for the care and cure of the sick and the defective. It must even learn some of the rudiments of sanitation, starting with provision for pure drinking water and for the disposal of sewage and garbage. The excessively high death rates and especially the frightful infant mortality in all these countries is incompatible with economic welfare and with reasonable standards of civilization. The figures with regard to infant mortality furnish another test of progress which is illuminating. In the United States 10 per cent of the children under one year of age die annually; in Japan, 17 per cent; in the Philippine provinces, 14 per cent; in Manila, 21 per cent; in India, at least 21 per cent; while official data are not available for Egypt or China, it is estimated that the rate is about 25 per cent in the former and approaches 50 per cent in the latter. The results of the efforts already made for improvement are convincing arguments for the steady prosecution of every possible enterprise for the promotion of public health; for instance, in the Philippine provinces the infant deaths in 1920 were only 75 per cent of the number in 1910, and in

³ For an up-to-date discussion of these problems on broad lines, but with slight attention to the East, see E. M. East, *Mankind at the Crossroads* (New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1923).

Manila the number decreased to only 50 per cent of the total a decade earlier.

Although these matters primarily concern the peoples of the East it is obvious that they are not without their effects upon the West. Unwholesome sanitary conditions in several different ways hamper the extension of intercourse and the development of commerce. There is a natural repugnance to traveling in unsanitary lands, and to contact with peoples or with goods that have come from pestilential countries. The West, moreover, must not only quarantine itself against infection from the East, but it has an obligation to itself and to humanity as a whole to do everything possible for the improvement of conditions of living in eastern lands. Such institutions as the Peking Union Medical College and Hospital, and such work as has been accomplished by the Americans in the Philippines are illustrations of what can and ought to be done. After all, the West can make but little direct contribution to the East in this matter or any other. Its chief responsibility lies in teaching the East to care for itself.

With all allowance for the poverty of the countries studied, it does not seem that taxes are excessive or that public debts constitute an unreasonable burden. The *per capita* proportions of the taxes and of all public debts in India, China, and the Philippines are among the very lowest in the world. The burden of Japan is distinctly larger but, with greater progress in adjustment to western ways, it is probably not much more seriously felt. Egypt fares worst of the five, but its affliction is inherited from the period prior to British occupation and is due to the reckless extravagance of a single despot, Ismail. The five countries taken together have a population at least seven times greater than the continental part of the United States, but the total of their annual taxes is only one half that for the support of the national government of the United States, and their national debts amount to less than one fourth the national debt of the United States.

Considering the favorable showing of the United States in comparison with Great Britain or France in the *per capita*

incidence of either debt or taxes it becomes clear that the financial situation of the eastern lands cannot be regarded as disproportionately burdensome even in view of the differences in economic status.⁴ Their situation, however, may become unduly and unjustly burdensome unless adjustment to the conditions created by the industrial revolution is steadily advanced in such a way as to assure that production will keep pace with the growing needs. The basic problem is, of course, a problem of food supply, but there is the further problem in each country of producing enough output of one sort or another to insure to the population of the country concerned at least the indispensable means of existence.

While the western peoples worked out the industrial revolution by the tedious, painful, and costly process of trial and error, eastern peoples, as already suggested, have the opportunity, through intelligent study and application, to arrive at the results by short-cut methods, but they must avoid the opposite danger of a short circuit. Educational progress at the most rapid possible rate is, therefore, necessary for the eastern peoples, and in this educational development the emphasis must at the outset, at any rate, be placed upon vocational and professional rather than literary training.

⁴Including all imposts national and local, the tax rate *per capita* for Japan in 1912-13 was \$5.54, in 1920-21, \$12.35; for the United States in 1912-13, \$22.95, in 1920-21, \$79.15; for the United Kingdom in 1912-13, \$26.07, in 1920-21, \$124.84. Calculated on the prewar purchasing power basis the figures *per capita* for 1920-21 would amount to \$5.35 for Japan, \$40.59 for the United States, and \$46.07 for the United Kingdom. Reckoned on the prewar purchasing power basis as percentage of the prewar national income the figures for Japan were 19.1% in 1912-13 and 18.4% in 1920-21; for the United States in 1912-13, 6.9%, in 1920-21, 11.4%; for the United Kingdom in 1912-13, 10.7%, in 1920-21, 19.0%. These data are derived from *Taxation and Income, Research Report Number 55, National Industrial Conference Board* (New York, The Century Co., October, 1922), which contains much other interesting information. No figures are available for any country considered in these lectures, except Japan, to show the real, as contrasted with the apparent, burden of taxation.

Literary study, however, cannot be entirely deferred, and it must be taken up with as much speed as possible, for the peoples of the East must also meet the problems of political and social readjustment, and to do so successfully requires training in many fields of thought which are quite apart from those connected with professional and vocational education.

In this matter of education Japan has a brilliant achievement to its credit and has shown to the other peoples of the East a way, quite probably the way. In view of the shorter time involved, the progress in the Philippines is, perhaps, no less gratifying. India, Egypt, and China, in order, trail far behind in educational achievements, as indicated by the percentages both of literates and of pupils in schools. If judged by priority and scope of their educational schemes, the order would be China, India, and Egypt.

The general introduction of elementary education is, of course, desirable, but it is something that cannot be attained at once or within a brief period of years. The establishment of a full system of elementary education in any country can hardly be effected in less than a generation, because of the necessities of acquiring the requisite lands, of erecting suitable buildings and, even more important, the training of an adequate supply of competent teachers. The experience of Japan and the Philippines affords definite evidence on these subjects and makes clear that the starting point must be the development of normal training schools suitable in number and in character.

Next to the elementary schools the universities are probably most essential, because of the need in each country for a limited number of persons with the highest training. The high schools or, as they are called in the East, the middle schools, are usually the last to be developed adequately, and that is apparently not merely accidental, but the genuine logic of the situation. While in general the educational institutions to be established in the eastern lands will, with the necessary allowances for linguistic and national differences, undoubtedly follow more or less closely the western types of curricula, it is certain that there must also be some

modifications, especially in the period of the first generation. The schools must be the means in the East of rendering a service similar to that which is expected of them in the United States in the training of children of foreign-born parentage. Both in the mission schools and the schools established under governmental control these considerations have already received no small amount of attention.

Closely allied to education by the schools is the continued education in later life through the press, and especially through journalism. As a consequence progress in the number and quality of newspapers, magazines, and books for general reading becomes of great importance. Japan also leads both in the development of journalism and in the size of its reading public. The contrast, for instance, between the amount of reading observable on the trains in Japan and in the other countries is remarkable. In the Philippine Islands the growth of journalism and of the reading habit does not seem to have been commensurate with the extension of education. Though the development in China may be no greater than in India or Egypt, it is certainly a healthier growth.

In all five countries the improvement and extension of education, whether through the schools or through the press, is a problem of primary importance. In every case wisdom will dictate careful study of western methods and the employment of experts from the West as councilors and advisers or even for a time in more responsible capacities. The West will serve itself well if it puts forth extraordinary efforts to assist in this all-important work. The aid already given is warmly appreciated in each of these countries, and is perhaps better understood than any of the other efforts of the peoples of the West to assist the peoples of the East or to intervene in their affairs.

Some of the best help can be rendered in the case of the students who come to the colleges of the western lands to complete their education. Whatever is done to smooth the way for these young men and young women and to aid them in their efforts will be even more tangibly valuable than bread cast upon the waters. The two chief diplomatic rep-

representatives of China at the Washington Conference received their training first in mission schools in China and later in universities in the United States. Their cases are not exceptional, for wherever one turns among the persons most active in the advancement of their respective nations it will be found that a large proportion of those persons has been trained under the western influences, and in the most important cases educated in western lands.

The training of the masses in each country, that is, the work of elementary education and also of secondary education in the main, must be done by the privileged individuals from that particular country who are able to benefit from western training whether in their home land or abroad. The rate of progress in the extension of education and journalism is a measure of the fitness of the people for political progress. The statistics are of some value as another index of advancement. In Japan 17 per cent of the population is in schools; in the Philippines, 10 per cent; in India, 2.6 per cent; in Egypt, 2 per cent; and in China, 1.5 per cent, as compared with 20 per cent in the United States. Japan ranks as one of the most literate countries in the world; in the Philippines 37 per cent are literate; in Egypt, 8 per cent; in India, 6 per cent, while the percentage in China is probably even less. Japan has approximately one periodical to 18,000 persons, the Philippines one to 96,000, India one to 200,000, and China one to 300,000.

Universal, gratuitous, compulsory, elementary education has been legally established in principle in each of the five countries under consideration, except India, where some provinces have taken similar action. In the Philippines the actual establishment of the system has been about half completed and in Japan it is in practically full operation. The significance of these facts for the movement of the East toward democracy must not be minimized. Generally training for citizenship is not only an avowed principle of the educational system but also the actual practice. Even where it is not, the unconscious influences of the schools are inevitably in the direction of greater freedom for the individual socially, economically, and politically. Through-

out the East education is advancing rapidly and carrying liberalism, if not democracy, in its train.

The achievements of the Japanese and of the Filipinos in political and governmental affairs are highly commendable. In each case the advances made seem to reach the maximum possible in view of the conditions and of the time involved, though one nation has worked independently and the other under foreign authority. Considering the great difficulties to be faced China has made hopeful progress. To India the British have probably given at least as full a measure of self-government as the circumstances justify, but they are open to criticism for failure to do more in education and in other ways to prepare the people for self-government. The same criticism is even more pertinent in Egypt, where their rule has savored of benevolent despotism rather than of the English traditions of free institutions.

In each nation the tendency has been to follow the western methods of creating constitutions and of establishing parliamentary representation. There is, however, considerable variation in the several cases, and in no instance has the result been the adoption of either the British system of responsible parliamentary government or the American system of presidential government, though the tendency seems to be toward the latter rather than the former. The problems of the several countries differ greatly from one another and the situations in them all are radically different from those in western lands. It is therefore probably wiser temporarily, even permanently, that each country should work out a form of government suited to its own conditions and needs.

It can scarcely be other than disastrous for a nation to break with the traditions of its past and to undertake to establish any new form of government, no matter how perfect theoretically. It is of the highest importance for each of these countries that the changes made in its government shall grow as naturally as possible out of the traditions of its past. Outward conditions may be modified in the course of time, but a people's habits of thought are altered only with the utmost difficulty. Material conditions may be

changed with comparative ease, but political readjustments must be made with due consideration for these facts if they are to be effected with safety and permanence. Contrary methods can scarcely fail to result in revolution with all its attendant evils.

With any people adjustments of such serious sort require no small amount of time. Parliamentary government, for instance, has been slowly worked out in England from the days of Magna Carta seven centuries ago. To-day critics express themselves harshly in judgment of the Japanese, the Filipinos, and others if they do not prove able within a few years to adapt themselves to the utilization of parliamentary methods with the expertness of English or Americans. It is absurd to expect such results. Indeed, comparison with the national legislatures not merely of the smaller or newer countries of Europe or America but also of such older countries as Spain and Italy does not prove unfavorable to the parliamentary institutions of these eastern lands in the character of personnel, organization, proceedings, or achievement. In any case the transition must take time, and this is the more true with the peoples of the East who have, as has been said before, been accustomed to regard the value of time somewhat lightly.

Hurry is something with which the East is unfamiliar. If a mistake is made orientals feel there is plenty of time to try again. Their patience in the matter of time is, it must be confessed, infinitely provoking to the occidental. These facts, however, must be taken into consideration in all the work that is done for the adjustment of the East to western ways or for the modernization of the East. Their habit is to take things easily. The situation requires them, and the world looks to them, to make the adjustments with almost astonishing rapidity. The West will need to learn patience, though perhaps not as much as the East will need to learn the value of speed, even its necessity.

The attitude of the foreign residents is of some significance in each country. These residents, in general, may be divided into two groups, the business people and the missionaries. The position of the latter group is based upon

toleration rather than on reciprocity. Consequently, the sense of favors received or expected makes the normal missionary attitude pro-government, or at least apologetic for the government. Nevertheless, the missionaries have customarily wielded a strong influence both on the government of the country in which they are located and on the government of the nation of which they are citizens with respect to the country in which they are stationed.

The business group is not so homogeneous and its position is based on reciprocity. Its attitude is therefore more independent, though perhaps no less conventional. The business man in a foreign community is almost inevitably strongly nationalistic on every question involving his own country. He is also alert to influence the policy of his nation with reference to the country in which he is domiciled for the advancement of his interests. Discretion normally dictates to him an attitude of outward, if not sincere, support of the government in whose domain he is trading.

In Egypt and India the British missionaries and traders, and in the Philippines the American missionaries and business people are inclined to regard themselves as possessed of a preferred interest in the country and vested with special privileges in urging their views upon both the local authorities and the home governments. The missionary, however, usually regards himself as the foreordained spokesman of the people among whom he ministers, whereas the business man rarely considers the welfare of the native population.

Though the western business man engages in trade in the East on a status of reciprocity, there are comparatively few orientals who are similarly resident and employed in Europe or America. The missionaries are offset by the considerable body of oriental students attending the educational institutions of the West. Their position is not based upon reciprocity. They concern themselves little with the government under which they are temporarily domiciled and rarely afford it concern. On the other hand, both in their student days and afterward, they assume a keen interest in the affairs of their home government, especially in matters involv-

ing the nation in which their studies are pursued. This officiousness appears in exaggerated form among the youth who pursue their studies in the country which dominates their own land, though fortunately it is not a general characteristic. As a whole, the group of western-trained oriental students is well aware of the value of its opportunities and of the responsibilities which they impose. The influence of the students after their return to their native land is properly disproportionately great.

Another personal factor in the contact and mingling of civilizations is the casual traveler, who, unfortunately, is rarely aware that he leaves impressions upon the countries through which he passes as well as carrying home new information and judgments concerning the peoples among whom he has journeyed. The oriental, no doubt, understands this fact better than the occidental and is more cautious and circumspect in his behavior when he fares abroad. He is also probably a shrewder, certainly a more serious, observer when he travels in the West than is the occidental when he visits the Orient.

The preceding observation suggests a vital question. Are the peoples of the West who consider themselves cultured and progressive preparing to meet the East as intelligently as the orientals are schooling themselves to face the West? How does the number of Americans who can use the Japanese language or pretend to a familiarity with Japanese literature, even in translation, compare with the number of Japanese who are proficient in the English tongue and well acquainted with the literatures of England and America? How many Americans possess a knowledge of the writings of Confucius comparable to that hundreds of non-Christian Chinese have of the Bible? How many English university graduates versed in the history of India for the last two centuries could be found to match the number of Indians familiar with the last four centuries of English history? How many Americans could continue their business in China without a compradore? Is there not some question whether it is not the West that is asleep and the East that is awake?

The internal problems of government in any country are

rarely entirely divorced from considerations of international relations. It has already been pointed out how intimately the modernization of China has been linked with questions of diplomacy. The Japanese government has had to give close attention to the correlation of internal with international policy. Its foreign relations have at times required restraint and at other times acceleration in the progress of internal reform. In the last half-dozen years domestic political feeling has been a powerful agent in modifying Japanese policies in dealing with other countries, while at the same time interests of an international sort have profoundly affected the political thought of the people and the domestic policy of the government.

International and imperial considerations have been almost exclusively responsible for the establishment of British control in Egypt and for its continuance. Conditions in international trade led to England's entrance into India. The importance of the resulting commerce compelled England to wage a prolonged international contest for its maintenance which resulted in the establishment of political control. International situations have required England to fight various wars, not confined to Asia, to safeguard its position in the country. The incorporation of more than one province in the Indian Empire has been due to international considerations. These facts have been responsible in large measure for the military establishment in India and for the consequent burden of taxation upon the people. Perhaps some of these problems arose from the presence of the British in India, but others would certainly have arisen even had India been free from any European intervention.

Both in Egypt and in India the British have repeatedly adjusted their legislative and administrative programs to the exigencies of international affairs. An illustration from India, where the case is less obvious, will suffice. The costly second Afghan war necessitated unfortunate curtailments of expenditure, especially for internal improvements and famine relief. Imperial relations have also seriously affected internal administration in both Egypt and India. The concession of responsible government to the former

Boer republics and the proposals for the Union of South Africa were among the reasons which made necessary the Morley reforms in the government of India and they, in turn, furnished an argument for the corresponding legislation for Egypt in 1913.

Political thought in England and the alternations of the parties in power in London have been constantly reflected in the policy of the government in India. It is notorious that parliamentary legislation for India often embodies English political sentiment rather than the judgment of the responsible British officials in India. On at least two important occasions, 1784 and 1880, cabinet changes and parliamentary elections have been determined in large degree by questions of Indian policy. For more than a century England's relations with Egypt have been dependent primarily on Indian considerations, and British policy in the Near East has customarily been conducted in defiance of the national conscience, but in accordance with the apparent necessities or interests of India.

The decision of the United States to acquire the Philippines from Spain by the treaty of 1898 was partly based on international considerations which were not all strictly relevant to the islands themselves. The subsequent history has afforded repeated evidence that American policy with reference to the islands cannot be conducted without careful adjustment to the international situation. Certainly, the foreign policy of the United States has been strongly influenced by the occupation of the Philippines. Public opinion and partisan interest in the United States have frequently affected the principles and methods of government employed in the islands. The Philippine question, on the other hand, was a prominent issue in the presidential election of 1900. Not least significant has been the effect throughout the East, upon the colonizing powers and upon their subjects, wrought by the policies and performances of the United States in training the Filipinos for self-government.

The great war which has recently been fought out in Europe could hardly have failed to have its repercussion in the nations of the East. Indeed, in each of these coun-

tries serious changes were occasioned in the economic situation, and from four of them considerable numbers of individuals, either as troops or as military laborers, saw service in remote lands from which they returned with new ideas and a broader intellectual horizon. Not only these occurrences but also the very fact of the war awakened thought in the East which has been particularly significant in the tendency of the pacific oriental to compare himself favorably with the belligerents of the West. The conditions of universal military service and the nature of the issues at stake between the two vast warring alliances also operated to stimulate the growth of democratic ideas in the East.

The progress of the great world conflict was already generating unwonted activity in many an oriental brain, when the ideas were crystallized by the declarations of President Wilson in favor of the two splendid principles of making the world safe for democracy and of assuring the self-determination of peoples. These twin purposes gave to the progressive and nationalist movements among the oriental peoples a definiteness and a motive power which had previously been lacking. Whatever may be said concerning the correctness or the wisdom of President Wilson's declarations there can be no doubt of the potency of their influence. The same generous principles, moreover, were enunciated, perhaps with less boldness of epigrammatic idealism, by the British premiers, Asquith and Lloyd George.

Throughout the East the advocates of national independence and democratic government acquired new confidence and authority from the indorsement given to their principles by the responsible rulers of the two nations which were recognized as the world's greatest exponents of political liberty. By strange irony these two nations were the very ones that were controlling the destinies of Egypt, India, and the Philippines in apparent violation of the doctrines of national independence and democratic self-government. They were likewise the two nations whose behavior was scanned with most intense interest and hesitant expectation by Japan and China. Another effect of no less significance was the awakening of consciousness, alike in the East and in the

West, that the political developments in the several nations of the East had ceased to be local phenomena. Unity of interest stands clearly revealed both to the peoples of Asia and to the western nations concerned in their affairs, though unity of action has thus far been absent. The World War has wrought a tremendous change in the situation in the East. Wisdom and patience in dealing with the problems are consequently infinitely more necessary. Never has the pressure for change been so great as within the last half-dozen years. The nature of the elements involved has not been altered but their action has been immensely accelerated.

The factors involved in the national readjustments of the East are necessarily not only economic and political, but also ethical and religious. The western nations have all built their systems upon a civilization long saturated with Christianity. Among the eastern nations which have been considered, only the Filipinos approximate such a condition. The major portion of the population of the Philippine Islands has been Christian for about three centuries. In the other four countries the religious and ethical factors are entirely dissimilar. Notwithstanding certain appearances of dissent, Egypt as Mohammedan, China as Confucianist, and Japan as Shintoist enjoy substantial unity and conformity of ethical concepts and standards. India, however, suffers from sharp diversities which render difficult, if they do not preclude, the adoption within the nation of common ethical standards.

Within each one of these countries the Christian ethic is exerting a strong influence in determining selection and emphasis within the field of indigenous ethical systems. Thus, under Christian influence, the Chinese are passing over as quietly as possible some of the teachings of Confucius and are giving a greater emphasis to others. In India this form of influence of the Christian ethic is of surprising importance, for there it is serving as a useful guide in the selective and harmonizing process among the prevailing rival systems. It is of no small interest to observe in the native writings, intended more or less wholly for native consumption, to what an extent the discussion of the problems of

the country is based on ethical principles which are Christian, or if they are Mohammedan or Hindu, are those which may most easily be assimilated to the Christian standards. It is necessary in this connection to distinguish clearly the difference between the utilization of the Christian ethic and its acceptance.

In a practical way the Christian ethic is wielding a wide and effective influence on the development of the new social and political order in the several eastern lands. In each one of these countries the last half century has seen accomplished a vast amount of new law-making. The old native laws have either given place to new laws copied more or less directly from western Christian models, or else the native laws have been revamped in such a way as to remove at least those features which might seem seriously objectionable in the eyes of western and Christian nations. Part of this has, of course, been done as in India directly under the guidance of British authority. It has been done in Japan, and is in process in China, with the different purpose of meeting western standards in order to remove the impairment of national sovereignty by the privilege of extra-territoriality.

This same influence has appeared even more clearly in the administration of justice. The systems of both criminal and civil procedure have been radically modified and practices repugnant to western and Christian sentiment have in large measure been eliminated. Not merely has torture been abolished, but the courts have been freed from corruption and bribery and from superstitious practices. One is inclined to say that the greatest actual contribution which the West has given to the East has been the example of the honest, prompt, and efficient administration of justice, admirably illustrated by the British in Egypt and India, and by the Americans in the Philippines. The progress of the Japanese and the Chinese in the administration of their own governments can very well be measured by the advances which they have made in this particular.

The influence of the Christian ethic permeates other forms of governmental administration as well as that of justice. Mention has been made of the notable change in Egypt due

to the substitution of a just system of military conscription for the old methods. A much more important illustration, however, is the reform in the collection of taxes and the disbursement of public funds. In this respect there is no doubt that the case of Egypt already discussed is the clearest example. Notwithstanding whatever faults there may be in the system in India, there can be little doubt that taxes have never been more justly levied, or public funds more honestly administered in that country than at the present time under British rule.

Examples are numerous in the history of Japan in the last half century of the influence of the Christian ethic in determining the practice of government. A negative illustration is furnished by the recent unfortunate experience of the Filipinos with their national bank. Even the Chinese, who have seemed furthest removed from the Christian ethic in all these matters because of their system of "squeeze," are beginning to realize the importance of the fundamental principle of administration, that public office is a public trust.

Quite apart from religious considerations the Christian ethic is in another way forcing its utilization upon the East, that is, in the field of international relations. Like the internal polity, the international intercourse of western nations, both commercial and political, has been built upon the common acceptance of the Christian ethical and religious teachings, though unfortunately there have been many failures to practice those teachings. While this development among the western nations has been quite unconscious it has none the less been fundamental. International law came into existence as a Christian creation for the purposes of Christian nations. Hitherto in so far as non-Christian nations have been admitted into international comity, such action has been based upon implicit acceptance of the Christian-made system of international law.

The situation is clearer if approached from the negative side. Non-Christian nations have been considered without the pale, as not merely different, but inferior, and have been so treated. Such was the case, for instance, with Japan until

1894, when it convinced western nations, after prolonged effort, of its readiness to discharge international obligations in harmony with the western Christian conceptions. Only then were extra-territoriality, conventional tariffs, and other discriminations gradually removed.

The entrance of Japan into a position of international equality with the peoples of the West was dependent upon Japanese conformity to western and Christian standards. This is a fact entirely apart from any question whether Japan is or is not a Christian nation as regards the religion of the majority of its people, or as regards the motives and policies of those who administer its government. China and Egypt still labor under this disadvantage from which Japan has been freed, though it has been recognized that they too must soon receive concessions of a similar sort.

In the case of India the problem takes a somewhat different form. In negotiations at the Paris conference and in the League of Nations India has been granted, to a certain degree, an international position. This has not resulted from anything inherent in India itself, but is due to India's position in the British Commonwealth of Nations. The real question then is, How far is the Christian ethic involved in India's position in that commonwealth. There can be no doubt whatsoever about the answer. India is able to play a part in the British Empire more or less similar to that of Canada, or Australia, only in so far as India conforms itself in thought and act to the same standards as do the self-governing dominions of the empire. It must be recognized, however, that this situation has its correlative, for not unnaturally the Indian peoples demand, in return for such conformity, equality of treatment with the other dominions and their inhabitants. They are keen enough to recognize that they may be fairly excluded from Australia or Canada or South Africa, but they are utterly unable to see the equity of a policy which places them in an inferior position in the crown colony of Kenya. No such issue has yet been raised in the case of the Filipino with the United States, but it is not difficult to foresee various circumstances which may present serious difficulties. In this instance, unlike that of

India, the questions will appear to involve primarily matters of race, of geographical position, and of constitutional law because the Filipinos are a Christian people and familiar with the Christian ethic. In this respect their situation is markedly different from that of India.

It is scarcely conceivable that international law should fail to remain essentially Christian or that Christian principles should fail to rule in its application. On the other hand, Christian exclusiveness and superiority toward non-Christian nations must give place in the future to Christian brotherhood. Any other policy can only breed hatred and even worse. The question at this point turns not upon race, but upon faith. If Christianity is the only true faith, it does not need to adopt a supercilious attitude toward those who are adherents of another faith. Unless Christianity can meet the other faiths, whether Mohammedan, Buddhist, or Hindu, upon their own ground and by its inherent superiority, quite apart from any privileged position or from any self-assumed superiority, win the peoples of those countries to a recognition of its superior qualities, then it is utterly unfit to claim such superiority and such exclusive recognition. Christianity can afford to be tolerant if it is right.

Any failure on the part of Christianity to demand to be judged on its merits and on them alone will prove highly detrimental, not only to Christianity but also to the Christian nations in their governmental capacities. Great Britain and France especially, with their vast numbers of colonial Mohammedans, must not only be considerate in the treatment of those Mohammedan subjects, but they must make their policy toward the independent Mohammedan states one of unquestioned justice unless they are prepared to alienate the Mohammedan subjects within their own dominions. Adherence to an anti-Mohammedan attitude and to a policy of destroying or curtailing the political independence of Mohammedan peoples is bound to create hate with all its attendant evils. It is possible to work out a policy for the fair and honorable treatment of Mohammedan and other non-Christian nationalities without sacrificing Christian

ideals or the standards of international law. The solution of this problem is one of the most important issues, though one of the least comprehended, before the world at the present day.

The social contacts between the peoples of the West and of the East are of no less significance than the contacts of religions; indeed, they merely involve the application in daily life of the same principles. The political position of white peoples in the East is built upon the assumption of racial superiority. This assumption is incompatible with equality of social intercourse, without which mutual understanding, sympathy, and coöperation are impossible. Every act of social superiority or exclusiveness builds higher the barrier between the races and embitters feelings. There can be little doubt that few remedies would contribute so much to the amelioration of the situation as the absolute removal of this barrier. The case is perhaps most acute in official circles.

The responsibility for the lack of equal social intercourse is, however, not confined to the occidental. The oriental, by his religious and social restrictions, especially in the seclusion of women, denies the opportunity for satisfactory exchange of social amenities. Another difficulty is that most orientals have not learned to prepare food and drink under such reasonably sanitary conditions that an occidental may sit at table with them without risk of his health or even his life.

There are other manifestations which afford cause for concern. Some white people are so insolent and devoid of any sense of *noblesse oblige* that they visit physical abuse upon coolies and other humble folk with whom they lose their temper over some petty provocation. The position of the Eurasians, especially in India, would be little worse if they bore the brand of Cain. Few generalizations are more false than that they lack the virtues and possess the faults of both the races from which they are blended.

The white race seems to be irrevocably opposed to racial miscegenation and there is little reason to doubt the existence of similar feelings among other races. There are, nevertheless, numerous exceptions in practice, but they do

not conclusively prove racial intermixture either desirable or dangerous. For the present, at least, it is impracticable to effect a scientific or convincing demonstration of the superiority of any one race over any other race, or, at any rate, it is impossible to deny the inherent or potential equality of races. This being the case it is the dictate of wisdom to avoid raising such issues in any political or social fashion. On the other hand, there can be little doubt that for a long period to come the wise policy will be one which will permit the fullest development of each race unhampered by confusion with any considerable numbers from other races.

Adjustments must be made, therefore, not on the basis of the superiority or inferiority of a particular race, but upon principles honorable to all parties, with due reference to the maintenance of the original geographical distribution of races into separate units. The establishment of large numbers of Japanese laborers in California or of Hindu laborers in Australia will be of doubtful value to either party, but so would the establishment of colonies of white laborers in Japan or India. There is no necessity for racial abuse and recrimination in securing a workable adjustment of the questions of migration.

Members of other races now domiciled among a different race must be accepted and treated with full equality of privileges and duties unless mutually agreeable arrangements for repatriation can be made. Another exception must be provided for in full equity, namely, freedom for travel, trade, and study, including privileges of temporary residence and other facilities necessary for the reasonable accomplishment of the purposes involved. All such arrangements must necessarily be upon a reciprocal basis. The questions of capitulations and of extra-territoriality which are at present involved in these problems make clear that reciprocal relations can be established only upon the basis of eastern acceptance of western ethical standards in the administration of justice and in the conduct of commercial and diplomatic intercourse.

In all these developments Christianity will necessarily be-

come less exclusive and superior in its attitude, but it will, on the other hand, become more brotherly and, because of these contacts with other faiths, will be required to exemplify its best ideals in practice rather than to sacrifice them. If Christianity, as has already been suggested, cannot stand the contacts without losing character, it is not good enough to be the world religion.

The pouring of coolie labor into a white man's country is not a very different interracial offense from western concession-grabbing in Asiatic lands. On no basis of equity or reciprocity can the white man maintain his attitude on both these matters. If it is unjust to put coolie labor into competition with the labor of white people of civilized nations, it is also unjust for peoples of these western nations to undertake to exploit the resources of eastern lands, while refusing to be subject to the laws of the land concerned and to conduct their activities in every way on the basis of equality with the peoples in the jurisdiction in which they are working.⁵ It is fairly clear that the concession-hunter who relies upon his home nation to support him in a privileged position is a pest to be eliminated.

This does not mean that the resources of eastern lands are not to be developed. It does mean that their development is the national prerogative of the people concerned. In this they may, and perhaps ought, to utilize western aid. The benefits, for example, accruing from placing its national resources at the disposal of the trade of the whole world belong to China just as they do to England or to the United States in their respective cases. It is full time for the closing of the age of exploitation and for the opening of the era of reciprocity.

The traditions of American foreign policy are against exploitation and in favor of reciprocity. Those are the ideals which inhere in the Monroe Doctrine and which have characterized American dealings with the nations of the Far East. To make sure against error in the statement of the ideals of American policy it will be wise to quote the words of the

⁵ Provided, of course, that the nation conforms to proper standards of justice and maintains the security of life and property.

fathers who formulated those ideals and inaugurated those policies. In his farewell address President Washington said, "The great rule of conduct for us in regard to foreign nations is, in extending our commercial relations to have with them as little POLITICAL connection as possible." At another point in the same address he said: "Harmony, liberal intercourse with all nations are recommended by policy, humanity, and interest. But even our commercial policy should hold an equal and impartial hand, neither seeking nor granting exclusive favors or preferences; consulting the natural course of things; diffusing and diversifying by gentle means the streams of commerce, but forcing nothing; establishing with powers so disposed, in order to give trade a stable course, to define the rights of our merchants, and to enable the government to support them, conventional rules of intercourse."

President Jefferson in his first inaugural address declared for "Peace, commerce, and honest friendship with all nations, and entangling alliances with none." Finally President Monroe, in the famous message of December 2, 1823, in formulating the doctrine which still bears his name, said: "But with the governments who have declared their independence and maintained it, and whose independence we have, on great consideration and on just principles, acknowledged, we could not view any interposition for the purpose of oppressing them, or controlling in any other manner their destiny, by any European power in any other light than as the manifestation of an unfriendly disposition toward the United States."

These same ideals have recently been embodied in the actions of the Washington conference. The American people desire no special favors at the expense of any eastern nation nor of any western nation. They desire just and generous relations with the eastern peoples, and equality of opportunity with every other western nation in intercourse with the East. The Americans desire equal privileges of trade, but they seek no political privileges for themselves, and they insist that others shall not seek them to the disadvantage of the United States. This policy with regard to

the Far East is not a violation of the Monroe Doctrine, it is the expression of its very spirit.

In the cases of India and Egypt the United States has merely the general interest of humanity and of trade to consider. On the other hand, Japan, China, and the Philippines face the United States across the Pacific. In these cases the United States has very special interest to guard against any development there unfavorable to its own welfare. It has the positive interest of promoting by every generous means the economic, political, and moral progress of those who are its nearest western neighbors. The interest of the United States in the affairs of eastern Asia is superior to that of any European country.

There remains for consideration another question of the highest potential significance. If non-Christian nations are to enter the general brotherhood of nations on equitable terms, whether that brotherhood be the League of Nations created by the treaty of Versailles, or any other, there will arise the question whether Christian ethics shall continue as the basis of international relations, and if so, how. At the present time the populations of India and China each represent approximately one fifth of the world's total, while Japan outnumbers the British Islands, and taken together with Egypt and the Philippines approximately equals the continental United States. One does not need to raise any alarmist cry about a "yellow peril," or a "Mohammedan menace," or anything of the sort, but it requires no emphasis to make clear how serious a situation may confront the world in the near future.

It is not easy at the present time to foresee how the problem may be worked out. Some light upon the ultimate solution, however, may be derived from a consideration of the history of the last century. Compare, in the first place, the progress of the various Christian nations with the progress of the various non-Christian nations in the same period, both as to the extension of their independent sway and as to the improvements made in their systems of government. Compare, in the second place, the area and population of the world that could properly be called Christian a century

ago, with the corresponding situation to-day. Then make a similar comparison for Hinduism, Buddhism, and Mohammedanism. These considerations will make clear how remarkable has been the advance of Christianity and of the Christian political powers within a hundred years.

Very few nations which are not Christian still maintain complete political independence. Many areas and populations have within the century come under Christian jurisdiction. Mohammedanism is the only non-Christian faith which has shown any possibilities of expansion within the past century, and its achievements have been insignificant compared with those of Christianity.

The progress of the Christian faith, both as a religious and as a political influence, has been vastly greater in the past hundred years than in any other period of its history. Such evidences of its vitality and power afford a reasonable hope that Christianity will be able to hold its own in furnishing the principles and affording the driving power of administration in whatever organic form the brotherhood of nations may take.

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
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